WW2 Aviation Mythbusters

[marshall]

Like your picture. Spitfires are so beautifull.
John

I agree, and the one on the avatar is the Spitfire from Battle of Britain Memorial Flight which actually took part in BoB. And I have to say that I quite often change avatars as I can't decide what plane I like more.

Hello Marshall
thanks for the correction, it has been years ago when I read on the combat and a short bio on Neubert. Oh, at least I remembered that there is something new (neu) in his name.

Thanks
Juha

Before I posted I've checked his name, so don't think I have such a good memory.

Another interesting thing about Frank Neubert and Wladyslaw Gnys is that they met after the war and become friends. Neubert wrote a letter to Gnys but hesitated to send it for a long time, eventually he did send the letter and Gnys send him invitation to his home in Canada (Beamsville) and they have met on 31 August 1989, almost exactly 50 years after they were fighting above Poland.

 

[Siegfried]

You are right Juha, though his name was Frank Neubert.

He shot down a PZL with a Stuka?

 

[Juha]

He shot down a PZL with a Stuka?

Yes, he shot down Cpt. Medwecki's P-11c.

Juha

 

[marshall]

He shot down a PZL with a Stuka?

Yes. Neubert's flight was attacking Cracow and two PZL P.11c fighters piloted by Mieczyslaw Medwecki and Wladyslaw Gnys were scrambled to intercept the bombers. Medwecki was shot down few moments after take off. Medwecki was shot in the liver and tried to do a forced landing but crashed. Gnys managed to escape and do a patrol flight. On that flight Gnys encountered two Do 17s and shot them down.

 

[renrich]

Some historians declare, and I tend to agree, that WW2 began in China in 1938. Given that the first air to air kills were probably by a Japanese AC.

 

[Vincenzo]

why in 38? was not 37 when started the war in china?

 

[pbfoot]

Italy invaded Ethiopia in 35

 

[Gixxerman]

"The Battle of Britain was virtually unwinable for the Luftwaffe."

Recently is has become fashionable for revisionist historians to say that the RAF couldn't have lost the Battle of Britain, or that the Luftwaffe had almost no chance of winning.
They argue that, overall, the Luftwaffe had fewer fighters than the RAF in the Battle, and therefore the RAF wasn't really outnumbered. Since Operation 'Sealion' (the German invasion of Britain) depended on the defeat of the RAF to succeed, they argue that the invasion threat was never serious. In fact, as RAF pilots were only too aware, the Luftwaffe could easily achieve local air superiority over their targets in southern England, and the RAF shortage was in pilots not aircraft. Had the Luftwaffe used better offensive tactics - as demanded by the aircrews themselves - such as allowing the escort fighters to roam more freely from the bombers, then German losses could have been lower and attacks more effective. Knocking out British RDF (radar) stations and systematically destroying RAF fighter bases would have severely limited RAF Fighter Command's ability to effectively defend Southern and Eastern England. If the sudden change in Luftwaffe tactics to area bombing of cities hadn't been made, (in reprisal for small scale RAF raids on Berlin), the RAF would have been forced to progressively retreat north and west, with an increasingly serious pilot shortage.

John

I've not seen too many revisionists at work here John, so I'm not sure I go along with this.

Wiki mentions the historian James Corum and he does make a very fair point about the 'weather window'.

The Stephen Bungay book (The Most Dangerous Enemy.........I'd recommend as an excellent read if you've not had the pleasure) does argue that alternate Luftwaffe tactics might have won the BoB for them, he especially mentions using the Me110 as a fast fighter-bomber intruder to make pin-point attacks on various high value targets (and as you mention radar especially).
He also talks about whether a more limited and local air superiority around the SE coastal area was possible and if that would have been sufficient to enable invasion (although that also brings in the variable not seen at that time, the Royal Navy and the Luftwaffe having to take that on).

But Bungay does show with each sides production and training schedules that the RAF did not come close to defeat - even during the airfield attack phase of the battle, and that with their loss rates they were on a hiding to nothing doing what they were doing.
German production at this stage is surprisingly low.

It's worth mentioning that it was largely only 11 group suffering the majority of losses, even with rotation this was far from the bulk of the RAF.
It also has to be remembered that German intelligence during the battle was utterly hopeless (perhaps surprisingly so given that at that stage they had been doing so well) and the British intelligence services were starting to make serious inroads with Ultra.

I would agree that to say there is no way the Luftwaffe could ever have won the BoB is a silly claim to make........but given how things were on each side (and standing head and shoulders above everything about the BoB - besides the RAF having adequte numbers of trained fighter pilots and machines largely the equal or, arguably, at that stage a little better than anything the Luftwaffe had - was the worlds first modern radar equipped fully integrated air defense system and above all it was properly understood operated as such) I think it is fairly difficult to see how the Luftwaffe could have truly won without one 'projecting' modern radically different tactics to it.

I say this not meaning to minimise or down-play the damage and danger or the terrible mauling Britain took during those dark days. ....or do similar to the young men on the German side and their courage and skills.

In fact I'd say that this (in reverse) is a well known myth (the RAF came within a hair's breadth/a few days/week or couple of weeks of losing the BoB)

One of my favourites....no tigers were knocked by the Allied AT fire in the whole of Normandy. They all ran out of petrol or were otherwise just abandoned.

This reminded me of something I'd read.
I've mentioned the book before but in 'The Final Hours: The Luftwaffe Plot Against Goring' by Johannes Steinhoff, in the preface he makes an interesting and rather scathing remark concerning one of his fellow inpatients inthe hopspital he was at, a member of a Tiger crew who had also had his face largely burned off.
"Not all Tigers destroyed thousands of Russian tanks".

So many myths.....

 

[Siegfried]

The Stephen Bungay book (The Most Dangerous Enemy.........I'd recommend as an excellent read if you've not had the pleasure) does argue that alternate Luftwaffe tactics might have won the BoB for them, he especially mentions using the Me110 as a fast fighter-bomber intruder to make pin-point attacks on various high value targets (and as you mention radar especially).
So many myths.....

That was the orginal role and specification of the "Zerstoerer" concept. The othe roles were bad weather fighter and bomber destroyer (over own territory). Fighter escort was not one of its orginal specs and had a spec been issued for a long range or twin engine fighter I'm sure the engineers would have come up with something completely different.

As far as the german tanks 'knocked out' at normany goes, it is true they mostly ran out of fuel or broke down.

Jarymowycz's work also includes a table of causes for German tank losses (time period not specified but probably relates to NW Europe 1944-45):

Gunfire.........................43.8%
Abandonment.....................18.3%
Mechanical.......................4.0%
Self destruction................20.7%
Air Attack.......................7.5%
Hollow-charge Rounds.............4.4%
Mines/Miscellaneous..............0.9%

If one takes ababonment and self destruction one ends up with 39% losses, mostly due to fuel. The Air attack figures are higher than British estimates which rank at around 4%.

 

[Juha]

Hello Siegfried
firstly 39% isn't over 50%
secondly, many tanks were abandoned, either simply left behind or demolished by the crews before they continued on foot because of Germans were surrounded, for ex in Falaise pocket or the end of KG Peiper. Or because of the retreat routes were blocked, for ex. on the left bank of Seine, Allied AFs had knocked all the bridges down and hindered badly possible ferries.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

A lot would also be abandoned because they had suffered some failure as well, such as a lost track, or a pentration of one of the hydraulic lines or engine bay area or any other myriad of failures that might occur. Some would run out of fuel, for sure, but to lump all losses "abandoned" to this cause (running out of fuel) is overoptimistic

which illustrates the point of the original myth in spades........

 

[tomo pauk]

If someone can asses why could Bf-110s play the major role in the BoB by employing a pin-point attacks, that would be most welcomed.
Another thing about the way LW fighter arm should have been employed: can anybody explain how the Bf-109Es would've conducted a real 'frei-jagd' over UK, to keep RAF on it's heels? Not just above SE England, of course.

 

[buffnut453]

Gixxerman,

It all depends what you mean by "winning the Battle of Britain". IMHO, the Luftwaffe didn't need to destroy the entire RAF Fighter Command - they just needed to dislodge 11 Gp from the forward airfields in East Anglia. Had they achieved that goal, there would have been no substantive fighter defences in front of London. Under such conditions, it's entirely feasible that Churchill would have faced a vote of no confidence which, had he lost, might have brought a new government that was more disposed towards reaching accommodation with Hitler.

There's much "what iffery" about my comments but they are within the bounds of reason.

 

[marshall]

If someone can asses why could Bf-110s play the major role in the BoB by employing a pin-point attacks, that would be most welcomed.

From what I remember from Bungay's book RAF had biggest problems when Bf 110s damaged some radar installations and did some surprising attacks on key air bases of 11th Air Group(though Germans didn't know that). He elaborates that using Bf 110s all the time during the battle for this task and not to escort the bombers would be most useful for Germans.

But that's just from the back of my head.

 

[Siegfried]

Hello Siegfried
firstly 39% isn't over 50%
secondly, many tanks were abandoned, either simply left behind or demolished by the crews before they continued on foot because of Germans were surrounded, for ex in Falaise pocket or the end of KG Peiper. Or because of the retreat routes were blocked, for ex. on the left bank of Seine, Allied AFs had knocked all the bridges down and hindered badly possible ferries.

Juha

Throw in mechanical failure and 44% of tanks were not lost due to enemy action but fuel/logistics issues which is a greater proportion than lost to gun fire. Peiper and his troops ran out of fuel and supplies and abandoned for that reason nothing to do with routes being blocked. Rockets/Typhoons had almost no impact: even at Falaise under heavy bomber bombardment. The tanks were dug out and continued on their missions. Allied air power murdered thousands of horses and made resupply during the day difficult. Greater emphasis on driving range in the tanks might have made a big difference to German tank readiness. Tanks listed as lost to abandonment clearly have NOT been lost to enemy action.

 

[tomo pauk]

If a tank is damaged by the enemy action, unable to move, and it's spare parts can't get to that tank (since enemy prevents logistics efforts), methinks enemy action has a lot to do with the abandonment.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Throw in mechanical failure and 44% of tanks were not lost due to enemy action but fuel/logistics issues which is a greater proportion than lost to gun fire. .

I'm glad that I had a less imaginitive maths master than yours obviously was; 39 + 4 = 43, not 44%

Peiper and his troops ran out of fuel and supplies and abandoned for that reason nothing to do with routes being blocked.

Which was due to Allied aircraft stopping the supplies getting through.

Allied air power murdered thousands of horses and made resupply during the day difficult.

Typical emotive tosh; you cannot murder an animal.

Tanks listed as lost to abandonment clearly have NOT been lost to enemy action

Then how do you explain reports, from pilots of rocket-firing Typhoons, that crews baled out, when they saw them lining up for an attack, and headed for cover? You can massage figures as much as you like, but those have clearly been abandoned due to enemy action.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Typical emotive tosh; you cannot murder an animal.

My wife would beg to differ...

 

[Juha]

Throw in mechanical failure and 44% of tanks were not lost due to enemy action but fuel/logistics issues which is a greater proportion than lost to gun fire. Peiper and his troops ran out of fuel and supplies and abandoned for that reason nothing to do with routes being blocked...Tanks listed as lost to abandonment clearly have NOT been lost to enemy action.

First of all, US troops had first stopped the point of KG Peiper and then captured Stavelot behind it, so no supplies got through. Then US troops defeated all German attempts to recapture Stavelot to reopen the supply route of the KG so Peiper decided to give up Stoumont and concentrated his KG at La Glaize. He waited there for help but the other KGs of 1.SSPzD could not get through the US forces, so KG Peiper had no other option that abandon its vehicles and trek through hills to the German lines. Notice that they didn't march along the road they had came, because it was blocked by US troops but sneaked through hills at night. So IMHO KG Peiper's AFVs were lost because of the actions by US forces.

 

[fastmongrel]

If you have run out of fuel because a Typhoon or P47 blew up the fuel tanker then that tank has been destroyed just as effectively as if it had been directly hit by said aircraft. A modern army can function for a few days without food and water whilst losing propotionate effectiveness the longer it is without supplies. Without fuel or ammunition it is simply a group of men in uniforms it ceases to be an army.

A tank any tank from the 1st world war on is a supply and maintenance black hole that needs constant refilling it also needs regular down time for servicing or its efficency plummets. You cant check and alter track tension whilst in combat or at constant risk of a ground attack aircraft finding you. This is why you see so many pictures of tanks abandoned with a track off, often its not due to direct enemy action its simply because a harried exhausted crew had no time to get the big tools out and adjust the track.

In modern terminology it is known as "Mission killed" in soldier speak it is known as "we are fuc***".