I am reminded that the P-38 got to Europe with 4 basic flaws:
1) The early Allison had some intake issues that took about 7 - 9 months to fix.
Actually the changes to intake/Intercooling to J model created issues in overcooling the oil, but the primary issues were operational procedures to a.) cruise settings, an b.) ramping up RPM and Boost from those cruise settings. Air Tecnical Service screwed that one u. Lockheed and Allison knew what the problem was.
2) The early gasoline the P-38s were using was not the same as the engine was jetted for at the factory. Again, this got fixed, but it took awhile,
3) The cockpit heater was extremely weak for the cold in Europe. A simple electfric heater fixed that.
The addition of a second generator largely solved the cockpit heating problem -
4) The early crews had little to no actual combat experience, and were basically flying into engagements before the aircraft was configured for combat. Again, time fixed this.
The P-38H didn't have the same problems as the new J with re-design of cooling scheme - but the high altitude stress on cockpit and the incorrect cruise philosophy still blew up turbo and engines when going from low RPM and boost to High.
The early P-47s likewise had some issues:
1) The early pencil propeller made it a terrible cimber. It wasn't until early 1944 that the Curtiss paddle-bladed propeller changed the character of the aircraft. By then. the P-51s were firmly established in the ETO. Similar to the P-38 problems in that once the P-51 was there, fixing the issue likely didn't change the mission assignments unless there was some compelling reason to do so.
The early C/Ds were plagued with radio issues, no wing rack/plumbing, no water injection as primary issues. The internal wing modifications to provided structure for pylons, and internal plumbing from pylon to aux tank were long and labor intensive before the -15/-16s arrived in spring 1944. But the root cause was lack of internal fuel tankage necessary for R-2800 engined airframe to go long. Not solved until the D-25, then the P-47N.
2) The early turtledeck units were not the best for rearward visibility. It wasn't until the P-47D-25-RE that the bubble canopy was incorporated. They never made another turtledeck unit after that.
3) It wasn't widely publicized, but the P-47 could suffer from the same critical Mach issues the P-38 did. It wasn't until 1944 that the P-47 got Mach dive brakes. Yanks Air Museum has a P-47D with the WWII-issue dive brakes on it. Our P-38 also has the dive brakes installed. These went a long way to changing the likelihood of a pilot diving steeply after an opponent.
So, I wouldn't be too hard on the early P-47s that went over there. Saying they did almost nothing through 1943, when they actually contributed 414 of 451 claims is a bit disingenuous. It actually means that the P-47 contributed 91.8% of the claims. Does that mean all the other fighters were dogs and not worthy of mention? I don't think so. It rather means we were getting our collective feet wet in actual combat and it took some time to develop the skills and tactics to be successful at it. If I recall, the the Brits went into the war flying the Vic combat formation and it took some time for them to convert to the finger four formation with wingmen for each element leader. They learned that from the Germans, who developed it in Spain, unless I misremember.
Yes, but... Before December 1, 1943 there only existed One P-38 FG operational for 6 weeks, No P-51B operations, Seven P-47 FGs. The 4th, 56th 78th were operational eight months, 353rd four months, 352nd and 355th for three months. To me the more intersting number is for the month of December 1943. At that time 8 P-47 FGs were operational, One totally inexperienced P-51B group and One+ P-38 FG (20th began December 28). The victory credits were 78, 9 and 5 respectively for P-47 then P-51 and P-38.
In January 143, 43 and 32; In February 233, 89.5 32.5 and in March 175, 251 and 25. At end of March the 354th, 3554th, 4th and 357th FG were flying P-51B. The 56th, 78th, 352nd, 353rd, 356th, 359th, 362st FG were flying P-47s.
The April Victory Credits for the three P-38 and seven P-47 (352nd converted to Mustang) dropped precipitously with 23 and 82, while the P-51 totals for April went up 50% to 329.
P-51 vs P-47 = 329 to 82. 4X the impact with 0.5X the force.
P-51 vs P-38 = 329 to 23. 15X the impact with 1.4 X the force.
Then progressively lopsided for the rest of the war
Do the P-47 units get less forbearance in developing successful tactics? They did good work with what they had to work with, and developed the aircraft into a good weapon system as the war went on. But, as we see, it didn't happen overnight.
It performed very well for a high altitude interceptor converted to Mid range escort and fighter bomber. The Mustang performed well for a medium altitude Pusuit to Jack of all trades, including the most difficut - fight on equal terms or better over adversary's capital, at hgh or low altitude. .
