You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940

[davebender]

That won't make much difference if Germany has only short range Me-109Es. RAF Fighter Command will wait until Me-109s turn for home short on fuel and then attack in large numbers. It worked historically and it's the smart thing for RAF Fighter Command to do.

 

[bobbysocks]

that is why you have to have drop tanks and refueling stops. also a large second wave coming in as they first is leaving and starting to be jumped by the RAF would be a good mouse trap play if the RAF elected not to disengage.

 

[parsifal]

Havent read all the posts oin this thread, but with regard to the "mediterranean" option. There was no agreement in place with italy to accept any German assistance in the TO until after October 1940. Duce was dead set against German assistance until then, and would not allow any significant reinforcement until his own offensives came unstuck. A few things forced him to change his mind.....the defeats in Greece, the defeats suffered at sea, and the defeats being suffered in Libya and Abysinnia and the general loss of initiative to the British were all factors affecting the italians. but until those events occurred Italy had determined it wanted to conduct what it referred to as "parrallel war" which means it wanted to minimise German intervention.

Since the scenario ends in January, there would not be much opportunity to achieve much of a victory in the MTO

If the operations were to be extended, there might be some scope for better results, but such ramp up in the central basin would necessarily need to be slow. There simply was not the infrastructure in place....the airfields, the port capacity, the logisitic netwoork in Sicily to allow for a rapid or wholsesale redeployment of the entire LW to that TO. The first moves to transfer the X FG to Sicily began in November, by January only a portion of the entire Korps was able to move to theatre. There may be some opportunity for greater LW committment, but not much.

Any wholseale redeployment threfore will take time, and this would be bound to evoke some response from Britain. If Britain itself was not being heavily attacked, britain could transfer more of its units the MTO for some kind of different war. I have no doubt that given the right amount of resources, the germans could clear the central basin. But provided the british reinforced Egyp and the middle east, what are the germans going to do then?

The MTO option is a bit of a pipe dream in the same way as Churchils idea of Southern Europe being a "soft underbelly" a couple of years later. Its ability to be used as a TO in which Britian could be defeated is overstated so many times.

Germany's destiny was decided in the west and the east. Thats where she needed to fight and win. In the south, about all she could realistically hope to achieve was an avoidance of defeat.

I see from the discussiion, that Germany apparently simply chose not to win over SE England. an interesting perspective, and one Ive seen many times before.... essentially "we let you guys (the british) win because we are such nice fellows". Or "we werent defeated, we did everything we needed to, got tired of the fighting and moved on".

Amazing how history can be re-written so easily and effortlessly.....

 

[davebender]

Drop tanks help but it won't be enough. There's no substitute for internal fuel capacity once the fighting starts.

 

[davebender]

If the war plan requires long range day fighter aircraft then build some.

 

[Hop]

Source on that? I've looked at E.R. Hooton's numbers of losses during the Blitz and there is no reference to that number being only for the first week in May.

The Night Blitz, John Ray

According to postwar British memoirs talking up their achievements; the reality was quite a bit different.

The reality is the accuracy the Luftwaffe achieved in their raids on Britain. They could reliably hit a port city, anything else was a bit hit and miss. You only have to look at the bomb map of London to see how bombs were scattered over a vast area. According to Hooton 18% of assigned crews failed to find Coventry, despite the massive fires lighting up the sky for miles around.

Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, Behrens, C. B. A. London: HMSO and Longmans, Green, 1955
Coal, Court, William H. B. London: HMSO, 1951
I based my post on these.

What exactly do they say? I can't believe any book would make the claim Britain was importing coal, and that consumption was about 20 million tons a year. Can we please have the quotes from the books that led you to that conclusion?

The difference was that the German radar could detect aircraft at a greater altitude than Chain Home Low, which was only for the altitudes of 500 to 800 feet. Its great that they were more accurate, but they didn't have the range of the German units.

The mistake is in thinking British radar = Chain Home. That was just part of it. Chain Home was an early, long range radar chain. It was supplemented with other radars.

Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration, Payton-Smith, D. J. London: HMSO, 1971
This contradicts that.

What exactly does it say? I have given you exact figures, broken down, from the War Cabinet.

When was that though? Swansea wasn't importing in 1940.
Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration, Payton-Smith, D. J. London: HMSO, 1971

Swansea was importing oil for Llandarcy from the 1920s until the Pembroke oil terminals took over in the 60s or 70s.

The use of Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration as a reference for saying Swansea wasn't being used for oil imports is odd. I don't have the book, but a Google search of it returns the following snippet:

For example, in the months after the fall of France, the railway lines out of South Wales were blocked by the trucks loaded with coal that could no longer be exported to the Continent. Consequently the oil port of Swansea with its five ocean tanker beths, which had received 46,000 tons of oil a week in June when its storage had been nearly empty, could

Another snippet from the same book:

Early in September there was heavy loss at Llandarcy in a fire which temporarily closed the oil port of Swansea to tankers

So Swansea was definitely being used for oil imports in 1940, on quite a large scale. Can you quote the parts of the book that made you believe it wasn't?

That's comparing apples to potatoes. Germany produced her own oil at several massive facilities that dwarfed the British refineries, but Britain wasn't refining oil on site anymore once France fell; instead they were importing refined fuels,

Can you please provide a quote for this claim. Not simply a reference to a book, but what the book actually says.

A war cabinet report from November 1940 gave the following production figures for 100 octane fuels from UK refineries:

Heysham - 150,000 tons
Billingham - 15,000 tons
Stanlow - 55,000 tons

It would have made no sense whatsoever to abandon refining. Refineries were the big bottleneck for fuel production during the war.

That's comparing apples to potatoes. Germany produced her own oil at several massive facilities that dwarfed the British refineries, but Britain wasn't refining oil on site anymore once France fell; instead they were importing refined fuels, so the vulnerable spots aren't the large refineries, but rather the storage facilities and the oil stations in the ports. That's a much more concentrated target that is easier to damage and requires far less tonnage than the German cracking facilities.

Hardly. Refineries have very specialised equipment that can be very difficult to replace. Imports are much, much easier to route to different ports etc, hence the provision of emergency off loading ports (like Port Talbot) as a contingency.

Chain Home was an obsolate and dead end and very much exploitable radar technology. CHL was based on the same simplistic technology - it has trouble even picking off single aircraft, let alone having any 'accuracy'.

No, Chain Home Low had nothing to do with Chain Home. CHL was based on a gun laying radar produced by a different air ministry team.

But it was useful and practical as an early warning system. Its range come from a single factor, that it was mounted on a 360 ft high tower, and therefore, could see further beyond the horizon at altitude.

And power. Freya had a peak power output of 20 kw, CH 350 kw.

 

[tyrodtom]

Drop tanks help but it won't be enough. There's no substitute for internal fuel capacity once the fighting starts.

The Bf109E's internal fuel load was 400L or 88 gals, when they eventually fitted a drop tank to the late E models it was 300L or 66 gals, that increased the range 75%. You use the fuel from the drop tanks to the British coast, or until combat if possibly. Then internal fuel for combat and RTB.

Not rocket science but SOP for drop tanks. And something that could be done with just a few months preplanning, instead of several years of preplanning that your magical FW187 would require.

 

[Shortround6]

Perhaps we need an English to English translation?

I don't know what country Viking85 is from but in English railway terminology "trucks" are freight cars, usually with 2 fixed (non-pivoting) axles.

Likewise the term "wagon" was often used to describe the same thing.

or

The Battle of Cambrai | Imperial War Museums

in the caption "British Mark IV tanks are being loaded onto railway trucks"

 

[wiking85]

Perhaps we need an English to English translation?

I don't know what country Viking85 is from but in English railway terminology "trucks" are freight cars, usually with 2 fixed (non-pivoting) axles.

Likewise the term "wagon" was often used to describe the same thing.

View attachment 222504

or

The Battle of Cambrai | Imperial War Museums

in the caption "British Mark IV tanks are being loaded onto railway trucks"

Someone already corrected me and thanks for being dickish about it.

Edit:
I misinterpreted your post, sorry.

 

[nuuumannn]

They could reliably hit a port city, anything else was a bit hit and miss. You only have to look at the bomb map of London to see how bombs were scattered over a vast area. According to Hooton 18% of assigned crews failed to find Coventry, despite the massive fires lighting up the sky for miles around.

Unaided, yes - but the Luftwaffe had the potentially the most accurate bombing force in the world at that time; the key was its radio navigation aids, Knickebein (which had been effectively countered by late 1940) and X-Gerat and Y-Gerat, both of which were, at the time of the Coventry raid carried by aircraft of KG 100 as 'pathfinders'. British scientists calculated that the 'beams' enabled the Germans accuracy down to 400 yards based on their research into the frequencies of the radio waves being transmitted from the German ground stations. These were located in France and Norway and comprised purpose built radar antennae called Wotan I and II for X and Y Gerat respectively. X-Gerat was first employed against Warsaw in September 1939. Clearly its potential was wasted attacking cities.

The fact that German bombers were not always accurate overall in their bombing is not because they did not have the capacity to do so, but because not every aircraft was fitted with the receiving equipment and perhaps other operational factors. The fact that these aids weren't used as effectively as they could have been boils down to policy and British countermeasures. The LW had the potential to carry out reasonably accurate attacks against smaller targets, but did not.

Another factor that foiled the Germans during the BoB was post-raid reconnaissance; it wasn't sufficient. The Germans had no idea how much damage they were doing after each raid. Their recon aircraft were often shot down and those that did get back gave an incomplete picture of the strategic situation. TRhis was one of their biggest failings during the battle; they never had a good idea of how well they were doing.

In order to successfully subdue Britain by attacking strategic targets - airfields, factories etc, the LW would have to step up its intel gathering efforts.

One thing that is often overlooked in 1939-41 period was how useless German torpedoes were. Attacks against British shipping occurred and torpedoes failed to explode, even when the torpedo struck the thip as had happened against HMS Nelson when attacked by U 56. Seven torpedoes were fired against Royal Oak in Scapa Flow, of which two exploded. During the Norwegian campaign German torpedoes fired at British destroyers exploded prematurely and this is thought to have been the cause of the destruction of U 27 - her torpedoes exploded prematurely, revealing her position to enemy destoryers.

 

[Shortround6]

Someone already corrected me and thanks for being dickish about it.

I don't know what country you are from, you don't have a country or flag listed.

American and British terminology is not the same. In America the "truck" is the 4 wheel bogie that goes under the car/wagon. If you are not a railroad buff it may be an honest mistake. If that is being "dickish" then so be it.

 

[wiking85]

The Night Blitz, John Ray

I ordered it earlier today, so I'll check it out.

The reality is the accuracy the Luftwaffe achieved in their raids on Britain. They could reliably hit a port city, anything else was a bit hit and miss. You only have to look at the bomb map of London to see how bombs were scattered over a vast area. According to Hooton 18% of assigned crews failed to find Coventry, despite the massive fires lighting up the sky for miles around.

Someone else already answered this.

What exactly do they say? I can't believe any book would make the claim Britain was importing coal, and that consumption was about 20 million tons a year. Can we please have the quotes from the books that led you to that conclusion?

I don't own copies of these books, so I'll have to reorder them via interlibrary loan.

The mistake is in thinking British radar = Chain Home. That was just part of it. Chain Home was an early, long range radar chain. It was supplemented with other radars.

Chain Home was the primary British radar system at the time, so in the sense of what is deployed in the largest amounts it was the most important system in 1940. Just like Freya wasn't the only German radar system either.

What exactly does it say? I have given you exact figures, broken down, from the War Cabinet.

I'll have to interlibrary loan the books again to get an answer.

Swansea was importing oil for Llandarcy from the 1920s until the Pembroke oil terminals took over in the 60s or 70s.

The use of Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration as a reference for saying Swansea wasn't being used for oil imports is odd. I don't have the book, but a Google search of it returns the following snippet:

So Swansea was definitely being used for oil imports in 1940, on quite a large scale. Can you quote the parts of the book that made you believe it wasn't?

Same as I said above.

Can you please provide a quote for this claim. Not simply a reference to a book, but what the book actually says.

I have to reorder the books to get one.

A war cabinet report from November 1940 gave the following production figures for 100 octane fuels from UK refineries:

Heysham - 150,000 tons
Billingham - 15,000 tons
Stanlow - 55,000 tons

It would have made no sense whatsoever to abandon refining.

Looking at the numbers you have above and the earlier numbers you posted, refining crude was a fraction of overall British fuel supplies.

Hardly. Refineries have very specialised equipment that can be very difficult to replace. Imports are much, much easier to route to different ports etc, hence the provision of emergency off loading ports (like Port Talbot) as a contingency.

But refining was a fraction of fuel supplies as your own numbers show. Disrupting the ports and oil stations makes it harder and harder to bring the fuel in. Knocking out the biggest and most important stations forces the British to use far smaller and less efficient stations to discharge fuel from tankers. Did Port Talbot have an oil station to unload tankers?

No, Chain Home Low had nothing to do with Chain Home. CHL was based on a gun laying radar produced by a different air ministry team.

Just like Würzburg. It had limited utility and just plugged the gaps that the main radar deployed at the time had. What was its accuracy compared to Freya or Würzburg and how many units were available?

 

[wiking85]

I don't know what country you are from, you don't have a country or flag listed.

American and British terminology is not the same. In America the "truck" is the 4 wheel bogie that goes under the car/wagon. If you are not a railroad buff it may be an honest mistake. If that is being "dickish" then so be it.

Sorry, I thought you were being condescending. Apologies.

 

[stona]

Leaving Liverpool and its docks for a minute I think it is important to know what the Luftwaffe thought it could do.

A report of July 16th 1940 Luftwaffe intelligence estimated both the Spitfire and Hurricane well below there actual performance abilities. It made no mention of Britain's integrated radar controlled air defence system and reckoned,optimistically,that the Luftwaffe was in a position to have a decisive effect in the war against Britain in 1940.
The initial estimate for the duration of the campaign was four days for the defeat of Fighter Command in Southern England . After this a further four weeks would be required for the Luftwaffe's bombers and long range fighters (Bf 110) to mop up the remainder of the RAF and destroy the aircraft industry.

Three days later Fliegerkorps I stated the four Luftwaffe missions for the upcoming campaign in a document from its headquarters entitled "Gedanken uber die fuhrung des luftkrieges gegen England" . I translate that as "thoughts on leading/executing the air war against England/Britain"

1 Win air superiority by attacks on the RAF and its industrial support,particularly the engine industry

2 Support the Channel crossing by attacks against the enemy fleet and bombers and eventually through direct support for the Army

3 Attack British ports,supplies and imports.

4 Launch ruthless retaliatory terror attacks on British cities.

Two things stand out. First the idea of interdicting British supplies does feature,but only third on the list. In July 1940 the Germans were making express reference to terror bombing British cities,whatever the apologists and revisionists might like to believe.

Most importantly all this could be achieved in little more than a month. Germany foresaw another quick and easy victory,forcing terms on Britain by August/September 1940 and having several months to prepare for the turn to the East thereafter.
It is only with hindsight that this seems pie in the sky stuff.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Tante Ju]

In July 1940 the Germans were making express reference to terror bombing British cities,whatever the apologists and revisionists might like to believe.

Yes they did - in the following context:

The Führer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

Führer Headquarters,
1st August 1940.
10 copies

Directive No. 17 For the conduct of air and sea warfare against England

In order to establish the necessary conditions for the final conquest of England I intend to intensify air and sea warfare against the English homeland. I therefore order as follows :

1. The German Air Force is to overpower the English Air Force with all the forces at its command, in the shortest possible time. The attacks are to be directed primarily against flying units, their ground installations, and their supply organisations, but also against the aircraft industry, including that manufacturing antiaircraft equipment.

2. After achieving temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be continued against ports, in particular against stores of food, and also against stores of provisions in the interior of the country.

Attacks on south coast ports will be made on the smallest possible scale, in view of our own forthcoming operations.

3. On the other hand, air attacks on enemy warships and merchant ships may be reduced except where some particularly favourable target happens to present itself, where such attacks would lend additional effectiveness to those mentioned in paragraph 2, or where such attacks are necessary for the training of air crews for further operations.

4. The intensified air warfare will be carried out in such a way that the Air Force can at any time be called upon to give adequate support to naval operations against suitable targets. It must also be ready to take part in full force in 'Undertaking Sea Lion'.

5. I reserve to myself the right to decide on terror attacks as measures of reprisal.

6. The intensification of the air war may begin on or after 5th August. The exact time is to be decided by the Air Force after the completion of preparations and in the light of the weather.

The Navy is authorised to begin the proposed intensified naval war at the same time.

signed: ADOLF HITLER

Hermann Göring's general order on 30th June 1940:

The war against England is to be restricted to destructive attacks against industry and air force targets which have weak defensive forces. ... The most thorough study of the target concerned, that is vital points of the target, is a pre-requisite for success. It is also stressed that every effort should be made to avoid unnecessary loss of life amongst the civilian population.

The 'express reference to terror bombing British cities' was in the context of specifically forbidding the Luftwaffe to initiate such attack a war (note - by this time the RAF was bombing various German cities for two months), and the right to decide for a retaliation for such British attacks were reserved for Hitler himself - whatever the apologists and revisionists might like us to believe.

Naturally when the RAF choose to bomb Berlin, the Luftwaffe responded in kind on 7 September 1940. In a public speech in Berlin on 4 September 1940, Hitler announced that:

The other night the English had bombed Berlin. So be it. But this is a game at which two can play. When the British Air Force drops 2000 or 3000 or 4000 kg of bombs, then we will drop 150 000, 180 000, 230 000, 300 000, 400 000 kg on a single night. When they declare they will attack our cities in great measure, we will eradicate their cities. The hour will come when one of us will break – and it will not be National Socialist Germany!

Indeed Londoners and other unlucky inhabitants of other cities in the UK soon found out that this was a game at which two could play.

 

[fastmongrel]

A lot of Alt history seems to depend on that nasty warmonger Winston Churchill being thrown out of office and terms being offered to Germany. I wonder which politician is supposed to take over from Churchill and then promptly destroy his career and be a pariah for the rest of his life and beyond by rolling over for Hitler to scratch his tummy. After seeing what Hitler had done to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands and France does anyone seriously believe the British public would allow its politicians to do something so rank and stupid. Britons were scared but I believe the general feeling was "Thus far and no further".

 

[Tante Ju]

I believe Halifax was considered the main candidate for PM (and IMHO would have been a better choice than Churchill in any case).

 

[fastmongrel]

Naturally when the RAF choose to bomb Berlin, the Luftwaffe responded in kind on 7 September 1940. In a public speech in Berlin on 4 September 1940, Hitler announced that:



Indeed Londoners and other unlucky inhabitants of other cities in the UK soon found out that this was a game at which two could play.

The RAF and the LW had been happily bombing each other cities well before the famous speech about bombing London. Just ask any inhabitant of Portsmouth for example when the bombing started. The only difference the RAF was struggling to hit mainland Europe the LW was a bit better at it but still struggled to hit the right country on occasion.

 

[stona]

I simply posted the content of a document propagated by Generalkommando I Fliegerkorps. I've given a reference,if you want to check the translation feel free. It is dated 24 July 1940 and makes a specific reference to "ruthless retaliatory terror raids on British cities". I think the translation is by the Air Historical Branch but I am not absolutely sure.

The word "retaliatory" is included. I neither edit my references nor selectively quote to suit any particular point of view. If I remember correctly the invasion of Poland was itself a "retaliation" for some imagined Polish agression.
On August 31, 1939, SS men dressed in Polish army uniforms "attacked" a German radio station at Gleiwitz (Gliwice). The next day, Hitler announced to the German nation and the world his decision to send troops into Poland in response to Polish "incursions" into the Reich. The Nazi Party Reich Press Office instructed the press to avoid the use of the word war. They were to report that German troops had simply beaten back Polish attacks.
The nazi definition of "retaliation" might involve a somewhat loose interpretation of the word.

The expression "terror raid" in direct reference to British cities was in use at a Luftwaffe headquarters in July 1940,sometime before the RAF targeted any German city.

Hitler's order to which you refer in your post is dated later than this. You might consider it a qualification or clarification of an earlier order. I do not believe that a scheme for bombing British cities was the unilateral invention of Fliegerkorps I. It is clear that this sort of bombing was being considered as part of the strategy for the attack on Britain from,at the very least,mid 1940.
As for Goering in June,he shows his normal lack of grasp of what the Luftwaffe,and in this case its bombers,were actually capable of.

Cheers

Steve

 

[fastmongrel]

I believe Halifax was considered the main candidate for PM (and IMHO would have been a better choice than Churchill in any case).

Lord Halifax is often held up as the sensible chap who would have sat down with Hitler over a brew and sorted things out like gentlemen. Two problems with that his being called on by the King to form a government is not going to happen without some big changes. The Labour and Liberal parties would have prefered him to Churchill (they would have preferred anyone but Churchill) but there were large parts of the Conservative and Unionist party who would rather have seen a Labour man like Attlee in 10 Downing St than Halifax, Halifax was not a popular man in the conservative back benches many prefering Eden.

Number two problem is if you read Halifaxs diaries he was not about to give into Hitler in 1940 he wasnt as warlike as Churchill, Eden or Attlee but he was not about to be an appeaser any time soon. It was Halifax in March 39 who gave Poland the guarantee that Britain would go to war saying that there would be "No more Munichs". he personally rejected an offer of peace talks via a Papal nuncio without first discussing it with the Cabinet. He was also responsible for Britain buying up stocks of vital war materials like Tungsten to keep them out of German hands.

Oh and number three the fact that he was Lord Halifax the 3rd Viscount Halifax, the only way he could have been Prime Minister would have been giving up his hereditary title and that would have been for an old fashioned Tory Grandee like Halifax tantamount to committing suicide. He was first a Viscount and a long way second a politician.