You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940

The Luftwaffe raids were successfully intercepted because the RAF saw them coming and had an integrated system of command and control that allowed its fighters to be in a position and altitude to meet those raids. In my scenario the RAF would be no more capable of intercepting Luftwaffe raids than the Poles or the French.

Why did squadrons scramble,trying to be airborne in minutes? Because every second counted.

If raids were not detected until they approached the South or South East coasts of England,rather than as they assembled over the French coast or North Sea that advantage is lost. The RAF might have resorted to flying standing patrols in the hope of positioning its fighters to make an interception,something Dowding considered pointless.

I can't emphasise enough that stage one of my campaign is the destruction of the Chain Home sites. Raid them until they are put out of action and then keep coming back to keep them that way. It could be done,it was done. What the Luftwaffe didn't do was attack all the sites,neither did it come back to keep those it had disabled out of action.

Cheers
Steve

Your arithmatic is a little suspect, to cover 35 miles in less than 2 minutes would require a speed of over 1000mph.

Unless you are tieing this 2 minutes in with the 6 minutes of response time .

riacrato said:

Even if there was no single fighter left in GB, that would never be a permanent state. Fighters can be rebuild, pilots trained. The KGs can't be everywhere, all the time.

Even if the Fighter Command disintegrates (big if, even the LW Jagdwaffe didn't disintegrate until long after the invasion), GB still had the option to defend against air attacks from the ground with AAA.

Even if LW bombers roam freely, as long as the RN is around, an invasion will fail.

Even if GB negotiates for temporary peace (which I think is highly unlikely no matter what big a 'what-if' you pull), who says they won't declare war again once the US enter the war?

All in all, this is a game with no winning strategy. Based on the (by now) disproven assumption that a determined populace can be forced to surrender by air assault only. With hindsight, doing nothing in the west (in terms of offensive actions on British soil), is the best strategy. Disrupt convoys, be a major nuisance in the atlantic. But other than that, hold back, conserve your numbers and cover your bases.

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You are still fighting the historical scenario,not the campaign that I would wage with the benefit of hindsight.

The Battle of Britain was winnable by the Luftwaffe with some major tweaks to their strategy and some minor ones to their equipment.

Britain's problem was pilots not aeroplanes. It's much easier to keep a man down than to get him down and any sign of the green shoots of recovery from the RAF would be dealt with.

Whether Britain could be forced to terms is an entirely different question. I think that she could have been in certain circumstances. An offer whereby she conceded Europe but held on to her maritime Empire would have been appealing to many in the British elite. It's not ideal but after the series of defeats she has now,in my scenario,suffered at the hands of Germany and with her cities defenceless from aerial attack (how many Luftwaffe bombers did British AAA shoot down in 1940?) it might be seen as the lesser evil.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

The Luftwaffe raids were successfully intercepted because the RAF saw them coming and had an integrated system of command and control that allowed its fighters to be in a position and altitude to meet those raids. In my scenario the RAF would be no more capable of intercepting Luftwaffe raids than the Poles or the French.

Why did squadrons scramble,trying to be airborne in minutes? Because every second counted.

If raids were not detected until they approached the South or South East coasts of England,rather than as they assembled over the French coast or North Sea that advantage is lost. The RAF might have resorted to flying standing patrols in the hope of positioning its fighters to make an interception,something Dowding considered pointless.

I can't emphasise enough that stage one of my campaign is the destruction of the Chain Home sites. Raid them until they are put out of action and then keep coming back to keep them that way. It could be done,it was done. What the Luftwaffe didn't do was attack all the sites,neither did it come back to keep those it had disabled out of action.

Cheers
Steve

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Until you can sustainably knock out radar stations, which was extraordinarily difficult to do so, then you can attack during the day. But it was also helpful to have bombers that can move quickly if needed because even if the radars are down, which would require bombing them every day and avoiding the AAA traps they would become, then there will still be risks of interception that fighters cannot beat off. Also the 'round the clock bombing of airfields and radar stations would sap RAF morale, as being hit during the day, having to scramble and fight, and being bombed at night would all reduce performance.
The BIG question is whether the LW could keep up that level of effort. The British also had mobile radar stations for coastal and inland use, so if the CH systems are knocked out the mobile units can be brought in to plug the coverage gaps. Beyond that what's to say the British would deal if the RAF is forced to pull back to more northern fields out of the range of German fighters? They could still engage German aircraft over Britain and have radar coverage from mobile stations. Churchill isn't going to be toppled because some airfields need to be temporarily abandoned. Also once the RAF withdraws from southern airfields, what are the Germans going to target? London? Once they do that then those airfields can rebuild, because they are no longer being bombed.

Chain Home - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

During the battle, Chain Home stations — most notably the one at Ventnor, Isle of Wight — were attacked several times between 12 and 18 August 1940. On one occasion a section of the radar chain in Kent, including the Dover CH, was put out of action by a lucky hit on the power grid. However, though the wooden huts housing the radar equipment were damaged, the towers survived owing to their open steel girder construction. Because the towers were untoppled and the signals soon restored, the Luftwaffe concluded the stations were too difficult to damage by bombing and left them alone for the remainder of the war.

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Radar in World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Transportable Radio Unit
While at Bawdsey, the Army Cell developed a GL system code-named Transportable Radio Unit (TRU). Pollard was the project leader. Operating at 60 MHz (6-m) with 50-kW power, the TRU had two vans for the electronic equipment plus a power van; it used a 105-ft erectable tower to support a transmitting antenna and two receiving antennas. A prototype was successfully tested in October 1937, detecting aircraft at 60-miles range; production of 400 sets designated GL Mk I started the following June. The Air Ministry adopted some of these sets as gap-fillers and emergency substitutes in the CH network.

As the war started, GL Mk I sets were used overseas by the British Army in Malta and Egypt in 1939–40. Seventeen sets were sent to France with the British Expeditionary Force; most of these were destroyed at the Dunkirk evacuation in late May 1940, but a few were captured and gave the Germans their first full information on British RDF hardware. An improved version, GL Mk II, was used throughout the war; some 1,700 sets were put into service, including over 200 supplied to the Soviet Union. Operational research found that anti-aircraft batteries using the GL averaged 4,100 rounds fired per hit, compared with about 20,000 rounds for unassisted guns.

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tyrodtom said:

Your arithmatic is a little suspect, to cover 35 miles in less than 2 minutes would require a speed of over 1000mph.

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Damn, you right, I calculated that all wrong. About 7.5 minutes. I'm assuming that they would cruise at about 280mph. Still, it would take too long for fighters to show up, but they could run down the Bf110s on the way back if the wanted to pursue.

tyrodtom said:

Your arithmatic is a little suspect, to cover 35 miles in less than 2 minutes would require a speed of over 1000mph.

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I'm not sure what you are referring to.

It would take a Luftwaffe formation cruising at an optimistic 220 mph about 10-12 minutes to cross the channel at its shortest point,by no means the route always taken. The formations were actually tracked from much greater ranges giving the RAF a chance to get into position to make the interception.
If you rely on the Observer Corps seeing the formation as it comes in across the Channel/North Sea it may well be on the most Southerly or Easterly airfields before the squadrons have even been ordered to take off. It is also very difficult for the observer to establish an accurate bearing (on which the formation is flying) until the formation is really very close.
Cheers
Steve

And then there was also CHL radars to be destroyed.

Juha

Juha said:

And then there was also CHL radars to be destroyed.

Juha

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Those don't matter because they top out at 35 miles and 800 feet high. As naval gun laying radar they had a height limitation.

stona said:

Freijagd with the increased endurance and tactical flexibility this bestows would be an entirely different affair to the 10/15 minutes that the Bf 109 had historically when it reached an arc running through the Thames at london.

If you have blinded the RAF by destroying the Chain Home stations the risk of effective bomber interceptions are much reduced. I'm suggesting that the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s go on the offensive. If they can catch the Spitfires and Hurricanes as they take off,climb or ideally on the ground,they are much more easily dealt with.

As Luftwaffe commander I propose a coordinated strategy,not the historical piece meal attacks with several concurrent objectives.

1. Destroy Britain's radar based air defence system.

2. Destroy Fighter Command.

3. Bomb the crap out of Britain and hope you can force her to negotiate rather than attempt a very risky invasion.

Cheers

Steve

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that is it exactly! and that is what you have to develope your tactics around (including the use of driop tanks) . radar gave FC the ability to direct and concentrate its defense force where the attack was coming from. without it the raf is blind. would be forced to actively patrol in order to intercept incoming EA instead of scrambling and being directed to them. that meant more planes in the air but actually less at the actual intercept point ( if they made contact at all ). initially so the LW could have initial local air supermacy. after contact would be made radio call would direct available ac in the area to reinforce the defense but the battle could be over by then. with all the plane there a gap in the defense exists elsewhere. it boils down to less rest for the RAF pilots and less maintenence for the ac. i believe the RAF would have suffered more losses this way and exhausted their resources faster and the LW would have been able to get the upper hand and capitalize on it. i wouldnt have worried about the ports too much or the navy. once you gain air supremacy you can deal with them practically unopposed... but unless you nullify the radar you dont have chance of beating britian...unless you doulble or triple your air force.

wiking85 said:

Those don't matter because they top out at 35 miles and 800 feet high. As naval gun laying radar they had a height limitation.

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I'd say 25 miles and 500 feet but I do agree.

The sets were also at the Chain Home sites so you didn't have to attack different targets.

Where does the idea that these radars were very difficult to disable come from? When the Luftwaffe actually made an effort,as at Ventnor, they were very successful. 360 foot high towers with a "curtain" array between them are vulnerable and the receivers were on 240 foot high wooden towers. A typical station had four of each. This is the most vulnerable part of the system,the transmitter buildings were well protected.

Cheers

Steve

wiking85 said:

Those don't matter because they top out at 35 miles and 800 feet high. As naval gun laying radar they had a height limitation.

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Not according to my info "When on 200' tower or on 200' cliffs, range on target at 500' is 110 miles." Maybe my sourse is over-optimistic because maps tended to show that CHL range was only just across the Strait of Dover

stona said:

I'd say 25 miles and 500 feet but I do agree.

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That was at the beginning

stona said:

The sets were also at the Chain Home sites so you didn't have to attack different targets.

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Not true, take a look on a map showing where the radar stations were.

Juha said:

Not according to my info "When on 200' tower or on 200' cliffs, range on target at 500' is 110 miles." Maybe my sourse is over-optimistic because maps tended to show that CHL range was only just across the Strait of Dover

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Sourcing on that? My source is the wiki-article on the CHL.

Chain Home - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This system had shortcomings in not being able to detect aircraft at lower altitudes and thus was used in conjunction with the Chain Home Low system, or AMES Type 2 which could detect aircraft flying at minimum altitude level of 500 ft. This was further refined by the addition of Chain Home Extra Low which gave cover down to 50 ft but at short ranges of only approximately 30 miles.

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The CHL (Chain Home Low) Air Defence Radar System

By July of 1939 the CD set could detect an aircraft flying at 500 feet up to 25 miles away with very good accuracy and in August 1939, on Watson-Watt's recommendation, the Air Ministry ordered 24 CD sets from Pye Radio with the intention of placing one at each CH site. These stations became known as Chain Home Low (CHL) stations and the equipment as Radar Type 2.

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stona said:

I'd say 25 miles and 500 feet but I do agree.

The sets were also at the Chain Home sites so you didn't have to attack different targets.

Where does the idea that these radars were very difficult to disable come from? When the Luftwaffe actually made an effort,as at Ventnor, they were very successful. 360 foot high towers with a "curtain" array between them are vulnerable and the receivers were on 240 foot high wooden towers. A typical station had four of each. This is the most vulnerable part of the system,the transmitter buildings were well protected.

Cheers

Steve

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The mobile radar stations were plugging the holes in the system, so could keep open the eyes of the RAF while the stations were fixed. They had several dozen IIRC in 1940 and were building many more at the time (1,200 is all of WW2). Though with less range than the CH system, they were still much harder to target thanks to being mobile and could keep the system running as needed.
The CH stations required a direct hit to knock out, which was difficult and costly to make when it was ringed with AAA.

Chain Home - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

However, though the wooden huts housing the radar equipment were damaged, the towers survived owing to their open steel girder construction.

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Radar in World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

even a concerted effort would not have had much effect on the transmitters as their structure made them very resistant to blast, which passed through the spaces in the metal lattice.

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Its a question of having the right intelligence about the power systems, which the LW did not have in WW2. Its arguable that they could have gotten all the information about the British system if they had checked the French intelligence files on the British radar, which were not destroyed during the war and sat there with all the information the Germans needed to strike. But they never even looked.

great discussion guys. very interesting. with regards to Dowdings comments, he did not actually say the RAF was facing defeat. He was saying he had a shortage of pilots and that his command was under strain. He did not want the LW to know that the RAF was feeling the pressure.

What is the context of those comments? At the time there were subordinates, Mallory in particular, that wanted to take more aggressive action, so as to increase the loss rates in the LW. But in committing to that sort of increased levels of activity, the RAF itself would also have its loss rates go up. This is Dowdings brilliance at its best, and something so often misunderstood. Dowding knew that the battle did not hinge on destroying the LW. it was never about that. He knew that every strike, if humanly possible had to be parried, but more importantly, that the RAF had to remain a viable force, until the poor weather set in. Why? So that the Luftwaffe could not gain initially air superiority, and then air supremacy to facilitate the invasion.

But Dowding was not saying directly that they were close to defeat. he was just telling his more impulsive subordinates (and political bosses) to cool it for a while.

There were people in the RAF and the government that were deeply affronted by Dowdings responses to their demands for more asserive action. Dowding suffered as a consequence.

Moreover, fighting the scenario with the benefit of hindsight is not a valid way to extrapolate the battle. If you give one side a free hand to respond to history, you have to give the other side some quid pro quo. Saying the germans have the benefits of hindsight and the British dont, in such a close battle as the BoB, can lead to just one outcome.

As far as target choices were concerned, the radar stations, the airfields, London, they were all valid targets. But the LW went for any and all of them, and as a consequence did no telling damage to any of them. as far as the radar stations were concerned, they were found to be an exceptionally hard target to knock out (at least permanently. And being a pin point target made them hard to hit and easy to defend. i think it relevant that the allies did not respond with a like strategy when they went on the offensive. Neither was it a focus in any other campaign where radar was important (which is just about all of them).

wiking85 said:

Sourcing on that? My source is the wiki-article on the CHL.

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I don't know why you are using Wiki when I posted a better source in Post#128.
Radar Pages Home page

Milosh said:

I don't know why you are using Wiki when I posted a better source in Post#128.
Radar Pages Home page

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I used that in my post too:
The CHL (Chain Home Low) Air Defence Radar System
From you source on CHL:

n 1936 the War Office had established a small group at Bawdsey under Dr. E. T. Paris and Dr. A. B. Wood. This group had been working on gun-laying (GL) radar for antiaircraft guns and coastal defence (CD) radar for the direction of coastal artillery. The CD equipment worked on the higher frequency of 180-210 MHz and the aerial comprised of a broadside 32 dipole array that produced a narrow beam in both azimuth and elevation. By July of 1939 the CD set could detect an aircraft flying at 500 feet up to 25 miles away with very good accuracy and in August 1939, on Watson-Watt's recommendation, the Air Ministry ordered 24 CD sets from Pye Radio with the intention of placing one at each CH site. These stations became known as Chain Home Low (CHL) stations and the equipment as Radar Type 2.

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CHL had very limited height and very limited range. It couldn't replace CH if it went down.

The RAF heard them coming with its earliest warning system; LW radio checks prior to takeoff.

Balljoint said:

The RAF heard them coming with its earliest warning system; LW radio checks prior to takeoff.

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Every single time? From what I can remember they only used that for night operations, rather than during the BoB.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain#Effect_of_signals_intelligence

According to F. W. Winterbotham, who was the senior Air Staff representative in the Secret Intelligence Service,[129] Ultra helped establish the strength and composition of the Luftwaffe's formations, the aims of the commanders[130] and provided early warning of some raids.

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So it seems it wasn't for every raid only some of them.

Hello Viking
source is Radar Types

If you look a good map on British radar stations you will see that max for CHL seems to have been 50+ mls, which is in line with The Early Days of Radar in the UK
Notes for talks by Dr W.H. Penley, which can be found from the net.

I wonder how limited the CHL was in height, because at least 43 naval fire control radars could see heavy shells in flight whose trajectories rose rather high during longer range firing

Juha

This gets back to my point that fighting the BoB is not a successful strategy for Germany. Bombing Liverpool/other ports and mining was the best option available in 1940-1.