It seems that up to the end of 1942, the Luftwaffe had contested control, or at least had the upper hand in the skies over Europe. Both the FW190 and the Bf109 F and early G models held air superiority. When did the Luftwaffe started loosing the war in the skies over Europe? Why?
WW2 Control of the skies over Europe
- Thread starter Maromero
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I would say mid 1943. The appearance of the longer range USAAF fighters was important and of course the bomb loads of US heavy bombers, which meant that LW fighters didn't have anymore the privilege to decide, engage or not depending on tactical situation, but their had to try to disturb the bombers. Also RAF pilots had learned from past errors, they got Spitfire IX with Merlin 63s and 66s which were better than those with Merlin 61s and more and more reliable Typhoons for lower altitude combats. Also during early part of 43 RAF got new, longer range radars for fighter control over France which meant better situation awareness to RAF formation leaders over France. If one looks only Spitfires vs. LW fighters in the ETO; in July 43 it was rather even, LW had a slight advance but in Nov 43 Spitfires seemed to have won all the bigger combats.
The UK is part of Europe the LW did not gain control over UK skies, or the sky over Malta. From the fall of France the superiority of the LW over the land that Germany and its allies held gradually diminished with what people now would call certain "mile stones". The Battles of Britain and Malta thwarted the LW in the west. Cologne May 1942 saw the first 1000 bomber raid, the numbers were a propaganda target and it drew bombers from all over the RAF but was a sign of things to come. Dieppe August 1942 was a military disaster for the British but saw the First use of USA B-17s, RAF first kill and loss for the Mustang Mk I (P-51) and first use of the Spitfire Mk IX in numbers, US "Tiger Squadrons" were involved flying Spitfires, they would soon switch to P-47s.
I think it can be attributed to technical and manufacturing failures that manifested in 1942. The Me 109G1 came into service around April 1942 it had a speed of 400.5mph / 640kmh. It was in service at most a couple of weeks before the two stage Merlin 61 powered spitfire IX which managed about 412 mph. The reason of the 12 mph slower speed of the 109 was that the DB601A failed to achieve its full 1.42 atmosphere boost rating (about 1420 hp) and was restricted to 1.3ata (about 1300hp) till almost October 1943 by which time the various bulges the Me 109G6 had developed and the loss of a retractable tail wheel cut speed to 387mph. The full rating of 1.42 ata restored speed to 399mph but Within months by December 1943 the 440mph Mustang was comming into service and the P47 was around as well.
The Me 109K1 was to remedy this but was delayed by 7 months by a sucesfull bombing which destroyed workshop and plans.
The situation of the degraded airframe and lagging engine tech (poor lubrication system arising from DB inexperience in move to journal bearing from roller bearings) should never have been allowed to develop.
How many Luftwaffe pilots lost their lives over the 12 missing mph? (20kmh) a lot I would bet. The high wing loading of the Me 109 meant it actually needed more speed than the spitfire to compensate and it really needed 100 extra hp on top of the 1420.
That year, 1942, the failure of the He 177 also manifested. The aircraft should have been in widespread service providing continuous reconnaissance on convoy positions, headings and escort strengths, attacking using computing bomb sights or Fritz-X bombs. This was at a time things were going badly for the u-boats due to ASV radar comming into service.
The aircraft also should have been pressuring Soviet production by bombing its Ural factories.
The Me 210 also failed leaving a black hole that disrupted He 111, Me 110 and ju 88 production. Though eventually fixed that aircaft was meant to replace in full the Me 110 and in part the Ju 87 and Ju 88 in many roles and never recovered as the Me 410.
1942 also saw widespread introduction of british microwave radar on AI, ASV and H2S the very year Germans cancelled their own microwave program. That lead to the late 1943 jamming of many German radars since microwave radars are hard to jam due to their narrow beams.
Britains production of bombers and fighters was underwritten by US lend lease and it was all but impossible to compete with US subsidies.
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That's a part of WW2 history I have to review. I know Jg53 had a hard time at it over Malta and I know some of the history regarding Malta's strategic importance in relation to North Africa's campaign (supply and blockade) but I've never dived into the air war over Malta.
An interesting read. Malta is smaller than the Isle of Wight and Isle of Man. It was initially defended by a few Gloster Gladiators by August 1942 it had 163 Spitfires (120 serviceable) which is about 25% of what Dowding/Park had to defend all the UK at the fall of France 1940. Italy and Germany just had to take Malta or eventually pay the price, they invaded North Africa and Russia instead.
I won't address the when, but the why.
IMO the Luftwaffe did not have the resources, experience manpower , or enough aircraft to cover all the fronts they were responsible for.
They had North Africa, and the Eastern front, in addition to Europe to cover.
They couldn't do it all.
IMO the Luftwaffe did not have the resources, experience manpower , or enough aircraft to cover all the fronts they were responsible for.
They had North Africa, and the Eastern front, in addition to Europe to cover.
They couldn't do it all.
On the Eastern Front, a/c were moved to the "hot spots" leaving the area they came from virtually undefended.
My impression was that both Allies and Germans fielded comparable fighter aircraft, at different times one side may have held a slight technonological edge, but never enough to be in itself decisive, that is compensating for difference in pilot skills.
Or numbers. I got the idea that when the US war machine got into gear, it started mass-producing fighter aircraft in numbers that the Luftwaffe simply could not compete with. attempting to only leading to a death spiral of loosing experienced pilots while the US training centers provided enough competent pilots to keep up.
Or numbers. I got the idea that when the US war machine got into gear, it started mass-producing fighter aircraft in numbers that the Luftwaffe simply could not compete with. attempting to only leading to a death spiral of loosing experienced pilots while the US training centers provided enough competent pilots to keep up.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Also the Allies were able to cycle experienced pilots to training squadrons. That had to help compensate for lesser aircraft the Allies earlier on, imho.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,986
- Jun 25, 2013
The Germans were able to have rotated experienced pilots through training units; the Luftwaffe chose not to do so, likely as keeping pilots in field units was a short-term benefit.
The Brits had their own training plan, the BCATP, which partially shut down in the last year because there was so many air crew.
drgondog
Major
The loss of air supremacy over Europe is too broad. The LW maintained parity over Kanal countries against RAF and AAF until late 1943/early 1944 when the P-51B and new P-38J extended the tactical footprint deep into Germany - and the array of twin engine fighters used effectively against AAF daylight raids were completely neutralized. The single engine day fighters were at a disadvantage to the P-38J and P-51B at B-17 and B-24 altitudes - but compelled to engage US bombers 'at all costs' and avoid the fighters. This strategy had the subtle effect of taking pre-1944 aggressiveness from LW in dealing with US fighters. Even if the performance advantage and average pilot skill were not in favor of US fighters and pilots, the LW was forced into a war of attrition of experienced fighter pilots that they could never win.
33k in the air
Staff Sergeant
- 1,283
- Jan 31, 2021
Coinciding with the start of 1944 was also the change in USAAF fighter escort policy initiated by Gen. Doolittle. The job of the fighter was no longer to protect and stay with the bombers at all costs, but instead to aggressively hunt down German fighters wherever they could be found.
A Mister Johnson from Number Ten would like a word...
The Germans never had air superiority over Great Britain at any time, contrary to popular belief...
The Luftwaffe never had air supremacy to be sure, the RAF was always up for a fight. However, it might have qualified for localized air superiority over south-east England, as they were strong enough to push their attacks through, albeit with casualties. I guess it depends on how mere superiority is defined.A Mister Johnson from Number Ten would like a word...
The Germans never had air superiority over Great Britain at any time, contrary to popular belief...
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
And at the start of U.S. involvement in the war, pilots were in short supply to the point of creating an "enlisted pilot program" where NCOs could qualify (two notable NCO pilots were Carrol Shelby and Bob Hoover).
Conversely, as the Luftwaffe's pilot pool started to suffer in the later years of the war, they started to tap into the NCO ranks.
Of note, would be an Unteroffizier, Oberfeldwebels, Feldwebels and even a Gefreiter who were aces flying the Me262.
Conversely, as the Luftwaffe's pilot pool started to suffer in the later years of the war, they started to tap into the NCO ranks.
Of note, would be an Unteroffizier, Oberfeldwebels, Feldwebels and even a Gefreiter who were aces flying the Me262.
The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms of the US Department of Defense defines air superiority as "that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force."
At no time was Britain's ability to defend its territory during the Battle of Britain disrupted to the point of the Luftwaffe establishing even local air superiority. Reconnaissance aircraft were tracked and routinely shot down, air raids were tracked almost immediately as they formated over France, plotted and intercepted - not always were the interceptions successful, but the mere fact that they were plotted and could have been successful but weren't for whatever reason is contrary to the Luftwaffe holding even local air superiority.
Statistically, the entire campaign by the Germans didn't go well for them. Between mid July and the end of August there were only five days where the Luftwaffe achieved a favourable kill to loss ratio against the defenders. Throughout the entire Battle of Britain however, RAF Fighter Command achieved a higher kill to loss ratio - it managed to shoot down on average two German aircraft to every British fighter shot down. By September 1940, the British aircraft industry was in a position where more fighters were being produced and were available than what was being lost. The same could not be said for the Luftwaffe.
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There was several Luftwaffe aces of 'NCO' rank that were active in the early years, some even aces. Granted most pilots were of officer rank.
Example:
Franz Schulte, Feldwebel
46
JG 77
Knight's Cross
KIA 12 August 1942
List of World War II aces from Germany - Wikipedia
Example:
Franz Schulte, Feldwebel
46
JG 77
Knight's Cross
KIA 12 August 1942
List of World War II aces from Germany - Wikipedia
