They would most likely be at the bottom of the sea.
I dont agree. You can consider this a reply to the other half truths contained in your response.
Starting firstly with your claims about the bismarck attack. They were carried out after sunset, thats a night attack. i would agree that they could be classified as a dusk attack, if the visibility conditions were better than they were, but they were "attorcious" (those are not my words, they are the words of the official after action report). Ark Royal was undertaking the launches "in the green" (ie with waves crashing over her bow) as early as 1900, the time of the first strike. By that time she had abandoneed all safety precautions to get the second strike airborne. She was no longer zig zagging (and in fact had been spotted by U-554 who fortunately was out of torpedoes). Cloud cover was heavy (several thousand feet thick) and as as low as 2000feet and described in the report as 100% at the time of launch , but was lower than that over the target....perhaps 1000 feet. Strike leader Moffat had wanted to drop down below cloud cover once the strike had located the target by ASV radar at 7000 feet (just above the clouds) and reform the squadron elements for a co-ordinated attack but this proved impossoible because of the very poor visibility. Each element had to attack separately and visibility below the cloud cover was impeding the dusk light and was down to about 1000 yds (horizontal) maximum. There was not sufficient height below the cloud cover to drop flares. A torpedo attack is a highly technical exercise requiring accurate estimates of course speed and the amount of helm being applied. All of these things were severely hampered by the low visibility and sea state, which goes some way to explaining why the attacks wre pressed home to point blank range. Winds were by that stage more than 50 knots, and and wave heights in excess of 40 feet high. I am reasonably sure that the elements approached the target with ASV radars still switched on down to a couple of 1000 feet.
The fatal torpedo hit was achieved at 2105, some 15 mins after sundown. Call the visibility condition good if you like, rely on an unreferenced photo if you like, but the attack on the bismarck was a night strike, undertaken in the most difficult of condition.
Including the missed strikes is statistically flawed. I never said or suggested that this be done. It represents a differenrt subset to consider, as do the other examples. The conditions, training and circumstances are bound to be different in each case, so trying to put them althogether is only good for propaganda purposes. What we can say, is that on one occasikon we had a 60% hit rate, on another occasion we had a 125% hit rate, on another occasion we had a 75% hit, on another occasion we had a 0% hit rate, and and on another occasion we had a 33% hit rate. These separate events cannot, and should not be lumped togetherm, because that tells us nothing,
As for the claim that ships are somehow harder targets at sea, I would dispute that. Where do ships go for protection....if they think they can avoid detection they are better off at sea. if they think they have been detected, they are better off in harbour, with the harbour defences up. How else can the survival of the Tirpitz be explained except that they were heaviliy protected by the harbour defences. if the harbour defences are down, suh as at Pearl, yes, it is a mistake to hide in port. At Taranto the defences were not down, they were just inadequate
Next, your reference to the unreliability of British ASV radar. Ive already posted those articles, and know them very well. They are written by a U-Boat expert, and are referencing radar fixes of U-Boats. I can only repeat my earlier advice, you really should read the articles . Relevantly it says
In relation to ASV I (developed in 1938-9, as an experimental version:
"ASV Mk.I was not intended to detect submarines, but after an enquiry from admiral Somerville in late 1939 test were conducted with one of the Hudsons of No.220 Sqdn and the submarine L 27. It was demonstrated that, flying at 1000 feet, the submarine could be detected at 3 miles, broadside on, and this under experimental conditions --- that means that the crew of the Hudson knew exactly where the submarine was. Further tests revealed that when flying at 6000 feet, the range was increased to 6 miles.
A notable improvement was achieved with what called Long Range ASV. LRASV was based on the second antenna configuration developed. It was a sideways-looking system. The transmitter was an array of ten dipoles, installed in five (later reduced to four) pairs on top of the fuselage of the aircraft. The receiving antennas were Sterba arrays, fitted to the sides of the fuselage. Because the transmitter array was a dipole array 18 feet long and the two receivers were arrays 12 feet long, a much better resolution and range could be achieved. The first installation was on a Whitley bomber, in late 1939. LRASV had a range 2.5 times better than the forward-looking system;
it could detect submarines at 10 to 15 miles".
In relation to ASV II which was the type in use at the time of the Bismarck attack
"However, night attacks were generally ineffective, for the simple reason that the aircraft crew could not see the submarine. The radar guided them to a mile of the submarine, but not closer. On 21 December 1941 an ASV-equipped Swordfish made the first successful night attack on an U-boat, but such remained exceptions".
Notice that this comment is directed specifically at the ability of ASV II to achieve sinkings of submarines. i dont know what your experience level is, but a submarine is a lot smaller than a Battleship, or even a merchantman. Ther was no actual problem with the detection (even of the submarine), more the execution of the attack. ASVII could only take you to within a mile or so of the target, after that visual means had to be used to complete the attack. against a submerging or partially submerged submarine, that was a tall ask (though as an aside , in the context of a convoy battle, knowing where the submarine is is as important as actually sinking it, and forcing the submarine to submerge will reduce losses to roughly 1/4 of those if aircover is not there). In the context of a surface ship, ASVII had no significant reliability problems, and no significant operational difficulties, and in many respects, could see further than visual spotting in most conditions (which makes your claim that the USN carriers were in mortal danger if they advanced at night even more absurd.
The allies did not have an effective ASW air search radar until ASV III, and the near simultaneous introduction of the air launched depth charge, in October 1942.
As for your other comments about likely loss of the American Carriers if they were using night strike capability, hardly. Thats your opinion, and you are perfectly entitled to it, but a developed night strike capability for aircraft already of no use in daytime strike, isnt going to make one bit of difference to risks the USNs day strike battles incur. if anything they would greatly help them. Having a credible night search capability would have allowed them to range and have ready daytime strikes at first light, and beat the Japanese to the draw every time. And this was half the battle....who gets in first is the person who locates the enemy first. If the position of the enemy has been plotted and observed all night, there is no blind spot each morning....the Americans can just go ahead and launch, and be home for scones and tea, or in your case flapjacks and coffee I guess ..... Its going to give them added capability to strike at night, not interfere with their operational doctrine (in fact it would greatly help them) . If they want to close and duke it out in daylight as they did at Midway, they can still do that with no real loss in daylight capability (since the TBDs added nothing to the daylight capability anyway) . If they want to launch their TBDs so as to approach at night, they are going to reduce losses on their TBD squadrons, and place greater threat on the Japanese carriers, and pricelessly, maintain a knowledge of the Japanese position which greatly assists achieving first strike capability. Ther is no greater risk to their carriers. The claim that somehow the Japanese surface forces could ambush their carriers and sink them is a total furphy. They would never catch them for a start, and secondly would need to fight their way through the screening forces even if they did., Somerville at least explored the posibilities of this approach in the preceding April, and I have personally been involved in excercises and operations where the carriers advanced toward the enemy at night. with adequate escort (which the US forces had), the risks to carriers is very slight indeed, provided night ASV equipped searchers are used to mainatin the position of the enemy throughout the night from the last known position the previous day.