WWII and Korean War Tankbuster Aces

an old thread, Parsifal can you use any of this info, delete most of the silliness within ? http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/stories/hans-ulrich-rudel-tank-destroyer-349.html

Thanks erich, I did see it....googled it actually. there is some good stuff in there for sure. Will try and harvest the best.


I just dont understand why this is such a touchy issue

was there any american or british pilots that where great at it

Ill try and find an account that I saw a couple of years agao. I cannot attest to its accuracy, but for what its worth the top scoring tank killer was a Soviet Pilot with about 55 kills. The top scoring western tank killer was an American with about 40 kills.

From memory, the Commonwealth did not award kills for ground targets.

Ill stand corrected on any of that.


This according to wiki....

"The true capabilities of the Il-2 are difficult to determine from existing documentary evidence. W. Liss in Aircraft profile 88: Ilyushin Il-2 mentions an engagement during the Battle of Kursk on 7 July 1943, in which 70 tanks from the German 9th Panzer Division were claimed to be destroyed by Ilyushin Il-2s in just 20 minutes. However, on 1 July 1943, the 9th Panzer Division had only a total of 83 tanks and armored command vehicles available, which continued in action for over three months with most of its initial tanks still intact.

In another Soviet report of the action on the same day, a Soviet staff publication states that:

Ground forces highly valued the work of aviation on the battlefield. In a number of instances enemy attacks were thwarted thanks to our air operations. Thus on 7 July enemy tank attacks were disrupted in the Kashara region (13th Army). Here our assault aircraft delivered three powerful attacks in groups of 20-30, which resulted in the destruction and disabling of 34 tanks. The enemy was forced to halt further attacks and to withdraw the remnants of his force north of Kashara".

—Glantz and Orenstein 1999, p. 260.

"Further Soviet claims during the Battle of Kursk, suggest the Sturmoviks destroyed over 270 tanks and several thousand men in a period of just two hours against the 3rd Panzer Division. Again, here on the 1st of July before the start of Operation Zitadelle, the 3rd Panzer Division had only 90 tanks and armored command vehicles, which is 180 less than the Soviets claimed as destroyed by Sturmoviks and on 11 July, the division still had 41 operational tanks.

Finally, the Soviet claim that over a period of 4 hours Sturmoviks destroyed 240 tanks of the 17th Panzer Division and virtually wiped them out is also of questionable merit. On 1 July the 17th Panzer Division had only a total of 67 tanks and armored command vehicles, which is 173 fewer total tanks than claimed destroyed by the Sturmoviks. Furthermore, the division did not even participate in the battle, being in Army Group South reserve."

Clearly there are problems then with Soviet claims. My suspicion is that many of the vehicles claimed as tanks, were in fact other vehicles, or simply that the Soviet reports are innaccurate. But this as much as showing the innaccuracy of Soviet claims, also shows that claims against ground targets are often in error, even when the best intentions are there.


Wiki contues:

"In the Battle of Kursk, General V. Ryazanov became a master in the use of attack aircraft en masse, developing and improving the tactics of Il-2 operations in co-ordination with infantry, artillery and armoured troops. Ryazanov was later awarded the Gold Star of Hero of Soviet Union twice, and the 1st Attack Aircraft Corps under his command became the first unit to be awarded the honorific title of Guards.

Total German tank losses in Operation Zitadelle were approximately 1,612 tanks and assault guns damaged and 323 irreparably destroyed, the majority most likely to Soviet AT guns and armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs). Total German fully tracked AFV losses on the entire East Front from 1941 to 1945 were approximately 32,800 of which approximately 2,300 were lost to direct air attack from the IL-2s and other aircraft such as the Petlyakov Pe-2.

In 1943, one loss corresponded to 26 Sturmovik sorties. About half of those lost were shot down by fighters, the rest falling to anti-aircraft fire.

The main problem with the Il-2 was the inaccuracy of its attacks. Towards the end of war the Soviets were able to concentrate massive numbers of Sturmoviks to support their main offensives. However, particularly against dug-in and armored targets, the effect was often more psychological than actual physical destruction of targets. In the 9 June offensive in the Karelian Isthmus in Finland, the Finnish AA forces were far too few in numbers to counter the armadas of Pe-2 and Il-2, but they quickly found that the Il-2 attacks generally missed their marks widely, particularly with bombs. While some attacks against large unprotected targets such as horse and truck convoys and railyards had devastating results, attacks against dug-in point targets were usually ineffective. The frequent duels between dug-in 20 and 40mm AA guns and Il-2 attackers never resulted in the complete destruction of the gun, while many Il-2s were brought down in these attacks.

The heavy armor of the Il-2 also meant that it would typically carry only comparatively light bomb-loads, which together with the poor accuracy of its attacks made it a far less deadly attack aircraft than the contemporary fighter-bombers of the western allies such as the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt and Hawker Typhoon. Likewise the Shturmovik's bombs were usually only 50 kg (rarely 100 kg), too small to compensate for the typically wide variation from target point.

To compensate for the poor accuracy of the Il-2's bombsight, in 1943 the Soviet Command decided to use shaped-charge armor-piercing projectiles against enemy armored vehicles, and the PTAB-2.5-1.5 SCAP aircraft bomb was put into production. These small-calibre bombs were loaded directly into the bomb bays and were dropped onto enemy vehicles from altitudes up to 100 meters (328 ft). As each Il-2 could carry up to 192 bombs, a fire carpet 70 meters (229 ft.) long and 15 meters (49 ft) wide covered the enemy tanks, giving a high "kill" probability.[31] Pilots of 291st ShAP were the first to use the PTAB-2.5-1.5 bombs. During one sortie on 5 June 1943, six attack aircraft led by Lt. Col. A. Vitrook claimed to have destroyed 15 enemy tanks in one attack, and during five days of the enemy advance the 291st Division claimed to have destroyed or damaged 422 enemy tanks".


"Senior Lieutenant Anna Yegorova piloted 243 Il-2 missions and was decorated three times. One of these awards was the Gold Star of Hero of the Soviet Union that she had received "posthumously" in late 1944, as she was presumed dead after being shot down. She managed to survive imprisonment in a German POW camp. Junior Lieutenant Ivan Grigorevich Drachenko, another Il-2 pilot, was reputedly one of only four men who were decorated as both Heroes of the Soviet Union and also won all three of the Orders of Glory.

Hero of the Soviet Union recipient T. Kuznetsov survived the crash of his Il-2 in 1942 when shot down returning from a reconnaissance mission. Kuznetsov was able to escape from the wreck and hide nearby. To his surprise, a German Bf 109 landed near the crash site and the pilot began to scrounge around the wrecked Il-2 possibly to assist Kuznetsov or to look for souvenirs. Thinking quickly, Kuznetsov ran to the German fighter and used it to fly home, barely avoiding being shot down by Soviet fighters in the process.

Lt. Col. Nelson Stepanyan flew an Il-2 and participated in a number of aerial battles and bombing sorties. He was shot down once but managed to return to the Soviet lines. On his final sortie in Liepāja, Latvia on December 14, 1944, his plane was hit by anti-aircraft fire and, though wounded, was able to steer his plane and ram it into a German warship. Soviet sources assert that Stepanyan undertook no less than 239 combat sorties, sunk 53 ships thirteen of which he did alone, destroyed 80 tanks, 600 armored vehicles, and 27 aircraft".

Thanks for excerpts.
It's refreshing that nowhere the never-built Il-2M3 isn't mentioned

and interesting piece i read on kursk awhile back...it references Glantz's work. i cant vouch for the accuracy of this as i do not know much about kursk. so you can tell me if this is true, hogwash, or something inbetween.

The Battle of Kursk

an older work but something to be considered allowing for the LW and overclaiming during Kursk and probably simple StG Soviet tank claims in general

Tank Busting Aircraft at Kursk - The Dupuy Institute Forum

An intersting extract from Christer Bergstroms Book, RED STAR - BLACK CROSS; Russian and German Fighter Pilots in Combat 1941-1945', and investigates one of the near misses for Rudel.

"On 10 August (9 August, according to the Russian report), Shestakov's fighters were engaged by fourteen Bf 109s of II./JG 77 flying as escort for the He 111s of KG 27. While the German pilots Oberleutnant Anton Hackl and Fahnenjunker-Gefreiter Günther Marschhausen each claimed one I-16 shot down and II./JG 77 reported no other loss than one damaged Bf 109 E, 69 IAP claimed to have shot down nine Bf 109s without any losses.

Lev Shestakov eventually flew more than 200 missions during the war, took part in 32 aerial combats and was credited with 15 kills before being killed in action in March 1944. According to Lavrinenkov's book, Lev Shestakov fought a private war with a well-known German Stuka ace - a 'Kurt Renner', who was awarded 'the Golden Knight's Cross'. No such Stuka ace existed, but the famous Stuka flier Hans-Ulrich Rudel - who flew over the same operational area as did Shestakov - was the only person to be awarded the Knight's Cross with the Golden Oak Leaves.

Interestingly, Lavrinenkov, who flew in Shestakov's unit, describes how he once met 'Renner' on the ground. His Airacobra hit by debris from a FW 189 he had shot down, Lavrinenkov went down over enemy-held territory and was captured by the Germans. He was brought to the Stalino airfield, where he met 'Renner'. Lavrinenkov claims that 'Renner' thought he was Shestakov, because he flew the Airacobra with call-code '01'. (Later, Lavrinankov managed to escape from a POW transport due to Germany, joined a guerilla detachment and eventually managed to make it back to the regular Soviet troops, where he re-joined his Fighter Regiment and took up combat flights again.) During this time, Hauptmann Hans-Ulrich Rudel (appointed commander of III./St.G. 2 'Immelmann' in September 1943) was stationed in Stalino.

During the first months of 1944, Lev Shestakov was hunting a Ju 87 with a viper painted along its fuselage sides - assuming that this conspicuos aircraft was flown by Rudel. Major Rudel certainly flew a Ju 87 G - one of the few Ju 87s still active in 1944 - over the same battlefields as Shestakov during this time. Due to his considerable successes against Russian tanks, Rudel was a highly coveted prey among the Soviet fighter pilots - as confirmed in Rudel's autobiography. Until March 1944, Rudel was credited with the destruction of more than 200 Soviet tanks and was awarded the Diamonds to his Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords.

On 13 March 1944, Lev Shestakov finally caught the Ju 87 he had been hunting for so long. Hit by a burst from Shestakov's La-5FN from short distance, the Ju 87 exploded in mid-air near Proskurov. But Shestakov didn't live to celebrate his victory. According to the version given in Lavrinenkov's book, his Lavochkin was thrown into a spin from the explosion and the famous Russian ace fell towards his death.

In reality, Rudel survived the war. No other famous Stuka ace was killed on 13 March 1944, nor is it known that Rudel ever flew a Ju 87 with a viper painted on its fuselage side (although he used a Ju 87 with a chevron painted on the fuselage side, which was quite unsusual in the Stuka units).

It is quite possible that this is a nice story to cover up how one of the highly esteemed fighter pilots was killed in a fight with a single Ju 87', according to Rodion Podorozhny. In his autobiography, Hans-Ulrich Rudel recalls how his Ju 87 once came under attack from 'an excellent "Lag-5" pilot': 'I just can't understand how he manages to follow my sharp turns in his fighter aircraft', wrote Rudel: 'Sweat poured from my forehead.' Rudel started preparing himself for the final end, as he suddenly heard his rear-gunner, Stabsarzt Ernst Gadermann, cry over the R/T: 'Got the Lag!' Rudel continues: 'Was he shot down by Gadermann, or did he go down because of the backwash from my engine during these tight turns? It doesn't matter. My headphones suddenly explode in confused screams from the Russian radio; the Russians have observed what happened and something special seems to have happened... From the Russian radio-messages, we discover that this was a very famous Soviet fighter pilot, more than once appointed as Hero of the Soviet Union.'"

Over the Western desert is the only area where I can think of the Western Allied pilots were actually scored meaningful success against German tanks.

According to Tony Williams, Hurricane IID pilots with 40 mm Vickers S guns claimed 144 tanks hit and were actually awarded kills for 47 tanks, as well as for more than 200 other vehicles.

Martyn Chorlton in 'Hawker Hurricane Mk I–V' states that No 6 Squadron, equipped with Hurricane IIDs, scored 45 tank kills and 35 soft vehicle kills in 100 sorties during June 1942. Leo McKinstry in 'Hurricane' states that during the Tunisian campaign, 6 Sqdn destroyed 46 tanks, 13 armoured cars and 17 lorries between 10 March and 8 April.

McKinstry also states that between 23 October and 8 November 1942, six Hurricane squadrons claimed 39 tanks, 212 lorries and armoured troop carriers, 26 fuel tankers, 42 guns and 200 other vehicles.

Cannon armed Hurricanes also claimed to have killed 11 Japanese tanks in a single action in early 1945 around the Irrawaddy bridgehead area, with the assistance of rocket firing Hurricanes accounting for two more. General Slim commented that the cannon armed Hurricanes were the best anti-tank weapon available.

As for later claims, I'd be conscious that Allied fighter-bomber claims against tanks were found to be out by a factor of better than ten to one.

JoeB had this to say in a post on this very subject in 2010

In surveys after the initial phase of the Korea War, ie after the North Koreans had been been defeated, before the Chinese entered, tanks were relatively seldom used by the Communists after that, 102 tanks were credited to a/c by USAF wreck survey teams. Claims of tanks destroyed by a/c in the same period have been given as 1,134 (Simon Dunston, Armour in Korea), but both the destroyed tank total and claims could be re-examined. Anyway the general situation of claiming accuracy was similar to WWII, and not comparable to aerial claim accuracy (captured NK reports show the much smaller US claims against NK Yak-9/11's and Il-10's in the opening weeks of the war were largely accurate).

Click to expand...

That does not bode well for the German claims then. Does it not follow that if the allies were out by a factor of 10x, would it not also be reasonable that German claims are similarly over- inflated.

I was part of that 2010 discussion. As I recall, after intense debate and argument, Joe did concede that in all likelihood the pilots claims probably related to all vehicles and that it was quite possible that some vehicles damaged and include in the pilots claims might possibly have been removed, repaired, sent back to the front, shot up again, repaired again and so on. Claims of a kill might may be innaccurate, but only to the extent of being a hit and disabled rather than an outright kill. A hit might disable the tank, but not kill it. This was certainly the case in WWII, where many vehicles on the eastern Front might be damaged many times, and then returned to service many times.

Joe never fully conceded all of this, and it is to my great regret that we parted ways on less than friendly terms. I dont think he ever forgave me for calling hiim out on the issue, which I regret intensely. We never could get agreement about the numbers of tanks committed prior the Chinese invasion. I think some eyewitness accounts were produced that contradicted the claim that few tanks were involved in the initial onslaughts.

This previous disagreement just underlines the fact that proving the case, one way ofr the other on this particular issue is very difficult

On a different tack, Tony Williams has a pretty good discussion on tankbusting aircraft and armamanet, which people may find interesting

TANKBUSTERS: AIRBORNE ANTI-TANK GUNS IN WW2

The strength of the North Korean Army particulalry its armoured strength is at issue, however my sources suggest a much higher initial strength than suggested in Joes Quote.


CHAPTER II, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu

"By June 1950, the 105th Armored Regiment had become the 105th Armored Brigade with a strength of 6,000 men and 120 T34 tanks. Its equipment-tanks, weapons, and vehicles-was Russian-made. The brigade had three tank regiments-the 107th, 109th, and 203d-each with 40 tanks, and a mechanized infantry regiment, the 206th, with a strength of about 2,500 men. A tank regiment had three medium tank battalions, each having 13 tanks. The battalions each had three tank companies with 4 tanks to a company. Tank crews consisted of five men. Battalion, regimental, and division tank commanders each had a personal tank. The 105th Armored Brigade was raised to division status in Seoul at the end of June 1950 before it crossed the Han River to continue the attack southward".

[Parsifal Note: the North Korean Army also had approximately 7 battalions of Light Tanks and Armoured Cars, which may well have been mistaken for heavy armour from the air]

"In addition to the 120 tanks of the 105th Armored Brigade, the better part of another tank regiment appears to have been available to North Korea in late June" [elsewhere estimated to be about 100 tanks]. "[Additionlly] Thirty tanks reportedly joined the N.K. 7th (12th) Division at Inje in east central Korea just before it crossed the Parallel. This gave North Korea a total of 150 Russian-built T34 tanks in June 1950" [but there were other light tanks of soviet and possibly Japanese manufacture available as well....estimated total tank strength was close to 500 vehicles in my estimation] .

"In the six months before the invasion, a defensive-type army of 4 divisions and an armored regiment had doubled in strength to form 7 combat-ready divisions and an armored brigade." [these did not initially cross the border but they soon joioned the battle. by my estimation that adds a further 240 further tanks and an unknown number of other AFVs to the inventory]... And there were in addition 3 other newly activated and trained divisions, and 2 independent regiments [not sure how much armour, but some....say 50 AFVs] .

"The North Korean ground forces-the NKPA and the Border Constabulary-in June 1950 numbered about 135,000 men. This estimated total included 77,838 men in seven assault infantry divisions, 6,000 in the tank brigade, 3,000 in an independent infantry regiment, 2,000 in a motorcycle regiment, 23,000 in three reserve divisions, 18,600 in the Border Constabulary, and 5,000 in Army and I and II Corps Headquarters.

The North Korean infantry division at full strength numbered 11,000 men. It was a triangular division composed of three rifle regiments, each regiment having three battalions. [It was based on the Soviet WWII era Assault Rifle Division, which usually had an AC company attached and often an SU assault gun unit based around the SU-76 or similar attached] The division had as integral parts an artillery regiment and a self-propelled gun battalion" [thats at least another 50 vehicles per Iassault Div, which adds at least 350 additional vehicles to the AFV inventory, pushing the total number of AFVs of all descriptions to well over 1000].

"There were also medical, signal, anti-tank, engineer, and training battalions [including Tank training units which I think were equipped with ex-Japanese equipment] , and reconnaissance and transport companies.

The artillery support of the North Korean division in 1950 closely resembled that of the older type of Soviet division in World War II. A division had 12 122-mm. howitzers, 24 76-mm. guns, 12 Su-76 self-propelled guns, 12 45-mm. antitank guns, and 36 14.5-mm. antitank rifles. In addition, the regiments and battalions had their own supporting weapons. Each regiment, for instance, had 6 120-mm. mortars, 4 76-mm. howitzers, and 6 45-mm. antitank guns. Each battalion had 9 82-mm. mortars, 2 45-mm. antitank guns, and 9 14.5-mm. antitank rifles. The companies had their own 61-mm. mortars. A North Korean rifle regiment at full strength numbered 2,794 men-204 officers, 711 noncommissioned officers, assault Infantry (of which there were seven divisions) had more vehicles....about 1879 compared to about 1100 for a regular 1945 style Infantry unit.

From the beginning the Soviet Union had been the sponsor for the NKPA and had provided it with the sinews of war. Most important at first were the Russian-built T34 tanks of the 105th Armored Brigade. The T34 was a standard medium tank in the Soviet Army at the end of World War II.

Other ordnance items supplied to the NKPA by the Soviets included 76-mm. and 122-mm. howitzers; 45-mm. guns; 76-mm. self-propelled guns; 45-mm. antitank guns; 61-mm., 82-mm., and 120-mm. mortars; small arms; ammunition for these weapons; and grenades. From the Soviet Union North Korea also received trucks, jeeps, radios, and fire control, signal, and medical equipment.

In the spring of 1950 the Soviet Union made particularly large shipments of arms and military supplies to North Korea. One captured North Korean supply officer stated that in May 1950, when he went to Ch'ongjin to get supplies for the N.K. 5th Division, Soviet merchant ships were unloading weapons and ammunition, and that trucks crowded the harbor waterfront area. Korean-speaking crew members told him the ships had come from Vladivostok. Markings on some of the North Korean equipment captured in the first few months of the Korean War show that it was manufactured in the Soviet Union in 1949-50 and, accordingly, could not have been materiel left behind in 1948 when the occupation forces withdrew from North Korea, as the Soviets have claimed.

North Korea began the war with about 180 aircraft, all supplied by Russia. Of these about 60 were YAK trainers; 40, YAK fighters; 70, attack bombers; and 10, reconnaissance planes".

A photo of US air interdiction some time in 1950. Napalm is being used. The devastation it could cause should be apparent.

Its a remarkable photo. The site that i got it from is adamant that its authentic...

bobbysocks said:

and interesting piece i read on kursk awhile back...it references Glantz's work. i cant vouch for the accuracy of this as i do not know much about kursk. so you can tell me if this is true, hogwash, or something inbetween.

The Battle of Kursk

Click to expand...

Its done by a credible author, and most of its true (well in a twisted kind of way), but there are some glaring weaknesses and outright misrepresentation, and I think some outright porkies. I much prefer Bergstrom and Zetterling, both of whom I think are far more ballanced and accurate.

The bit I really dislike is the claim that the Germans "barely noticed" the effects of key battles in Kursk. I dont know where they get that from, it certainly is not what the front commanders were saying at the time....kursk hurt both sides, it hurts a lot, but the Russians could absorb the losses better than the Germans.

Perhaps the number of tank kills claimed by the Luftwaffe (Luftflotte 1,4 6) in the east might be of interest to some:

July 1943: 1.008 (12,13% of total kills claimed by the Wehrmacht)
August 1943: 856 (10,52%)
September 1943: 107 (2,81%)
October 1943: 313 (10,25%)
November 1943: 101 (2,5%)
December 1943: 41 (1,41%)
January 1944: 200 (4,27%)
February 1944: 25 (1,15%)
March 1944: 317 (13,7%)
April 1944: 280 (9,58%)
May 1944: 176 (30,61%)
June 1944: 36 (4,12%)
July 1944: 417 (9,72%)
August 1944 to December 1944: 462 (4,72%)
January 1945: 296 (5,03%)
February 1945: 346 (5,1%)
March 1945: 91 (1,26%)
April 1945 (not complete): 213 (19,91%)

Source:
OKH/Fremde Heere Ost (T78R465)

Hans Ulrich Rudel on left with T-34 recognition model


And indicates where to hit 'em in their weak rear and top armour, same applies to all WW2 tank types, their rear/tops were all relatively thinly armoured.



The Ju87G's 2 x 37mm cannons. The open Russian steppes made tanks sitting ducks

It appears that they are "aiming" for the engine deck (grilles, vents, hatches being thinner/weaker that solid armor sheet) ant the rear of the turret. Or at least low shots will hit hull rear and a little high ( or ricochet ) will hit turret rear or shell trap under turret. Possible jam of turret?

The 40-50 degree dive at the T-34 also negates the effects of the armor's slope - the projectiles hitting the target are likely to enjoy the hit angle of 80 deg and better, while the ground-based guns/projectiles need to overcome the 40-50 deg slope. The actual difference could be some 20 mm (45mm at 90 deg vs. 64 mm (45 mm at 45 deg)) for rear hull armor, upper part.
Another advantage of the airborne gun is that it can actually hope to strike the enemy tank from behind (= thinnest armor), not something that ground-based gun could have high hopes to accomplish.

even from a 45 degree dive, What is the altitude needed to pull out without hitting the ground?

What is the slant range to the target?

The lower the angle the "closer" the aircraft can get to the target.

We can try out the exercise:
The plane flies at, say, 250 km/h; roughly 70 m/s. That would give, for 500m distance to target, 7 seconds until impact, in case the plane continues to fly straight. Is 7 seconds enough for pilot to pull out, for Stuka in such a position? With each second the stick is pulled, the pilot earns more time for the pullout?

You have two opposed factors. The steeper dive allows for better penetration but the steep dive requires firing from a longer distance (less accuracy) to ensure save altitude for pull out.