I have nothing to add, here, really. That is to say, you put it that way, I know specifically where you were going with this, now, and we're on the same page.
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I have nothing to add, here, really. That is to say, you put it that way, I know specifically where you were going with this, now, and we're on the same page.Swordfish, if attacking in daylight unescorted would have been slaughtered, just like the TBFs and the TBDs. Im not arguing that. Im saying that as part of a night capable weapon system, with adequate torpedoes, properly trained crews, a doctrine and procedure for attacks at night, and an aircraft suited to night operations, they didnt need to be escorted, and had a high probabilty of succeeding. If we assume a similar number of Swordfish in place of the TBDs over the target at night how amny torpedoes might we expect being put into the Japanese carriers?. Anything from 0 to 12, depending on the luck and situation. Lets assume about 30-40% success, that means 3 or 4 topedo hits.
The Swordfish was not a wonder weapon, but it was suited to the role that it was put. And it enjoyed considerable success. Its apparent weaknesses (it slow speed) helped to also make it an accurate delivery system. i am not denying its basic obsolesence. I am disputing that use of slightly more high performance aircraft in daylight conditions was suicide, and that far more could have been derived from those aircraft (the TBDs) if they had been trained and used at night, using the same tactics as the Swordfish crews.
There is no denying the crappiness of US torpedoes, though this was rectified by early 1944. US VYs still did not enjoy a high success rate even with decent torps, against an enemy that by that stage was clearly on the ropes. Even without torps, having a fully night capable squadron on each carrier would have been a help, not a hindrance to US daylight strikes. It would have allowed tracking of the enemy day or night and thereby greatly increased the utility of the USN CVs
AF Manual 51-37
The slow landing speed made it perfect in foul weather providing you didn't have to deal with variable winds as it only had a 15 knot cross wing component (the same as a Cessna 172!) at the same time it was probably miserable coming aboard ship in an open cockpit
Bombers that had some inherent problems include:
Manchester
He 177
Botha
Fw 200C
Bombers that appear to have been inadequate in some of the rolls they were used for include:
Battle
TBD
Blenheim
Ju 87
Ventura
Hampden
G3M
G4M
Br 20
But the Ju-87 inadequate for its role??? The only thing the Ju-87 lacked was adequate air cover while performing its duties which has nothing to do with its design.
Ok, I'll give you that the He 177 had some engines problems because of the unique design and that the Fw 200 had a poor back ( maybe because it was designed as an airliner!!??)
But the Ju-87 inadequate for its role??? The only thing the Ju-87 lacked was adequate air cover while performing its duties which has nothing to do with its design. The Stuka was one of the best it not the best, dive bomber of the war. Far more accurate than alot of others available. And I might add that it would appear that most dive bombers had this problem as the last few pages discussing Midway would show.
Manchester
He 177
Botha
Fw 200C
I think the same argument could be made about the Fairey Battle.
To a certain degree; the concept to which it was built was heavily flawed, which resulted in its high loss rate.
And there you have it. Hard to pin anything on the aircraft when it's distracted from doing its job.ALL dive bombers were vulnerable to enemy fighters, but the combat records of the likes of the Ju 87, Dauntless, D3A Val speak for themselves.
Not only was the original concept heavily flawed, the Battle was never used for the original concept. Using a strategic bomber as a tactical bomber usually didn't work well and when they don't have escorts it usually gets even worse.
No, it was not.
It started as a "light weight" bomber when there was some talk of an international treaty limiting the weight of bombers. In the early and mid 30s no "tactical strike aircraft" needed a range of 1000 miles.
The British had plenty of experience with fighters with 20lb bombs, Brisfits, De Havalind aircraft and the Hawker Hind series doing "tactical strikes" and "policing the empire" (dropping bombs on Afghan tribesmen) to know the difference between a tactical bomber and a strategic bomber. The Tactical strike aircraft was the Lysander.
Fairey Aircraft Since 1915 states the same.The original Fairey Battle was designed to Specification P.27/32 as a two-seat day bomber, to replace the ageing Hawker Hart and Hind biplane bombers, and to act as an insurance policy in case heavier bombers were banned by the 1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference.[2]
from wikipedia
I'll let you in on a little secret about our pilots which I doubt will ever make it into Wikipedia. When my Dad was towing targets for the bombers in his FM2 in Kaneohe the off-duty pilots were encouraged to check out the available planes for short hops to keep their skills sharpened. One day an F4U from another base came in for an emergency landing with the Hawaiian police hot on its tail and telephone wires wrapped around one of its wings. The police got no further than the gate, where they were promptly stopped by the guards, and turned back. The pilot probably got a good balling-out, too. But, everybody knew what was going on. They'd dive at the Hawaiian sailboats and rock them with the prop-wash on the way up. While I'm not suggesting the Navy encouraged stunts like that much less trying to fly under telephone wires, they did encourage a degree of risk-taking. Of course, nobody called it that, they called it something like "aircraft familiarization." But, the point was, these pilots were encouraged to know the limits of their aircraft, and that's how they did it, by taking chances. All to say, it would be a mistake to underestimate the degree of skill of these pilots. Especially by the time they were on those carriers, they could operate their aircraft like they were riding a bicycle. And, that's the truth.Then you add in operational hazards, official tactical restraints, crew experience and psychology, and the quality of the fighters and pilots intercepting them, and you are approaching the total formula. Often it isn't a matter of bad aircraft but rather, bad management.
Ok, not trying to pick a fight with you, but did you not notice what I said? I did not specifically say the Ju 87 was inadequate in its roll. I listed it as one of the "Bombers that appear to have been inadequate in some of the rolls they were used for"