WW2 Aviation Mythbusters

"The Polish air force was wiped out in the first two days of World War Two."

The air force had secretly deployed to reserve airfields on 30th August 1939, and continued flying combat operations until the surrender

"The bomber will always get through."

This seems to have originated from war games and air defence exercises conducted during the early 1930's. Without the benefit of radar to direct fighters, the chances of a fighter standing patrol catching a bombing raid on the way in was found to be very slim. Consequently, many countries invested heavily in AA guns and searchlights to defend cities. The radar-assisted integrated air defence network pioneered in Britain during the late 1930s was fully vindicated during the Battle of Britain, and broke the myth.

"The modifications required for carrier service make naval fighters inherently inferior to land-based fighters. We don't need naval aviation."

This myth was not disproved until the introduction of the F6F Hellcat in 1943.

"Air power alone can win wars."

This myth was propagated by US Army Air Corps General Billy Mitchell in the 1920s. He managed to convince many Americans and was instrumental in the development of long range bombers such as the B-17. However, a decisive conclusion to a war normally requires the occupation of the enemy's territory. The Gulf War, for example, required a ground campaign - however brief - to apply the decisive blow. Arguably, Operation Allied Force begins a new trend, whereby a successful air campaign forces the enemy to accept a negotiated, (and thus unopposed), occupation of his territory.

John

Readie said:

"Air power alone can win wars."

This myth was propagated by US Army Air Corps General Billy Mitchell in the 1920s. He managed to convince many Americans and was instrumental in the development of long range bombers such as the B-17. However, a decisive conclusion to a war normally requires the occupation of the enemy's territory. The Gulf War, for example, required a ground campaign - however brief - to apply the decisive blow. Arguably, Operation Allied Force begins a new trend, whereby a successful air campaign forces the enemy to accept a negotiated, (and thus unopposed), occupation of his territory.

Click to expand...

Interestingly, I think we see echoes of this thinking in the movement of B-17s to the Philippines in late-1941. There were people in Washington who genuinely believed that the threat presented by these aircraft would force Japan to accede to America's political demands...of course we know how successful that was.

So, having crossed the streams and linked this thread to the Pearl Harbor-Hari Kari thread, I'll now duck out of the way. We will now return to our regularly-scheduled programme.

Myth:- Mitchell said that Spitfire was "A bloody silly name." He didn't; he said that it was "Bloody silly, naming it after a failure," referring, of course, to the 224.

How about "The AVG were in combat against the Japanese months, if not years, before America formally entered the war". That's a classic myth.

Click to expand...

I think that myth got sparked by the unusual manner the AVG was set up, which was before Pearl but they didn't enter action until after. The area was controlled by two warlords, colonial British interests, the Thai wanted independence, the Yellow River Valley...Chinese communists but this is circumstantial, chinese communism in reality split with soviet postwar because it is more like nationalism than communism, but in '36 they needed soviet support against the Japanese since the Americans/League was backing the corrupt and largely defunct kuomintang, got some great research on this and there's a lot to it, Chenault was really in the deep end politically over there and I don't think Washington really had any idea what was going on.

Anyway so about July41 what Washington and the Pentagon decided was that servicement would resign their commission in US military to serve with Chenault officially as mercinaries paid for by the Chinese. Of course the US gave the money to the Chinese to pay them, this was all just so that it looked okay on paper if the Japanese wanted to negotiate or the Yellow River Valley, which was the true provincial government from about 1932, in case they kicked up an international stink and the League found it convincing. They needed plausible deniability. As it happened the first Tomahawks they got were from the British, not the US, more of this plausible deniability but all that got tossed out the window after Pearl.

So even when the AVG was going into action, it wasn't part of the US really, and they felt very abandoned and alone out there, a little bit mercinary, and most importantly they did not have to recognise or practise any formal chain of command. They liked that bit.

So for them it still felt the same, America at war or not. Over there, it wasn't like you could drive down the shop and order a tacos, stop and buy the paper and see the difference of being at war. Those guys were in the middle of the jungle thinking about curbing the Japanese Imperialism that was entirely getting away from itself. The attack on Pearl did no more for them than confirm their fears, they were already enacting to combat the threat.

It is as if they went into action just prior to the US formally entering the war. They would've still felt like they were. They would've if Pearl didn't happen, the AVG was going into action one way or another.

vanir said:

It is as if they went into action just prior to the US formally entering the war. They would've still felt like they were. They would've if Pearl didn't happen, the AVG was going into action one way or another.

Click to expand...

Very true and just for the record, the AVG's first combat was 20 December 1941.

Readie said:

"The Fairey Swordfish flew so slowly that naval anti-aircraft guns couldn't track it." -

ALL the attacking Swordfishes in the 'Channel Dash' incident were shot down, mostly by AA fire.

John

Click to expand...

One of the surviving crewmen of the Bismarck said the problem with the Swordfish was that they flew at wave top height so that a lot of the time they were concealed by ocean swell, but this served a secondary purpose too, almost none of the guns on the Bismarck were capable of enough negative elevation to target them, only small guns. So what they did was fire some big guns into the water ahead of them at (presumably plunging fire, I've no visual concept of this myself, just what he said). They've splashed aircraft trying this tactic before like that, it was a common tactic in Europe apparently.

The Garand clip myth-
Allied soldiers used to throw empty M1 Garand clips onto the ground to fool enemy soldiers into exposing themselves thinking the Allied soldier's gun was empty. Just watched a new show on The Military Channel called Triggers last night and the Garand was the topic of the show. The host and a historian mentioned the tactic of throwing a empty clip. Is this totally false, or is there some truth to this myth.

Only thing remotely like that I've heard myself from German vets is the sound. They sometimes listened for the sound it makes when ejecting, it was very loud and very distinctive. Germans aren't stupid though, you wouldn't see an empty mag laying on the ground and leap up in front of an enemy barrel thinking you'll be fine would you? I'd call someone an idiot for doing that, or stare down at his body saying, yeah I knew that was going to happen.

Hard to believe large numbers of internationally respected professional infantry would be that stupid.

I myself would not risk my own life waiting for that distinctive ping sound. I would believe there might be some truth to it though. I imagine tens of thousands of soldiers lost their life by making foolish mistakes on both sides.

Two more myths and the truth.

"Parachutes will only make pilots abandon the fight too soon."
In fact parachutes were widely used in World War One by balloon observers. The static-line type parachutes then available were not suitable for abandoning out-of-control aircraft.

"Heavily armed twin-engined 'destroyer' fighters can easily match single-engined fighters."
In the period before World War Two, several designs of 'destroyer' fighter were flown. The most well known being the Messerschmitt Bf110, Westland Whirlwind, and Fokker G-I. These aircraft were usually intended as roving bomber escorts, designed to achieve air superiority over enemy territory. In the Battle of Britain, the Bf110 proved a complete failure, needing single-engined fighter escort itself! Only the P-38, in the vast Pacific Theatre, came close to the idea, and that was a very different type of aircraft.

John

I don't believe either the Whirlwind or the P-38 were intended to be "destroyers", from the american camp the Bell Aircuda was. The French certainly had one or more aircraft in that camp as well as perhaps the Japanese Ki 45 Nick?

No matter how you throw a Garand clip on the ground, it's no going to make a sound anything like what the Garand makes when it ejects that clip. Plus it would depend on where the American has his replacement clip, it only takes about a second to insert the new clip, and the bolt goes forward on it's own.

How about the myth about allied troops waiting for MG-42 crews to change barrels, then they charge the mg site?

I fired a MG-3 ( a modern 7.62 version of the MG-42) in the 1970's while in the Army in Germany, even I could change the barrel in less that 10 seconds, the barrel comes out sideways, you can do it from the prone position. The Bundeswehr crew could do it in half of the time I took. How much of a charge could a Army platoon manage in 5-6 seconds ? How would they know if the MG-42 crew is changing barrels, or just took a pause in their shooting ?

i think this is an other myth "In the Battle of Britain, the Bf110 proved a complete failure, needing single-engined fighter escort itself! "

Vincenzo said:

i think this is an other myth "In the Battle of Britain, the Bf110 proved a complete failure, needing single-engined fighter escort itself! "

Click to expand...

I think the statment that the BF 110 "needed a single engined fighter escort itself" could be looked upon as an exaggeration, but during the BoB the Bf-110 was a total failure within its initial role. From memory I think the Luftwaffe had about 240 -110s at the start of the BoB, I believe over 200 were lost by the fall of 1940. I'll have to do some research to find the exact numbers.

afaik the 110 was not bad in free fighter mission the heavy trouble come with near escort mission. w/o doubt a twin engined fighter has ever trouble vs single engined fighter if they are of same level of "state of art"* (110 was good v/s less capable single engined fighter)

* this is not more valid with jets

Vincenzo said:

afaik the 110 was not bad in free fighter mission the heavy trouble come with near escort mission. w/o doubt a twin engined fighter has ever trouble vs single engined fighter if they are of same level of "state of art"* (110 was good v/s less capable single engined fighter)

* this is not more valid with jets

Click to expand...

While I agree, bottom line during the Battle of Britian, the Bf-110 got mauled. Herman Goring's nephew was even shot down in one. It served well in other roles but the BoB showed its weaknesses.

FLYBOYJ said:

While I agree, bottom line during the Battle of Britian, the Bf-110 got mauled. Herman Goring's nephew was even shot down in one. It served well in other roles but the BoB showed its weaknesses.

Click to expand...

Talking of Herman..

"Adolf Galland rated the Spitfire so highly he told Goering 'Give me a squadron of Spitfires'." -

Here's a quote from his book The First And The Last:

"The theme of fighter protection was chewed over again and again. Goering clearly represented the point of view of the bombers and demanded close and rigid protection. The bomber, he said, was more important than record bag figures. I tried to point out that the Me109 was superior in the attack and not so suitable for purely defensive purposes as the Spitfire, which, although a little slower, was much more manoeuvrable. He rejected my objection. We received many more harsh words. Finally, as his time ran short, he grew more amiable and asked what were the requirements for our squadrons. Moelders asked for a series of Me109's with more powerful engines. The request was granted. 'And you ?' Goering turned to me. I did not hesitate long. 'I should like an outfit of Spitfires for my group.' After blurting this out, I had rather a shock, for it was not really meant that way. Of course, fundamentally I preferred our Me109 to the Spitfire, but I was unbelievably vexed at the lack of understanding and the stubbornness with which the command gave us orders we could not execute - or only incompletely - as a result of many shortcomings for which we were not to blame. Such brazen-faced impudence made even Goering speechless. He stamped off, growling as he went."


John

parsifal said:

I admit i always thought that the predictors on the bismarck and Tirpitz had a minimum setting of 100 knots , but the Swordfish had a max speed of 80 knots when loaded. The Germans rectified this error in 1942.

I cannot confirm this as myth or not, but it is mentioned in Campbells book and I believe on the Nvaweapons site.

Click to expand...

The myth basically isn't true in anyway shape or form.

Bismark had 4 predictors for the 8 sets of twin 10.5cm heavy FLAK guns.

The were two forward predictors port and starboard and two rear predictors. All four were meant to be the same.

The forward ones were very advanced: they were triaxially stablised and the they were fully tachyometric measureing speed and position and calculating an complete firing solution and shell bursting time. The rear predictor were meant to be the same type but due to agreements with the soviet union they were removed and given to the Soviets in order that Germany might meet her commitments. Germany's food and raw materials were in part paid for by those directors. So Bismarck went on her maiden mission with less advanced, temporary biaxial predictors.

The actual state of Bismarks Armanet and gunnery can be read in a report created only a month before here voyage:

AVKS Tests aboard Battleship Bismarck.
KBismarck.com - On-Line Archive - Armament Information

Page 46 explains a very serious problem which might have been fatal if not rectified.

Basically Bismark had the following heavy FLAK

Forward mountings (4): Dop. L. C/31
Aft mountings (4): Dop. L. C/37

The latter were brand new mountings, while the former were 8.8cm guns fitted with 10.5cm guns, the ne mounts had different rates of traverse and it seems some bugs that prvented the rear guns firing at low flying aircraft.

As far as Radar goes, the Bismark was as good as any in the world at the time, better than anything the USN had at the time. Its radar did have some level of integration into the FLAK eg range could be passed as well as bearing. Latter Seetakt radars were very tightly integrated and offered full anti aircraft blind fire capabillity, including height, with the FuMO 26 radar.

If there was a weakness it was that the 2.0cm C30 guns which fired at about 220 rpm per barrel and usually in single or duel mounts had not yet been replaced with the 2.0cm quad C38 FLAK vierling which fired at 480 rpm/barrel that Tirpitz received. These guns had excellent ballistics.

Another weakness was the 3.7 cm/L83 (1.5") SK C/30 which fired on 30 rpm per barrel from their twin gyro-stabalised mount. This gun had excellent ballistics but the ROF was poor.

Of course the vissibillity was poor and the Germans gunners had trouble seeing and ometime lost the Swordfish between the waves.

I would say any, effectively unescorted ship, might have suffered the same fate whether German, British or US as ship AAA had not been seruously upgraded.

fastmongrel said:

I reckon this is a myth in the mid 30s when the Bismark was designed virtually every torpedo bomber was a relatively slow biplane and even the fastest monoplane torpedo bombers could only drop there fish at around 100 knots max because the torpedo wouldnt take the water entry shock of anything faster.

Maybe just maybe the Royal Navy knew what it was doing using biplanes in the North Atlantic and maybe just maybe the German gunners werent the supermen the internet would have us believe.

Click to expand...

Bismarck likely did as well in the circumstances as other navies ships would have. They faced poor visibillity, and armement and systems that had not been fully debugged at a time all navies were upgrading their FLAK including the Germans. Tirpitz nearly quadroupled throw weight.

One year latter PoW suffered a single torpedo hit dropped by twin engine bombers, that had her dead in the water within 25 minutes, listing and with all gun turrets out of action bar one that was trained manually. She was sunk by only 4 torpedoes. PoW did shoot some of her attackers down, but she also had the benefit of good weather and calm seas.

bear in mind however that the Bettys and Nells that attacked the PoW were much faster than the Swordfish that attacked the bismarck. Also there were just 15 attackers against the the German battleship versus more than 50 attackers attacking the two RN battlewagons.

The specific events of bismarcks loss are as follows. The Swordfish attack took place at 2047. Bismarck was hit by a torpedo amidship which caused no damage. But then she was hit by a torpedo in the starboard rudder area. According to the rudder indicator, the rudder was jammed at 12º or 15º to port (the sources disagree here). Despite German anti-aircraft fire being very intense none of the Swordfish aircraft were shot down.

The different sources about the history of the Bismarck are disagree about what actually happened during the last air attack against the Bismarck. The outcome of my research seems to state the fact that:

1. Accounts differ as to the number of torpedo hits (two or three) and the order in which they occured.

2. All the sources agree that Bismarck turned to port when the fatal torpedo came towards her.

3. The Bismarck's rudder indicator indicated that the rudder was jammed either 12° or 15° to port. They disagree about that too.


Eleven topredoes were fired at her, it seems possible that three hit her. Thats a hit to launch ratio of 27%. Despite having a defensive flak umbrella described as heavy and despite the swordfish crews being hampered by poor weather and visibility (the fatal hit was delivered at 2047, in conditions of poor visibility and high winds), the fifteen attackers still managed to achieve either two or three hits (3 being the more likley) . the crews were aware they could not penetrate the main belt, they had to hit aft of the main belt. it is a credit to the crews that they managed this against a target moving at 20 knots, under either 12 or 15 degrees helm over (thats a violent manouvre for a battleship). It also means that the flak, despite its heavy barrage weight and sopbistication, failed at the very moment it was needed.

In sumary, what conclusions can we draw about Bismarcks flak effort in that battle. it was heavy, but it was neither accurate or effective: there were no losses to the Swordfish attackers, and the swordfish achieved a high hit to launch ratio, suggesting the the flak failed in the even more crucial task of throwing the attackers off aim. A year later tirpitzs 4.1 in batteries were effective in somewhat similar conditions, with quite a few swordfish lost.....what changed (the Light AA did not effectively engage in either battle, torpedoes were launched from too far away for them to be considere effective) for this top occur???

So, in effect, bismarcks fate was sealed by a single torpedo hit, the same as the POWs

Now, looking at the POWs experience. Around 11:40 AM, seventeen torpedo-equipped G3Ms arrived with nine attacking Prince of Wales and eight attacking Repulse. While the latter ship survived unscathed, Prince of Wales sustained a hit where its outer port propeller shaft exited the hull. Thats a hit to miss ratio of just 5.88% about 1/5 as good as the Swordfish crews achieved on the bismarck , in weather and visibility conditions far more suited to attacking. claims vary, but conservatively 4 of the 9 attackes are credited with being shot down in this attack. Causing severe flooding, the damage also slowed the ship to 16 knots and led to an 11.5 degree list. The hit also cut electrical power which left pumps inoperable and many anti-aircraft mounts unable to traverse.

At 12:20 PM, Force Z was hit by approximately 53 attackers. Prince of Wales took three torpedo hits to its starboard side from G4Ms flown by the Kanoya Air Group. Kanoya aircraft also struck at Repulse and attacked both sides of the ship. Bracketed, it was hit by four torpedoes.

Thats a total of 7 hits from 53 attackes, or a hit to launch rate of 13%. Thats against a much reduced flak effort, and against a ship no longer able to manouvre (similar to the bismarck predicament). Once again, however the RNs flak effort, if measured by the hit to launch ratios of the attacking japanese, was significantly bette than bismarcks shooting. Hard to account fo this better performance. I am doubtful that the FAA crews were much better trained than Matsunagas betty and nell crews. There were different weather condition, but the intensity and size of the japanese attacks were much greater, and the speed of delivery much faster.

Lacking anti-torpedo blisters, Repulse quickly began to flood and Captain William Tennant ordered abandon ship. Capsizing, it sank at 12:33 PM. Clinging to life and limping along on one propeller, Prince of Wales came under a bomb attack eight minutes later. Taking one hit, it slowly began rolling to port. Coming alongside, Express began removing the ship's crew. At 1:18 PM, Prince of Wales capsized and hit the destroyer as it sank. Though taking minor damage, Express survived

The only comparable situation between the two battles occured in the initial part of PoWs attack. At that point, the 17 attackers of the Kanoya air group achieved 1 hit out of 17 launches, in conditions more suited to the attack

To be honest, no real conclusions can be drawn about the relative advanatages and efficiency of the respective flak efforts. The statistical samples are simply too small to draw conclusions from. However Bismarck flak effort on the day of her demise was not impressive, and m,arkedly less effective than POWs effort the following December. it was heroic, but it was not impressive. Neither were her passive defensive arrangements all that good. she was disabled by the same number of hits as the PoW.