I would have to challenge the notion that Radar was decisive for the americans in the battles around Guadacanal in 1942, except for the battleship action at the very end of the year. The Americans showed a marked inability to use the technology to any significant advantage in this period. There appear to be two main reasons for this, crew inexperience, and an inability for the equipment to cope with the coastal conditions evident in the waters around guadacanal. Radar assisted the Americans, but it did not give them much advantage, and any advantage they did gain was largely negated by the poor showing of their crews and commanders in the night battles. that was not from a lack of courage or even ability, but night fighting is a slowly aquired skill in which instinct, initiative and above all teamwork are paramount. The Japanese showed this in spades and the fact that their ships were not radar equipped whilst the Americans were ended up being no penalty at all for them during this period. The fact that the Americans were on ocasion able to fight the japanese to a draw, and ocasionally achieve tactical victories can be attributed to as much the fact that the Japanese were often preoccupied with a mission other than surface engagement and therefore had competing mission priorities. On the few occasions where the japanese could concentrate on fighting the Americans, they invariably came away the victors.
American cruiser superiority is one of the most overrated "advantages" put forward in naval discussions. The USN ships had a theoretical advantage, but this seldom translated into anything tangible. they demonstrated advantage in battleship actions, but seldom in any of the cruiser actions. this has less to do with the ships and more to do with the philosophy behind US surface engagements. Whereas the correct way to view the enagement was the Destroyers providing the main protection for the gun line the americans viewed things the other way around, with Destroyers seen as some kind of optional afterthought. For them it as the cruisers that led the destroyers into battle and protected them, not the other way around. That is precisley the wrong way to use your ships and precisely the opposite way to the way the IJN and the RN viewed how to fight night battles. The USN were similar to the KM in that respect, and both showed a conspicuous lack of success in their earlier night battles.
Eventually the Americans did realize the value of their destroyers and went on to win some impressive victories when men like Arleigh Burke were put in charge. With gun line besotted admirals like callaghan in charge they tended to blunder around in spectaculalry unsuccessful fashion.
Contrast this with the way the japanese designed and used their Light cruisers. despite their age and apparent lack of firepower, these ships were highly successful at what they did. They were not viewed as part of the gunline, but neither were they there to protect the destroyers. they were there to lead them, and provide immediate gunfire support against the enemy destroyers, with the Japanese gunlines and destroyers freed up to engage these vaunted US cruisers, which they did with a great deal of success
Didn't mean to suggest that Task Group use of RADAR was a decisive element in any Guadacanal engagement
except November 14 with Lee and Washington. However, Gil Hoover and Mike Moran knew how to fight their ships, while for all Scott's pre-battle preparation he really hadn't absorbed the advantage his technology provided. He didn't use the full assets he possessed and it was a closer thing than it might have been. If you remove Helena's Boise's SG radar, and replace their rapid firing guns with standard prewar firing rates I suspect the victory goes to the Japanese. It wasn't that the RADAR was a critical element, I submit that the CL class weapon system and how it was fought was a critical element. Harder to prove but seems likely to me, IMO.
You say above that RADAR was an unrealized or theoretical advantage. I have to agree. But my own reading indicates that fact had nothing to do with crew preparation although Coastal shadowing did prove a handicap to its most effective operation in many encounters. The white hats and JOs seem to have been adequately trained but typically couldn't get their superiors to pay attention or absorb the implications. That may be wrong, but it's the impression I get from what I've read. IIUC, Hoover and Moran knew exactly how to use the radar. Scott had the night fighting preparation going for him better than prior USN commanders, but he didn't recognize the potential advantage RADAR provided that might have overcome his hesitancy to open fire. As perceived today, choosing the wrong, less capable flagship is a huge gaff and bespeaks a tendency to adhere to tradition as having greater importance than weapon system technology. IMO, that was a lesson that could and should have been learned earlier. Some people had evidently learned it quite well. They just weren't in charge until Lee arrived.
IMO the advantage provided by superior situational awareness is huge. SG provided it to the USN and added to that of fire control by radar, the combined technology should have been a game winner in most engagement between SG equiped ships and their IJN counterparts. SG not only saw further than the IJN's night vision glasses it saw the entire battlescape except of course that obscured by Radar shadows and inherent system blockages.
USN Cruiser advantage may appear to be overrated but IMO its got nothing to do with the weapon systems. If anything, USN task group commanders may have been so wrapped up in notions of their assumed technological superiority that they thought they had the latitude to ignore some of their advantages. With the IJN as skilled as you correctly point out, no USN advantage could be ignored without being defeated.
I agree there was mishandling of the light forces (DD's) but the DD's led the way and paid heavily at Esperance and during the Naval Battle of Guadacanal on both nights. Of course an equal number of DD's trailed (probably uselessly) behind. In contrast, Lee deployed his DDs ahead and they fortunately absorbed the brunt of the initial long lance volley, IIRC.
The point Juha makes is very important and it's IMO purely a fault of leadership. Scott prepared for night fighting as best he could, but even he had much to learn. All that experience was lost when Halsey pulled him from command because of Callahan's few week's seniority.
Much maligned F. J. Fletcher faced with a similar choice, selected experience over seniority.
14"/45 -35K tons? in Battleship Vs Battleship Forum
