World War II American vs. Japanese ships

[parsifal]

Just one correction. The Japanese did have an outstanding DD designed specifically for AA work, the Akitsuki class. the big failing for Japanese DDs was in their ASW capabilities. Then again USN DDs sucked at this as well until later in '43.

What made the USN designs seem to overtake the japanese designs was a matter of age......USN Fletcher class were built 1942 to 1944 and were fighting many DDs designed and built 15 years older than they were.

Both the USN and the Japanese really failed in producing designs that were adequate seaboats. Particulalry true for the American carriers, which to this day continues to be their Achilles heel. Both the Japanese and the Americans were almost as besotted with firepower as were the Germans, and this made their ships anything but satisfactory when the weather was poor

 

[Ruud]

Yeah, USN ships got rather top heavy with all the AA and radar that was added. More than a few older CAs had a catapult removed just to save a little weight.

The USN had the advantage of getting "sneak peeks" at the new ways to wage war from the RN. That really gave them a head start on the anti-sub stuff.

RN CVs did have the best design for taking on the weather and the sea, but i'm not sure that their BBs were any better than the USN NCs and NDs. The Iowas did have it better. I've never read much about the Cleveland and Baltimore classes. At least they were better designed to handle all the additional equipment that ships got as the war went on.

 

[cherry blossom]

There is some reason to doubt if the South Dakota class were able to fight in all conditions judging from the damage suffered by U.S.S. Massachusetts in February 1943 Researcher@Large - BB-59 USS Massachusetts Storm Damage, 1943 or NC class = 12 X 14"/50 or KGV class = 1 14"/45 -35K tons? in Battleship Vs Battleship Forum. It is possible that those problems could be corrected and in support of this, Scharnhorst was much less damaged by heavy seas in 1943 than in 1940. However, it looks as if a South Dakota would have been fairly useless at North Cape in its pre-February 1943 condition.

Japanese ships as initially built were often very vulnerable to storm damage. However, after the events of 1934-5 Axis History Forum • View topic - 4th fleet incident, www.sozogaku.com/fkd/en/hfen/HB1011022.pdf , Japanese ships were modified to be able to fight in most conditions.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I find the USN pre-war light cruisers are a particularly interesting ship design, in part because of the combination of their rapid firing 6"/47's and the sheer number of barrels firing. Their 15 gun broadside throw weight exceeded that of an 9 x 8" gun heavy cruiser until the advent of the rapid firing guns of the Baltimore class. Add the situational awareness available due to the SG Radar with its PPI scope and the accuracy provded by the fire control radars and these ships were really formidable. It might be argued that this class (the Boise and Helena) was instrumental in the 'close' victory at Cape Esperance and (the Helena) in the holding action during the bloody November 13th cruiser vs IJN Battleship action that prevented the second BB bombardment of Henderson field. The Long Lance really gave the IJN an advantage that somewhat neutralized the advantage of RADAR. The pre-war treaty cruisers suffered from poor leadership at Guadacanal, where the slim advantages of RADAR went largely unexploited, in part due to many ship commanders being unfamilar and untrained with its use; at least until the arrival of the Washington on November 14th. Neptune's Inferno is a gripping account of Savo Island and the subsequent naval battles.

IIRC neither the Boise or Helena were hit by Long Lance during the Guadacanal campaign. (Although the Helena was ultimately sunk by one much later.) That despite the fact that USN task group commanders withheld opening fire until the ships were inside LL range. Crazy as it may seem, I believe the capability of the LL wasn't completely understood or accepted until well after the Guadacanal Campaign. The SG RADAR of the two ships were tracking their IJN opponents at 30K yards while the LL had a range of 20K yards. It was a cause of consternation for the Helena's fine commander Capt. Gil Hoover, to realize he could plaster the enemy at 26,000 yards which (unknown to him) would have wrecked the IJN heavy cruisers due to the vulnerability of their unlaunched torpedoes.

 

[parsifal]

I would have to challenge the notion that Radar was decisive for the americans in the battles around Guadacanal in 1942, except for the battleship action at the very end of the year. The Americans showed a marked inability to use the technology to any significant advantage in this period. There appear to be two main reasons for this, crew inexperience, and an inability for the equipment to cope with the coastal conditions evident in the waters around guadacanal. Radar assisted the Americans, but it did not give them much advantage, and any advantage they did gain was largely negated by the poor showing of their crews and commanders in the night battles. that was not from a lack of courage or even ability, but night fighting is a slowly aquired skill in which instinct, initiative and above all teamwork are paramount. The Japanese showed this in spades and the fact that their ships were not radar equipped whilst the Americans were ended up being no penalty at all for them during this period. The fact that the Americans were on ocasion able to fight the japanese to a draw, and ocasionally achieve tactical victories can be attributed to as much the fact that the Japanese were often preoccupied with a mission other than surface engagement and therefore had competing mission priorities. On the few occasions where the japanese could concentrate on fighting the Americans, they invariably came away the victors.

American cruiser superiority is one of the most overrated "advantages" put forward in naval discussions. The USN ships had a theoretical advantage, but this seldom translated into anything tangible. they demonstrated advantage in battleship actions, but seldom in any of the cruiser actions. this has less to do with the ships and more to do with the philosophy behind US surface engagements. Whereas the correct way to view the enagement was the Destroyers providing the main protection for the gun line the americans viewed things the other way around, with Destroyers seen as some kind of optional afterthought. For them it as the cruisers that led the destroyers into battle and protected them, not the other way around. That is precisley the wrong way to use your ships and precisely the opposite way to the way the IJN and the RN viewed how to fight night battles. The USN were similar to the KM in that respect, and both showed a conspicuous lack of success in their earlier night battles.

Eventually the Americans did realize the value of their destroyers and went on to win some impressive victories when men like Arleigh Burke were put in charge. With gun line besotted admirals like callaghan in charge they tended to blunder around in spectaculalry unsuccessful fashion.

Contrast this with the way the japanese designed and used their Light cruisers. despite their age and apparent lack of firepower, these ships were highly successful at what they did. They were not viewed as part of the gunline, but neither were they there to protect the destroyers. they were there to lead them, and provide immediate gunfire support against the enemy destroyers, with the Japanese gunlines and destroyers freed up to engage these vaunted US cruisers, which they did with a great deal of success

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
I'dn't be so hard on USN, remember Battles of Cape Esperanca and Empress Augusta Bay. If Scott had been in command at 1st Guadalcanal instead of Callaghan the results might have been different. Also USN usually fought with ad hoc formations during Guadalcanal campaign so crews were without much knowledge on the other crews/ships capabilities and unfamilar with tactics of the formation commander

Juha

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I would have to challenge the notion that Radar was decisive for the americans in the battles around Guadacanal in 1942, except for the battleship action at the very end of the year. The Americans showed a marked inability to use the technology to any significant advantage in this period. There appear to be two main reasons for this, crew inexperience, and an inability for the equipment to cope with the coastal conditions evident in the waters around guadacanal. Radar assisted the Americans, but it did not give them much advantage, and any advantage they did gain was largely negated by the poor showing of their crews and commanders in the night battles. that was not from a lack of courage or even ability, but night fighting is a slowly aquired skill in which instinct, initiative and above all teamwork are paramount. The Japanese showed this in spades and the fact that their ships were not radar equipped whilst the Americans were ended up being no penalty at all for them during this period. The fact that the Americans were on ocasion able to fight the japanese to a draw, and ocasionally achieve tactical victories can be attributed to as much the fact that the Japanese were often preoccupied with a mission other than surface engagement and therefore had competing mission priorities. On the few occasions where the japanese could concentrate on fighting the Americans, they invariably came away the victors.

American cruiser superiority is one of the most overrated "advantages" put forward in naval discussions. The USN ships had a theoretical advantage, but this seldom translated into anything tangible. they demonstrated advantage in battleship actions, but seldom in any of the cruiser actions. this has less to do with the ships and more to do with the philosophy behind US surface engagements. Whereas the correct way to view the enagement was the Destroyers providing the main protection for the gun line the americans viewed things the other way around, with Destroyers seen as some kind of optional afterthought. For them it as the cruisers that led the destroyers into battle and protected them, not the other way around. That is precisley the wrong way to use your ships and precisely the opposite way to the way the IJN and the RN viewed how to fight night battles. The USN were similar to the KM in that respect, and both showed a conspicuous lack of success in their earlier night battles.

Eventually the Americans did realize the value of their destroyers and went on to win some impressive victories when men like Arleigh Burke were put in charge. With gun line besotted admirals like callaghan in charge they tended to blunder around in spectaculalry unsuccessful fashion.

Contrast this with the way the japanese designed and used their Light cruisers. despite their age and apparent lack of firepower, these ships were highly successful at what they did. They were not viewed as part of the gunline, but neither were they there to protect the destroyers. they were there to lead them, and provide immediate gunfire support against the enemy destroyers, with the Japanese gunlines and destroyers freed up to engage these vaunted US cruisers, which they did with a great deal of success

Didn't mean to suggest that Task Group use of RADAR was a decisive element in any Guadacanal engagement except November 14 with Lee and Washington. However, Gil Hoover and Mike Moran knew how to fight their ships, while for all Scott's pre-battle preparation he really hadn't absorbed the advantage his technology provided. He didn't use the full assets he possessed and it was a closer thing than it might have been. If you remove Helena's Boise's SG radar, and replace their rapid firing guns with standard prewar firing rates I suspect the victory goes to the Japanese. It wasn't that the RADAR was a critical element, I submit that the CL class weapon system and how it was fought was a critical element. Harder to prove but seems likely to me, IMO.

You say above that RADAR was an unrealized or theoretical advantage. I have to agree. But my own reading indicates that fact had nothing to do with crew preparation although Coastal shadowing did prove a handicap to its most effective operation in many encounters. The white hats and JOs seem to have been adequately trained but typically couldn't get their superiors to pay attention or absorb the implications. That may be wrong, but it's the impression I get from what I've read. IIUC, Hoover and Moran knew exactly how to use the radar. Scott had the night fighting preparation going for him better than prior USN commanders, but he didn't recognize the potential advantage RADAR provided that might have overcome his hesitancy to open fire. As perceived today, choosing the wrong, less capable flagship is a huge gaff and bespeaks a tendency to adhere to tradition as having greater importance than weapon system technology. IMO, that was a lesson that could and should have been learned earlier. Some people had evidently learned it quite well. They just weren't in charge until Lee arrived.

IMO the advantage provided by superior situational awareness is huge. SG provided it to the USN and added to that of fire control by radar, the combined technology should have been a game winner in most engagement between SG equiped ships and their IJN counterparts. SG not only saw further than the IJN's night vision glasses it saw the entire battlescape except of course that obscured by Radar shadows and inherent system blockages.

USN Cruiser advantage may appear to be overrated but IMO its got nothing to do with the weapon systems. If anything, USN task group commanders may have been so wrapped up in notions of their assumed technological superiority that they thought they had the latitude to ignore some of their advantages. With the IJN as skilled as you correctly point out, no USN advantage could be ignored without being defeated.

I agree there was mishandling of the light forces (DD's) but the DD's led the way and paid heavily at Esperance and during the Naval Battle of Guadacanal on both nights. Of course an equal number of DD's trailed (probably uselessly) behind. In contrast, Lee deployed his DDs ahead and they fortunately absorbed the brunt of the initial long lance volley, IIRC.

The point Juha makes is very important and it's IMO purely a fault of leadership. Scott prepared for night fighting as best he could, but even he had much to learn. All that experience was lost when Halsey pulled him from command because of Callahan's few week's seniority.

Much maligned F. J. Fletcher faced with a similar choice, selected experience over seniority.

 

[parsifal]

Good replies and points well taken guys

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Pars, I wanted to fill out my own understanding of events discussed in this thread by reading Richard Frank's purportedly more detailed description of the individual actions (naval and ground) than that provided by my prior primary source: Neptune's Inferno. The latter is a great read but lacks some of the detail of the former. I read Franks description of Wiilis Lee's Battle on November 14, 1942. I came away in much greater agreement with the point of view you expressed. Without Lee's radar expertise, he is unlikely to have walked away from the action scene unharmed and having sunk a IJN BB, but RADAR and expertise in its use by itself did not give him the significant advantage I had inferred from reading NI. The IJN fired a very large number of LL torpedoes at SODAK and Washington and evidently NONE of them scored. As previously mentioned, Lee's DD screen absorbed the most effective initial LL launch. However, after that initial salvo, many more were launched and every one of them missed, failed to explode, or exploded prematurely. Some the the LL failed due to good ship handling by the Washington's CO. Considering what happened with the LL, even Lee with the combination of technology and skill in its use needed substantial luck to come out on top. IJN commanders were so astonished at the failure of the LL that night that there was widespread belief that the torpedo system had an unknown flaw or the USN possessed a secret counter weapon. This is such a departure from the usual LL peformance that it devalues the victory in the most general sense regarding RADAR's importance under the best of cicrumstances. RADAR provded a technical advantage that was better on paper than in practice. Evidently so. I think that was your quote or at least your point. I am forced to reluctantly agree.

 

[parsifal]

I think the failure of LL that night was just dumb luck to be honest. Just the same lees command that night was really a cut above all that happened before. For reasons not quite clear to me, the USN was proficient with BB actions, but not as proficient with its cruisers. I dont know the reason, just am looking at the results. IJN were excellent with cruisers, average with BBS, in contrast. Again the reasons are not clear

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Interesting observation. Hadn't looked at it that way, but it seems you are right. I was thinking about doing a break-out description of the 4 naval battles based on Frank's detailed description and analysis which seems insightful to me.

Taking Lee's November 14th battle as an example:

Good day night aircraft recon (something the IJN typically did VERY well) provided observers on both sides information about what to expect. Both sides were anticipating encountering enemy and had a general idea of force composition.

Lee deploys his DD's in line, about 5000 Yards ahead. He steams north of Savo and then returns to the South of the island as the IJN units arrive transiting the channel between Florida and Santa Isabel Islands.

(IIUC) Lee is blind to initial approach of IJN due to Florida and Savo Island Radar shadow. IJN initially detects Lee south of Savo at long range via night vision (probably ~ 25-35,000 yards!!! comparable to SG range!). Approaching Savo from North on a slightly SW course, Kondo splits formation into three groups to pursue and engage USN whose ships are moving generally SE, south of Savo. IJN Light forces to use LL to engage and clear opposition (sweep) for planned Henderson bombardment. 3 DDs come due south, east of Savo, another group (1 CL 4 DDs) circles to the west of Savo as Kondo's screen.

Lee changes course to due west. Lee's SG RADAR now picks up IJN light forces east of Savo Island at ~18,000 yards. Washington and SODAK commence firing! (Near LL Limit). This unit of 3 DDs immediately turns and heads away laying smoke, without launching LL! USN BB's cease fire. NO HITS SCORED! One of this DD's is detached to aid a sinking IJN DD while the other 2 DD's eventually head straight for Henderson to complete their sweep. This puts them out of the fight as battle has moved rapidly to NW. 3 DD's worth of LL's removed from fight.

USN DDs have no working SC or SG and only one had a working FC unit which detects IJN DD and CL units coming out of SAVO's RADAR shadow to take up a southern course. At 2322 USN DDs open fire on lead IJN light units. Gun duel goes to IJN: USS Gwin hit hard and USS Preston sunk by 5" 5.5" fire!. ~ Simultaneously, First LL salvo launched and damages one USN DD and sinks another.

Washington retaliates and sinks offending IJN DD. SODAK suffers massive, self-induced, electrical stroke and is out of the fight except to act as a sort of well-padded attack dummy for all IJN ordnance launched in her direction. USN BBs split apart to avoid USN DD wreckage. SODAK goes east and becomes excellent back-lit target and into Lee's blind spot, Lee goes west and becomes an invisible, phantom with virtually complete battle scape revealed by SG and tracking everything EXCEPT SODAK! However, completely unengaged by IJN Units and with his SG RADAR, Lee is now stalking the very numerically superior IJN forces. IJN heavy units launch second LL salvo (their first), all at SODAK and illuminate in preparation for what they expect to be a fatal heavy bombardment of SODAK. 27 hits later, SODAK is not severely damaged but has to retreat due to lack of situational awareness necessary to target and engage enemy.

At about this time, Washington at 8,400 yards unleashes repeated broadsides of 5 and 16 inch fire aimed at BB Kirishima and Kondo's flagship CA Atago. CA Takao is unengaged. Kirishima is out of the fight and sinking while the CA's fire 3rd and subsequent salvo of LL at 4,000 yards. All LL and IJN gunfire miss! Lee, who with his damaged units retreating, is pursuing Kondo's heavy units while heading away from the potentially dangerous LL wielding light screening units, who have not yet reloaded after their first deadly salvo. These IJN Units will be unable to get optimal LL firing geometry during the remainder of the battle. Lee, by pursuing the heavy units has interposed his BB in the path of the IJN Tokyo Express and thwarts its resupply mission and is now on the more open sea to the NW of Guadacanal. With a clear view of the Battle scape, and recognizing the eventual approach of the dangerous IJN light units, Lee breaks off pursuit and retires having provided a screen for his damaged units to leave the area. In the meantime, Kondo having no, or at least a very poor, sense of the battle scape including the location of his own forces, decides to disengage and delays the Tokyo express.

The SG FC radars certainly played a vital role in the battle, but so did the luck that spared the USN BBs from hits. Of course it could be argued that the US also had bad luck. The IJN approached along a RADAR shadowed corridor, but would have probably been revealed at much longer range had they arrived just a bit earlier when Lee's forces were north of Savo. If SODAK had not suffered its 'stroke' and made the wrong course change that revealed it to the IJN would the USN have done even better? I would guess so. Luck always plays a role in battle. In this case, the combination of IJN bad luck and effective use of USN technology saved its bacon.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

To elaborate on the capabilities of ship's RADAR that were unexploited at two Guadacanal naval battles (Cape Esperance and the cruiser action of November 13).

At Cape Esperance, Adm Norman Scott, evidently largely ignorant of the enhanced capabilities of the new SG radar on his ight cruisers Helena and Boise, orders his lower frequency SC units (equipping all DDs and the CAs flagship San Francisco and SLC) turned OFF for fear of IJN monitoring. Helena's SG unit picks up the IJN formation at 27,700 yards. SLC disobeyed Scott and its SC picked up the IJN at a slightly shorter distance about 3 minutes after Helena. At this distance, well within the range of the USN's fire control RADAR and 6" 8 " guns, Scott could have opened fire. He withheld the order due to some confusion in his formation, until all units were in mutual view at about 5,000 yards. LL's weren't fired immediately because Goto initially thought the USN ships were his Tokyo Express units. Opportunity lost and the battle almost given away. possibly a Helena or Boise salvo hits CA Furotaka's unfired LL torpedo mount and does heavy damage which along with some 90+ heavy caliber hits dooms her.

On November 13, Callaghan even less familiar than Scott and without the benefit of Scott's dedicated night-fighting training regimen or actual experience is placed in command by Turner (endorsed by Halsey). Halsey withholds CA Pensacola's 10 x 8" barrels to reinforce Enterprise Task Force. Callahan assumes flag on CA San Francisco. 3 of 4 SG Radar equipped ships are placed BEHIND the SC radar equiped SF, including CA Portland, CL Helena, CLAA Juneau, and DDs Fletcher. 3 x SC equipped DDs and CLAA Atlanta with Scott aboard are in the van and ultimately in a cross fire. Helena picks up Abe's jumbled formation at 27,100 yards. TBS is essentially saturated and no action taken until the disorganized IJN formation essentially collides with the USN line. A barroom brawl ensues in the dark at point-blank range in which Hiei and Atlanta are mortally wounded and many destroyers sunk. RADAR totally unnecessary at ranges ship vs ship engagements are conducted.

RADAR could have provided a decisive edge in these battles but command failures prevented realizing its full advantage.

The battle of Savo Island is a whole other story of command failure.

 

[ColesAircraft]

I would have to challenge the notion that Radar was decisive for the americans in the battles around Guadacanal in 1942, except for the battleship action at the very end of the year. The Americans showed a marked inability to use the technology to any significant advantage in this period. There appear to be two main reasons for this, crew inexperience, and an inability for the equipment to cope with the coastal conditions evident in the waters around guadacanal. Radar assisted the Americans, but it did not give them much advantage, and any advantage they did gain was largely negated by the poor showing of their crews and commanders in the night battles. that was not from a lack of courage or even ability, but night fighting is a slowly aquired skill in which instinct, initiative and above all teamwork are paramount. The Japanese showed this in spades and the fact that their ships were not radar equipped whilst the Americans were ended up being no penalty at all for them during this period. The fact that the Americans were on ocasion able to fight the japanese to a draw, and ocasionally achieve tactical victories can be attributed to as much the fact that the Japanese were often preoccupied with a mission other than surface engagement and therefore had competing mission priorities. On the few occasions where the japanese could concentrate on fighting the Americans, they invariably came away the victors.

American cruiser superiority is one of the most overrated "advantages" put forward in naval discussions. The USN ships had a theoretical advantage, but this seldom translated into anything tangible. they demonstrated advantage in battleship actions, but seldom in any of the cruiser actions. this has less to do with the ships and more to do with the philosophy behind US surface engagements. Whereas the correct way to view the enagement was the Destroyers providing the main protection for the gun line the americans viewed things the other way around, with Destroyers seen as some kind of optional afterthought. For them it as the cruisers that led the destroyers into battle and protected them, not the other way around. That is precisley the wrong way to use your ships and precisely the opposite way to the way the IJN and the RN viewed how to fight night battles. The USN were similar to the KM in that respect, and both showed a conspicuous lack of success in their earlier night battles.

Eventually the Americans did realize the value of their destroyers and went on to win some impressive victories when men like Arleigh Burke were put in charge. With gun line besotted admirals like callaghan in charge they tended to blunder around in spectaculalry unsuccessful fashion.

Contrast this with the way the japanese designed and used their Light cruisers. despite their age and apparent lack of firepower, these ships were highly successful at what they did. They were not viewed as part of the gunline, but neither were they there to protect the destroyers. they were there to lead them, and provide immediate gunfire support against the enemy destroyers, with the Japanese gunlines and destroyers freed up to engage these vaunted US cruisers, which they did with a great deal of success

It's very refreshing to see the Japanese Navy getting credit where credit is due. From Savo Island to Tassafaronga the Japanese Navy fought most of their battles with destroyers alone against superior American forces. Those destroyers were further hampered by dual missions (usually protecting a resupply effort, or being used as transports themselves) and often sailed with lower than normal ammunition supplies. That they performed so spectacularly should speak more loudly in support of the superiority of the ships, their crews included, than anything that can be gleaned from stats on paper.


Ron Cole

 

[parsifal]

stated far more clearly and diplomatically than I can ...thanks