Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
What happens to "one of a kind" aircraft that don't make it into production ?
Some are surely destroyed (like Northrops big flying wing, and Martin's
"Seamaster"), but what happens to the others ?
From everything I have read, the F-35 is a marvel of manufacturing compared to the F-22. Many lessons learned there and applied to the Lightning II program.
From what I understand, the YF-23 was the technical selection of the fly-off. It had better supercruise speed and better stealth and met all the maneuvering requirements without the use of vectored thrust. I understood that the selection was based upon the perception that LM could manage the program better than Northrop, which is understandable since the B-2 bomber had grossly overrun (although the AF had a significant part of that with changing requirements, but, of course, Northrop mismangement, and rampant lack of contract discipline on both sides, contributed mightily. And beside, I had to send my kids to college!). However, as an interesting sidelight, when I started supporting LM on the JSF in Fort Worth, I was expecting to see an efficient systems driven engineering organization. What I found was an organization very similar to Northrop's and was just a screwed up. This showed it ugly head with the greatly inflated cost of the F-22. I have lost track of the progress of the F-35.
In my opinion, the F-23 is much more attactive than the F-22, which looks like a cluge of parts that don't quite fit. I worked at Northrop Grumman at their El Segundo plant just before I retired. I always enjoyed going out side and walking all around the YF-23, which was parked there. Unlike the F-22, the F-35 is good looking and I think it will be an amazing aircraft.
And without horizontal stabs and vertical stabs of such dihedral, the AOA performance can't possible be as good as the F-22.
A very good friend of mine worked on the X-35 and now the F-35. He helped design the electrical system. A lot of "lessons learned" from the F-22 went into the F-35. Additionally a lot of original General Dynamics people moved into key positions when Lockheed swallowed them up. There was (and still is) a lot of resentment in the Skunk Works in Palmdale over the Fort Worth influence but it seems to have things going in the right direction.
My ex-brother in law was a retired Lockheed procurement director who went back to Lockheed as a consultant on the F-22. The last time I saw him he was telling me how screwed up the F-22 program was. The boarding ladder alone was costing several millions to design and build - A Boarding Ladder!!!!
Actually a lot of the management was over-run by people from Fort Worth - I knew a lot of older Skunk Works people who retired when the influx of FW people moved to Palmdale. The FW people were given hefty raises, relocation allowances and for a period per diem to relocate to Palmdale. When these folks got there they eventually filled management spots as they became available. At the same time my friend said he saw a lot of laziness and incompetence within the organization - the problem (and I think you find this in all aircraft manufacturers) is a majority of the people who hold key positions are not "Aviation Folks." Sure, they have the big degrees, but most of them could care less about aircraft, flying or aviation - I've seen some folks get laid off and try to stay in aviation in an aircraft maintenance capacity and at that point it really shows their true lack of knowlege of the industry and their apathy toward aviation.I saw the rift between GD people and Lockheed people from the GD side. There was a lot of disdain from Ft. Worth for the work that was being done at the Skunk Works. I think they took over the Skunk Works or something like that.
Yep! And on the F-35 engineers were given cash awards when they came up with weight saving ideas.An example of the costly design of the F-22 was the separation of circuit boards in the avionics. In the F-22, the separation was so close that Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) components could not be used and most electronic parts had to be specifically designed for the F-22, an extremely costly effort. On the JSF, we were told that the board separation HAD to be great enough for COTS equipment. Cost control was a major factor in JSF competition.
And you also have the program Manager promising the customer that he could make 2+2=7!there is the customer wanting more capability and contractor willing to provide it for a price.