WW2 Aviation Mythbusters

[fastmongrel]

First of all, US troops had first stopped the point of KG Peiper and then captured Stavelot behind it, so no supplies got through. Then US troops defeated all German attempts to recapture Stavelot to reopen the supply route of the KG so Peiper decided to give up Stoumont and concentrated his KG at La Glaize. He waited there for help but the other KGs of 1.SSPzD could not get through the US forces, so KG Peiper had no other option that abandon its vehicles and trek through hills to the German lines. Notice that they didn't march along the road they had came, because it was blocked by US troops but sneaked through hills at night. So IMHO KG Peiper's AFVs were lost because of the actions by US forces.

Hit the nail square on the head there Juha

 

[fastmongrel]

My wife would beg to differ...

My missus would also beg to differ anyone who kills one of our menagerie will have a mad Latvian coming after them with a carving knife

 

[Siegfried]

If a tank is damaged by the enemy action, unable to move, and it's spare parts can't get to that tank (since enemy prevents logistics efforts), methinks enemy action has a lot to do with the abandonment.

If a tank was immobilised by AT fire, or HEAT rocket then it would be listed as lost to enemy action even if the crew survived and it didn't brew up. It would not be listed as abandoned or self destructed.

There are seperate listings for mines, AT hits, RPG, mechanical failure. Parsifal seeded the meme that abandoned or self destroyed meant immobilised by enemy action. Those tanks were recorded under gunfire, mines, Hollow charge rounds or mechanical failure. The categories are clear.

 

[Siegfried]

First of all, US troops had first stopped the point of KG Peiper and then captured Stavelot behind it, so no supplies got through. Then US troops defeated all German attempts to recapture Stavelot to reopen the supply route of the KG so Peiper decided to give up Stoumont and concentrated his KG at La Glaize. He waited there for help but the other KGs of 1.SSPzD could not get through the US forces, so KG Peiper had no other option that abandon its vehicles and trek through hills to the German lines. Notice that they didn't march along the road they had came, because it was blocked by US troops but sneaked through hills at night. So IMHO KG Peiper's AFVs were lost because of the actions by US forces.

This rather beats about the Bush. Peipers tanks were not defeated in battle, or destroyed by enemy action: they were abandoned for supply starvation, the supply issue being fuel.

The fact that they were cutoff from supplies is a result of US air superiority intefering with what was a critical supply situation anyway as much as US Army action. Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain local air superiority a certain amount of fuel and ammunition would have been air dropped in parachute containers.

 

[Njaco]

I've not seen too many revisionists at work here John, so I'm not sure I go along with this.

Wiki mentions the historian James Corum and he does make a very fair point about the 'weather window'.

The Stephen Bungay book (The Most Dangerous Enemy.........I'd recommend as an excellent read if you've not had the pleasure) does argue that alternate Luftwaffe tactics might have won the BoB for them, he especially mentions using the Me110 as a fast fighter-bomber intruder to make pin-point attacks on various high value targets (and as you mention radar especially).
He also talks about whether a more limited and local air superiority around the SE coastal area was possible and if that would have been sufficient to enable invasion (although that also brings in the variable not seen at that time, the Royal Navy and the Luftwaffe having to take that on).

But Bungay does show with each sides production and training schedules that the RAF did not come close to defeat - even during the airfield attack phase of the battle, and that with their loss rates they were on a hiding to nothing doing what they were doing.
German production at this stage is surprisingly low.

It's worth mentioning that it was largely only 11 group suffering the majority of losses, even with rotation this was far from the bulk of the RAF.
It also has to be remembered that German intelligence during the battle was utterly hopeless (perhaps surprisingly so given that at that stage they had been doing so well) and the British intelligence services were starting to make serious inroads with Ultra.

I would agree that to say there is no way the Luftwaffe could ever have won the BoB is a silly claim to make........but given how things were on each side (and standing head and shoulders above everything about the BoB - besides the RAF having adequte numbers of trained fighter pilots and machines largely the equal or, arguably, at that stage a little better than anything the Luftwaffe had - was the worlds first modern radar equipped fully integrated air defense system and above all it was properly understood operated as such) I think it is fairly difficult to see how the Luftwaffe could have truly won without one 'projecting' modern radically different tactics to it.

I say this not meaning to minimise or down-play the damage and danger or the terrible mauling Britain took during those dark days. ....or do similar to the young men on the German side and their courage and skills.

In fact I'd say that this (in reverse) is a well known myth (the RAF came within a hair's breadth/a few days/week or couple of weeks of losing the BoB)



This reminded me of something I'd read.
I've mentioned the book before but in 'The Final Hours: The Luftwaffe Plot Against Goring' by Johannes Steinhoff, in the preface he makes an interesting and rather scathing remark concerning one of his fellow inpatients inthe hopspital he was at, a member of a Tiger crew who had also had his face largely burned off.
"Not all Tigers destroyed thousands of Russian tanks".

So many myths.....

While I may agree with the notion that the RAF - as a WHOLE -weren't going to lose the BoB, 11 Group sure came close to extinction (especially that first week of September) which would have hampered RAFs ability to continue BoB. Production and aircraft numbers were rolling along for England but those planes were being distributed throughout the kingdom - they would definately NOT be concentrated along the east coast of Britain.

And not all those Spits and Hurris were being funneled into 11 Group. And even if they were, you still needed pilots which was a premium.

 

[buffnut453]

On the subject of killing tanks, I've posted something like this before so I'll do it again ('cos I like repetition).

When I was a lad in uniform, there were different types of "kill" associated with heavy armour. The two I distinctly remember were the M-Kill for mobility kill and K-Kill for total destruction. I believe there was also a term associated with destroying the main armament (could have been A for armament or perhaps W for weapon - can't remember clearly 'cos they were pretty rare).

As others have noted, tanks are a huge logistics drain. They can be great in battle but getting them there and keeping them supplied is bluddy hard. Turning a tank into a smoking hole in the ground isn't the only way to eliminate an armoured capability. Looking at a tank formation as a target system (which includes logistics), one can try to take out each individual tank but they are hard targets because they're hard to find and very difficult to kill completely. The logistics chain is a much, much softer target - the fuel for several tanks can be eliminated by a single shot which blows up a tanker - and it's easier to find because fuel tankers drive on roads.

 

[Milosh]

The fact that they were cutoff from supplies is a result of US air superiority intefering with what was a critical supply situation anyway as much as US Army action. Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain local air superiority a certain amount of fuel and ammunition would have been air dropped in parachute containers.

Just like at Stalingrad.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

The fact that they were cutoff from supplies is a result of US air superiority intefering with what was a critical supply situation anyway as much as US Army action..

Allied, please; however much contempt you might have for the RAF and British Army, there were many other countries involved, all with a deep loathing for the Nazi regime.

Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain local air superiority a certain amount of fuel and ammunition would have been air dropped in parachute containers

But they weren't, so it wasn't, so it's rather academic, isn't it?

 

[parsifal]

As always, the voice of reason and balance NJ. Where did you find the hraphical representation?

 

[Edgar Brooks]

While I may agree with the notion that the RAF - as a WHOLE -weren't going to lose the BoB, 11 Group sure came close to extinction (especially that first week of September) which would have hampered RAFs ability to continue BoB. Production and aircraft numbers were rolling along for England but those planes were being distributed throughout the kingdom - they would definately NOT be concentrated along the east coast of Britain.

No, it didn't, because 11 Group was not a rigid organisation, and Squadrons, once exhausted, were moved out, and replaced by other Squadrons who'd had a chance to rest, reform, and replenish their numbers. From 8-8 to 7-9, there were 34 Squadron movements between various Groups. As an example, 8-8, 41 moved from Hornchurch to Yorkshire, then returned to Hornchurch on September 3rd, 54 going in the opposite direction each time.
Only one airfield was put out of action for (and only just) more than a day; the reason for pulling back from the likes of Lympne was their proximity to the Channel, which meant they had to fly away from the fight in order to gain enough height. One of (if not the main) reasons for 11 Group's struggle was 12 Group's failure to cover for 11 Group while they were intercepting the Germans at the coast.

 

[Njaco]

Well, Park did complain that those squardons transferring in at times were not as effective as others (I just read this either here or a BoB book I'm currently reading).

As for the airfields, that 3 Sept date was part of "The Bad Weekend" where numerous A/F were being clobbered.

By the morning of 7 Sept.:

Six out of seven sector airfields were heavily damaged. Another five advanced airfields were also destroyed. Telephone and communication lines were disrupted or totally destroyed and the general destruction was confusing the handling of squadrons in the air. The fighter losses from the day before again exceeded aircraft production. And Fighter Command could call upon only about 700 pilots.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/day-battle-britain-25360-14.html

As concerning the "Big Wing", there were 2 problems:

1.) At times it took far too long for the squadrons to form up in time to engage the LW,
2.) On Park's directive they were to protect 11 Group airfields but several times they went looking for the enemy and left the airfields to fend for themselves.

My point is still that RAF 11 Group was close to being destroyed by 7 September - in men and material and location. We may disagree but that is what my opionion is.

 

[parsifal]

Thought this site might be useful in determining Tiger losses

Tiger Tank Battalions during WWII - Page 2

According to this site, the following losses in Normandy are noted

For the 503rd Heavy Tank Bn, The 3rd company was caught in a bombing attack in July 1944, and all of its Tigers were destroyed or damaged.
The details are as follows

22 April 1944 22 Tigers are lost in action or destroyed by crew (in the Hube Pocket, most Tigers being destroyed by crew) (easyern Front)
May 1944 Tigers turned over to s.Pz.Abt. 509 and transferred to Ohrdruf (WK IX) to be rebuilt
11-17 June 1944 Rebuilt with 33 Tiger I's, 12 Tiger IIs
26 June-7 July 1944 Transferred to France
18 July 1944 3./ is bombed during Operation Goodwood, but only two Tigers are lost, one burnt out and the other was flipped over by a near miss. 13 Tigers lost during the day to all causes
20-29 July 1944 3./ ordered to Mailly-le-Camp for re-equipment with Tiger IIs
12 August 1944 3./ entrains for Paris
mid-August 1944 Most of 3./ destroyed by Allied fighter-bombers, all of the rest of the Abt. is destroyed during the retreat from Normandy, only 2 Tiger IIs of 3./ on strength

Schwere Panzer Abteilung (Funklenk) 301 - sPzAbt (FKL) 301

....The 301st was first reported on the Western Front by the LXXXI Armee Korps on November 1944 as having 31 Tigers (27 operational) and 66 BIV (61 operational). Four Tigers were lost before the 301st was engaged in the Ardennes Offensive

Schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 101

....The leading elements of the 101st reached the front in Normandy on 12 June 1944, six days after the Allied landings. By the end of June, the 101st had lost 15 of its 45 Tigers, and was pulled out in July to refit with the Tiger II. The 101st still had 25 Tigers of which 21 were operational on 7 August 1944, but these were all lost during the retreat in August, the remnants of the 101st being ordered back to the training grounds to rest and refit, in Senneläger, with the Tiger II on September 1944.

From this website, the following losses in action were reported ...Tiger I Information Center - Unit Histories

13 June 1944 3 Tigers are lost in action ("112","121" and "222"?)
15 June 1944 5 Tigers are lost in action (4 by aircraft/bombing raid)
16 June 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action ("111")
24 June 1944 2 Tigers are lost, 2 written off
27 June 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action
28 June 1944 3 Tigers are lost in action
3 July 1944 1./ turns over its last 3 Tigers to 3./ and transfers to Paderborn to re-equip with Tiger IIs
7 July 1944 2 Tigers are lost, written off
19 July 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action
20 July 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action
-18 August 1944 1./ entrains for Normandy, detrains 30 km north-east of Paris with 14 Tiger IIs
8 August 1944 7 Tigers are lost in action ("007" and "214 " are among them, Wittmann killed)
14 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action
16 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew
18 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew
19 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action
24 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action
25 August 1944 Absorbs 2 Tiger IIs of s.SS-Pz.Abt. 103, 2 Tigers are lost, destroyed by crew
27 August 1944 2 Tigers are lost, 1 lost in action ("221"), 1 destroyed by crew
29 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action
30 August 1944 5 Tigers are lost, 1 lost in action, 4 destroyed by crew, 2./ and 3./ have no tanks left

Schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 102

.....Ordered to the front in Normandy, the first seven trains unloaded west of Paris on 27 June 1944, however, the threat of attacks from the fighter-bombers was sufficient to delay their arrival at the front until 7 July. On 20 July, the 120nd still had 42 Tigers of which 17 were operational.

7 July 1944 28 operational tanks, but 3. Kompanie still hadn't reached the front
9 July-1 August 1944 Subordinated to 10. SS-Panzergrenadier Division Hohenstauffen
10 July 1944 5 Tigers are lost in action (2 by aircraft)
11 July 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action
26 July 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action
2 August 1944 Transferred to sector of 9. SS-Panzergrenadier Division Frundsberg with 38 Tiger I's, 1 Tiger is lost in action
3 August 1944 3 Tigers are lost in action
4 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew
5 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action
13 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action
14 August 1944 2 Tigers are lost in action
16 August 1944 2 Tigers are lost, destroyed by crew
17 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action
18 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew
19 August 1944 6 Tigers are lost in action
20 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew
21 August 1944 4 Tigers are lost, destroyed by crew
22 August 1944 4 Tigers are lost, destroyed by crew
25 August 1944 3 Tigers are lost, destroyed by crew (one sank in river crossing)
28 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew (sank in river)
30 August 1944 4 Tigers are lost, destroyed by crew
1 September 1944 All tanks lost during the retreat from Normandy


(note these losses are not complete for the formations, even in the time period of June-August 1944)...
XXXXXXX

I am not claiming these numbers to be 100% correct. however this material comes from an enthusiast site with a distinct "pro-Tiger Bias" But even these guys are not attempting to say that no Tigers were lost in Combat....

The Saumur Tank Museum Intranet site has published research data on German tank losses in Normandy, based on Allied analysis of tanks they found in field and data from Operation Goodwood.

For first month of Overlord,

48% by AP
7% by HEAT
9% by HE
1% by mines
10% by aircraft

The most amazing statistic is the percentage of panzers that were knocked out, by tank type. This statistic was computed by comparing tank losses to available tanks.

The PzKpfw IV, Panther, Tiger and StuG III all lost the same percentage of available vehicles during the first month. While CM threads often talk about the vulnerability of PzKpfw IV, due to light frontal armor, tank survival chances in a PzKpfw IV were equal to a Panther or Tiger.

Further research indicated that the Tiger tank was more efficient than Panther in terms of kills per tank compared to losses.

M-Kenny state that :
"This is a complicated area of Research. It is influenced by what months you use for the figures. Usually August is the cut-off point but the bulk of the German losses did not appear on the books until September. By carefully picking your date/percentage/area/definition of loss and excluding the German Stugs it is possible to show not a single German tank was lost due to Allied action!
For instance using German loss figures for the retreat in August (when abandonment was high) and applying the same high rate to June and July (when abandonment was low and AP kills were high)will give a skewed picture of reality.
Overal Normandy losses would be circa 3000:2000 Allied v German. Thus it is important we exclude a good number of the German losses so the myth of the high kill ratios can be continued....."

 

[Njaco]

Sorry for the double post. I found it.

"The Battle of Britain": by Roy Conyers Nesbit pg 151

"A disagreement between two of the RAF's Group Commanders broke out on August 26 when Park wrote to Dowding complaining that the squadrons sent from No. 12 Group under AVM Leigh-Mallory, under the rotation system, were of poorer quality than those sent from No. 13 Group under AVM Saul. He statewd that three squadrons sent from Saul had shot down 43 aircraft at the cost of four of their own, while the two sent from Leigh-Mallory had shot down only 17 enemy aircraft but lost 13 of their own number. On the following day, Park wrote complaining that 12 Group was failing to respond when asked to patrol airfields of 11 Group."

 

[kettbo]

On the subject of killing tanks, I've posted something like this before so I'll do it again ('cos I like repetition).

When I was a lad in uniform, there were different types of "kill" associated with heavy armour. The two I distinctly remember were the M-Kill for mobility kill and K-Kill for total destruction. I believe there was also a term associated with destroying the main armament (could have been A for armament or perhaps W for weapon - can't remember clearly 'cos they were pretty rare).

As others have noted, tanks are a huge logistics drain. They can be great in battle but getting them there and keeping them supplied is bluddy hard. Turning a tank into a smoking hole in the ground isn't the only way to eliminate an armoured capability. Looking at a tank formation as a target system (which includes logistics), one can try to take out each individual tank but they are hard targets because they're hard to find and very difficult to kill completely. The logistics chain is a much, much softer target - the fuel for several tanks can be eliminated by a single shot which blows up a tanker - and it's easier to find because fuel tankers drive on roads.

F-Kill, Firepower
Yes, tanks are hard to kill, trucks full of gasoline and ammo are easy to kill
The war was pretty much decided by the late fall of 44; Western Allies closing in on the German border, Much of Italy captured, USSR steadily pushing west

 

[tomo pauk]

If a tank was immobilised by AT fire, or HEAT rocket then it would be listed as lost to enemy action even if the crew survived and it didn't brew up. It would not be listed as abandoned or self destructed.

There are seperate listings for mines, AT hits, RPG, mechanical failure. Parsifal seeded the meme that abandoned or self destroyed meant immobilised by enemy action. Those tanks were recorded under gunfire, mines, Hollow charge rounds or mechanical failure. The categories are clear.

A plane fires a woley of rockets, that destroy sprocket wheel, so the tank is immobilised. Since the unit cannot receive any sprocket wheels (due to enemy action that is just destroyed supplies sent), and the enemy ground forces are narrowing down on the tank unit, the tank is blown up in order to prevent capture.
My question: under what causes is the lost counted - blown up by own crew, or destroyed by enemy action?

Hi, marshall,

From what I remember from Bungay's book RAF had biggest problems when Bf 110s damaged some radar installations and did some surprising attacks on key air bases of 11th Air Group(though Germans didn't know that). He elaborates that using Bf 110s all the time during the battle for this task and not to escort the bombers would be most useful for Germans.

But that's just from the back of my head.

That way of using a fast plane to bomb enemy assets, before enemy fighters can react, points that they were used very much in 'Schnellbomber' fashion.
The Bf-110 was one of the least numerous planes in BoB, so their effect, even when employed in such a fashion, would've been rather limited, and applicable mostly on areas near coast line? Anyway, much better usage than forcing them to do close escort.

 

[Njaco]

parsifal, I really don't remember where I got that...one of the sources at thestart of the BoB thread.

 

[Juha]

This rather beats about the Bush. Peipers tanks were not defeated in battle, or destroyed by enemy action: they were abandoned for supply starvation, the supply issue being fuel.

The fact that they were cutoff from supplies is a result of US air superiority intefering with what was a critical supply situation anyway as much as US Army action. Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain local air superiority a certain amount of fuel and ammunition would have been air dropped in parachute containers.

In fact LW tried to drop some fuel (1.5 tons?) and some ammo to Peiper, but dropped almost all into Stoumont, which was already recaptured by US troops, so they helped US forces. In any case you have interesting oppinion.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

In fact LW tried to drop some fuel (1.5 tons?) and some ammo to Peiper, but dropped almost all into Stoumont, which was already recaptured by US troops, so they helped US forces. In any case you have interesting oppinion.

Interestiong information Jha.

I wouldnt call it an interesting opinion as such. You and I have seen this opinion and approach many times before. Which is why its kinda funny really

 

[mhuxt]

Some reference was made earlier in this thread (or another?) to the RAF's reliance on the Spit V into 1944. Sorry, can't remember the exact wording.

I used the OOB in Foreman's Fighter Command War Diaries to whip up a quick map of Spitfire squadrons on 1 January 1944. Numbers don't seem to tell the whole story. FC's reliance on the V was more pronounced in the quiet sectors up north, far less so on the channel coast.

The numbers indicate the number of squadrons in the location (rough location for obvious reasons) - red is Spit V, green is Spit IX, blue is XI, black is VII and XII, the lighter colour I meant to use didn't show up.

As noted, that's the situation at the start of January. By the end of the month, 6 of the Spit V squadrons had converted to the IX, including two of those in the south.

 

[Grounded]

Is it true that only two types of US aircraft got into the air 12-7-41, at Pearl, P36 and P40? I've heard some P36 pilots got off the ground to fight. I've also heard the P40's did not..??