I recently read in a Wikipedia article that the Panther's Maybach V-12 would last around 960 (1500 km) miles under ideal road conditions, less off-road. Is this correct? This seems like a ludicrously short life for a tank engine, but I haven't been able to find any info on Allied tank engine lifespans. What about the Continental R975 in the Sherman? The GAA? I realize that the Panther was considerably heavier than a Sherman, but I'm wondering about the lifespan of these engines. The Wikipedia article also showed a picture of a gantry that was said to be essential to Panther maintenance, which isn't surprising if the engines are breaking down all of the time.
WWII tank engine longevity?
- Thread starter Stelth
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Freebird
Master Sergeant
Yes that's correct, and the Pz III & Pz IV also had a similar 1,500 mile range before needing a rebuild/overhaul.
Sherman had a lifespan of about 3,000 miles before major overhaul, as did the British Cromwell
parsifal
Colonel
My main source for this response is from the following:
Tank Archives: Tank Reliability
It states;
As almost everyone knows, the Panther had a lot of mechanical problems when it debuted at Kursk. However, a report from Guderian to Hitler proudly proclaims that these problems have been resolved by 1944.
"The latest messages from the Panther battalions say that the Panther is currently capable of withstanding all combat conditions, and does not even have minor drawbacks. For example, the 1st tank regiment writes on February 22nd, 1944: "The Panther in its current shape is perfect for battle. It greatly surpasses the T-34. Almost all minor drawbacks are gone. It is greatly superior to the PzIV in armament, armour, off-road maneuverability, and speed. The lifetime of the engine is 700-1000 km.
700-1000 sounds like a very large number of kilometers. I guess we could take the 1st regiment's word for it that the T-34 isn't the shining star of the Eastern Front anymore, ignoring the fact that Guderian's "all drawbacks are gone" assertion seems to be contradicted by them.
However, just to be thorough, let's look at some numbers from the other side. The 6th Guards Tank Army discovered the following lifespans of their tanks:
"T-34: 2000-2500 km, 250-300 hours
IS/ISU-122: 1200-1800 km, 230-280 hours
M4A2: 2000-2500 km, 250-300 hours
SU-76: 1200-1800 km, 180-200 hours
Individual tanks made it as far as 3000 km, and their motors functioned for 300-350 hours."
I am fairly sure these reported engine life spans were from tanks manufactured later in the wart, as the figures otherwise greatly conflict with dat obtained at Aberdeen in 1942.
These are the figures for all components. Even the weakest link of the Soviet and American tanks served twice as long as the Panther's engine.
Final drives were generally the weakest links for all tank designs and could be as low as 150km depending on the amount of strain being placed on the final drive. Weight was a big factor there and given that german tanks were generally much heavier than anyone elses with their drive systems typically massively overloaded it would be reasonable to assume the lifespan of their final drives was a veritable basket case…..generally.
A French report from 1947 on the Panther states that average engine life was 1000km with some reaching 1500km. (Spielberger)
- A German report from April 1944 mentions that "new engines have a significantly longer lifespan than the first series" and mentions examples of engines running up to 1800km. (Jentz)
- A document dealing with the engine life of a wide range of vehicles in service with British forces in North Africa (and Italy?) has some figures on engine life (from Bovington, was posted on the G104 Yahoo Group May 5th, 2001.)
Sherman M4A2: 1400-3000 miles
Sherman M4A4: 518-642 miles
Churchill: 600-1000 miles ("rarely more than 1000 miles")
Grant: 400-2000 miles.
I dont know how the French report reached its conclusions, but the figures from Jentz is a single case of three tanks while the British figures are taken from many different reports, some of the figures qualified by "isolated case" or some specific cause like "oiling up" or "by constant plug changing". So they should not be taken as averages but rather as examples.
From (WO 169/3861) message G(AFV) Middle East to ?, end of September 1942, regarding the Tank Overhaul Program:
Overhaul Mileage Limit:
Crusader – 1,200
Valentine – 2,500
Matilda – 1,000
Stuart – 3,500
Grant – 1,500
Annual Mileage Rate:
All – 3,000
Time in Workshop for Overhaul
All (except Stuart) – 8 weeks
Stuart – 4 weeks
Objective of the program was to maintain tank formations in the field above strength with a vehicle mileage limit of 250 miles per month.
In regard to the now famous report on the T-34 completed at the Aberdeen proving Ground it should now be familiar to most that the assessment was scathing about the t-34 (and KV-1) AFVs that were submitted for testing. An article by Boris Kavalerchik about the assessment appeared in the Russian-language magazine Voenno-Istoricheskiy Arkhiv, issue No. 1, 2006. Kavalerchik says that contrary to popular opinion in Russia which holds that the T-34s which were sent to the US and England were intentionally not of the highest quality, in the spring of 1942 five T-34s were specially prepared using the highest quality parts at the Ural Tank Factory (UTZ), which at that time produced the best T-34s in Russia.
The article, comments on Aberdeen's finding that the T-34 broke down beyond repair after 343 kilometers due to dirt getting into the engine's cylinders.
Kavalerchik responds to this by saying "There was nothing unusual about a tank breaking down after such a short period. At that time T-34 tanks were guaranteed not to break down for 1,000 kilometers, but in practice this number was unattainable. According to a report by the Scientific Institute for Armored Equipment (NIBT) to Ya. N. Fedorenko, the chief of the Red Army's Auto-Armored Directorate, the average distance a T-34 travelled before requiring overhaul (capital repairs) did not exceed 200 kilometers". The Aberdeen T-34 exceeded this.
This information does need to be balanced against a number of known circumstances however. In 1942 the quality of Soviet tanks had significantly fallen for many understandable reasons. These included the difficulty of reestablishing production by the evacuated factories at new locations, factories switching over to new production, the loss of many supply lines and sources of raw materials, a sharp drop in the average qualification of workers due to losses among experienced workers and the hiring of many new, inexperienced workers including women and teenagers. These new workers worked tirelessly and did everything they could for the front, but they were not qualified. Producing the most tanks possible was the priority, which was understandable since the heavy losses of the initial part of the year had to be made up. Therefore the requirement for quality was reduced, and the military accepted any tank that was built and running at the time of delivery. It proved a war winning decision. As a result, in 1942 some 34's could only go 50-100 kilometers before needing an overhaul.
To a certain degree this was justified because tanks, as a rule, did not survive until the expiration of its overhaul life, short as that was. The life of a tank on the front line was not long – on average 4-10 days (not counting time spent in transit on rail road and being repaired), or from 1-3 attacks. In 1942 the average mileage before being put out of service due to combat was 66.7 kilometers, which was less than half the average mileage before needing an overhaul. The majority of tanks simply didn't live long enough to break down.
The V-2 diesel engine which equipped T-34s and KV-1s was still suffering growing pains. At that time its designers were struggling to extend the diesel's service life to 100 hours, but in reality it seldom lasted more than 60. The engine of the T-34 which was tested at Aberdeen broke down at 72.5 hours, of which 58.45 were under load and 14.05 were while idling. The KV's diesel lasted 66.4 hours. One of the deficiencies of the B-2, besides a short guaranteed life, was an increased fuel consumption (12% above norm), and, especially, a completely unacceptable over-consumption of oil, which exceeded existing norms by 3-8 times! Therefore the range of a T-34 in 1942 was limited not by fuel, but by oil: according to the averages at that time from the technical department of the People's Commissariat for Tank Production, a T-34 carried enough fuel for 200-220 kilometers, but oil for only 145. At the same time German and American tanks didn't require any additional oil; it was simply changed every 2,000 kilometers.
Tank Archives: Tank Reliability
It states;
As almost everyone knows, the Panther had a lot of mechanical problems when it debuted at Kursk. However, a report from Guderian to Hitler proudly proclaims that these problems have been resolved by 1944.
"The latest messages from the Panther battalions say that the Panther is currently capable of withstanding all combat conditions, and does not even have minor drawbacks. For example, the 1st tank regiment writes on February 22nd, 1944: "The Panther in its current shape is perfect for battle. It greatly surpasses the T-34. Almost all minor drawbacks are gone. It is greatly superior to the PzIV in armament, armour, off-road maneuverability, and speed. The lifetime of the engine is 700-1000 km.
- Less damage to the engines.
- There are no more breaches in side reduction gears.
- The controls and suspension demonstrate their qualities.""
700-1000 sounds like a very large number of kilometers. I guess we could take the 1st regiment's word for it that the T-34 isn't the shining star of the Eastern Front anymore, ignoring the fact that Guderian's "all drawbacks are gone" assertion seems to be contradicted by them.
However, just to be thorough, let's look at some numbers from the other side. The 6th Guards Tank Army discovered the following lifespans of their tanks:
"T-34: 2000-2500 km, 250-300 hours
IS/ISU-122: 1200-1800 km, 230-280 hours
M4A2: 2000-2500 km, 250-300 hours
SU-76: 1200-1800 km, 180-200 hours
Individual tanks made it as far as 3000 km, and their motors functioned for 300-350 hours."
I am fairly sure these reported engine life spans were from tanks manufactured later in the wart, as the figures otherwise greatly conflict with dat obtained at Aberdeen in 1942.
These are the figures for all components. Even the weakest link of the Soviet and American tanks served twice as long as the Panther's engine.
Final drives were generally the weakest links for all tank designs and could be as low as 150km depending on the amount of strain being placed on the final drive. Weight was a big factor there and given that german tanks were generally much heavier than anyone elses with their drive systems typically massively overloaded it would be reasonable to assume the lifespan of their final drives was a veritable basket case…..generally.
A French report from 1947 on the Panther states that average engine life was 1000km with some reaching 1500km. (Spielberger)
- A German report from April 1944 mentions that "new engines have a significantly longer lifespan than the first series" and mentions examples of engines running up to 1800km. (Jentz)
- A document dealing with the engine life of a wide range of vehicles in service with British forces in North Africa (and Italy?) has some figures on engine life (from Bovington, was posted on the G104 Yahoo Group May 5th, 2001.)
Sherman M4A2: 1400-3000 miles
Sherman M4A4: 518-642 miles
Churchill: 600-1000 miles ("rarely more than 1000 miles")
Grant: 400-2000 miles.
I dont know how the French report reached its conclusions, but the figures from Jentz is a single case of three tanks while the British figures are taken from many different reports, some of the figures qualified by "isolated case" or some specific cause like "oiling up" or "by constant plug changing". So they should not be taken as averages but rather as examples.
From (WO 169/3861) message G(AFV) Middle East to ?, end of September 1942, regarding the Tank Overhaul Program:
Overhaul Mileage Limit:
Crusader – 1,200
Valentine – 2,500
Matilda – 1,000
Stuart – 3,500
Grant – 1,500
Annual Mileage Rate:
All – 3,000
Time in Workshop for Overhaul
All (except Stuart) – 8 weeks
Stuart – 4 weeks
Objective of the program was to maintain tank formations in the field above strength with a vehicle mileage limit of 250 miles per month.
In regard to the now famous report on the T-34 completed at the Aberdeen proving Ground it should now be familiar to most that the assessment was scathing about the t-34 (and KV-1) AFVs that were submitted for testing. An article by Boris Kavalerchik about the assessment appeared in the Russian-language magazine Voenno-Istoricheskiy Arkhiv, issue No. 1, 2006. Kavalerchik says that contrary to popular opinion in Russia which holds that the T-34s which were sent to the US and England were intentionally not of the highest quality, in the spring of 1942 five T-34s were specially prepared using the highest quality parts at the Ural Tank Factory (UTZ), which at that time produced the best T-34s in Russia.
The article, comments on Aberdeen's finding that the T-34 broke down beyond repair after 343 kilometers due to dirt getting into the engine's cylinders.
Kavalerchik responds to this by saying "There was nothing unusual about a tank breaking down after such a short period. At that time T-34 tanks were guaranteed not to break down for 1,000 kilometers, but in practice this number was unattainable. According to a report by the Scientific Institute for Armored Equipment (NIBT) to Ya. N. Fedorenko, the chief of the Red Army's Auto-Armored Directorate, the average distance a T-34 travelled before requiring overhaul (capital repairs) did not exceed 200 kilometers". The Aberdeen T-34 exceeded this.
This information does need to be balanced against a number of known circumstances however. In 1942 the quality of Soviet tanks had significantly fallen for many understandable reasons. These included the difficulty of reestablishing production by the evacuated factories at new locations, factories switching over to new production, the loss of many supply lines and sources of raw materials, a sharp drop in the average qualification of workers due to losses among experienced workers and the hiring of many new, inexperienced workers including women and teenagers. These new workers worked tirelessly and did everything they could for the front, but they were not qualified. Producing the most tanks possible was the priority, which was understandable since the heavy losses of the initial part of the year had to be made up. Therefore the requirement for quality was reduced, and the military accepted any tank that was built and running at the time of delivery. It proved a war winning decision. As a result, in 1942 some 34's could only go 50-100 kilometers before needing an overhaul.
To a certain degree this was justified because tanks, as a rule, did not survive until the expiration of its overhaul life, short as that was. The life of a tank on the front line was not long – on average 4-10 days (not counting time spent in transit on rail road and being repaired), or from 1-3 attacks. In 1942 the average mileage before being put out of service due to combat was 66.7 kilometers, which was less than half the average mileage before needing an overhaul. The majority of tanks simply didn't live long enough to break down.
The V-2 diesel engine which equipped T-34s and KV-1s was still suffering growing pains. At that time its designers were struggling to extend the diesel's service life to 100 hours, but in reality it seldom lasted more than 60. The engine of the T-34 which was tested at Aberdeen broke down at 72.5 hours, of which 58.45 were under load and 14.05 were while idling. The KV's diesel lasted 66.4 hours. One of the deficiencies of the B-2, besides a short guaranteed life, was an increased fuel consumption (12% above norm), and, especially, a completely unacceptable over-consumption of oil, which exceeded existing norms by 3-8 times! Therefore the range of a T-34 in 1942 was limited not by fuel, but by oil: according to the averages at that time from the technical department of the People's Commissariat for Tank Production, a T-34 carried enough fuel for 200-220 kilometers, but oil for only 145. At the same time German and American tanks didn't require any additional oil; it was simply changed every 2,000 kilometers.
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I think it was somewhere on this forum that I read one tank crew in Normandy had six different tanks from landing to breakout, they are much more often immobilized or damaged than destroyed. Of course some of those tanks would be repaired but for tanks like the Sherman I doubt many reached the overhaul mileage without having other work done.
Short of a catastrophic explosion, most "Destroyed" tanks are repairable That is one of the reasons that whoever holds the battlefield will win in the long run because they can recover most of their losses. From what I have read in some accounts, most of the destroyed tanks will be back in action within a week.
I am somewhat surprised at the lack of durability of tank engines. Some of these numbers are basically saying that the tank will need an overhaul before it needs to be refueled.
- Ivan.
- Thread starter
- #7
Thanks, guys, this is great info! Parsifal, I read your entire post several times - I had already thought that logistics would be a nightmare for the tankers, it appears that it was even worse than I had thought. Apart from enormous quantities of gasoline, there would have to be numerous engines, transmissions, and other drivetrain components available, along with a lot of specialized equipment.
There are descriptions and photographs of Soviet T-34 leaving the factory with an extra transmission strapped onto the rear deck. I had thought it was peculiar to the T-34 because of its poor manufacturing quality, but it now seems like other tanks were no better in general.
A calculation of engine running time versus mileage makes for an interesting average speed.
- Ivan.
A calculation of engine running time versus mileage makes for an interesting average speed.
- Ivan.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
... keeping scarce Tiger tanks operational was a major feat of guts and ingenuity on the part of the Heer mechanics and engineers. Recovery and repair ensured that a handful of Tigers punched 100+ to 1. Otto Carius, I believe, refers to the mechanics and engineers as "the wizzards".
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yulzari
Tech Sergeant
I can't answer for the US or Soviet tanks but by 1944 the British system for front line units, other than minor repairs, was to issue a new tank to the crew and let Recovery and Workshops deal with the problems and give the repaired tank to another crew needing a new mount later on. Not unlike modern fleet car operators who lease their cars and expect car problems to be dealt with by being given another car straight away and not left short while 'their' car is in the workshop. This kept armoured units up to strength continuously. But then, by 1945 the shortfall in the British army was soldiers not kit given the WW1 western front levels of losses. Finding enough infantry was a real problem and proposals were to re-role spare aircrew and release conscripted miners from the mines. Entering the seventh year of a war does that.
parsifal
Colonel
American Tanks were generally well balanced designs in which the tolerances for the drive systems and other elements of the tank were not as overstressed as tanks from some other nationalities, particularly the germans
The standard of construction was very high and the workforce building them was highly trained and the tank building factories were excellently laid out and roomy. Finally the proportion of production diverted to the manufacture of spare parts made maintenance and overall reliability fairly straightforward.
American engines had a reputation for reliability and engineering simplicity that in my opinion was well deserved and tangibly affected those serviceability rates.
British tanks suffered from engine weaknesses and poor design philosophy which tended to limited the operational usefulness to the tanks. Ive not heard much about the skills of the workforce or the suitability of the manufacturing base, although I do know that the british in a similar vein to their aircraft "shadow factories" used standard automotive factories to augment their production. British tank production was consequently impressive in terms of numbers, but indifferent in terms of the usefulness of the designs. Ive not heard too many bad things about serviceability of british tanks, but Im happy to be corrected on that
Italian tanks in the desert suffered woeful reliability issues in the heat and dust. M11/39s were overstressed and poorly designed and the heat treatment of the armour plate overstressed. British tests found the engine life at 80% power to be about 20 miles. Radiator leaked profusely and coolant pressures could not be met because of that. Their L3 light tanks suffered from the same transmission issues. Given that the L3s were mostly intended to serve in the recon role, these reliability issues must have played havoc to their recon groups
I don't have much on the French tanks. Ive seen a report about ex-French H-35s that had been sold to Romania and participated in the 1942 summer campaigns in Southern Russia. They suffered terrible reliability issues, which is made worse by the fact that the Romanians never used them in heavy combat. They broke down, it seems under just normal operating conditions. The most reliable and useful tanks for the Rumanians were their R-2 tanks (a derivative of the Pzkpfw 38) which appeared to have very long servicibility times. The Romanians found the 30 (approximately) PzKpfw 35s passed on by Germany in 1942 (in exchange for oil) to be so clapped out and lacking in spares as to be rendered unserviceable for more than 5 months as they were almost completely rebuilt at their tank arsenal at Resita. By the time they were ready, they were so obsolete as to be basically worthless. They equipped the 2nd regt of the 1st armoured div but were used only for training with frequent breakdowns recorded even in that role.
The 50 (?) MkIIIs sold to Romania in June (?) 1942 provided much needed firepower to the Rumanian armoured formations. However these tanks were deemed unfit for service like the Mk35s and spent about 4 months being rebuilt before being assigned to the Rumanian 1st armoured Div. 1st armoured acquitted itself well at Stalingrad.
Its broad history and equipment tables are accessible via this link
Phil on World War Two: The Romanian 1st Armored Division
During the night of 19/21 November, the Romanian 1st Armored Division moved against the Soviet Tank Corps (in the area of attack of 26th Soviet Tank Corps). It was cut to pieces but nevertheless is considered to be a far more effective fighting unit than the german 22 pz Div also operating in this area 922 pz wperformed so badly during operations on the chir that the germans never bothered to properly rebuild it).
Romanian tanks moved from the Perelasovskiy area towards Serafimovichi and in the dark of night missed the spearhead of the 26th Tank Corps, which was on the left flank of the Romanian 1st Armored Division. As the Romanian tanks advanced toward Novocaricinskaya, the forward elements of the 26th Tank Corps collided with the rear replenishment column of the Romanian 1st Armored Division and captured it. The Romanians therefore lost most of their refuelling capability. On the morning of 20 November, the 26th Tank Corps destroyed the main rear depot of the Romanian 1st Armored Division located in Perelasovskiy. Meanwhile, the 19th Tank Brigade of the Soviet 4th Tank Corps, which was advancing on the east flank of 26th Tank Corps, was attacked by the tanks of the Romanian 1st Armored Division advancing from the Zhirkovskiy area. The German 22. Panzer-Div. was also engaged at this time, fighting with the Soviet 1st Tank Corps in the vicinity of Pestchannyy, but its tanks basically ran away (german sources don't describe it in such unflattering terms).
However, according to Soviet accounts, the Romanian tanks had been very expertly handled and severely disrupted the advance of Soviet infantry and cavalry that were moving forward behind their tanks corps. This would appear to be the case as the commander of 1st armoured, received the iron cross for his defensive efforts.
During the battles, the 1st Panzer engaged a Soviet tank corps, four rifle divisions and a cavalry corps, in conjunction, with the German 22nd Panzer Division (41 tanks) in an effort to at cut off the attackers. When that effort failed and supplies reached critical levels, the division broke out across the Chir River and formed a corridor for the 22nd Panzer Division and the remnants of several Romanian infantry divisions..
Despite being down to 28 tanks, the 1st, along with the 22nd Panzer Division, continued to counter attack Soviet bridgeheads across the Chir River. On 2 December, the situation stabilized and other divisions replaced the panzer divisions along the river line. By this time, the 1st was down to 3 tanks and 7,200 men, of whom 6,300 were non-combat troops.
The remains of the 1st became known as the "Nistor Detachment," after the Colonel who took charge of it. Its manpower was bolstered by a security battalion and 20 tanks had been repaired when the Soviets attacked again, penetrated the Chir River, and encircled most of the Romanian 3rd Army. The Nistor Detachment attacked to breakout of the pocket, this time going through the Soviet 1st Guard Mechanized Corps. Once it reached safety, the division was withdrawn to Romania for a major refit. It had managed to keep 40 of its tanks, though most required major repairs. Despite being outnumbered, outmaneuvered, poorly supplied and equipped, it had managed to destroy 150 Soviet tanks (claimed) during the previous two months.
Almost immediately, there was an effort to rebuild the 1st Panzer. However, all tank deliveries were dependent on Germany, which needed every armored fighting vehicle, so no new tanks arrived for some time. The only tanks in repair were 25 R-2s, 2 R-3s, 2 R-4s, 54 F-17s and 52 R-35s from the 2nd Panzer Regiment. The proud 1st Romanian Panzer Division was relegated to training infantry in anti-tank tactics.
Since the Romanian government would not commit the division to the front without equipment upgrades, Germany was forced to meet its commitments to supply German equipment. When elements of the 1st Romanian Panzer Division were committed to battle again, in February 1944, its equipment list included a number newly delivered, if used, Panzer IVs and Stug-IIIs, which joined the recently rebuilt and converted TACAM T-60s. It fought in defense of the Romanian borders, but never as a full unit. From February to August, several battalions were still refitting in Romania and, during August, the division was split into two separate battle groups.
There are some reports of action following Kursk in conjunction with SS Totenkopf
The standard of construction was very high and the workforce building them was highly trained and the tank building factories were excellently laid out and roomy. Finally the proportion of production diverted to the manufacture of spare parts made maintenance and overall reliability fairly straightforward.
American engines had a reputation for reliability and engineering simplicity that in my opinion was well deserved and tangibly affected those serviceability rates.
British tanks suffered from engine weaknesses and poor design philosophy which tended to limited the operational usefulness to the tanks. Ive not heard much about the skills of the workforce or the suitability of the manufacturing base, although I do know that the british in a similar vein to their aircraft "shadow factories" used standard automotive factories to augment their production. British tank production was consequently impressive in terms of numbers, but indifferent in terms of the usefulness of the designs. Ive not heard too many bad things about serviceability of british tanks, but Im happy to be corrected on that
Italian tanks in the desert suffered woeful reliability issues in the heat and dust. M11/39s were overstressed and poorly designed and the heat treatment of the armour plate overstressed. British tests found the engine life at 80% power to be about 20 miles. Radiator leaked profusely and coolant pressures could not be met because of that. Their L3 light tanks suffered from the same transmission issues. Given that the L3s were mostly intended to serve in the recon role, these reliability issues must have played havoc to their recon groups
I don't have much on the French tanks. Ive seen a report about ex-French H-35s that had been sold to Romania and participated in the 1942 summer campaigns in Southern Russia. They suffered terrible reliability issues, which is made worse by the fact that the Romanians never used them in heavy combat. They broke down, it seems under just normal operating conditions. The most reliable and useful tanks for the Rumanians were their R-2 tanks (a derivative of the Pzkpfw 38) which appeared to have very long servicibility times. The Romanians found the 30 (approximately) PzKpfw 35s passed on by Germany in 1942 (in exchange for oil) to be so clapped out and lacking in spares as to be rendered unserviceable for more than 5 months as they were almost completely rebuilt at their tank arsenal at Resita. By the time they were ready, they were so obsolete as to be basically worthless. They equipped the 2nd regt of the 1st armoured div but were used only for training with frequent breakdowns recorded even in that role.
The 50 (?) MkIIIs sold to Romania in June (?) 1942 provided much needed firepower to the Rumanian armoured formations. However these tanks were deemed unfit for service like the Mk35s and spent about 4 months being rebuilt before being assigned to the Rumanian 1st armoured Div. 1st armoured acquitted itself well at Stalingrad.
Its broad history and equipment tables are accessible via this link
Phil on World War Two: The Romanian 1st Armored Division
During the night of 19/21 November, the Romanian 1st Armored Division moved against the Soviet Tank Corps (in the area of attack of 26th Soviet Tank Corps). It was cut to pieces but nevertheless is considered to be a far more effective fighting unit than the german 22 pz Div also operating in this area 922 pz wperformed so badly during operations on the chir that the germans never bothered to properly rebuild it).
Romanian tanks moved from the Perelasovskiy area towards Serafimovichi and in the dark of night missed the spearhead of the 26th Tank Corps, which was on the left flank of the Romanian 1st Armored Division. As the Romanian tanks advanced toward Novocaricinskaya, the forward elements of the 26th Tank Corps collided with the rear replenishment column of the Romanian 1st Armored Division and captured it. The Romanians therefore lost most of their refuelling capability. On the morning of 20 November, the 26th Tank Corps destroyed the main rear depot of the Romanian 1st Armored Division located in Perelasovskiy. Meanwhile, the 19th Tank Brigade of the Soviet 4th Tank Corps, which was advancing on the east flank of 26th Tank Corps, was attacked by the tanks of the Romanian 1st Armored Division advancing from the Zhirkovskiy area. The German 22. Panzer-Div. was also engaged at this time, fighting with the Soviet 1st Tank Corps in the vicinity of Pestchannyy, but its tanks basically ran away (german sources don't describe it in such unflattering terms).
However, according to Soviet accounts, the Romanian tanks had been very expertly handled and severely disrupted the advance of Soviet infantry and cavalry that were moving forward behind their tanks corps. This would appear to be the case as the commander of 1st armoured, received the iron cross for his defensive efforts.
During the battles, the 1st Panzer engaged a Soviet tank corps, four rifle divisions and a cavalry corps, in conjunction, with the German 22nd Panzer Division (41 tanks) in an effort to at cut off the attackers. When that effort failed and supplies reached critical levels, the division broke out across the Chir River and formed a corridor for the 22nd Panzer Division and the remnants of several Romanian infantry divisions..
Despite being down to 28 tanks, the 1st, along with the 22nd Panzer Division, continued to counter attack Soviet bridgeheads across the Chir River. On 2 December, the situation stabilized and other divisions replaced the panzer divisions along the river line. By this time, the 1st was down to 3 tanks and 7,200 men, of whom 6,300 were non-combat troops.
The remains of the 1st became known as the "Nistor Detachment," after the Colonel who took charge of it. Its manpower was bolstered by a security battalion and 20 tanks had been repaired when the Soviets attacked again, penetrated the Chir River, and encircled most of the Romanian 3rd Army. The Nistor Detachment attacked to breakout of the pocket, this time going through the Soviet 1st Guard Mechanized Corps. Once it reached safety, the division was withdrawn to Romania for a major refit. It had managed to keep 40 of its tanks, though most required major repairs. Despite being outnumbered, outmaneuvered, poorly supplied and equipped, it had managed to destroy 150 Soviet tanks (claimed) during the previous two months.
Almost immediately, there was an effort to rebuild the 1st Panzer. However, all tank deliveries were dependent on Germany, which needed every armored fighting vehicle, so no new tanks arrived for some time. The only tanks in repair were 25 R-2s, 2 R-3s, 2 R-4s, 54 F-17s and 52 R-35s from the 2nd Panzer Regiment. The proud 1st Romanian Panzer Division was relegated to training infantry in anti-tank tactics.
Since the Romanian government would not commit the division to the front without equipment upgrades, Germany was forced to meet its commitments to supply German equipment. When elements of the 1st Romanian Panzer Division were committed to battle again, in February 1944, its equipment list included a number newly delivered, if used, Panzer IVs and Stug-IIIs, which joined the recently rebuilt and converted TACAM T-60s. It fought in defense of the Romanian borders, but never as a full unit. From February to August, several battalions were still refitting in Romania and, during August, the division was split into two separate battle groups.
There are some reports of action following Kursk in conjunction with SS Totenkopf
MIflyer
1st Lieutenant
In one of Stephen Zaloga's books he points out that many of the M4 Shermans that hit the beaches at Normandy had 10,000 miles on them and were still good for many thousands more, in direct contrast to just about everyone elses tanks. Now, that does not mean the same engine survived that whole mileage, but then again with radial engines like the R-670 and R-975 it is not uncommon to have to yank a cylinder or two to rework or replace it and then have the engine last much longer. The design of the engine makes it possible to do that; other types of engines are not necessarily that way. On the other hand the need to swap out cylinders on such air cooled aircraft engines says a lot right there; relatively few light aircraft owners have avoided that experience.
Of course, the mutibank automobile engines used on some Shermans offered some options for engine repair without replacement as well.
By the way, Zaloga's "Armored Thunderbolt" is the best book on tanks I have ever read.
Of course, the mutibank automobile engines used on some Shermans offered some options for engine repair without replacement as well.
By the way, Zaloga's "Armored Thunderbolt" is the best book on tanks I have ever read.
Benjdragon
Airman
- 13
- Sep 18, 2015
Some time ago I read an article (or a book excerpt) that stated that the King Tigers broke down, on the average, about once every 50 miles. It didn't say if that was due to the engine failing or some other reason.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,036
- Jun 25, 2013
When I worked at Lycoming, into the early 1980s, the M1 Abrams was undergoing its service trials. The diesel in the M60 was reported to have a mean time between removal (MTBR) of about 50 hours, which worked out to (if my nearly 40-year old memories of a different group's program are not as corroded as a '73 Datsun 240Z) an engine being pulled about every other month.
There's a lot to go wrong on a tank; engines are only one of them. I suspect that tracks and transmissions were as much or more of a maintenance issue than engines.
There's a lot to go wrong on a tank; engines are only one of them. I suspect that tracks and transmissions were as much or more of a maintenance issue than engines.
parsifal
Colonel
The Australian Army back in 1988 commissioned a detailed study into the expected track life on its M-113 APCs. Rather optimistically, it concluded the average track life was about 9000 km. That is not to say that tracks would last 9000 km between repairs being needed.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a219397.pdf
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1800/RR1834/RAND_RR1834.pdf
I can say that in the finish, the Australian Army all but abandoned the use of tracked APCs as its primary AFV for its infantry. In the conditions and distances applicable to the Australian army battlefields, wheeled vehicles were found to be far more cost effective and reliable in sustained operations. I am led to believe that US army experiences in Iraq have been similar. Their Bradley tracked AFVs were all but rendered unserviceable by the sutained operations they were called upon to fulfil. The Humvees that became synonomous with that war proved to be far more cost effective and reliable, though the Humvee was far from ideal.
Heavy armoured vehicles like tanks have the same problem, magnified several times over by the weight of their armament and armour. The heaviness of the designs seems to bear a direct correlation to the effectiveness of the drive system. The heavier the tank, the more likely it is to fail. throw into that mix a drive system that was inherently overloaded, and add wartime stresses and indifferent build standards and you quickly generate conditions where equipment failures will be rife.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a219397.pdf
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1800/RR1834/RAND_RR1834.pdf
I can say that in the finish, the Australian Army all but abandoned the use of tracked APCs as its primary AFV for its infantry. In the conditions and distances applicable to the Australian army battlefields, wheeled vehicles were found to be far more cost effective and reliable in sustained operations. I am led to believe that US army experiences in Iraq have been similar. Their Bradley tracked AFVs were all but rendered unserviceable by the sutained operations they were called upon to fulfil. The Humvees that became synonomous with that war proved to be far more cost effective and reliable, though the Humvee was far from ideal.
Heavy armoured vehicles like tanks have the same problem, magnified several times over by the weight of their armament and armour. The heaviness of the designs seems to bear a direct correlation to the effectiveness of the drive system. The heavier the tank, the more likely it is to fail. throw into that mix a drive system that was inherently overloaded, and add wartime stresses and indifferent build standards and you quickly generate conditions where equipment failures will be rife.
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- Thread starter
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fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
Very well surprisingly, 30 cylinders in 5 banks sounds like it shouldnt have worked but the British Army was perfectly happy with it and found it to be more reliable than the radial engines. I have read that the Sherman V was better cross country than other marks of Sherman. Possibly this was because the Sherman V had a longer hull (and longer tracks) to fit the Chrysler multibank engine and the longer tracks improved grip or flotation. Another advantage the Chrysler multibank had over the radials was it wasnt quite so particular about its fuel and could burn any Octane available.
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
May not have been the best tank engine in WWII (though better than legend suggests) but its certainly a candidate for the best sounding
Nuffield Liberty V12
Nuffield Liberty V12
The adaptability of the US to adapt various power plants to tank production was rather amazing. I've driven the R985 around a lot in airlines and originally had a hard time picturing it as a tank engine. Similarly marine engines were adapted. A major bottleneck in steam turbine plants (the optimal instillation) was cutting of reduction gears. The CVE's on C-3 merchant hulls were largely equipped with the triple expansion (piston) Uniflow engines which were direct drive. Destroyer Escorts often used a Diesel Electric plant which similarly avoided reduction gearing.
I also read about the Brits liking this version of the Sherman.
A longer hull on an AFV would ride successive bumps better with less pitching.
