You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940

[Tante Ju]

Flirting with the idea? The document you quoted expressly rules it out.

Yes, they ruled out for the time being. Chamberlain was still PM and common sense mostly prevailed over Churchill's silly ideas. The UK did not have a bomber force to match the Germans, the French were even hopeless in that regard. Apparantly Chamberlain was not very fond if the idea either, the French were even less fond of the idea, validly pointing out that while the British chaps conduct a leisurely terror bombing campaign because Churchill considered it such a grand idea, it will be their neck on which German bombers will breath down on when they come back to retaliate for all that. The Belgians were reluctant too, probably for the same reason.

In the end, Churchill pushed it through anyway when he became PM, but much like many of his other silly master plans, this one did not work out either. The Germans simply did not took the bait, and instead of mindlessly running to bomb the hell out of London in retaliation, they obliterated the French and British ground troops. Then used the PoWs to clear up the rubble.

How is this the government flirting with retaliation?

It is not, it the First Sea Lord (Churchill) flirting with winning the war via terror bombing. Chamberlain evidently did not, not only for practical (= Germans would kick arses if we tried to pull that stunt off) but also for moral reasons. Post-war propaganda and apologists aside, nobody at the time considered the Luftwaffe's operation over Poland anything like terrorful, neither the British neither the French; Chamberlain was however quite aware what was Churchill asking for, no matter how he tried to pack it, it still stinked.

The Prime Minister said that the adoption of this action might be necessary, and, if so, he would not shrink from it. Nevertheless, he-would be reluctant that this country should lay itself open to the accusation of being the first country to adopt action of this kind. He did not think that what had happend in Poland was altogether comparable to the action which was proposed in the Ruhr, at any rate as regards the
effect which it would have on world opinion. His conclusion was that the matter would have to be determined by judgment of the whole position when the time came.

Presented with a report by a separate committee they decided to adhere to existing policy, not to be the first to bomb.

Unless, of course, things turn sour on the military front, in which case they shall be terror bombing. Things did turn sour in May 1940.

Or if the Germans invade Belgium, their close military ally, they would be terror bombing again. The Germans could still invade Luxemburg, or the Netherlands, that one did not count for some reason. Still, it is ironic that in the end they justified it with the bombing of a Dutch town, isn't it?

The fact remains that the Germans bombed Poland with no provocation. They bombed Norway with no provocation. They bombed Belgium and the Netherlands with no provocation. At least France was at war with Germany before the bombers took off, but again the German air attacks preceded any French air attacks on Germany.

I think the Germans bombing Poland had something to do with being a war and such (plus the less then optimal history/relations of the two nations in the last 20 years)?

The bombing of Norway (really? they bombed Norway?) must have to do with another of Churchill little plans to invade Norway, Operation Wilfred, formulated in September 1939 and executed in April 1940, which prompted to Germans who have found out to (and kick the French British the hell out of there) intervene. They were perfectly fine with a neutral Norway through which swedish ore could flow to Germany. The British weren't.

Britain only began bombing Germany after the Luftwaffe had killed tens of thousands in Poland, Norway, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

True. But decided to to do it regardless well before the Luftwaffe supposedly killed 'tens of thousends' in Poland, Norway, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

How then could the Luftwaffe "retaliate" against Britain?

In fact, when the war cabinet authorised attacks on Germany east of the Rhine, they stressed the military nature of the objectives:

To authorise the Chief of the Air Staff to order Bomber Command to carry out attacks on suitable military objectives, (including marshalling yards and oil refineries) in the Ruhr as well as elsewhere in Germany; and that these attacks should begin that night with approximately 100 heavy bombers.

"Military" was underlined in the original text...

... knowing full well that the Ruhr 'contained moreover, a population which might be expected to crack under extensive air attack and that such attacks would involve a heavy casualty roll among civilians, including women and children.'

But of course it was 'military targets'. Justification for the unrestricted attacks was also discussed in detail.

THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF said that it should not be imagined that the Chiefs of Staff were at all anxious to let loose unrestricted air warfare, or, indeed, at present to start a train of circumstances which was likely to lead to heavy retaliation on our own and the French aircraft industry. They were only recommending the attack on the Ruhr in the particular circumstances of a German invasion of Belgium., Apart from the justification which such a violation of neutrality would give, they felt that the moment when the German Armies were starting their advance was psychologically and militarily the right one. As regards the legality of the operation, there were no agreed rules on the subject. The Hague draft Rules had received a certain measure of acceptance. In these draft Rules "factories engaged in manufacturing distinctly military supplies" were defined as military objectives. As the whole of the German industry was organised for the production of war material, he thought that the targets selected would come within the definition.

It not really hard to see where this whole discussion was going about unrestricted attacks, cracking moral, justifications and lawyering the definition of what fits into a factory manufacturing distinctly military supplies (the whole of the German industry, down to shoemakers) and fear of heavy retaliation. It is not very hard to see what these fine gentlemen were cooking in the pot - in November 1939, that is.

Now the real problem was not that, but the fact that this was a game at which two which could play, and the Germans at the time had a LOT more toys to play with.

You make it like you do not get the hypocrisy of Churchill about the Ruhr being a 'military deployment zone' which would give an excuse to attacks that 'would involve a heavy casualty roll among civilians, including women and children' a 'population which might be expected to crack under extensive air attack' but everybody else around the table clearly got it. Obviously nobody wanted to go straight on record about it, not even in documents classified for 70 years.

Certainly the THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS got the message in full:

'It was necessary, however, to consider the effect on the morale of the German people. He had been able to consult a number of authorities who had lived in close touch with the German people up to the outbreak of war, and their views were conflicting. All were agreed, however, that the breaking of the German morale would ultimately depend upon the success of our venture. If we attacked the Ruhr and failed, not only should we have let loose indiscriminate bombing, but we should have strengthened the German will and made easier the task of the German Government.'

OOPS, somebody failed to properly proof read (or simply did not care, since he was long dead by the time this would have been disclosed to public) left that politically incorrect word in the text which every one of these fine gentlemen were discussing with fine and elaborate words.

 

[wiking85]

With regard to losses, Germany was having dificulty inmaintaining force structure from before operations in the west even commenced. The exapnsion of the LW was much slower than the RAF up to mid 1941 suggesting they had some difficulties with aircraft supply. The aircrew training was another issue that constrained the LW as the war progressed. The losses sustained during the BoB cannot have been good for the LW given these constraints.

Axis History Forum • Luftwaffe losses France, 1940

For example, E. R. Hooton, in Phoenix Triumphant p. 267-268 lists Luftwaffe losses as 1,428, 0f which 1,129 were lost due to enemy action. Hooton goes on to list 1,092 aircrew killed, 1,395 aircrew wounded, and 1,930 aircrew missing.

Battle of Britain - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

2,698 aircrew killed[12]
967 captured
638 missing bodies identified by British authorities[13]
1,887 aircraft destroyed[nb 9]

So the twin campaigns of the Battle of France and Britain seriously cost the Luftwaffe. IIRC they had 10,000 replacements in May 1940 before the invasion, so between the two campaigns the losses were 3790 killed, 2897 missing or captured, and at least 1395 wounded in France and another 270 wounded in July-August (not sure beyond that how many were wounded). That's enormous. Even with some of the wounded returning to duty, the losses in those two battle alone were most of the reserves that existed in May 1940. So Germany was able to make good its losses with replacements by October, but it had wiped out its crew reserves, so that meant any losses and replacements were going to be hand-to-mouth from here on out.

So the Battle of Britain losses were the nail in the coffin of the Luftwaffe, as once Barbarossa started then losses could not be made good except for initially. There of course was an expansion of the Luftwaffe as time went on, but the replacement quality dropped ridiculously low immediately. Of course the losses from October 1940-May 1941 are not factored in, but with the Blitz and some daylight fight ongoing, plus the Mediterranean theater opening, there were probably hundreds more losses.

So this gets to my point of why it was not a good idea to launch the Battle of Britain with the losses from the French campaign so recent.

However the significance of the battle was never about the losses, or the survival of the LW. It was a battle about firstly control of airspace, over south east england, and secondly about the survival of the RAF as aviable force. The LW was defeated because it failed in both of these missions. it did not gain control of the airspace over SE England, and it did not eliminate the RAF as a viable fighting force. By the following march, the RAF was begining to undertake significant counteroffensive operations over the Channel and Coastal areas of occupied Europe. initially the LW resisted, but by the end of 1941 all pretence at challenging the RAF over the channel, and over the port areas that surrounded it had disappeared. the LW continued to inflict heavy losses on the RAF, but losses were inevitable in gaing control of the skies over a particular area. Galland acknowledges that from a certain point in 1941, the LW was no longer the hunters on the attack. They were standing on the defensive in the west, and he acknowledges that was greatly debilitating to the LW.

The LW did not win anything during the BoB. The RAF gained considerably. Guess who won.

The reason the LW didn't contest the Channel after mid-1941 was the draw down to fight in russia. Not only that, but the LW needed to conserve its strength, while inflicting as much damage as possible on the RAF, so that necessarily meant fighting over the continent, as the British demonstrated it was far more cost effective to fight over one's own territory, just as they had learned in WW1. The LW being on the defensive was not debilitating in 1941, 42, or 43 necessarily, as it kept Allied losses much higher than their own; it was only the arrival of the US and its massive replacement capabilities, plus its production and manpower and eventually technological advantages that finally debilitated the LW.

 

[Njaco]

Chamberlain was still PM and common sense mostly prevailed over Churchill's silly ideas.

You're kidding, right?

.

So let me get this straight - Germany was forced into 'terror' bombing and horrible acts of war because of Churchill's 'silly' ideas?? Germany just wanted a simple war - bang, bang, you're dead, I win.

Let me ask you Tante -

Was Churchill right? All through the 1930s and into the 1940s about Germany and Hitler's aggressive nature? Or was that just Churchill being 'silly'?

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

This is the only warning. I can see tempers starting to flare and like stona posted, another thread starts to go down in flames. If people can't be civil, then a week at the beach might help. No warning given - this is it.

And that goes for both offending parties. I don't give a **** if you are "Pro Allied" or "Pro Axis". I don't play that game. Both parties will equally be removed. Some of you are just picking fights and thinking you will get away with it. Not anymore. We mods have been discussing this, and we are tired of it.

 

[Tante Ju]

Was Churchill right? All through the 1930s and into the 1940s about Germany and Hitler's aggressive nature? Or was that just Churchill being 'silly'?

No, IMHO Churchill was a war mongering, back stabbing fool who simply betrayed everyone, in and outside Britain to further his own political career. But even the wrong clock shows the right time twice a day as they say it... silly? He certainly had plenty silly ideas. Was invading Norway a bright idea? Or the idea of attacking the USSR in Finland, or Bombing the Ruhr in 1940? The Dieppe Raid? Mers el Kebir that firmly pushed the French away and almost made the join the Germans? Interfering in Greece that finally gave the Germans an excuse to prevent the Italians from tripping over there? Sending Prince of Wales to the Far East without any air cover right after the IJN sank almost the entire US battleship force to the bottom with airplanes in a single strike? The 'soft underbelly of europe' fixation of his, on the WORST possible place to attack and finally relieving the Germans of the burden the Italians really meant for them?

But Churchill's silly ideas had nothing to do with 'forcing' the Germans into terror bombing. That seems to have been his plan in October 1939 - May 1940 but it did not work out, and because the Luftwaffe generally simply did not buy into douhet's ideas and did not took the bait. There was never such a bomber lobby in the LW as was in Britain and the Germans had entirely different idea how to employ their bombers, which worked very well for them for most of the war I might add (see Corum). There might have, but General Waver died, and the Germans simply did not believe in it. They flirted of course and made some attampts at it on a couple of occasions (which ironical, are least known ones) just like anyone else, but their idea of the bomber was somewhere between that of the Russians (tactical support) and the Americans (stategic bombing of industrial bottleneck) - they first and foremost believed in operational level bombing.

Chamberlain may not be liked for his appeasement policy, but perhaps he was right that from the British national interest, with Britain in a poor financial situation in the 1930s and very much struggling to make the Great War right, a peaceful solution could be better, and perhaps Hitler could be satisfied by giving in to his more or less reasonable demands (up to 1939), especially as there was nobody to fight him. Britain did not have an army worth speaking of and did not care that much of Eastern Europe (which sooner of later would Germany's turf anyway) and the French did not want another great blood letting either. War was not good for trade and Britain was a trading nation.

But Chamberlain was hardly the naiive fool that Churchillian propaganda cast upon him After When The Great Bulldog Descended From Heaven To Save The Empire either. When did all the rearmament programmes, that ensured that Britain could fight and survive at all the Battle of Britain and the Atlantic started? All in mid 1930s, the same time Chamberlain was damned for appease Hitler, he was also stocking up in weapons, securing fuel supplies for war, building large aircraft plants. Do you think Beaverbrook just popped out in mid 1940 out of nothing and fixed everything with a magic wand, tripled production and so on? These were all set in motion under and by Chamberlain's office. Look at the size of aerial programme of the RAF that were started under Chamberlain... he was pretty much a realpolitik in my eyes, make peace when you must to buy time, and prepare for the worst.

 

[Hop]

Yes, they ruled out for the time being.

They ruled it out unless circumstances changed.

Unless, of course, things turn sour on the military front, in which case they shall be terror bombing.

I don't see that phrase there. I see a reference to the Ruhr being Germany's weakest point, with 60% of German industry.

And by this point the Luftwaffe had already inflicted mass casualties in Poland. At best the Luftwaffe didn't care about the civilian casualties they inflicted, at worst they did so deliberately.

I think the Germans bombing Poland had something to do with being a war and such

It wasn't a war when the German bombers took off headed to targets in Poland. Likewise Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands.

The bombing of Norway (really? they bombed Norway?)

Yes, they bombed Norway. Quite heavily in some places. In Kristiansund about 800 of the town's 1,300 buildings were destroyed.

True. But decided to to do it regardless well before the Luftwaffe supposedly killed 'tens of thousends' in Poland, Norway, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

No, they actually decided not to do it. And by that point Poland had already been heavily bombed.

The War Cabinet met on 14 May and decided not to bomb Germany. On the 15th they were unanimous in agreeing to the bombing.

knowing full well that the Ruhr 'contained moreover, a population which might be expected to crack under extensive air attack and that such attacks would involve a heavy casualty roll among civilians, including women and children.'

Which is why they kept in place very strict engagement rules. No bombing unless the precise target was identified. If not, the bombs had to be brought back or jettisoned at sea. That rule wasn't changed until mid September, with a few thousand Londoners dead from Luftwaffe attacks.

Again it's worth pointing out the casualty figures. The Germans didn't even see fit to compile a central registry until October 1940. In the last 3 months of the year the RAF killed just over 300 civilians. The Luftwaffe killed over 6,000 in September alone.

The fact remains the RAF did not bomb Germany at all until the Germans had begun a bombing campaign in the west. They did so on a smaller scale and with a more restrictive targeting policy than the Luftwaffe. They kept to that policy until the Luftwaffe began their campaign of firebombing British cities, causing mass civilian casualties. Only when approx 20,000 British civilians had been killed did the RAF begin area attacks on German cities.

 

[nuuumannn]

IMHO Churchill was a war mongering, back stabbing fool who simply betrayed everyone, in and outside Britain to further his own political career.

Change 'Churchill' with 'Hitler' and 'Britain' with 'Germany' and voila! World War Two!

Here's the best idea Churchill ever came up with; stop at nothing to defeat the Nazis. If one man could inspire a nation to carry this out during its darkest hour, it was Churchill.

Now, getting back on track; rightly or wrongly, indiscriminate bombing of civlians was on everyone's agenda, whether portrayed on paper or not. The fact of the matter was, in hindsight it didn't work as a means of knocking each country's opponents out of the war. At the time the Luftwaffe and RAF Bomber Command believed that it could be used as a war winning strategy, although with the amount of damage done to Germany by the Allied bombing campaign certainly slowed the German war machine down. Unfortunately, underlying fears and beliefs at the time meant that it was going to be pursued as policy.

As for Luftwaffe orders, as much as the intent that these held, part of the LW's failings was that it did not stick to the priorities as stipulated in these orders. Its lack of continuity was its downfall as much as the RAF's ability to counter it.If the Luftwaffe wanted to subdue Britain it needed to be consistent; keep bombing airfields and strategic factories, ports etc, collate information of the results of its work and keep attacking those same sites. Don't deviate from the plan.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... Do you think Beaverbrook just popped out in mid 1940 out of nothing and fixed everything with a magic wand, tripled production and so on? These were all set in motion under and by Chamberlain's office. Look at the size of aerial programme of the RAF that were started under Chamberlain..."

Auntie ... you and I will have to part ways on Churchill. In Canada we like to say that the Nazi Germany in the late 30's and early '40s suffered from 'Churchhill Envy' .... they just didn't have a word for it.

"Started" ain't built. But yes - that is what Canadians do - effectively manage our magic wands ...

"During the Second World War, his friend Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, appointed Beaverbrook as Minister of Aircraft Production and later Minister of Supply. Under Beaverbrook, fighter and bomber production increased so much so that Churchill declared: "His personal force and genius made this Aitken's finest hour. ..... a Time Magazine cover story wrote, "Even if Britain goes down this fall [1940], it will not be Lord Beaverbrook's fault. If she holds out, it will be his triumph. This war is a war of machines. It will be won on the assembly line." **

** Wikipdia Aitken-Beaverbrook

MM
Proud Canadian

"... rightly or wrongly, indiscriminate bombing of civlians was on everyone's agenda"

Hardly surprising:

Zeppelin Raids WW1 [Kaiser Germany], Guernica, Spanish CW, April 26, 1937 [Nazi Germany]

 

[parsifal]

Change 'Churchill' with 'Hitler' and 'Britain' with 'Germany' and voila! World War Two!

Here's the best idea Churchill ever came up with; stop at nothing to defeat the Nazis. If one man could inspire a nation to carry this out during its darkest hour, it was Churchill.

Now, getting back on track; rightly or wrongly, indiscriminate bombing of civlians was on everyone's agenda, whether portrayed on paper or not. The fact of the matter was, in hindsight it didn't work as a means of knocking each country's opponents out of the war. At the time the Luftwaffe and RAF Bomber Command believed that it could be used as a war winning strategy, although with the amount of damage done to Germany by the Allied bombing campaign certainly slowed the German war machine down. Unfortunately, underlying fears and beliefs at the time meant that it was going to be pursued as policy.

As for Luftwaffe orders, as much as the intent that these held, part of the LW's failings was that it did not stick to the priorities as stipulated in these orders. Its lack of continuity was its downfall as much as the RAF's ability to counter it.If the Luftwaffe wanted to subdue Britain it needed to be consistent; keep bombing airfields and strategic factories, ports etc, collate information of the results of its work and keep attacking those same sites. Don't deviate from the plan.

Great post and agree more or less 100%, with one exception. At a tactical level, sometimes terror bombing did at least have an effect. In 1940, the germans bombed Rotterdam. The intent of that raid was to terrorize the Dutch into surrendering. The fact that the actual bombing became superfluous, and a mistake seems immaterial to me.....the Dutch were inclined to abandon resistance primarily because of fears of reprisal bombing.

Bombing in the 1920s and 1930s had been seen in a siimilar vein to nuclear warfare postwar. Prdictions of dire casualties scared the bejeezuz out of the civilian populations. rightly or wrongly (I think rightly) the germans had acquired a reputation of meting out terror bombings whenever their opponents got in the way of their "peaceful occupations"....

Another instance where bombing of civilain targets had an effect was in the french campaign. There is evidence of the Germans targetting refugee columns to increase the panic and thereby clog the road systems. The French were so fearful of German bombing that they absolutely refused to allow the British to take any offensive action against Germany. There are recorded incidents of the french obstructing British airfields to prevent any raids from occurring even after hostilities in the west had broken out. The French would not allow the British to lay mines in the Rhine, for fear of german aerial bombardment in retailiation.

On the Axis side, the incessant bombing of the island of pantellerria is said to have been the result of constant air bombardment, although I have seen reports that the garrisons surrender was due to a breakdown in the water supply

So while strategically it doesnt work, ther are tactical situations that suggest it might work

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Tante Ju, if Churchill was warmongering, what were the Nazis?

 

[Njaco]

Tante Ju, if Churchill was warmongering, what were the Nazis?

I wish I could hit 'Like" a thousand times!!!!!!!


Tante, sorry to wake you up to this fact but...Hitler and the Nazis were a WARMONGERING, EVIL REGIME during WWII.....

 

[nuuumannn]

Regardless of his faults, History quite rightly views Winston Churchill as the man who inspired millions to stand up to the evils of Nazi-ism. The civilised World will for ever be grateful to him for this.

 

[parsifal]

He was indeed a great leader and an inspiration to the world really. More than any man, he was responsible for the formation of the grand alliance needed to defeat a great evil. That evils was evil even to the people of germany. Just ask any rational German old enough to remember

I hope we are done with this rubbish and can get back on topic

 

[nuuumannn]

Yes, please.

Regarding the examples of terror bombing, Parsifal, you are probably right about its effect in the examples you give, but I think these might be the exception rather than the rule. Such examples served to convince war planners of the validity of their intentions.

One factor that anyone launching a campaign against Britain has to take into account is the Royal Navy - far from sitting on the sidelines, when the s*it hits the fan, there's no doubt the home fleet would go steaming into the Channel and cause as much disruption as possible - the Kriegsmarine has not the ships to successfully conduct an invasion and counter the RN simultaneously and that's where mining might prove useful. The obvious answer is dive bombers, but with heavy fighter escort and perhaps after Fighter Command has been countered.

 

[Juha]

Hello Tante Ju
Thanks for the memo, but where there they wrote that the idea was "to to bait the German air force into a bombing war of each others cities by provocative attacks on German towns" as you claimed in your earlier message?

...Declaration of War by Britain on 3 September 1939, subsequent bombing of German towns (with many times the civillian casulties which you list above) when things turned sour in Belgium under the pretext of Rotterdam, refusal of German peace offer by the Churchill cabinet.

Again, have you any numbers on German civilian casualties in May-June 40 caused by BC bombing? The BC attacks didn't kill many German civilians in May 40, e.g. 10/11 May bombing of road and rail communications at Mönchengladbach killed 4 civilians, one of them was an Englishwoman living there.

Juha

 

[stona]

Basil Fawlty an emminent historian! I just spit my dinner all over the computer monitor!!!

Well he was right and he did have a fine Moose head on his wall.

You can make a quote support more or less any view. Horst Boog does a pretty good job with Webster and Frankland!

There is a tendency for people to take themselves far too seriously,not just here. A little levity is not a bad thing.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

Warsaw was a fortified military objective defended by military forces, so therefore was a military target. In the view of the Germans the Poles were using their civilians as shields because they were hiding in the city among them, rather than 'fighting in the field'. The 25th raid was to convince the Polish to surrender.

That argument makes every village in Britain with a LDV (Home Guard) unit a legitimate target.

The argument now seems to be that it is perfectly okay to kill civilians in 1939/40 if you can justify this by claiming that they were inextricably mixed with a military target. Of the roughly 1,200 killed at Wielun members of the Polish military are noteable by their absence.
That is a long way from claiming to target specifically military installations and formations,despite all the various orders,minimising civilian casualties etc, to the contrary posted in this thread..

Guernica it seems was bombed for exactly the same reason as Dresden. Thank heavens we have a precedent set by the Luftwaffe

Cheers

Steve

 

[Juha]

...Unless, of course, things turn sour on the military front, in which case they shall be terror bombing. Things did turn sour in May 1940.

Or if the Germans invade Belgium, their close military ally, they would be terror bombing again. The Germans could still invade Luxemburg, or the Netherlands, that one did not count for some reason. Still, it is ironic that in the end they justified it with the bombing of a Dutch town, isn't it?

In fact Belgium wasn't anyone's military ally, close or otherwise. In October 1936, King Leopold III announced that Belgium would remain neutral in the event of another war in Europe. To this end, the Belgian government tried to steer a path away from alliances: leaving the Locarno Treaty, repudiating a defence pact with France signed in 1920 and receiving a guarantee of neutrality from Nazi Germany in 1937. One more proof the trustfulness of 3rd Reich guarantees.

The bombing of Norway (really? they bombed Norway?) must have to do with another of Churchill little plans to invade Norway, Operation Wilfred, formulated in September 1939 and executed in April 1940, which prompted to Germans who have found out to (and kick the French British the hell out of there) intervene....

No, Germany didn't intervene, they invade Norway. British and French came only after German invasion

THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF said that it should not be imagined that the Chiefs of Staff were at all anxious to let loose unrestricted air warfare, or, indeed, at present to start a train of circumstances which was likely to lead to heavy retaliation on our own and the French aircraft industry. They were only recommending the attack on the Ruhr in the particular circumstances of a German invasion of Belgium., Apart from the justification which such a violation of neutrality would give, they felt that the moment when the German Armies were starting their advance was psychologically and militarily the right one. As regards the legality of the operation, there were no agreed rules on the subject. The Hague draft Rules had received a certain measure of acceptance. In these draft Rules "factories engaged in manufacturing distinctly military supplies" were defined as military objectives. As the whole of the German industry was organised for the production of war material, he thought that the targets selected would come within the definition.

It not really hard to see where this whole discussion was going about unrestricted attacks, cracking moral, justifications and lawyering the definition of what fits into a factory manufacturing distinctly military supplies (the whole of the German industry, down to shoemakers) and fear of heavy retaliation. It is not very hard to see what these fine gentlemen were cooking in the pot - in November 1939, that is.

Now the real problem was not that, but the fact that this was a game at which two which could play, and the Germans at the time had a LOT more toys to play with.

You make it like you do not get the hypocrisy of Churchill about the Ruhr being a 'military deployment zone' which would give an excuse to attacks that 'would involve a heavy casualty roll among civilians, including women and children' a 'population which might be expected to crack under extensive air attack' but everybody else around the table clearly got it. Obviously nobody wanted to go straight on record about it, not even in documents classified for 70 years.

Certainly the THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS got the message in full:

'It was necessary, however, to consider the effect on the morale of the German people. He had been able to consult a number of authorities who had lived in close touch with the German people up to the outbreak of war, and their views were conflicting. All were agreed, however, that the breaking of the German morale would ultimately depend upon the success of our venture. If we attacked the Ruhr and failed, not only should we have let loose indiscriminate bombing, but we should have strengthened the German will and made easier the task of the German Government.'

OOPS, somebody failed to properly proof read (or simply did not care, since he was long dead by the time this would have been disclosed to public) left that politically incorrect word in the text which every one of these fine gentlemen were discussing with fine and elaborate words.

IMHO you really read too much from the docu, as I wrote the attacks were during May 40 restricted to oil and communication targets.

 

[stona]

Some here are quoting Boog as if he is an impeccable source on WW2 bombing campaigns whereas in fact his views have always been controversial,even within Germany (both East and West).
When Groehler wrote that there was " a group of historians" in the Federal Republic "who tried to deny the historical responsibility of Nazism for starting the terror bombing war" he undoubtedly had Boog in mind.
Now I would be the last man to see Groehler as an unbiased source. His early work in particular is very much influenced by the politics of East Germany but it is important that the interpretations of any historian are seen in the light of competing narratives and historical context. Other German historians like Maier,Bergander,Messerschmdt (Mannfred) also took exception to Boog's views.
Irving is a historian probably more familiar to an English speaking audience who also expresses some controversial views. Some of his research is nonetheless impressive and cannot be discounted out of hand. That doesn't mean you have to agree with his conclusions!
Cheers
Steve

 

[fastmongrel]

I have this vision of the evil British Govt using giant cartoon ACME corporation horseshoe magnets to suck the bombs out of peaceful heavily loaded LW bombers that just happened to be flying over cities. All this so that the warmongering Winston Blofeld Churchill could get on with his plans of world domination.