WW2 Battle of Britain, how many bombers (or fighters) did the Hurricane shoot down, compared to the Spitfire?

[Todd Secrest]

In the Battle of Britain, the Hurricane shot down about twice as many Nazi (german) aircraft, compared to the Spitfire.
How many bombers (HE-111, Stuka, etc) did the Hurricane shoot down and how many bombers did the Spitfire shoot down?
And how many German fighter were shoot down (Hurricane vs Spitfire)?

 

[pbehn]

In the Battle of Britain, the Hurricane shot down about twice as many Nazi (german) aircraft, compared to the Spitfire.
How many bombers (HE-111, Stuka, etc) did the Hurricane shoot down and how many bombers did the Spitfire shoot down?
And how many German fighter were shoot down (Hurricane vs Spitfire)?

Well that gets very complicated.

 

[Hornchurch]

In the Battle of Britain, the Hurricane shot down about twice as many Nazi (german) aircraft, compared to the Spitfire.
How many bombers (HE-111, Stuka, etc) did the Hurricane shoot down and how many bombers did the Spitfire shoot down?
And how many German fighter were shoot down (Hurricane vs Spitfire)?

'


The Hawker Hurricane's recognised quota/percentage of kills (during THAT 1940 air-campaign), is circa 64-65% (around 2/3rds)


Around 25-years ago, one comment I 'loved', was reading an actual letter-home, from a young "Hotshot" JG.26 pilot (Me.109's)

Writing to his parents he said..... "The Hurricanes ARE TIRED OLD PUFFERS" - (But he 'raved' about the Spitfire)

"I once saw a LONE Spitfire, surrounded in the sky, by some 14-15 Messerschmitts - He danced around them, not once getting into any trouble"

The letter then rambled-on about other uninteresting & irrelavnt stuff, but HIS mind was 'set' on how 'good' the Spitfire was.


Made me roar with laughter, as just three-weeks later, HE WAS DEAD - Shot-down & butchered by, what was it now again ?

Ahhhh yeah, I remember = "TIRED OLD PUFFERS!"

Not shouting the odds QUITE so loud now, eh, fool !

The Hurricane 'took-out' plenty beyond that date, as well.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Hurricane is the Rodney Dangerfield of the RAF. No respect.

 

[nuuumannn]

Well that gets very complicated.

Yup, I'm waiting for the discussion on overclaiming...

 

[Todd Secrest]

Hopefully someone who knows the details on this will see this thread.

 

[PAT303]

They were about one to one but the Spit pilot had about half a percent better chance of survival. All up it didn't matter if you flew a Hurri Spit or 109, they all missed equally as bad as each either.

 

[pbehn]

Hopefully someone who knows the details on this will see this thread.

The problem with the details is that the devil is in the detail. People still believe that Hurricanes were used to attack bombers while Spitfires took on the escorts. Not only was this not true, it couldn't be true. If 2/3s of the RAF planes are Hurricanes and 1/5 to 2/5 of LW planes are bombers it is impossible to have such a distribution. If you are in a squadron in NE England or Scotland you wont see a Bf 109 or a Ju 87. Park didn't use squadrons as Spitfires or Hurricanes he just used them as squadrons so the relative kill to loss rate depended on the deployment which depended as much on geography as anything else. In 12 group you had the largely ineffective "big wing" philosophy but in 11 group there was 1 squadron of aces (303 squadron) which changes the overall number count drastically.

 

[Hornchurch]

The problem with the details is that the devil is in the detail.

People still believe that Hurricanes were used to attack bombers while Spitfires took on the escorts.

Not only was this not true.....,

'


Good to see another (like myself), who'll debunk that stupid, stupid "myth"

Those that 'know', know that Park/Dowding & 11-Group WOULD throw-up whatever WAS available at the time - (no time for niceties)

The defence of the nation is at stake & they DON'T have time or resources to 'micro-manage' the "Spitfires/Escorts" - "Hurricane/Bombers" nonsense.

Yeah, sure, "in an ideal world" that's what they'd do........ in an ideal world.

But heavily outnumbered & concerned with loss of pilots AND potential replacements, they'd throw up whatever squadron when they can.....

Time, place, circumstances - The 'stars' in one's outlooks & plans sadly rarely-align !

(Strength, under-strength flights, Re-arm, Re-Fuel, therefore unable to react at that precise-second, then the burden falls to someone-else ; another Sqdn)

You always get that 'sheeet' (word which sounds like) - Always hear & see it spouted-off by all the 'You Tube' EXPERT armchair-warriors.

Sadly, that myth WILL no doubt be perpetuated, by those who've barely scratched the surface.....

.

 

[Greyman]

I can't find the thread where this myth was addressed but it is what they endeavoured to do -- at least when operating the larger formations. Naturally it wasn't always possible.

Whenever possible the minimum fighter formation to meet a large enemy formation should be a wing of two or more Squadrons, and when necessary, to secure superiority in numbers or to reduce inferiority as far as possible, a force of two fighter wings should be operated as a tactical formation. In the latter case it is important that Spitfire Squadrons should be available for engaging enemy fighters, owing to their superior performance at high altitudes.

Fighter Command Tactical Memorandum
Operation of Fighter Forces By Day
14/12/40

 

[pbehn]

I can't find the thread where this myth was addressed but it is what they endeavoured to do -- at least when operating the larger formations. Naturally it wasn't always possible.

Whenever possible the minimum fighter formation to meet a large enemy formation should be a wing of two or more Squadrons, and when necessary, to secure superiority in numbers or to reduce inferiority as far as possible, a force of two fighter wings should be operated as a tactical formation. In the latter case it is important that Spitfire Squadrons should be available for engaging enemy fighters, owing to their superior performance at high altitudes.

Fighter Command Tactical Memorandum
Operation of Fighter Forces By Day
14/12/40

The date on that is important.

 

[Greyman]

Here's a clipping from Dowding's despatch on the Battle. When he writes 'this third phase' he means the London attack phase of the battle.

Highlighting is mine.

 

[nuuumannn]

Good to see another (like myself), who'll debunk that stupid, stupid "myth"

Yup, it was actually a policy that 12 Group put into practise, 'fraid to say.

Reference document titled Report on Wing patrols sent up by 12 Group, 7th, 9th, 11th, 15th September 1940, dated 17 September 1940 and signed by Trafford Leigh Mallory. A sentence in the first paragrah confirming the policy:

"Definite roles have been allocated to the squadrons on each occasion, with the general idea of having Spitfire Squadrons above the Hurricane squadrons so that the former could attack enemy fighters and prevent their coming down to protect their bombers, while the remainder of the Wing break up and destroy enemy bombers."

The next four pages of the document detail scenarios in which this was applied and its success rate. This was emphasising the whole Big Wing thing that Mallory kept on about, but these were tactics 12 Group applied in battle when utilising the Big Wing.

 

[buffnut453]

Dowding's report is interesting because the Hurricanes weren't going for the bombers. They were also tasked to take on any close-in fighter escorts. That's a distinction that I've never seen made before in any discussion of this topic.

 

[stona]

30 Hurricane squadrons were credited with 655 victories, at 22.5 per squadron.

19 Spitfire squadrons were credited with 530 victories, at 28 per Squadron.

Who shot down most bombers or fighters would be a labour of love for someone trawling through a good reference like The Battle of Britain Then and Now, but it won't be me.

It is true that the intention that Hurricane squadrons should engage the bombers and close escort while the Spitfire squadrons engaged the higher flying escorts was expressed on several occasions. In reality it proved a policy impossible to implement. The state of a squadron's readiness and its geographical position relative to an incoming raid always over rode considerations of the type it operated.

 

[PAT303]

Whenever possible the minimum fighter formation to meet a large enemy formation should be a wing of two or more Squadrons, and when necessary, to secure superiority in numbers or to reduce inferiority as far as possible, a force of two fighter wings should be operated as a tactical formation. In the latter case it is important that Spitfire Squadrons should be available for engaging enemy fighters, owing to their superior performance at high altitudes.

Plans like that work perfectly right up to the point of contact, then it falls on it's arse and it's every plane for himself.

 

[stona]

I don't want to edit a post to which people have already reacted, so I will add here that on 14 June, Park presided over a conference of squadron commanders at Northolt, to thrash out the best tactics for opposing the expected German onslaught. In Park's summing up he reminded squadron commanders of a principle he would stress over and over again once the battle began: their aim, he said, was the destruction of enemy bombers and action against enemy fighters was only a means to this end.

The Germans had a say in this too. From 24 August (by Park's reckoning) the Germans sent over smaller bomber formations escorted more closely by their escorts. This made it more difficult for Park's men to avoid the fighters while engaging the bombers. By detailing some fighters to go high to engage non-existent high escorts the controllers were allowing these bombers an easy run. This was compounded by squadron commanders adding a few thousand feet to minimise the chance of being caught at a disadvantage. Some of the intercepting fighters were too high, and orders were issued to avoid this.


In relation to the three phases of the Battle, referred to in Greyman's post, these in fact originated with Park, though Dowding adopted them. Phase one ran from 8-18 August, phase two from 19 August to 5 September and phase three was still on going on 22 September when Dowding forwarded Park's quoted report (which Evill had requested on 6 September and Park had provided within a week), along with his own comments, to the Air Ministry.

 

[pbehn]

The advocates of a strategy see the positives not the negatives of it. Operating squadrons in pairs automatically cuts the number of fighting units in two, so you have more chance of landing an effective blow but also more chance of not hitting anything at all. The appearance of the "big wing" may have had an effect on those who saw it, was it more effective than 5 squadrons coming from different directions or 15 flights of 4.

 

[Hornchurch]

Yup, it was actually a policy that 12 Group put into practise, 'fraid to say.


.

Hi nuuuuumann ; If ya actually read thru my post (#.9), I was referring to 11-Group - (look again, it says it).


I do tend to centralise on 11-Group (my bad), as they were "Johnny on the spot" & on the doorstep of the Channel (& therefore, Germans).


Less notice, more frantic & far-less time than those wazzocks in (cozy/cushy), '12-Group' & Bader's "Let's Waste Time Formating" B.S.


Never had any time for that knob 'Leigh-Mallory' - (Big Wings shoulda been re-named 'Big Wank')


The Trevor Howard scene (1969 film, as 'AVM Park'), "You're NOT defending MY airfields Leigh.... " Blah, Blah (you know the score)


My main roll-eyes over Leigh "I'm The Man" (NOT), was when the twat was 'inspecting' a Belgian Sqdn at Northolt..... (in the rain)


He'd given 'strict' instructions NOT to be disturbed, under any circumstances......


Menatime, the Germans (once again), couldn't be arsed to 'wait' for Leigh-Malloy (as I call him, or his pompous-wanker self-importance/ego.


So whilst dimlow was 'inspecting' & indulging in pompous B.S, meantime the Prinz Eugen, Tirpitz & the rest were "doing the Channel-Dash" thang.


Yeah Leigh-Mal', SO damn impressive.

 

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