Worst aircraft of WW2? (1 Viewer)

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Something to remember about these battles is that while on occasions the Buffaloes might have posted kill to loss ratios of 2:1 or higher it may not have been against fighters. While shooting down bombers counts as a kill is does not mean that the kill to loss ratio reflects the actual fighter vrs fighter capability of hte Buffalo. I will leave it to those who have better access to the combat reports to decide if there is anything to this theory.
 
I believe you might be correct. If I get a chance I'll go through Bloody Shambles for some of the documented airbattles over Malaya.
 
Parsifal,

You state "The Japanese gained air superiority over Malaya with just 25 Zeroes, and a similar number of Oscars. I forget how many Nates were involved, but many of these were transferred to Burma after December 23rd. Post war allies revionist histories have tried to portray the Japanese as heavily outnumbering the Allies. This might be true in terms of the overall numbers, but in terms of the critical fighter numbers, the Japanese achieved enormous things with just a handful of aircraft. A big part of that success was the near total failure of the Buffalo to achieve anything meaningful at all. this might be an affront to American sensibilities, but it is the cold hard truth I am afraid."

Can you please cite sources for your so-called "truth"? Here are some facts from Japanese and UK original sources as pertaining to the start of the Malayan campaign:

Total number of Ki-43s deployed = 59
Total number of Ki-27s deployed = 108
Total number of Buffalos deployed = 63 (15 per Sqn for 243, 488 and 453 Sqns, and 18 for 21 Sqn).

The Zeros only appeared very late in the campaign but, even if we take your figures, that adds another 25 fighters against the dwindling number of defenders, most of whom were lost in flying accidents or destroyed on the ground rather than shot down in combat by fighters. Also, a large number of Nates continued operations over Malaya - basing in Thailand enabled the IJAAF to retask fighters between Burma and Malaya with relative ease (interior lines of communication etc) and, even late in the Malayan campaign, Nates were actively involved in defending recently-captured airfields in southern Malaya.

The Commonwealth fighter squadrons in Malaya were outnumbered by almost 4 to 1 in fighters alone. THey had no comprehensive early warning system, were equipped with mediocre aircraft and staffed with pilots who were mostly fresh out of the training system. What on earth do you expect could the Commonwealth fighter defences have done with these sorts of resources when faced with the elite of the IJAAF (and yes, the Ki-43 units were the best which is why they got the Ki-43s first)? Even Spitfires would have failed under these conditions so to roast the Buffalo as, in large part, a victim of circumstance, is hardly fair.

I will agree that the Buffalo was far from a war-winner but given the odds, I still think the Commonwealth units in Malaya did a remarkable job (and that includes the ground crews). More could have been done had AHQ Far East concentrated its fighter strength on neutralising the Japanese-held airfields in Thailand but they were playing a waiting game in hopes of reinforcement and by the time they realised no reinforcements were coming it was too late.

By the way, I'm not American so no sensibilities affronted here!

Kind regards,
Mark H
 
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Finns installed armoured seat to their B-239s, IIRC they also put some self-sealing to the tanks nearest to the pilot later, but that I must check from a/c papers. And Finns also installed reflector gun sights to their Brewsters fairly early.

Juha
 
Hi Buffnut and welcome

Good general references in English are virtually impossible to locate, and because nearly all the post war accounts of losses and actions are based on one or two wartime allied intelligence reports, they need to be treated with a great deal of circumspection. This probably means that virtually everything you have read is innaccurate and wrong ( I apologise for the assumption I make there....perhaps yopu can read Japanese and have consulted their official histories)....

To help you understand what I am on about, have a look at this quick summary....it describes the problem better than I can

http://www.warbirdforum.com/jaaf.htm

Reasonable sources do exist, however, to get a basic idea of the initial order of battle, you should look here

Imperial Japanese Army, 8.12.1941

Dr Niehorster is reasonably accurate, and as you can see only 35 Oscars were available to 3rd hikoshidan, grouped in the 64th Chutai (Wing). If your figures are referring to the total commitment over some time period, that may explain the discrepancy, but ther were definately not fifty (or so) Ki-43s available to the 3rd air fleet (or indeed the entire JAAF) at this time. Those 35 represented the entire strength of the type, and as such that 35 could never be used as a total force. For the first month of the war, the japanese were lucky to have more than 20 serviceable at any given time.

The page I sent you to does not cover the IJNs contribution to the battle. Still using Niehorster resources, I direct you to this page

22nd Naval Air Flotilla, 11th Air Fleet, Imperial Japanese Navy, 7.12.1941

As you can see, the 22nd flotilla had deployed to Indochina before the war, and this unit included the Yamada detachment with 25 aircraft. given that only the zeroes of this unit were capable of reaching Malya from Indochina, that no fighters were deployed into Burma until after 23rd December, and that only one wing was deployed into Malaya itself (until after December), it was this small force of zeroes that decimated the allied forces. They were most definately ther from the beginning, incidentally, Japanese records are very clear about that....

Ther are good sources for Japanese strengths, losses and deployments, but they are in Japanese, mostly. A few are beginning to be translated, but they are meeting voracious criticism, because they completely upturn the traditional histories based on those faulty intell reports that I mentioned.

Some examples that I know of include: Dai 22 Koku Sentai sento shoho (Battle Reports of the 24th flotilla) and the Daitoa senshi minami taieiyo sakusen (greater East Asia war operations summary) being amongst them. Several Japanese sources have been translated, but the process is occurring slowly
 
Hi Parsifal,

Thanks for responding. From the ORBAT charts you kindly shared, it seems we are in broad agreement over the number of Ki-27s available for the invasion of Malaya and Thailand (approx 108 in total). The main discrepancy lies in the 59th Sentai which was in the process of re-equipping from Ki-27s to Ki-43s in Nov-Dec 41. The ORBAT you provided lists that unit as only having Ki-27s when, in reality, it had a mixed complement of aircraft. Therefore, my figure of 59 Ki-43s is probably not too far off the mark, although I agree not all would have been available simultaneously.

I firmly disagree that the IJN's Zeros were the only fighters capable of reaching Malaya. They were not involved in any way in the early invasion effort into southern Thailand and northern Malaya. It was the IJAAF Ki-43s that spearheaded efforts to gain air superiority over northern Malaya operating from 2 newly-created airfields on the island of Phu Quoc. These operations (known as "aerial exterminating action") included bomber escort, air interception and airfield strafing missions and were pivotal to the success of the Japanese landings on the east coast of the Kra Isthmus. (See Yokoyama, Hisayuki (2004), 'Air Operational Leadership on the Southern Front' in Bond, Brian and Tachikawa, Kyoichi eds., British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War 1941-1945 (London and New York: Frank Cass) for more information on these tactics). The Ki-43s and Ki-27s operating from Phu Quoc and the nearby airfield(s) of Kampong Trach and Tani Kep were speedily redeployed to Thai airfields as soon as they were taken by the IJA, enabling them to sustain pressure on the RAF in Malaya.

Thanks for an interesting discussion...

Kind regards,
Mark H
 
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On the self-sealing fuel tanks nearest to the cockpit in B-239s of FAF. I have digiphotos on the papers of 3 B-239s. The set of one didn't include repairs and maintenance cards, one can see from the cards of the two others, that the work is ordered in Aug 40, but is done only to one in Dec 43, installation of reflector sight was ordered Dec 40, and done rather soon after that, back and head armour was ordered March 41 and done rather soon after that.

Juha
 
Its my understanding that one of the first things the Finns did to the B-239's was to chznge out the gun sight.
I just don't know if the work was doine in Norway, where the planes originally landed, or whether that work occurred in Finland, upon those planes arrival.
I forgot about the armoured seats. Thanks for the reminder.


Elvis
 
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According to the book, "Japanese Army Air Force Fighter Units And Their Aces", the 59th was equipped with the Ki-43 in June of 1941...and by December of 41 had a total of 21 battle worthy Ki-43lb's ready for combat. While the 64th sentai had 35 (equipped in Aug 41). I can't find any reference to any combat claims made by the Ki-27 for either of these units made after June 41, and August 41 respective...

Available fighters for the combined Malaya-Burma campaign...

1st Sentai 42 Ki-27
11 Sentai 39 ki-27
77 Sentai 27 ki-27
4th Chutai 9 ""
=117 Ki-27

This number is in addition to the 56 battle ready Ki-43's of the 64th 59th
 
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Thanks Proton45. I had forgotten about that reference. I don't think we need get overly excited about the level of precision in these numbers - I think we can fairly safely say that there were 55-60 Ki-43s and 108-120 Ki-27s. Irrespective, this is far more than Parsifal's "approx 25" fighters and my previous post refutes his claim that 25 Zeros did all the damage in the fight for air superiority over Malaya - they weren't even committed to operations over the Malay peninsula until mid-Jan 42.

The history of the Ki-27 units over Malaya is very, VERY sparsely documented. We know that they flew CAPs over the invasion convoys from Phu Quoc Island during the early stages of the campaign, and there are references to them performing airfield fighter defence in Thailand and in southern Malaya but there are few details beyond this. We know a number were used in Burma but that was much later in December after the airfields in northern Malaya had been abandoned by the RAF and taken over by the IJAAF. The activities of the Ki-27 units is one area where I wish further research was focussed - there are just too many aircraft available to assume they only did airfield defence, and I can't see any commander letting his fighters sit on the ground in the middle of a campaign.

Kind regards,
Mark
 
Hello Elvis
The B-239s were shipped to Bergen in Norway, then moved by rail to Trollhättan in Sweden, where they were assembled and test flown, then flown to Finland. Finns got them without USN equipment, ie without weapons; anyway Finns bought new ones from US, dials, sights etc. That was a bit surprise to Finns who had thought that they have bought complete a/c. Finns bought from GB Aldis telescope sights, and these were put to planes first. As I wrote earlier, in Dec 40 it was ordered to change the Aldis to Revi 3c/Väisälä reflector sights and this was done during the early months of 41.

Juha
 
Juha,

So you're saying that the gun sight was changed twice?
I only recall seeing referrnce to one change.
Regardless, sounds like the work was done in Finland. Correct?
Also, you're saying that all B-239's sent to Finland were brand-new planes?
If so, I have a problem with that statement.



Elvis
 
From accounts I have read The US navy agreed to give up planes on production line or to be built against original order to the Finns in return for a better price on on the "Improved" F2A-2 model to be delivered later. Not sure of that but the Finns could have gotten both a few used aircraft and a bunch of "new" aircraft. In any case they would have been knocked down and crated for shipment. Which would require assembly and test flights on the other end.
 

That's pretty much what F2A Buffalo in Action by squadron/signal states.
 
Hello Elvis
Quote:" Also, you're saying that all B-239's sent to Finland were brand-new planes?"

Where I wrote that? Anyway, as Shortround wrote, most of the planes were new ones. USN had got 11 F2A-1s, of which 9 were delivered on USS Saratoga, to VF-3, or was it VF-2. Finns got these 11 and the 33 others were new ones.

All planes arrived to Trollhättan without sights. I don't know, were Aldis sights installed at Trollhättan or in Finland. Revi 3Cs and Väisälä reflector sights were installed in Finland in early 41.

Juha

CORRECTION: All FAF B-239s were new, USN had ordered 54 F2A-1s, got 11, FAF got the rest, that is 43, plus one "proto" which was a modified plane from the Belgian order OR FAF got 38 de-navalised F2A-1s and 6 from Belgian order. This is a bit unclear, I have rather plenty material on B-239 but don't have time to go through it now, and the the sources I checked gave these 2 explanations.

On sights, from the photo on one B-239 damaged when landing at the end of ferry flight from Sweden, one can see that it had bead and ring sight. I have photos on B-239s soon after arrival but not time to dig them up, but it seems that during assembly in Sweden they got bead and ring sight, fairly soon after arrival to Finland they got Aldis telescopic sights, I have photo(s) that show that configuration, and during the early 41 they got reflector sight.

Juha
 
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Hi Buffnut

I don't think you can safely assume anything, because your assumptions and quotes appear to heavily rely on discredited information, which I pointed out to you previously, but which you are preferring to adhere to at this point

Far from being outnumbered, the Buffaloes in Malaya in those opening days enjoyed a superiority of about 1.3:1 over the opposition. And that includes the Zeroes which you say were not used over Malaya until after the 21st, but which Japanese records say were flying missions and engaging and shooting down Allied aircraft from the the first week of the campaign. I am looking for referenced source material, which i know that I have on this, but cant quite place right at this minute.

The 59th Sentai at Hankou was selected as the first unit to receive the new Nakajima Ki-43 Type 1 Fighter 'Hayabusa' ('Oscar'). The unit returned to Japan during June-August 1941 to collect some 30 examples of the Ki-43-Ia, which were then flown to Hankou. During these ferry flights and in training flights, folds began appearing in the wings following sharp turns and several mid-air disintegrations occurred. Four or five aircraft out of 20 examined proved to have defects in the wing construction, and at once the Sentai's ground personnel attempted to install reinforcement. Their efforts proved to be in vain, and the major part of the unit therefore returned to Tachikawa in October to convert to the –Ib model.

The second unit to re-equip with the Nakajima Ki-43 was the 64th Sentai. Pilots returned to the homeland in August. From the end of August, receiving their new aircraft at Fussa, near Tokyo. Major Tateo Kato, understood fully why the Ki-43 had been adopted, and at once stressed training in over-sea navigation and long distance flights. Consequently the 64th Sentai pilots were able to achieve ranges of 700 km, whilst those of the 59th Sentai, who had not trained in the same way, could manage only 600 km. However the 64th Sentai remained dissatisfied with the integrity of the wings, and subsequently flew to Tachikawa for to be properly strengthened, then flying back to Canton in November.

I will concede that the 59th Sentai was equipped with Ki-43s, but you are distorting the facts by attempting to say these aircraft were available for operationjs over Malaya from the beginning. They were not, due to their range limitations, moreover none of the units were formally transferred from their initial base of operations until after the 21st. Despite any thing you have read, these aircraft were physically incapable of reaching Malaya until after that date. Their topscoring ace of the period, for example a captain Hideki (from memory ???) did not undertake his first mission over Malaya until the 21st....there may have been isolated participation before that date, but the overwhelming majority of the Sentai did not contribute to the offensive over Malaya until the latter part of December. Because of their lack of overwater training, and relative inexperience on the type (having only received the airworthy versions of the type in late October) it was not committed to much combat until later in the campaign. You need to consult the Japanese records to understand this...Allied records consistently misrepresent this.


Moreover, the 64th Sentai's Oscars continued to experience technical difficulties that are synonymous with the introduction of a new type. As I said, there were seldom more than 25 Ki 43s available from 64th at any given time during these early campaigns….a similar number to the 25 Zeroes of the Yamada detachment. These few aircraft flew rings around the buffaloes that opposed them, and shot them out of the skies with ease.
In December the 59th Sentai flew its new Ki-43-Ibs to Kompong Trach in Indochina the day before the outbreak of the Pacific War. I attach a link to allow you the opportunity to determine just where they were. With an effective maximum range of 600km, and a base of operations effectively beyond that range, it should come as no surprise that the 59th could not get into battle until much later

Kampong Trach Region Map: Kampong Trach — Phumi Veal Taping | Cambodia Google Satellite Maps

The 64th Sentai moved to Duong Dong, Idu Phu Quoc, in December. I didn't check Duong Dong airfield, but Phu Quoc is at least 150 km closer to Malaya than Kompok Trach. With an effective range of 700km, and 150 km advantage in airbase location, it should come as no surprise that it was solely the 64th that flew over Malaya up until the 21st December, when the first air units began redeployment. All references to relocation of fighter units from the 3rd Hikoshidan before that date should be treated as pure allied propaganda. They simply did not happen……

The Japanese deployments in Indochina were as follows:
The JAAF (3rd Air Division) was at the following places in Indochina:
Konpong Trach, Konpong Chong, Duong Dong, Sien Reap, Kurakar, Kukan, Phnom Penh.

The JNAF (22nd Air Flotilla) was at the following places in Indochina:
Saigon, Thu Dau Moi, Soc Trang.

I concede that I do not know where Kukan airfield is , but it was not used by the 59th in any case
 
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Juha said:
Hello Elvis
Quote:" Also, you're saying that all B-239's sent to Finland were brand-new planes?"

Where I wrote that?
Click to expand...
In the post you wrote.

Quote: "Hello Elvis
The B-239s were shipped to Bergen in Norway, then moved by rail to Trollhättan in Sweden, where they were assembled and test flown, then flown to Finland. Finns got them without USN equipment, ie without weapons; anyway Finns bought new ones from US, dials, sights etc...."

Yep, that sounds better.
Thank you for checking into that.
I apologize for the misstatement earlier. I had remembered the numbers incorrectly.
When you stated that they got "new ones", that suggests (to me, anyway) that they went straight from Brewster's assembly line to Finland, and that's not totally true. Some went to the USN first. This makes those planes "used", even if only slightly so.
However, you make a good point. MOST of those planes were indeed, new and I failed to remember that fact.

I have a very good magazine article on the Buffalo's expderience in Finland, and it starts off with some history of Buff from its design and inception into the USN.
Unfortunately, I have recently moved and threw a lot of things out, including some old magazines.
I hope I still have that article, but if I do, its buried in a box somewhere.
Still, I will see if I can find it. If so, I'll check the article and see what it says, if anything, about the Belgian order.


Elvis
 
Hi Parsifal,

I really don't want this discussion to be overly contentious – I welcome robust discussions and arguments but I must contest your assertion that my "assumptions and quotes appear to heavily rely on discredited information". Since most of my research comes from original, contemporary sources or, where necessary, from Japanese researchers, which of my information is discredited and by whom? If you're referring to Yasuho Izawa, who authored the definitive record of IJAAF fighter units, he is recognized as a pre-eminent historian of WWII Japanese military aviation. Several contemporary British and Japanese sources agree that there was a substantial build-up of IJAAF fighters on Phu Quoc and nearby on mainland Indochina prior to the invasion of Thailand and Malaya, and that these fighters were used to gain air superiority over northern Malaya and provide air cover for the invasion convoys.

To clarify the airfields situation, Duong Dong and Kukan were the 2 new airfields created on the western coast of Phu Quoc. These were the closest airfields to the Malaya coast and were an ideal location from which to launch fighter operations. You state "I will concede that the 59th Sentai was equipped with Ki-43s, but you are distorting the facts by attempting to say these aircraft were available for operations over Malaya from the beginning". I am not distorting facts but reporting Japanese sources on this subject. A former Ki-43 pilot who participated in these actions stated that the 64th and 59th Sentais deployed to 2 airfields on Phu Quoc on 3 Dec 41 and were tasked to escort bombing missions, conduct fighter sweeps and strafe airfields. A Japanese Times and Advertiser article from Apr 42 described how, without consulting Tokyo or French authorities, the IJAAF built an airfield in fifteen days 'on an island close to Kota Bharu' which, when completed in late November 1941, played a 'vitally important role in effecting a landing at Kota Bharu for the Japanese Air Units could operate freely from the newly acquired base'. This island was Phu Quoc. Colonel Tsuji saw the Phu Quoc airfields as, 'A mighty mainspring in accomplishing perfect protection of our convoy of transports and air cover for the landing of our troops at Singora, Patani, and Kota Bharu'. Finally, I refer you again to my previous post and the reference to "aerial exterminating action" over northern Malaya which research was undertaken by a Japanese historian (who, coincidentally, was also a JASDF officer). All these sources—which, you will note, are Japanese not western—agree on the role of the Ki-43s (of both 64th and 59th Sentais) operating from Phu Quoc from the first week of Dec 41 onwards.

You also claim that, "None of the units were formally transferred from their initial base of operations until after the 21st. Despite any thing you have read, these aircraft were physically incapable of reaching Malaya until after that date" Why were the fighters "physically incapable" of reaching Malaya before 21 Dec but suddenly were capable after that date? This makes no sense to me. IJAAF fighters WERE in Malaya at least a week before the date you cite. Allied pilots encountered fixed-undercarriage fighters over northern Malaya on 9 Dec which patently cannot be Zeros. Some 40 fighters were observed by RAF recce aircraft at Kota Bahru airfield on 15 Dec and 44 fighters were observed at Sungei Patani on 19 Dec. Or are these contemporaneous reconnaissance reports part of the "allied propaganda" to which you referred?

One final point to ponder. You indicate that it was the Japanese fighter force that was outnumbered by Buffalos. At the time of the Japanese invasion, there were 18 Buffalos of 21 Sqn and 3 Buffalos of 243 Sqn in northern Malaya. The units in Singapore were tasked with air defence of the island, convoy patrolling and fleet air defence support. Thus we have 21 Buffalos against 150+ Japanese fighters. The IJAAF was able to concentrate it's fighter force and dictate the tempo of the campaign because (a) they had sufficient numbers of aircraft to accomplish the roles assigned to them, and (b) Malaya lacked an adequate integrated air defence system. To put the situation in context, the RAF had 4 squadrons of fighters to defend a territory the size of England against an adversary that could (and did) choose the time and location of its attacks. In closing, you state that "These few aircraft flew rings around the buffaloes that opposed them, and shot them out of the skies with ease." Here are the real Buffalo loss figures (derived from contemporary sources):

Shot down by enemy fighters: 21
Shot down by other enemy action: 9
Destroyed on the ground: 30+ (only lists known airframes destroyed – actual figure likely to be higher)
Destroyed in Accidents: 49 (20 pre-war, 29 from 8 Dec onwards)

That leaves approx 40 airframes unaccounted for, most of which were abandoned either in northern Malaya, on Singapore or in the Dutch East Indies (the RAF tends to be quite punctilious about recording human casualties but less so about abandoned hunks of metal, hence we can be reasonably certain about the numbers of aircraft shot down compared to the total destroyed on the ground or abandoned).

Apart from vague references to things you remember reading, you have not cited a single source for your assertion that IJN Zeros were active over Malaya from the beginning of the campaign. Which aircraft did they shoot down? You continue to state that the main Japanese fighter force comprised 25 Zeros and roughly the same number of Ki-43s and yet there is ample evidence that far more fighters were available and were used – the additional 110 Ki-27s, for example. Despite ample contemporary evidence to the contrary (eg RAF photo recce reports identifying 60-80 fighters operating from airfields in northern Malaya from mid-Dec 41 onwards), you insist that IJAAF fighters were not deployed to Thailand or northern Malaya before 21 Dec. I'm not making this stuff up – I spent many years researching primary sources to come to my conclusions. I would welcome seeing the sources you are citing so we can achieve a more comprehensive understanding of what all Japanese air arms were doing in early Dec 41.

Kind regards,
Mark H
 
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Not that you need help in this discussion...but i thought I would add to the information you supplied. Aside from the Pearl Harbor attacks, the only engagements that the A6M was involved in was the campaign on the Philippines. Zero's of the 3rd and Tainan Kokutais escorted bombers that attacked Clark and Iba air bases on December 8th. These fighters where based in Taiwan. By December 22nd the 3rd kokutai had moved from Takao airbase in Taiwan to Davao airbase on Mindanao. On December 28th, from their airbase on Davao, the 3rd Kokutai launched 7 A6m's with reconnaissance aeroplanes to the island of Tarakan on the northeast coast of Borneo...here is the first time that they encountered 9 Dutch Brewster Buffaloes.
 
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