Would the British FAA have been better off with the Brewster Buffalo?

Often a point can be made more clear by turning it on its head. I recall a number of comments in Eric Brown's Wings of the Navy that appear to be germain to this thread. One in which he discusses the Fulmar. IIRC, he says something like: "If the RN/FAA HAD (my emphasis) to have [mulitrole] multiseat aircraft, it is difficult to imagine one better suited to the need than the Fulmar." My perspective on the Fulmar was largely formed upon reading his quote and by my general appreciation of its elegant lines. Trying to imagine the US building a similarly capable aircraft has brought me to an acceptance of the contemporary technological parity of the aircraft, so I stand corrected as to whether the RN-FAA was technologically retarded. No matter how misguided I may consider the policy of sending a carrier to war with anything less to protect it from aerial attack than the best (as in highest performance) fighter-interceptor aircraft technology and the nation's industrial base can create. No need to repeat/recount the many justifications used to validate this policy. I understand them and have my own issues with them sufficient to define a separate thread. For now, its enough to say, from a USN doctrinal perspective, a carrier air wing with anything less than an F2A-1/-2 or Martlet I is sheer madness. But then, what would the world be without mad dogs and Englishman. By the way Parsifal, one can be a fan of the RN and FAA without endorsing every cockamamie thing it chooses to do or did. For me the heroism and battles fought by the FAA against long odds, whether the enemy be the Germans, the Italians, the Japanese or the RAF, more than earns them enormous respect and my undying admiration.

As Ali G would say, Respek.

Just to preempt the inevitable lecture on how much the USN owes the RN FAA, I'll list them here as a far from complete but indicative of the depth of the legacy. Forget post war, its too lengthy to list, but just in WW2 the USN learned most of what it know about Fighter direction from the RN and RAF. Without the spur of the wealth of experience provided in the use of ASV in a variety of roles, it is difficult to imagine the USN reaching the level of effectiveness it ultimately enjoyed especially in post-1942 ops. There are probably more, but like my lapse on recalling my own argument about the Martlet III production impacting F4F-3 delivery, I can't think of them now. Getting old sucks.

On a personal level, working in airborne ASW during the latter half of my career you may not realize that USN professional gospel is that when it comes to ASW, Britain's armed forces are the teacher, the USN the pupil. This is a statement made more frequently than you might imagine.

Ill reply simply. For the USN, the fulmar was less than ideal. For the RN it was as good as they could get in 1940. There was nothing better that could fulfil all the specifications and requirements.

The shortcomings of the FAA and the RN in carrier aviation stemed from 25 years of parsimony and and downright hostility from the RAF controlled air wings.

And yes the USN did, and does have a lot to learn from the RN with regard to carrier aviation. Closed hangars, multi role capability, rough weather handling, anglefd decks, mirror landing sytems, ski jumps, VStol technology, torpedo ordinance, night attack capability, ASW capability and tactics, are all areas that the RN either did, or does, hold a clear lead over the USN at some point. The USN holds a clear lead in other areas, most notably dedicated air defence, radar communications and overall aircreaft performance. Its not a question of getting all jingistic about the issue...these are clear aspects of carrier warfare.

Just to make sure you understand my cockamamie comment (not knowing how fluent you are with american slang). A cockamamie idea is one that may sound crazy to the listener (me in this case) but every once in a while works. I would be remiss if I didn't make the observation that the RN's approach basically worked (although at some cost at times). IIRC, the RN lost but one CV to air attack and that one an old light carrier with perhaps more sentimental value that actual although of course during a time when all flight decks were precious. The events in the IO at that time could be considered a cautionary tale illuminating the difference in the air policies of both nations. However, it strikes me as the stage for one of the bal*siest moves of any Admiral during the war, when Somerville took a stab at bringing the IJN to battle with a RN fleet that, numerically at least, was vastly inferior to his opponents. As recounted in Fighting Admiral, it was a game attempt and if it had succeeded could have changed the balance of power in the PTO before Coral Sea and Midway. Of course in the end, Somerville did the smart thing and preserved his fleet but what an interesting what if flows from his attempt.

Leonard Birchall and the Japanese Raid on Colombo

which contains an important shout out for the effective RCAF recon.

oldcrowcv63 said:

Just to make sure you understand my cockamamie comment (not knowing how fluent you are with american slang). A cockamamie idea is one that may sound crazy to the listener (me in this case) but every once in a while works. I would be remiss if I didn't make the observation that the RN's approach basically worked (although at some cost at times). IIRC, the RN lost but one CV to air attack and that one an old light carrier with perhaps more sentimental value that actual although of course during a time when all flight decks were precious. The events in the IO at that time could be considered a cautionary tale illuminating the difference in the air policies of both nations. However, it strikes me as the stage for one of the bal*siest moves of any Admiral during the war, when Somerville took a stab at bringing the IJN to battle with a RN fleet that, numerically at least, was vastly inferior to his opponents. As recounted in Fighting Admiral, it was a game attempt and if it had succeeded could have changed the balance of power in the PTO before Coral Sea and Midway. Of course in the end, Somerville did the smart thing and preserved his fleet but what an interesting what if flows from his attempt.

Leonard Birchall and the Japanese Raid on Colombo

which contains an important shout out for the effective RCAF recon.

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The RN started the war with four 30 knot CVs, Furious, Glorious, Courageous, and Ark Royal. By Nov 1941, 3 of these ships were lost (all but Furious), and the RN built four 30 knot armoured carriers by Nov 1941, so the total number of fleet carriers had only gone up by one, to five total, by April 1942. It is interesting to speculate would have happened if some or all of these CVs had survived. With 4 or 5 carriers Somerville would have had a lot more recon capability, and lot more offensive potential. If he could have caught the IJN carriers as they were attacking Ceylon, he might have been able to cripple or destroy the IJN CVs, as actually happened at Midway.

His best chance was to attack the japanese at dusk or before dawn. If only he had just a couple more ASV Albacores....a horse a horse my kingdom for a horse.....

parsifal said:

His best chance was to attack the japanese at dusk or before dawn. If only he had just a couple more ASV Albacores....a horse a horse my kingdom for a horse.....

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I would argue that he needed more Fulmars because they would have been more survivable during daylight recon, so the Fulmars find the IJN during the day and provide the ASV Albacores with an approximate location for a night ASV recon and then a night strike. Apparently, an ASV Albacore found the IJN just at sunset (18:00), but it was damaged by a Zero. Given the latitude, it would have been completely dark in about another 1/2 hour.

Last night I was reading Airwar for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete by Christopher Shores and came across this on page 141:

"However Lt Cdr Black [805 Squadron on Crete] had early problems, for the Buffalos proved troublesome. He recalls:

The Buffalo was a delight to fly - very manoeuvralbe (compared to the Fulmar). It would have been an excellent fighter but the guns could not be fired because the ends of the wires which were part of the interrupter gear, failed and 805 did not have the necessary spares. At no point did I request the the Buffalos be exchanged for Sea Gladiators but I do remember that in the light of the inadequacy of Fulmars against CR 42s I requested that the Sea Gladiators, if not required for other operations, should be sent to Maleme, to reinforce 805."

To complete the discussion on the F4F-3 development, it appears as though there were indeed considerable difficulties in getting the F4F ready for fleet service. It looks like engine overheating and fuel pressurization and supply problems. I suspect the production of the apparently service unready G-36A did contribute somewhat to a delay in solving the problem but not nearly so much as I had surmised. The initial four or so "production F4F-3s" appear to have been subjected to an intensive series of tests and mods to attempt to bring the type to servicable form, leading to the XF4F-5 and XF4F-6 as alternate forms, in addition to the Martlet Is, the former were apparently derived from the initial batch of a half dozen or so "pre-production models (Bureau numbers: 1844 to 1846 1847 to XF4F-5 and one of these early -3s becomes the XF4F-6, all with engine variants with single stage superchargers). The best description I've found of the F4F's development trials is, strangely enough, the difficult to read czech page:

Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat :: Grumman :: USA

By the end of 1940 there were a grand total of 22 F4F-3 in squadron service apportioned to VF-41 and 71 in batches of 11 to each.

This compares to approximately 40 F2A-2 fighters in squadron service delivered starting in September 1940 through the end of the year.

Finally did a weight break down and comparison for the F2A-2 and F2A-3. Looks like the former is about 750 pounds lighter than the latter. Obviously not all of that is SST armor which in the F4F-3 amounted to about 400 lbs. The ammo load for the -2 was apparently 225 rpg while that of the -3 is listed as 325 rpg, but that only accounts for about 120 lbs. the -3 wing was over 130 lbs heavier and even the engine had gained about 200 lbs. over its predecessor. I suspect that about 400 lbs of the -3 weight gain was in armor. In contrast, the Finn B-239 version appears to have been perhaps only about 100 lbs heavier than a 4 HMG version of the F2A-1 upgrade completed in the summer of '40. All weight data inferred from AHT whose breakouts appear to have little to no connection to reality in their various combinations. The weights seem ok but how they are combined by model variant is bizarre. (e.g. the Finn B-239 is variously portrayed as a 4 gun fighter or 2 gun bomber. The fuel loads are mixed between fighter and bombers by prototype 110 gallon vs operational 160 gallon capacities.

Bottom line here is that I would expect an armor upgraded F2A-2 to be quite effective flown from a CV and not nearly as susceptible to landing gear failure as its overweight successor. Trouble is that SST are probably difficult to implement on the -2 based on its fuel tank construction. Without fuel tank protection, I doubt the FAA would have given it a second look, even if it had been in the market for a single seat fighter.

RCAFson said:

Regardless, the Fulmars were not with the Albacores when the Albacores were attacked.

You'll excuse me if I'm skeptical about that. None of the Albacores claimed an Me-110, while the Fulmars claimed 2 and a probable. Maybe there was another Me-110 loss not noted in the "incomplete" Luftwaffe loss register cited on the wikipedia page?

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Sorry about a very late answer, had been very busy lately.
When we take a notice that 11 Albacores were lost during the Kirkenäs attack, the fact that none of the returning 9 crews claimed a Bf 110 doesn't prove anything conclusively. We have better info on Z./JG 77 (the Bf 110 unit) than on 14./JG 77 (the Bf 109 unit).

Juha

I feel impelled to quibble about the reiterated assertion that the FAA had to put up with the aeroplanes that the RAF decided they should have. It was their Lordships of the Admiralty not their 'Airships' of the Air Ministry who drew up the requirements for FAA aeroplanes. The RAF provided staff and training but exercised no real operational nor doctrinal control of the FAA so, if the aeroplanes sought and bought to meet the RN doctrine were poor choices, the finger should be pointed at the Admiralty not the Air Ministry (I except the madness that was the Roc).

One could postulate a dive bombing capable Fulmar and a RN willing to abandon torpedo attack diverting resources into effective anti shipping bombs and mines thus allowing all Fulmar fleet carriers. It is worth remembering that it was the FAA who funded and supported the early development of the Griffon. If half the resources devoted to Rocs,Firebrands, Barracudas etc. were used to move onto the Merlin Fulmar and then the Griffon Firefly then stocking FAA would have been far easier.

In respect of the original topic question, what would the FAA have done with the Buffalo. The only role vacant would be to replace Sea Gladiators as point defence for the fleet and a strike Fulmar would have been a more versatile candidate for that if the FAA saw itself as an aggressive force able to find the enemy at a distance and reach out and strike at him. Later in the war escort carriers needed an all weather strike force (Swordfish) and to destroy shadowing reconnaissance; for which the Martlet was perfectly adequate. The RAF could have used more Buffalos in the Far East and one could define particular circumstances where the Buffalo could have been of use to FAA squadrons but, in a overall doctrinal concept, the Buffalo was not what the FAA was looking for.