WWII Fighter Combat Statistics (2 Viewers)

[33k in the air]

But he does point out, correctly that the P-47 was responsible for crippling the Luftwaffe before the Merlin powered P-51 was a factor.

The high-water mark for the Luftwaffe's fighters was April 1944, a month in which it shot down 669 American aircraft. It is after that month that the Luftwaffe's fighter fortunes rapidly declined while American strength continued to grow.

Up through April 1944 combined ETO and MTO losses to enemy fighters paralleled the number of combat sorties U.S. forces were flying. Afterward, however, losses plunged relative to combat sorties.

 

[drgondog]

The P-51 had its good points too and was a fine fighter so the P47 did not out perform it in all respects and Greg explains this in both the speed and the climb performance videos And maybe in "maneuvering". But he does point out, correctly that the P-47 was responsible for crippling the Luftwaffe before the Merlin powered P-51 was a factor. High scoring German aces moving from the Eastern to the Western front were often killed fighting the USAAF and some had nervous breakdowns. Robert S Johnson killed a German ace with 230 odd kills. At bomber escort altitudes, 25000 ft, the P-47 was superior to virtually all the Luftwaffe fighters except a few very late variants. It was faster in all respects and with 130 and 150 octane fuel it was as good a climber at most altitudes. P&W engineers came the England and taught the crew chiefs how to increase boost so that even before the later engines were in use P-47s were running 2600+ hp with the better fuels. And all the leading P-47 pilots, remembering the leading US aces in Europe were P-47 pilots, survived the war. Robert S Johnson in an interview and Greg both point out that the P-47 had decimated the highly experienced Luftwaffe pilots by the time the P-51 arrived on scene in significant numbers. This and the total losses were the primary reason that the Luftwaffe was powerless to interfere with the D-Day landings. Johnson pointed out that many of the P-51 victories were over low time pilots with little or no combat experience. That the Bomber Mafia lied about the range of P-47 is proven with the actual facts. From their arrival in Europe the P-47s were equipped for drop tanks and Republic had a 200 gal fully tested to 30000 ft belly tank but Hap Arnold had ordered that NO pursuit a/c were to use drop tanks. "The Bombers would get through and could not be stopped". And the Army would not even pay for development. The various companies did it on their own. Then when their arrogance and stupidity had killed a LOT of bomber crews they cooked up the false "insufficient range" story to cover their butts. And thus the myth of the P-51's range "allowed escort of the bombers" was born. This no drop tank idiocy was much like the US Navy submarines fighting almost half the war with torpedos with a 50% or higher failure rate. Why? Because high ranking people had said they were OK but they only tested 2 of them and one of these failed. And the LT Commanders actually using the things were at fault. Heck John Wayne made a movie about this. And Johnson had a higher kills per mission rate than Rall. In the P-47. And he was fighting harder targets.

I'll reply to your comments in more detail but will simply 'paste' an email that I sent Jackson concerning his claim that the P-47 did all the heavy lifting before D-Day. I basically sent "Greg" the same, plus much more detail to explain why he was filled to the brim with Bovie Fecal Matter i claims that USAAF-bomber mafia conspired to hold the P-47 back - as well as his range estimates for operational combat radius.

Quote - "
Dear Mr. Jackson - For whatever reason, you may have missed that the P-51B, with half the sorties in ETO, matched between December 1, 1943 and June 5, 1944, ALL the P-47C/D air victories credits – and doubled the ground scores. By the time Big Week began there were 9 Operational 8th/9th AF combined P-47 equipped FGs to the Mustang 2, and P-38 2.

Most folks would agree that the Mustang contribution was key to the success of Pointblank, when in fact as of January 1944 Pointblank objectives had been denied by the LW. Neither the P-47 nor the P-38 had met and destroyed LW Day Fighters. During Big Week, with 1/5 the sorties, the -51B destroyed 64.5, the P-47 destroyed 78. The P-38 with same as the P-51B destroyed 10.

The last date that the P-47D could claim more LW destroyed per day was March 16th. Thereafter, the Mustang accelerated to 2x per day over the P-47 equipped groups of 8th and 9th AF COMBINED.

By DDay Mustangs had achieved the same victory totals in the air as ALL the P-47 credits beginning in April 1943, including ALLthe IX FC P-47 equipped fighter groups..

The difference? For P-47D vs P-51B, the LW could not retreat and was out performed in comparison with P-47. For P-38 vs P-51, while range was nearly equivalent, the P-38 suffered major operational issues at high altitude, was easy to spot, out dive and out maneuver in every dimension but climb.

Source, Frank Olynyk, USAF 85 and 8th AF VCB, Jun 1945. They do not exactly match, but match in context with little difference in the total.

Regards,

Bill Marshall"

 

[drgondog]

The P-51 had its good points too and was a fine fighter so the P47 did not out perform it in all respects and Greg explains this in both the speed and the climb performance videos And maybe in "maneuvering".

'Greg' was imbibing on prohibited substances when he offered opinions not sourced by fact based reports by AAF Performance Evaluations of P-47 vs P-38 vs P-51B. Fact - the ONLY P-47 that could outclimb a similarly loaded P-51B/D up to 33000 feet was the P-47M. The P-47D was slower at all altitudes, had the same dive speed, and roll rate - but was out accelerated, outturned, outclimbed and out ranged. Check Mike Williams' Spitfireperformance.com site for particulars.

But he does point out, correctly that the P-47 was responsible for crippling the Luftwaffe before the Merlin powered P-51 was a factor. High scoring German aces moving from the Eastern to the Western front were often killed fighting the USAAF and some had nervous breakdowns.

As in 'crippling the LW' are you referring to 10-25% loss rates at Schweinfurt/Regensburg, Munster. Schweinfurt II, Oschersleben (1-11-44), Aschersleben (2-22, 44), Rostock/Gotha (2-24), Berlin (3-6), Bernburg/Rostock/Stettin (4-11), Berln (4-29)? You know that a.) the losses were for targets out of P-47 range?, b.) that the LW was still hammering the 8th AF with crippling losses (>40) through May 1944?

The reason that those statistics are pertinent is that P-47s weren't There. They were turnig back before the LW piled on.

Robert S Johnson killed a German ace with 230 odd kills. At bomber escort altitudes, 25000 ft, the P-47 was superior to virtually all the Luftwaffe fighters except a few very late variants. It was faster in all respects and with 130 and 150 octane fuel it was as good a climber at most altitudes. P&W engineers came the England and taught the crew chiefs how to increase boost so that even before the later engines were in use P-47s were running 2600+ hp with the better fuels. And all the leading P-47 pilots, remembering the leading US aces in Europe were P-47 pilots, survived the war. Robert S Johnson in an interview and Greg both point out that the P-47 had decimated the highly experienced Luftwaffe pilots by the time the P-51 arrived on scene in significant numbers.

But Johnson had not the slightest shred of evidence to support his claims. 150 Octane fuel was never available to Johnson, who went home before arrival of the 130/150 fuel in June 1944. The later engines Did run 2600HP - after Johnson went home. All of the leading P-51 Aces survived the war also, except Preddy who was KIA by friendly fire. Offhand I can't think of a high scoring P-51 ace KiA by LW. Several top P-47 ETO aces at one or another were shot down - Mahurin by Do 217 and Beckham and Duncan by flak. Gabreski bent a prop strafing. Several top P-51 aces were downed by flak also, including Hofer, Goodson, Henry Brown but I can't think of any to aces (P-51 or P-47 shot down by German fighter.

This and the total losses were the primary reason that the Luftwaffe was powerless to interfere with the D-Day landings. Johnson pointed out that many of the P-51 victories were over low time pilots with little or no combat experience.

So they put their low time pilots to defend Berlin, Schweinfurt, Regensburg, Brunswick, Munich, Kassel where the P-47s couldn't go? - perhaps to give the Newbies combat experience against the feeble Mustang - then send them within range of the P-47 equipped grups?

Ya thinkwe might have had a little 'hey see how good I was'

That the Bomber Mafia lied about the range of P-47 is proven with the actual facts. From their arrival in Europe the P-47s were equipped for drop tanks and Republic had a 200 gal fully tested to 30000 ft belly tank but Hap Arnold had ordered that NO pursuit a/c were to use drop tanks.

Total and utter bovine fecal matter. The 'bomber mafia' was embodied by Eaker and Spaatz perhaps - in 1942. "The Bomber will Always Get Through" mantra died a grisly death in July 1943 Blitz Week. Eaker begged Arnold for the P38 and -51B with the help of Asst SecWar Lovett in June 1943 when Arnold was recovering from major heart isues. The 200 gal tank you speak glowingly of was a Fat/Draggy Ferry tank = not self sealing and unpressurized. They woud not feed above 18K. Thankfully the pressurized 75 gal C/L tank arrived in August (too late for Schweinfurt/Regensurg)and the 110 arrived in September - Combat Radius still WOEFULLY short of Schweinfurt, Brunswick radius. Even when plumbing and pylons for wing mounted tanks arrived, the modifications required to strengthen every P-47D in the ETO was prohibitively time consuming - preventing P-47s from pentrating beyond central German and 150 short of Berlin and Munich until summer 1944- a year after Greg claimed the 'bomber mafia' conspired to kill THOUSANDs of B-17 & B-24 crews 'to make a point'? Do you REALLY believe what you write? The achilles heel of the P-47 was insufficient internal fuel capcity and woefully difficult to modify, Recall, it was designed as a High Altitude Interceptor so the need to add wing tanks or more extensive internal fuel was deemed un-necessary. Both the P-38 and P-51 were much better suitedfor a.) existing long range, b.) adding external tankage (P-38 1941, P-51 1942), c.) adding much more internal tankage (Fuselage P-51B 1943, P-38J mid 1943, P-47 end of 1944.

As to Arnold prohibiting pursuit a/c from using drop tanks? Well, yes - the purpose was to ferry fighters if necessary, but extremely dangerous to use in combat without self sealing capability. BTW, neither the P38, P-47, P-40 and P-39 were originally designed with self sealing tanks - OTOH the Mustang began production from ship #1 with self sealing tanks. The Combat Tank project did not even start until the Fighter Conference Jan-Feb -1942.

"The Bombers would get through and could not be stopped". And the Army would not even pay for development. The various companies did it on their own. Then when their arrogance and stupidity had killed a LOT of bomber crews they cooked up the false "insufficient range" story to cover their butts. And thus the myth of the P-51's range "allowed escort of the bombers" was born.

If you choose to step out of your comfort zone and STUDY Hap Arnold views - you will know that he was very troubled that the Spanish Civil War bombers were being crushed by fighters. He understood that the current state of the art of the B-17 with turbos were faster and flew higher than most of the fighters - save the 109. That said he was aware that pursuit technoloy outpaced bomber technolgy. He reprioritized 1941 R&D objectives to name "1. 1500 mile range Pursuit Fighter." which, BTW, is double the capability of the P-47 until 1944. The Allison powered P-51 in 1942 could fly nearly 1.6x of P-47C on internal fuel for straight line ferry. The P-61 was ultimately the product of that objective.

It is sad that you would think that the so called bomber mafia delighted in watching classmates die in droves so that they could somehow stop the development of a long range pursuit fighter - or worse - order life saving technogy be witheld?

This no drop tank idiocy was much like the US Navy submarines fighting almost half the war with torpedos with a 50% or higher failure rate. Why? Because high ranking people had said they were OK but they only tested 2 of them and one of these failed. And the LT Commanders actually using the things were at fault. Heck John Wayne made a movie about this. And Johnson had a higher kills per mission rate than Rall. In the P-47. And he was fighting harder targets.

Repeat, -- 'no drop tank idiocy' lasted until Ben Kelsey spilled the beans to Arnold on how he got the P-38s to England, using 300gal unpressurized tanks on wing pylons which had only emerged as a Lockheed self funded project in December 1941.

 

[GrauGeist]

The problem with watching a video, is that you're listening to someone's opinion.

Reading books from the source may not be as entertaining, but far will be far more accurate.

 

[33k in the air]

The problem with watching a video, is that you're listening to someone's opinion.

Reading books from the source may not be as entertaining, but far will be far more accurate.

To be fair, some video creators do cite references and provide a list of reference sources.

 

[GregP]

The P-47 was one of the best high altitude fighters of the war and it was pretty good at strafing anything. Other than strafing, where the eight 50s shined, the P-47 basically got less good as it got lower than 25,000 feet. It was NOT in it's element down low like it was at 25,000 feet and above.

While I may not be quite as enamored with the P-51 as Drgondog is, the combat record does tell a story if you look at it, and the P-51 deserves its accolades. A LOT of success at shooting down enemy airplanes in air-to-air combat comes with the opportunities the airplane had while on missions. The P-51, with good range, was primarily assigned the escort missions, which led directly to opportunities for air-to-air combat. The P-47s primarily had other assignments and were assigned a disproportionate number of ground attack missions due to their abilities as a strafer and as a fighter-bomber. Hey, you use what you have to get the missions accomplished.

When the P-47s DID get the chance for aerial combat, they weren't bad at all at it. But, they were never assigned as frequently as primary escort fighters like the P-51 was. That being said, there is no evidence that they would have done any better or worse at it had they been assigned and they had the range. Both airplanes were pretty good at what their primary assigned missions were.

It could be that the "powers that be" at the time assigned the missions as they did because that was the best use of the airframes they had to work with to get the missions accomplished. Stranger things have happened than using your assets correctly.

 

[Barrett]

Excellent coverage, gents, and always good to hear from Bill/Drgndog. This thread goes in The Keep File.

Ref. Hurricane: found this compilation of RAF claims.

Sprifire 6,338; Hurricane 4850.

Which Allied fighter achieved the most victories in World War 2?

Edward Rippeth's answer: This is a heavily revised version of my original article, in which I’ve added some detailed research of all evidence presently available in print and online – including literally logging every score by an RAF or Commonwealth ace by aircraft and campaign, using Shore and W...

www.quora.com

==

Frank O's compilations far exceed anything done by the US Govt. But I'll add an attaboy for the mentions of the massive USN statistical survey. Long ago when I had more time, I crunched the numbers and found that the FM-2 "Wilder Wildcat" had by far the highest kill-loss record of US (and likely any) piston fighters at 32-1 with 420-13. Main reason had to do with the CVE mission.

Incidentally, I was acquainted with Ralph Elliot, the top FM-2 ace with 9.5. He had A LOT of experience as a tactics instructor before joining VC-27. A really tough dogfighter whom some students dubbed "Tojo."

 

[drgondog]

The P-47 was one of the best high altitude fighters of the war and it was pretty good at strafing anything. Other than strafing, where the eight 50s shined, the P-47 basically got less good as it got lower than 25,000 feet. It was NOT in it's element down low like it was at 25,000 feet and above.

Agreed

While I may not be quite as enamored with the P-51 as Drgondog is, the combat record does tell a story if you look at it, and the P-51 deserves its accolades. A LOT of success at shooting down enemy airplanes in air-to-air combat comes with the opportunities the airplane had while on missions. The P-51, with good range, was primarily assigned the escort missions, which led directly to opportunities for air-to-air combat. The P-47s primarily had other assignments and were assigned a disproportionate number of ground attack missions due to their abilities as a strafer and as a fighter-bomber. Hey, you use what you have to get the missions accomplished.

Greg, the P-47 was sent to replace the P-38s snatched from 8th AF as result of North Africa campaign (1st, 14th and 82nd). It was sole escort fighter after 4th FG converted from Spitfires and 78th FG became operational in Late March 1943. All P-47FG until the lone 55th FG P-38s arrived for first Oct 15th 1943 mission - one day after Schweinfurt. The P-47s tasked for Overlord in the IX FC were assigned escort through late May 1944.

The 354th FG of IX FC proved that the Mustang was the most efficent killer of LW in December/January 1944. It was a low combat experience group that stepped in with a brand new airplane and made an immediate impact - and became the focus of the tug of war between AEAF and USSATAFE (Spaatz) which led to trade of 358FG (P-47) for the new 357FG (P-47) originally tasked for 9th AF. It further led to the agreement that the future delivery of P-51Bs to ETO woul replace P-47 and P-38. Until that turf was all were originally designated for CAS/TAC role by Generale Saville - Chief, Air Defense Directorate, who at that time made decisions regarding the role of which fighter type was dispatched to which AF for what mission. He decided that P-51B would replace P-51A and P-39 as essentially US version of Army Co-Operation Command. He never considered the P-51B as necessary for 8th AF deeming P-47 and P-38 as sufficient (and superior to P-51) bomber escort.

When the P-47s DID get the chance for aerial combat, they weren't bad at all at it. But, they were never assigned as frequently as primary escort fighters like the P-51 was. That being said, there is no evidence that they would have done any better or worse at it had they been assigned and they had the range. Both airplanes were pretty good at what their primary assigned missions were.

They were good, but primarily only better than the P-38 in the 25-30K performance envelope. It was only in the narrow envelope of 30-33K that the P-47 and P-51B were more or less matched in performance. To reiterate, VIII FC Hunter and then Kepner had a more favorable opinon of the P-47C/D than the P-51 in 1943 - but the P-51B that belonged to the 'other' 9th AF changed his mind. It is a good assumtion that neither were aware of the enormous jump in intermediate to high altitude performance of the new Merlin/Packard equipped Mustang. It is a possibility that both were victims of 'not invented here' with respect to grudging accolades of the NAA product when compared to P-40/P-39 and even P-38 and P-47 up to 18-20K in 1942 testing.

The problem with the P-47 is that the LW learned to retreat to the edge of its tactical radius, rendering enagement to support Pointblank 'destroy the LW' mantra impossible.

It could be that the "powers that be" at the time assigned the missions as they did because that was the best use of the airframes they had to work with to get the missions accomplished. Stranger things have happened than using your assets correctly.

See above. Note that P-47C/D was the best above 20K (compared to P-38). Note that Kenney, who selectively ignored Materiel Command/Air Service Command when it suited him, arranged for 348th FG P-47s to obtain bootleg external fuel tanks earlier than 8thAF - of large capacity - and able to provide useful combat radius. He was able to do so because SWP operations enabled long legs with no flak or fghter intervention compared to ETO.

The P47D was an excellent escort for US Heavy bomber doctrine to the limit of its range, which unfortunately was not enough to serve as the primary long range escort.

 

[GregP]

Excellent coverage, gents, and always good to hear from Bill/Drgndog. This thread goes in The Keep File.

Ref. Hurricane: found this compilation of RAF claims.

Sprifire 6,338; Hurricane 4850.

Which Allied fighter achieved the most victories in World War 2?

Edward Rippeth's answer: This is a heavily revised version of my original article, in which I’ve added some detailed research of all evidence presently available in print and online – including literally logging every score by an RAF or Commonwealth ace by aircraft and campaign, using Shore and W...

www.quora.com

==

Frank O's compilations far exceed anything done by the US Govt. But I'll add an attaboy for the mentions of the massive USN statistical survey. Long ago when I had more time, I crunched the numbers and found that the FM-2 "Wilder Wildcat" had by far the highest kill-loss record of US (and likely any) piston fighters at 32-1 with 420-13. Main reason had to do with the CVE mission.

Incidentally, I was acquainted with Ralph Elliot, the top FM-2 ace with 9.5. He had A LOT of experience as a tactics instructor before joining VC-27. A really tough dogfighter whom some students dubbed "Tojo."

Yes, the FM-2 was excellent. But it had a lot to do with what it was assigned. The FM-2 was a Wildcat and doesn't quite measure up to the Hellcat if you lump all the Wildcats together. The FM-2 alone came in at 32.5 : 1 in air-to-air combat. The Hellcat came in at 19.1 : 1.

But, if you look at ALL Wildcats in U.S. service together, they collectively come in at 6.9 : 1 in air-to-air combat. I see NO reason to lump the FM-2s as anything other than a Wildcat. We don't break out F6F-5s from F6F-3s, why break out the FM-2 all by itself? All it had to differentiate it was a different R-1820 and a slightly taller fin and rudder. And it was largely assigned to Jeep carrier mop-up operations when the big carriers bypassed the smaller Japanese outposts. So, it wasn;'t exactly flying against the best the Japanese had to offer.

The F6F-5 had an R-2800-10W rated at 2,200 hp; the F6F-3 had an R-2800-10 rated at 2,000 hp. Should we break out the F6F-5 from the F6F-3? No.

Same for Wildcats. If we lump them together, like all the Hellcats were lumped together, they don't come out quite so good.

Here is my chart of USAAF/USN/USMC planes together:

Look at the "Kill-to-Loss Air-to-Air column for an apples-to-apples comparison.

If you want to be even more fair about it, the next column is "kill to Loss Air-to-Air including Operational Losses." That one is an eye-opener. But the Hellcat STILL comes out comfortably on top. No wonder it was called "The Ace Maker."

The P-51 Mustang flew about one half the missions the P-47 flew (213,876 sorties for the P-51 versus 423,435 for the P-47). The P-47 dropped 113,963 tons of bombs. If the ground support missions were about the same percent, we'd expect the P-51 to drop somewhere about half the tonnage of the P-47. In fact, it only dropped 5,668 tons, or about 5% of the bomb tonnage the P-47 dropped. So, my conclusion is the P-51 didn't fly all that many attack missions where dropping bombs was a factor. That leaves a lot of missions where ground attack wasn't the focus. I'm betting they were escort missions. More escort missions means more air-to-air opportunities, like I said above.

In the statistical digest, I don't see a breakout by airplane model of the sortie types flown. My table above uses the ETO table from Ray Wagner's American Combat Planes. If there is another table with a summary by model for the entire war, I'd love to see it. Until then, I believe the P-51 was. far and away, the more frequent escort fighter between the P-47 and P-51. Because the P-47 wasn't the primary escort doesn't mean it never escorted; it did. It means the P-47 was a much more infrequent escort than the P-51 was. Ergo, the P-51 had a LOT more opportunities for air-to-air combat thrown at it, if only by mission selection. That is not a condemnation of the assignments in the least. I'm just trying to say the P-51 got into aerial combat more frequently with German fighters than the P-47 did and, when the P-47 DID get into aerial combat with German fighters, it was MUCH more likely to be carrying bombs than the P-51 was. To me, that means the P-47 with bombs had to evade the initial firing pass, drop ordnance, get into attack formations, and then engage in aerial combat. The escorts, by contrast, were already configured for aerial combat and were primed and ready for it.

Surely that translates into better initial success upon encountering the enemy by the escorts, if only due to not carrying bombs during the mission.

 

[pbehn]

Agreed



They were good, but primarily only better than the P-38 in the 25-30K performance envelope. It was only in the narrow envelope of 30-33K that the P-47 and P-51B were more or less matched in performance. To reiterate, VIII FC Hunter and then Kepner had a more favorable opinon of the P-47C/D than the P-51 in 1943 - but the P-51B that belonged to the 'other' 9th AF changed his mind. It is a good assumtion that neither were aware of the enormous jump in intermediate to high altitude performance of the new Merlin/Packard equipped Mustang. It is a possibility that both were victims of 'not invented here' with respect to grudging accolades of the NAA product when compared to P-40/P-39 and even P-38 and P-47 up to 18-20K in 1942 testing.

From a book I read recently which you may be aware of, my take on it was that the biggest drawback for the P-51B at the time was that it wasnt in service with anyone when the discussions were being had, and even the Allison engined types had little track record with US forces and British use of Mustangs could hardly be further removed from high altitude bomber escort. Making decisions from test reports is fraught with danger, it may be another P-400.

 

[Vincenzo]

the USAAF, the USAAC is before of war, kill are heavy underestimated in the table
for the statistical digest they get 26994 air "kills" of this 14682 by fighters

 

[drgondog]

Yes, the FM-2 was excellent. But it had a lot to do with what it was assigned. The FM-2 was a Wildcat and doesn't quite measure up to the Hellcat if you lump all the Wildcats together. The FM-2 alone came in at 32.5 : 1 in air-to-air combat. The Hellcat came in at 19.1 : 1.

But, if you look at ALL Wildcats in U.S. service together, they collectively come in at 6.9 : 1 in air-to-air combat. I see NO reason to lump the FM-2s as anything other than a Wildcat. We don't break out F6F-5s from F6F-3s, why break out the FM-2 all by itself? All it had to differentiate it was a different R-1820 and a slightly taller fin and rudder. And it was largely assigned to Jeep carrier mop-up operations when the big carriers bypassed the smaller Japanese outposts. So, it wasn;'t exactly flying against the best the Japanese had to offer.

The F6F-5 had an R-2800-10W rated at 2,200 hp; the F6F-3 had an R-2800-10 rated at 2,000 hp. Should we break out the F6F-5 from the F6F-3? No.

Same for Wildcats. If we lump them together, like all the Hellcats were lumped together, they don't come out quite so good.

Here is my chart of USAAF/USN/USMC planes together:

View attachment 713523

Look at the "Kill-to-Loss Air-to-Air column for an apples-to-apples comparison.

If you want to be even more fair about it, the next column is "kill to Loss Air-to-Air including Operational Losses." That one is an eye-opener. But the Hellcat STILL comes out comfortably on top. No wonder it was called "The Ace Maker."

The P-51 Mustang flew about one half the missions the P-47 flew (213,876 sorties for the P-51 versus 423,435 for the P-47). The P-47 dropped 113,963 tons of bombs. If the ground support missions were about the same percent, we'd expect the P-51 to drop somewhere about half the tonnage of the P-47. In fact, it only dropped 5,668 tons, or about 5% of the bomb tonnage the P-47 dropped. So, my conclusion is the P-51 didn't fly all that many attack missions where dropping bombs was a factor. That leaves a lot of missions where ground attack wasn't the focus. I'm betting they were escort missions. More escort missions means more air-to-air opportunities, like I said above.

Greg the only Mustangs Tasked for bombs was the A-36 and P-51A. All Mustangs produced before 1943 had no capability to attach and drop bombs. While the IX AF P-51Bs were originally tasked for FB/CAS/TAC mission, ot one bomb was dropped by 8th or 9th AF Mustangs til May 1944. In the meantime, all the SWP P-47 FGs (I.e. 348th) were flying dual task of escort and CAS, ditto for 12th AF P-47s from 1943 to EOW. The 9th AF P-47s were largely removed from escort (not entirely for medium/light bomber escort) to focus on CAS after May 1944, while the 9th Mustangs were stlll primary escort or recon mission focused. I would speculate that most of the P-51 missions (including A-36 and P-51A) sorties resulted in about 90% escort through EOW. That said, the P-47 flew as many escort missions in ETO as Mustangs, in total, at least through 1944. Remember that 95% of all escort sorties by 8th and 9th AF combined through -Day were flown by P-47s in Penetration and Withdrawal escort - while P-51s and P-38s few target escort, There were still 2x P-47 FGs in ETO through May 1944. There were still four P-47 FGs in 8th AF (to one P-38 and ten P-51) at the end of September 1944.

In the statistical digest, I don't see a breakout by airplane model of the sortie types flown. My table above uses the ETO table from Ray Wagner's American Combat Planes. If there is another table with a summary by model for the entire war, I'd love to see it. Until then, I believe the P-51 was. far and away, the more frequent escort fighter between the P-47 and P-51. Because the P-47 wasn't the primary escort doesn't mean it never escorted; it did. It means the P-47 was a much more infrequent escort than the P-51 was. Ergo, the P-51 had a LOT more opportunities for air-to-air combat thrown at it, if only by mission selection.

Not true until Mid 1944, wrt to escort sorties. True wrt to 'opportunities per the much longer range and better performance throughout the flight profiles. The P-47 was the Dominant bomber escort in ETO (in strength and sorties) from March 1943 through May 1944, but the P-51 was far more Efficient air to air.

That is not a condemnation of the assignments in the least. I'm just trying to say the P-51 got into aerial combat more frequently with German fighters than the P-47 did and, when the P-47 DID get into aerial combat with German fighters, it was MUCH more likely to be carrying bombs than the P-51 was. To me, that means the P-47 with bombs had to evade the initial firing pass, drop ordnance, get into attack formations, and then engage in aerial combat. The escorts, by contrast, were already configured for aerial combat and were primed and ready for it.

Surely that translates into better initial success upon encountering the enemy by the escorts, if only due to not carrying bombs during the mission.

Greg, unfortunately Wagner's table is filled with inaccuracies. including victory credits and air losses when compared to USAF 85 and MACR compilation. You will note from the USAG 85 ETO tables I shared with you - and you assisted with - that his ETO VCs for Mustang are 700 short, and that his totals Globally for the Mustang are 1000 short for AAF and 1450+ for combined AAF and Allies incl. China and Commonwealth.

From 8th AF and MACR data there were 384 Mustang losses air to air, 569 due to flak. P-47 losses in ETO were 214 air and 200 ground. The actual ETO ratios for the Mustang ai to air are far higher than Wagner's (10:1) as well as P-47 (7:1)

I am a Loooong way from compiling a decent table - with far more data available than Wagner's sources. I'm too old and tired to go through the grinder to gather the rest when Olynyk has pretty well delivered high quality data for all WWII AAF data.

Of all the authors out there I think only Miller and I have gone to the level of parsing operations loss data to the level of accident reports and MACRs. While we don't agree precisely we are in close agreement for 8th AF. Miller however used 8th AF VCB data solely for air to air statistics, whereas I relied on USAF 85.

 

[GregP]

the USAAF, the USAAC is before of war, kill are heavy underestimated in the table
for the statistical digest they get 26994 air "kills" of this 14682 by fighters

The USAAC became the USAAF on 9 March 1942, well after Pearl Harbor.

 

[33k in the air]

Greg the only Mustangs Tasked for bombs was the A-36 and P-51A. All Mustangs produced before 1943 had no capability to attach and drop bombs. While the IX AF P-51Bs were originally tasked for FB/CAS/TAC mission, ot one bomb was dropped by 8th or 9th AF Mustangs til May 1944.

To put some numbers to this, the total number of bombs dropped by aircraft model in the 9th Air Force from 14 Oct. 1943 through 8 May 1945. In parentheses is the most numerous type of bomb among those dropped by that aircraft model. Note that these figures include bombs dropped not on target and jettisoned.

P-38   29,838  (49.3% of which was the 1,000-lb GP)
P-47  266,139  (66.7% of which was the 500-lb GP)
P-51    9,371  (61.7% of which was the 500-lb GP)
P-61      181  (44.8% of which was the 500-lb incendiary)

A-20   77,206  (96.8% of which was the 500-lb GP)
A-26   66,035  (21.9% of which was the 1,000-lb GP)
B-26  528,592  (28.9% of which was the 250-lb GP)

 

[Vincenzo]

The USAAC became the USAAF on 9 March 1942, well after Pearl Harbor.

for wiki was 20th june 1941

 

[GrauGeist]

for wiki was 20th june 1941

The USAAC remained as a component of the USAAF between June 1941 and March 1942.

My two Uncles were fighter pilots in the AAC prior to Pearl Harbor and were transferred to the AAF in late Spring of 1942.

 

[drgondog]

The USAAC remained as a component of the USAAF between June 1941 and March 1942.

My two Uncles were fighter pilots in the AAC prior to Pearl Harbor and were transferred to the AAF in late Spring of 1942.

Dave - Essentially Personnel, including pilots and crews, were AAC while all else was AAF. They essentially transferred to an organization within AAF. Their serial number was an AAC artifact.

Several confusing re-orgs in the late 30s in which General Emmons was senior to Arnold and head of GHQ - which was Operations. When Arnold was named Chief AAF, Emmons, outranking him, still reported to Arnold as everyone rolled up to AAF-Hq. GHQ morphed into AAF control in June 1940. Emmons was highly regarded by Arnold as a thinker, leader and problem solver.

 

[Stig1207]

Greg, unfortunately Wagner's table is filled with inaccuracies. including victory credits and air losses when compared to USAF 85 and MACR compilation.

Wagner's table does however match pretty closely when compared with the USAAF Statistical Digest. The same is the case for Wagner's table for bomber stats. So where ever he got his numbers from there is some similarity with what was recorded in the Statistical Digest.

 

[drgondog]

Wagner's table does however match pretty closely when compared with the USAAF Statistical Digest. The same is the case for Wagner's table for bomber stats. So where ever he got his numbers from there is some similarity with what was recorded in the Statistical Digest.

Although Wagner does not cite the Statistical Digest in Mustang Designer for his comparatve victory totals P-51 vs P-38 vs P-47, it is most likely source.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

A part of the USAAF impact on the Luftwaffe in the ETO was the "Sudden Overnight" increase in fighter strength, from 13 groups end January 1944 to 34 end May and the establishment of the groups was being increased, 7,167 fighter sorties in January, 36,210 in May.

From April 1943 to 15 October 1943 the P-47 was the USAAF fighter force in Britain. When the first P-51 group began operations on 1 December it was around 10% of the total fighter force and the P-47 around 75%. The percentages fluctuate as new groups arrived but as of 22 February 1944 it was 12.5% P-51, 75% P-47. By the end of the month the P-51 were around 25% of the force and would remain about this to end May, while the P-47 force was down to 65% end February and would slowly drift down to 53% by end May, by which time the 8th had 4 P-38, 4 P-47 and 7 P-51 groups, the 9th had 3 P-38, 14 P-47 and 2 P-51. The 8th chose to convert 5 P-47 groups to P-51 between February and May.

Three of the 8th's P-38 groups were converted to P-51 in July making the force 1 P-38, 4 P-47 and 10 P-51, end September it was 3 P-47 and 12 P-51, with the 479th converting from P-38 on 27 September, the 353rd from P-47 on 30 September. The final 8th AF fighter group conversions to P-51 were on 6 November and 21 December. The P-47 units had lower accident and attrition rates. The April 1944 abort report has 7,133 P-47 sorties (take off less unused spares, spotters and relays), 681 did not complete the mission, P-38 3,075 sorties, 560 non completions, P-51 3,484 sorties, 515 non completions.

The 8th AF reports its P-51 started dropping bombs in April 1944, 51.5 short tons, 54.7 tons in May. The 9th AF reports its P-51 started dropping bombs in March 1944, 25.75 short tons of bombs on targets, 149.75 tons in April and 117.625 tons in May, plus any jettisoned. The 9th's P-47 units also started fighter bomber missions in March, around 3,950 tons dropped by end May, in terms of effective sorties the P-47 were dropping an average of 335 pounds of bombs per sortie, the P-51 118 pounds in this time period. For the 9th AF March 1944 to May 1945 the average effective P-38 sortie dropped 690 pounds of bombs on a target, the P-47 591 pounds and the P-51 131 pounds. The average P-38 and P-47 sortie was around 2.5 hours, the P-51 around 3 hours.

For the entire period of 9th AF operations in the ETO, 249,028 effective fighter sorties of which 53,849 were escort, 16,862 for Fighter Bombers, 22,061 for Medium Bombers, 13,168 for Heavy Bombers, 1,670 for Troop Carrier, 1,628 for Light Bombers, 15 for Photo Recon. The MIA plus Category E rate for escort missions was 0.4%, for the various bombing missions 0.99%.

Sent USAAF fighter sorties, SD= Statistical Digest, 8th AF Yearly Summary, 9th AF War Summary

SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	8th AF	8th AF	8th AF	9th AF	Diff-
Month	Total	Escort	Bomb etc.	Other	Escort	Rodeo, Sweep etc.	ASR	All	erence
Jan-44​	7,167​	6,080​	201​	886​	5,946​	669​	0​	370​	182​
Feb-44​	10,679​	10,295​	83​	301​	8,738​	274​	0​	1966​	-299​
Mar-44​	16,261​	14,659​	887​	715​	10,810​	539​	0​	5080​	-168​
Apr-44​	21,554​	14,072​	3,803​	3,679​	11,431​	2,811​	0​	7914​	-602​
May-44​	36,210​	26,091​	6,405​	3,714​	14,108​	1,637​	248​	21074​	-857​
Jun-44​	55,460​	27,970​	11,320​	16,170​	13,747​	11,716​	442​	29990​	-435​
Jul-44​	42,953​	20,577​	9,098​	13,278​	15,420​	2,492​	299​	24773​	-31​
Aug-44​	45,827​	23,793​	4,524​	17,510​	13,356​	6,440​	266​	26037​	-272​
Sep-44​	33,685​	13,531​	11,056​	9,098​	9,800​	5,041​	148​	18879​	-183​
Oct-44​	29,881​	15,659​	11,731​	2,491​	13,103​	453​	337​	16540​	-552​
Nov-44​	30,120​	19,082​	7,542​	3,496​	12,471​	1,613​	296​	12829​	2,911​
Dec-44​	35,487​	15,723​	12,940​	6,824​	13,563​	641​	223​	15953​	5,107​
Total	365,284​	207,532​	79,590​	78,162​	142,493​	34,326​	2,259​	181,405​	4,801​

8th AF Monthly Summary fighter sorties

Time	Fighter	HB Support	Ftr/Bmb	Ftr/Bmb escort	Sweep&Other
1942/43	P-38	1158​	0​	0​	299​
1942/43	P-47	16233​	117​	283​	10052​
Jan-44​	P-38	941​	0​	0​	0​
Jan-44​	P-47	5020​	253​	397​	4​
Feb-44​	P-38	1432​	0​	0​	0​
Feb-44​	P-47	7008​	83​	65​	0​
Feb-44​	P-51	424​	0​	0​	0​
Mar-44​	P-38	1813​	0​	0​	95​
Mar-44​	P-47	7015​	69​	139​	187​
Mar-44​	P-51	1982​	0​	0​	49​
Apr-44​	P-38	1993​	578​	161​	343​
Apr-44​	P-47	6118​	129​	206​	680​
Apr-44​	P-51	2895​	114​	62​	413​
May-44​	P-38	2969​	35​	0​	208​
May-44​	P-47	4380​	470​	143​	0​
May-44​	P-51	6502​	161​	73​	338​
Jun-44​	P-38	2757​	743​	149​	3696​
Jun-44​	P-47	3861​	485​	81​	2931​
Jun-44​	P-51	6958​	204​	8​	3277​
Jul-44​	P-38	2927​	3​	0​	687​
Jul-44​	P-47	3928​	193​	111​	919​
Jul-44​	P-51	8281​	0​	0​	529​
Aug-44​	P-38	815​	0​	0​	567​
Aug-44​	P-47	2420​	82​	22​	3196​
Aug-44​	P-51	9844​	10​	12​	2482​
Sep-44​	P-38	348​	n/a	n/a	335​
Sep-44​	P-47	1265​	n/a	n/a	2478​
Sep-44​	P-51	7943​	n/a	n/a	2123​
Oct-44​	P-38	26​	n/a	n/a	0​
Oct-44​	P-47	2594​	n/a	n/a	75​
Oct-44​	P-51	10164​	n/a	n/a	362​
Nov-44​	P-47	1821​	n/a	n/a	383​
Nov-44​	P-51	10414​	n/a	n/a	1197​
Dec-44​	P-47	1365​	n/a	n/a	0​
Dec-44​	P-51	12081​	n/a	n/a	641​

The Digest and the combined 8th and 9th AF yearly report disagree on total sorties. The 8th AF monthly summaries agree with the yearly for January to April 1944, then diverge by more than just the ASR sorties.

The Statistical Digest has ETO fighters flying 167,028 bombing/strafing, 283,902 escort and 99,951 other sorties for the war, total 569,097 while the 9th AF says its fighters were sent on 183,406 bombing/strafing, 57,653 escort and 23,060 other sorties, total 264,119.

9th AF "Other" fighter sorties, sorted by most to least sorties, Area Patrol, Fighter Sweep, Weather Reconnaissance, Leaflet Dropping, Interception, Demonstration Patrol, Flying Bomb Interception, Radio relay, Night Area Patrol, Night Intruder, Night Fighter Sweep, Photo Reconnaissance, Supply Dropping, Night Interception, Night Weather Reconnaissance, Tactical Reconnaissance, Radar Calibration, Flare Dropping for Artillery and finally 4 Miscellaneous sorties.

1 January 1944 the RAF had 3 non operational Mustang III squadrons, 19, 65 and 122 (the latter still had Spitfires), all with 2nd TAF, still the same at the end of the month, end February 3 operational squadrons with 47 aircraft plus 306 squadron converting but still using Spitfires. End March, 3 operational squadrons, with 53 aircraft, plus 129, 306 and 315 converting but still using Spitfires, while Air Defence Great Britain had 316 squadron converting but still with Spitfires. End April, 6 operational Mustang III squadrons with 2nd TAF, with 115 aircraft, and 1 operational squadron with Air Defence Great Britain with 19 aircraft. End May 1944, 5 operational Mustang III squadrons with 2nd TAF, with 100 aircraft, and 1 operational squadron with Air Defence Great Britain with 18 aircraft as 65 squadron was non operational.