You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940

[Tante Ju]

I simply posted the content of a document propagated by Generalkommando I Fliegerkorps. I've given a reference,if you want to check the translation feel free. It is dated 24 July 1940 and makes a specific reference to "ruthless retaliatory terror raids on British cities". I think the translation is by the Air Historical Branch but I am not absolutely sure.

'A document propagated by Generalkommando I Fliegerkorps' - that would be your reference?

The word "retaliatory" is included. I neither edit my references nor selectively quote to suit any particular point of view. If I remember correctly the invasion of Poland was itself a "retaliation" for some imagined Polish agression.

*SNIP lenghty irrelevancy excuse for documents shown not supporting conclusion*

You seem to mix concept of retaliation with casus belli, though I did not get your point about the origins of the hundred years war.

The expression "terror raid" in direct reference to British cities was in use at a Luftwaffe headquarters in July 1940,sometime before the RAF targeted any German city.

No, the RAF bombed German cities since May 1940. Besides - riding on words is meaningless. The world retaliatory or reprisal air attack was in everybody's vocabulary. The bomber forces were very much like MAD in the nuclear era - everyone was watching the other, vouching not to strike first but retaliate in kind if need be. Its only natural that higher orders would deal with this issue. In case Luftwaffe, standing order was not to launch terror attack unless RAF do so first.

I am fairly sure something similar was written in RAF general orders, although War Cabinet meetings in 1939 show clear that bombing of German cities as strategy was considered since 1939. Fear of German reprisal attacks made them to consider twice, until May 1940, when situation on the ground become so critical that they wanted to bait the German air force into a bombing war of each others cities by provocative attacks on German towns - which, given bad situation was seen as better alternative then Luftwaffe bombers giving effectice support to Heer in Low Countries.

For practical purposes of this discussion, it is enough to fix that Luftwaffe standing orders ruled out terror attacks apart for retaliation. Attack on industry and supply was preferred method, much like USAAF doctrine.

It is clear that this sort of bombing was being considered as part of the strategy for the attack on Britain from,at the very least,mid 1940.

No they were not, you misinterpret the document. The wording is very clear that 'this sort of bombing' was only being considered as a reaction, should the British initiate such attack first (which they did, at least in German perception, for months already).

If Hitler would have wanted to employ such attacks as a strategy, he had more than ample excuse to do it, since the RAF bombers flew hundreds of bombing sorties against German cities since May. But Hitler was not particularly fond or convinced that such attacks would be useful at all (he had turned down such incitive in Septemer 1940 several times, in fact also in July when IIRC Keitel proposed it), therefore, they were very much kept at a minimum in favour of bombing industrial targets. In the Luftwaffe, before the bomber baron mindsets simply lost out and few would have preferred such douhetist doctrine. They simply did not believe in it (and as a matter of fact I find it hard to find anyone else, except of course good old Harris since his childhood).

 

[stona]

The document is named in my earlier post.

As for the rest we'll agree to disagree.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

None of the prominant british politicians of the time were prepared to make peace with hitler after Poland (and even before that). For three hundred years, Britain had always supported and aided the second most powerful power in Europe, whoever that may have been, so as to prevent any one nation from dominating and controlling the whole of Europe. a united Europe was a direct threat to British vital interests and security. The British were never going to allow that situation to remain, in much the same way that would never allow Napoleon to peacefully control Europe.

Britain would fight for that principal, even if it meant sacrificing their own nation to do it. There was no room for negotiation on the issue. Allowing one nation to control and dominate western Europe was toally unnacceptable to the British, and they would fight to the death to prevent it.

There was an added twist for hitler. after Munich he was exposed for the liar and the bully that he was. The British could never forgive him for that. before Munich they had wanted nothing more strongly than peace. They were prepared to make sacrifices to achieve that, including the sacrifice of another nation. After Munich, the British realized that hilter could not be trusted, and that he had sucked the British into sullying their honour by even dealing with him. There was no further serious talk of negotiating with a man like Hitler. the British knew they were going to war. Once war broke out there was never the slightest chance that any British politician was going to parley with hitler.

Thats the nature of the British people that so infuriates the nordics. We are a bit illogical when it comes to exposing liars and bullies

 

[Hop]

Looking at the numbers you have above and the earlier numbers you posted, refining crude was a fraction of overall British fuel supplies.

Those numbers are just for 100 octane aviation fuel. They exclude all other grades of petrol, and diesel.

Disrupting the ports and oil stations makes it harder and harder to bring the fuel in. Knocking out the biggest and most important stations forces the British to use far smaller and less efficient stations to discharge fuel from tankers.

The same problem exists with refineries. They have storage tanks, pumps, pipelines, rail yards etc just like ports. In other words, the distribution network is the same, the big difference is that the refinery has to have a lot of complex equipment in addition to the distribution infrastructure.

Did Port Talbot have an oil station to unload tankers?

Yes. It was one of the ports equipped in case of emergency.

Just like Würzburg. It had limited utility and just plugged the gaps that the main radar deployed at the time had. What was its accuracy compared to Freya or Würzburg and how many units were available?

CHL frequency was 1.5 metres compared to Freya's 2.4, so there's no reason accuracy should be a problem. Again power was much higher than Freya, giving superior range. As to numbers, it shouldn't be too hard to find the number of CHL stations, but the same radar was used in mobile versions, and I've never seen accurate numbers for those.

 

[Tante Ju]

So in short you do not know either range or the accuracy of CHL system, but you claim it to be superior...

 

[Timppa]

Thats the nature of the British people that so infuriates the nordics. We are a bit illogical when it comes to exposing liars and bullies

Indeed you are. Britain did declare war on Germany for attacking Poland. Yet Britain did not declare war on Soviet Union, when they also attacked Poland (September 17, 1939), or when they invaded and enslaved Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania...wait, the list gets too long.

 

[Milosh]

Indeed you are. Britain did declare war on Germany for attacking Poland. Yet Britain did not declare war on Soviet Union, when they also attacked Poland (September 17, 1939), or when they invaded and enslaved Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania...wait, the list gets too long.

Did GB have the same agreement with those countries mentioned as it did with Poland?

 

[Milosh]

The Radar Pages - Chain Home

The Chain Home radar system

 

[stona]

This sort of thread has degenerated as usual.
For what its worth I do believe that Britain could have been forced into a negotiated peace with Germany.
It is true,as Parsifal says,that a Europe dominated by one power had been historically unacceptable to Britain. Her foreign policy in Europe had always had the prevention of such a situation as its primary aim. The British were quite happy to sacrifice the interests of small states on the altar of their own self interest. Historically Britain paid others to do most of the fighting and she could easily afford to do it. British money to fund the armies of other European states was known as "St George's cavalry". Nonetheless Britain might have been forced into an acceptance of this unsavoury situation by a succession of defeats and with any potential continental allies already defeated. That is something that had never happened before,even during the Napoleonic wars.Why do we imagine that Churchill looked so desperately to the United States for salvation?
Guarantees which the Germans seem to have been happy to make regarding Britain's wider imperial interests would certainly act as a spoonful of sugar to help the medecine go down.
In the long term and for reasons rooted in the perverse racial and political ideology of the nazi leadership,Britain and her Empire were perceived as a potential ally against Bolshevism and the Slavic hordes.
Cheers
Steve

 

[parsifal]

Indeed you are. Britain did declare war on Germany for attacking Poland. Yet Britain did not declare war on Soviet Union, when they also attacked Poland (September 17, 1939), or when they invaded and enslaved Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania...wait, the list gets too long.

Refer to milosh's reply. i should not have used the term "nordic', but was trying to be somewhat 'politically correct". The Russians were also not a threat to vital british interests as Germany was. Russians were not capable of overrunning Europe, or at least Whitehall believed that. Plus one war at a time is more than enough. The British did not attack Russia in 1807 either, after their alliance with napoleon from the talks at Tilsit. Why? Well because both 1807 and 1939, Russia was not the major continental power, and on both occasions was viewed by Whitehall as the Russians simply acting from expediency . In 1807, Prussia and Austria had suffered a series of heavy defeat, as had Russia. The British in 1807 knew that russia was not keen on allying with Napoleon, and began work to prise them away. In 1939, the situation was not as clear cut, but Russia posed no real threat to the British. Thats not to say that the British were not foolish enough to consider involvement in a confrontation with Russia. During the Russo-Finnish war, the Allies were making plans to intervene, which would have had disastrous effects if they had.

Britain continued to sometimes get sidetracked on issues like Turkey and Yugoslavia, but in the main, her wartime strategy remained remarkably constant. no deviation from the primary objective. The primary objective was the defeat of germany. Seek to ring germany with hostile alliances, build the strength to defeat her. later the nature of what defeating germany meant was solidified by the unconditional surrender terms.

 

[Njaco]

This is the only warning. I can see tempers starting to flare and like stona posted, another thread starts to go down in flames. If people can't be civil, then a week at the beach might help. No warning given - this is it.

To follow up what parsifal posted - I just completed reading the biography of Winston Churchill and it will amaze you what the British government was like during the 30s. Winston saw Hitler for what he was and was almost exiled from government as a 'warmonger'. Amazing.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Originally Posted by Timppa
"... Indeed you are. Britain did declare war on Germany for attacking Poland. Yet Britain did not declare war on Soviet Union, when they also attacked Poland (September 17, 1939), or when they invaded and enslaved Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania...wait, the list gets too long."

Did GB have the same agreement with those countries mentioned as it did with Poland? "

No. They did not.

MM

 

[Juha]

... until May 1940, when situation on the ground become so critical that they wanted to bait the German air force into a bombing war of each others cities by provocative attacks on German towns - which, given bad situation was seen as better alternative then Luftwaffe bombers giving effectice support to Heer in Low Countries...

Any source to back up that claim? In fact the attacks were restricted against communication targets west of Rhein before 15 May 40 and changed only after the bombing of Rotterdam after which BC was allowed to attack German industrial targets. So from from 10/11 May (road and rail communications at Mönchengladbach) to 14/15 May (communications Mönchengladbach, Breda and Roosendaal) and then on 15/16 May Ruhr industry and railways then oil and railway targets in Western Germany to the end of May, didn't bother to look farther, only exceptions were attacks against battlefield targets in Belgium and NW France.

For practical purposes of this discussion, it is enough to fix that Luftwaffe standing orders ruled out terror attacks apart for retaliation. Attack on industry and supply was preferred method, much like USAAF doctrine.

No they were not, you misinterpret the document. The wording is very clear that 'this sort of bombing' was only being considered as a reaction, should the British initiate such attack first (which they did, at least in German perception, for months already).

What was the reason of bombing St. Helier, Jersey and St Peter Port, Guernsey on June 28 1940? Altogether 44 civilians died in that day.

 

[Tante Ju]

Any source to back up that claim? In fact the attacks were restricted against communication targets west of Rhein before 15 May 40 and changed only after the bombing of Rotterdam after which BC was allowed to attack German industrial targets. So from from 10/11 May (road and rail communications at Mönchengladbach) to 14/15 May (communications Mönchengladbach, Breda and Roosendaal) and then on 15/16 May Ruhr industry and railways then oil and railway targets in Western Germany to the end of May, didn't bother to look farther, only exceptions were attacks against battlefield targets in Belgium and NW France.

Except that the intention was laid out pretty clear in recently de-classified confidental annex to the War Cabinet meetings. Churchill was pressing for indiscriminate attacks on the Ruhr with Belgium used a pretext, or if things would go really sour. He hoped that indiscriminate bombings would break German civillian morale.

In short, he wanted to win the war with terror bombings, but as long as Chamberlain was prime minister, he had no chance to do so.

Note the date - 14th October, 1939 - since stona is amused by the world 'retaliation', for the historical record we should note how soon the British War cabinet was flirting with such idea.

This was noted by Boog and other high profile historians in their exhaustive work on the Second World war.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

MOST SECRET W.
M-(S9) 47th CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 4.

Confidential Annex.

AIR POLICY, THE MINISTER FOR CO-DRDTNA^ION OP DEFENCE said that the Conference arranged in accordance with the (Previous Reference: War Cabinet Conclusion referred to in the margin.

W.M.(39) 46th

Conclusions, had arrived at the following, conclusions in connec Minute 2,) tion with the policy which should govern the employment of the Royal Air Force in the immediate future.

The governing fa.ctors might be summarised as follows

a) The Allies were in a position of inferiority vis-a-vis Germany inexisting air strengths. From this it follows that for the present the initiative was with Germany: our action must be conditioned by her action. It also followed that, so far as enemy action permitted, we should conserve and develop our resources until the gap in numerical strength was narrowed. In particular, we should not fritter away our striking force on unprofitable objectives in deference to public clamour for retaliation or public criticism at inaction.

(b) On the other hand, we must not shrink from using the whole of our air strength if enemy action against either France or ourselves looked like being decisive; for example, an attack on our Mercantile Marine, on the scale of 1917: in that event, our striking force must, at all costs, be employed in the manner that held out the best hope of obtaining decisive results against Germany,

c) Germany's weakest spot was the Ruhr, the heart of which was about the size of Greater London, anr1 in which was concentrated approximately 60 per cent, of Germany's vital industry. It contained moreover, a population which might be expected to crack under extensive air attack. Such attacks would involve a heavy casualty roll among civilians, including women and children.

(d) We should not be the first to "take the gloves off". Prom this it followed that until and unless Germany, either by killing large numbers of civilians or by a violation of Belgium, gave the necessary justification,there could be no question of attacking the Ruhr, or anything other than strictly military objectives If the War Cabinet approved these conclusions, the Committee proposed that the governing principles should be applied to the situation with which we were now confronted, in the following way:

i) If the enemy confined his attack either on the French or ouselves to strictly military objectives, we should reply by strictly limited attacks on corresponding German objectives, i.e., we should continue our present bombardment policy.

(ii) If the enemy attacked convoys or even our Fast (joast ports indecisively, i,e,,if they were not doing vital damage — we should, still not do anything to invite retaliation which might do us vital damage.
It would, however', probably be necessary, both on military and political grounds, to take some "token" action in reply. For example, an attack on Hamburg Oil Storage and. Refinery would, be a useful, spectacular and appropriate reply to a German attack on "East Coast ports or London Docks.

(iii) If the Germans should deliver an attack on either France or ourselves which looked like being decisive and had involved either appreciable casualties to civilians outside the battle zone (i.e., anywhere in England or in the back areas in France) or a violation of Belgian neutrality, we should attack the Ruhr as our first and chief objective. In the event of an attack on France through Belgium, our air forces, in addition to attacking the Ruhr, should operate against any favourable military targets presented by the German advance.

Action under (i) was within the existing policy approved by the War Cabinet. Action under (ii).and particularly (iii), would not have to be taken at a moment's notice, and, in the view of the Committee, should not be undertaken without the approval of the War Cabinet.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that an attack on the Ruhr, in consequence of Germany violating Belgian neutrality, would be a departure from our previous ideas.

THE MINISTER FOR CO-ORDINATION OP DEFENCE said that the Committee had taken the view that an attack on Belgium would be an act which would involve tremendous suffering in Belgium amongst the civil population, and we should be amply justified in hitting Germany as hard, as we could.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether the same argument did not apply to Luxembourg and Holland.

THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR ATR said, that Belgium had been considered a special case. An advance through Luxembourg would meet with no opposition, as there were no defences. An advance into Holland would no doubt be rapidly succeeded by an attack on Belgium.

THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS while not pre-judging the issue, asked whether there was not a wide distinction between a violation of Belgian neutrality and an attack on the Ruhr, which would result in heavy civilian casualties. In the latter case would, there not be a grave danger of an accusation that we were the first to "take the gloves off"?

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY said that he thought the violation of Belgium would afford a moral justification for our bombing the Ruhr, even if this involved civilian casualties. The idea of causing civilian casualties among the German population of the Ruhr was to him less shocking than the civilian casualties which the Belgians would incur if we bombed, the German Army while it was moving through Belgium.

THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR ATR pointed out that, in order to invade Belgium, the German Army would have to pass through the Ruhr, which would therefore become a military concentration area. (yeah, right)

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL felt that a decision on the matter should not be taken until the time came. An indiscriminate attack on the Ruhr, in reply to a violation of Belgian neutrality, would be a departure from the policy (which we were at present pursuing) of meeting like with like.

THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR ATR pointed out that an attack by our Air Force on the Ruhr would be by no means indiscriminate, Attacks would be carried out in daylight against military objectives. It was inevitable, however, that, heavy civilian casualties would be caused. A point which the War Cabinet would have to bear in mind, was the probable loss sustained by our attacking formations, which might conceivably be as heavy as 50 per cent.

THE MINISTER WPTTOPT PORTFOLIO said that the Committee had felt that attack on the Ruhr was the only operation of a decisive character to relieve the pressure on Belgium. There was general agreement, that an attack on
the Ruhr would, have a very big moral, as well as military, effect. In the course of discussion it was pointed out that the Belgian Ambassador had been confident that the Belgian defences would, hold up a German advance
at least for a time.

THE CHIEF OF mHE AIR STAFF said that, in the view of the Chiefs of Sta.ff, Belgium could, only impose a certain delay on the German advance.

Tt was agreed that, while it was desirable to have preliminary discussion on this matter, there wa.s no need for the War Cabinet to reach a final decision that day as to the use of our Bomber Force in the circumstances envisaged.

The War Cabinet —
(i) Approved the conclusions summarised in (a), (b), ( c) and (d) above:
(ii) Took note of the proposed courses
of action set out in ( i) , (ii) and
( iii) above.

Richmond Terrace, S.W.1,
14th October, 1939.

What was the reason of bombing St. Helier, Jersey and St Peter Port, Guernsey on June 28 1940? Altogether 44 civilians died in that day.

Declaration of War by Britain on 3 September 1939, subsequent bombing of German towns (with many times the civillian casulties which you list above) when things turned sour in Belgium under the pretext of Rotterdam, refusal of German peace offer by the Churchill cabinet.

 

[stona]

Boog can be strident in his opinions. On 1st September 1939 1,200 civilians died under the 46 tons of bombs dropped on Wielun in Poland. The germans had detected a Polish cavalry brigade and an infantry division in the area. Boog is adamant that these were the target and yet the centre of the town was destroyed. British aviation historian Peter Smith,a big fan of dive bombing,describes this as "collateral damage" and blames fog for the inaccurate bombing.
It is no coincidence that some of the Luftwaffe officers involved had not only served with the Legion Condor but been directly involved in the bombing of Guernica (incidentally how would you characterise that raid?)

You might explain away the Luftwaffe raids on Warsaw on 1/8/and 13th of September,particularly those carried out by Ju 87s. The massive attack of 25th September was a terror raid by any measure.

This is a rather futile discussion about who did what first. Germany was the agressor in WW2. Basil Fawlty,an emminent historian and collector of Moose heads was correct when he said "you started it!"

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

Boog can be strident in his opinions. On 1st September 1939 1,200 civilians died under the 46 tons of bombs dropped on Wielun in Poland. The germans had detected a Polish cavalry brigade and an infantry division in the area. Boog is adamant that these were the target and yet the centre of the town was destroyed. British aviation historian Peter Smith,a big fan of dive bombing,describes this as "collateral damage" and blames fog for the inaccurate bombing.
It is no coincidence that some of the Luftwaffe officers involved had not only served with the Legion Condor but been directly involved in the bombing of Guernica (incidentally how would you characterise that raid?)

I'm not endorsing these opinions, but I've seen it argued this way:
Guernica was an attempt to bomb Republican troops moving through the city/or was an attempt to knock out the bridge so they couldn't escape; therefore the mission was a failure. This is in Corum's "Creating the Operational Air War", where he shows different opinions, one from von Richthofen who lamented the poor aim of his pilots, and IIRC Sperrle's who trumpeted the destructive power of his bombers.

You might explain away the Luftwaffe raids on Warsaw on 1/8/and 13th of September,particularly those carried out by Ju 87s. The massive attack of 25th September was a terror raid by any measure.

I've also see this one argued: Warsaw was a fortified military objective defended by military forces, so therefore was a military target. In the view of the Germans the Poles were using their civilians as shields because they were hiding in the city among them, rather than 'fighting in the field'. The 25th raid was to convince the Polish to surrender.
I want to stress that I don't hold these views, but I've seen these counter arguments in writing and thought I'd share because you asked for the rationalizations that people had for these acts.

This is a rather futile discussion about who did what first. Germany was the agressor in WW2. Basil Fawlty,an emminent historian and collector of Moose heads was correct when he said "you started it!"

Cheers

Steve

Yes, the Germans did start the war. Legally speaking it is debatable whether they intentionally started violating the prohibition against targeting civilians first, though the actions in Poland are pretty damning. Even if not ordered from on high the Luftwaffe did strafe columns of civilians and bomb villages whether or not their were confirmed military targets there. Ultimately responsibility for these acts lie with the regime, which was tried and judged at Nuremberg for their crimes.

 

[Njaco]

Basil Fawlty an emminent historian! I just spit my dinner all over the computer monitor!!!

 

[Hop]

Note the date - 14th October, 1939 - since stona is amused by the world 'retaliation', for the historical record we should note how soon the British War cabinet was flirting with such idea.

Flirting with the idea? The document you quoted expressly rules it out. Note that it first gives statements of facts arrived at by an outside committee:

c) Germany's weakest spot was the Ruhr, the heart of which was about the size of Greater London, anr1 in which was concentrated approximately 60 per cent, of Germany's vital industry. It contained moreover, a population which might be expected to crack under extensive air attack. Such attacks would involve a heavy casualty roll among civilians, including women and children.

and

(d) We should not be the first to "take the gloves off". Prom this it followed that until and unless Germany, either by killing large numbers of civilians or by a violation of Belgium, gave the necessary justification,there could be no question of attacking the Ruhr, or anything other than strictly military objectives If the War Cabinet approved these conclusions, the Committee proposed that the governing principles should be applied to the situation with which we were now confronted, in the following way:

It then makes recommendations:

i) If the enemy confined his attack either on the French or ouselves to strictly military objectives, we should reply by strictly limited attacks on corresponding German objectives, i.e., we should continue our present bombardment policy.

(ii) If the enemy attacked convoys or even our Fast (joast ports indecisively, i,e,,if they were not doing vital damage — we should, still not do anything to invite retaliation which might do us vital damage.
It would, however', probably be necessary, both on military and political grounds, to take some "token" action in reply. For example, an attack on Hamburg Oil Storage and. Refinery would, be a useful, spectacular and appropriate reply to a German attack on "East Coast ports or London Docks.

(iii) If the Germans should deliver an attack on either France or ourselves which looked like being decisive and had involved either appreciable casualties to civilians outside the battle zone (i.e., anywhere in England or in the back areas in France) or a violation of Belgian neutrality, we should attack the Ruhr as our first and chief objective. In the event of an attack on France through Belgium, our air forces, in addition to attacking the Ruhr, should operate against any favourable military targets presented by the German advance.

The cabinet then debated the report, before agreeing the following:

Tt was agreed that, while it was desirable to have preliminary discussion on this matter, there wa.s no need for the War Cabinet to reach a final decision that day as to the use of our Bomber Force in the circumstances envisaged.

The War Cabinet —
(i) Approved the conclusions summarised in (a), (b), ( c) and (d) above:
(ii) Took note of the proposed courses
of action set out in ( i) , (ii) and
( iii) above.

How is this the government flirting with retaliation? Presented with a report by a separate committee they decided to adhere to existing policy, not to be the first to bomb.

The fact remains that the Germans bombed Poland with no provocation. They bombed Norway with no provocation. They bombed Belgium and the Netherlands with no provocation. At least France was at war with Germany before the bombers took off, but again the German air attacks preceded any French air attacks on Germany.

Britain only began bombing Germany after the Luftwaffe had killed tens of thousands in Poland, Norway, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. How then could the Luftwaffe "retaliate" against Britain?

when situation on the ground become so critical that they wanted to bait the German air force into a bombing war of each others cities by provocative attacks on German towns

In fact, when the war cabinet authorised attacks on Germany east of the Rhine, they stressed the military nature of the objectives:

To authorise the Chief of the Air
Staff to order Bomber Command to
carry out attacks on suitable
military objectives, (including
marshalling yards and oil refineries)
in the Ruhr as well as elsewhere in
Germany; and that these attacks
should begin that night with
approximately 100 heavy bombers.

"Military" was underlined in the original text.

 

[parsifal]

Im waiting for someone to claim that the germans showed no aggressive behaviour toward their neighbours. After all Germany never declared war on anyone except the US AFAIK.


With regard to losses, Germany was having dificulty inmaintaining force structure from before operations in the west even commenced. The exapnsion of the LW was much slower than the RAF up to mid 1941 suggesting they had some difficulties with aircraft supply. The aircrew training was another issue that constrained the LW as the war progressed. The losses sustained during the BoB cannot have been good for the LW given these constraints.

However the significance of the battle was never about the losses, or the survival of the LW. It was a battle about firstly control of airspace, over south east england, and secondly about the survival of the RAF as aviable force. The LW was defeated because it failed in both of these missions. it did not gain control of the airspace over SE England, and it did not eliminate the RAF as a viable fighting force. By the following march, the RAF was begining to undertake significant counteroffensive operations over the Channel and Coastal areas of occupied Europe. initially the LW resisted, but by the end of 1941 all pretence at challenging the RAF over the channel, and over the port areas that surrounded it had disappeared. the LW continued to inflict heavy losses on the RAF, but losses were inevitable in gaing control of the skies over a particular area. Galland acknowledges that from a certain point in 1941, the LW was no longer the hunters on the attack. They were standing on the defensive in the west, and he acknowledges that was greatly debilitating to the LW.

The LW did not win anything during the BoB. The RAF gained considerably. Guess who won.

 

[Tante Ju]

Boog can be strident in his opinions.

Hardly, he is a respected historian and head of the Bundesarchiv AFAIK. He also presents an extremely heavy dose of evidence. You, for your own reasons may disapprove his factual and objective presentation of the events, but you can be strident in your opinion sometimes. And unlike Boog, you do not present any significant sources.

On 1st September 1939 1,200 civilians died under the 46 tons of bombs dropped on Wielun in Poland.

And 30 000 in Rotterdam, 6000 in Guernica, 350 000 in Dresden etc. All bogus war propaganda numbers I am afraid.

The germans had detected a Polish cavalry brigade and an infantry division in the area. Boog is adamant that these were the target and yet the centre of the town was destroyed. British aviation historian Peter Smith,a big fan of dive bombing,describes this as "collateral damage" and blames fog for the inaccurate bombing.

So does even the official history of the Polish air force *caugh caugh*.. btw every single picture I have seen of the destroyed 'town centre' really shows about half a dozen damaged buildings around a tiny square of a small Polish town.

It is no coincidence that some of the Luftwaffe officers involved had not only served with the Legion Condor but been directly involved in the bombing of Guernica

Certainly not. Both were performed by the Luftwaffe. And the Luftwaffe tended to have Luftwaffe offciers who in turn tended to be involved in previous bombing operations. That whats an air force do, bomb, right?

(incidentally how would you characterise that raid?)

I would characterise it as as a successful interdiction of enemy forces and cutting of their roads of deployement and essential to Nationalist victory in the campaign over the anarcho-communist Republicans. The event has been heavily propagandized ever since and is a favoured myth to be repeated by certain groups.

You might explain away the Luftwaffe raids on Warsaw on 1/8/and 13th of September,particularly those carried out by Ju 87s.

"... by 8 September, as the Germans began to assualt Warsaw, a crisis developed in the rear. The city itself attracted much Luftwaffe attention on 8th of September, with Luftflotte 1 beggining daily attacks on bridge over the Vistula in the city centre. In the southern suburbs, the Luftwaffe sought to help Reichenau's advance in face of fierce resistence, flying 140 Stuka sorties (StG 77 and III/StG 51) on the first day alone. Meanwhile KG 77 struck railways east of Warsaw and during the night of 10/11 September LnAbt 100 conducted the last of four precision night missions using the X-Geraet navigation system. The first attack had taken place on 3/4 September and this last one destroyed a munition dump."

There were no Stuka sorties at all on the 13th I know of. Two squadrons of KG 4 were initially tasked with bombing targets in the besieged northern Warsaw, dropping 50-50 load of incendinaries and HE, the jewish Ghetto due North of the Danzig railway station possibly being included in the target folder. 183 sorties were flown that day. The operation went very poorlz, none of the units attacked on schedule, there were several near misses and smoke prevented assessing the damage. KG 77s commader, Seywald ignored the selected targets in favour of purely miliitary ones. Seywald was relieved on the same night.

The massive attack of 25th September was a terror raid by any measure.

Who's measure, yours? Terror raid of a besieged city, bombarded by 1000 pieces artilerry day and night, you are kidding, right?

von Richthofen indeed requested for such a raid ('a last opportunity for large-scale experiment as devastation and terror raid') and given your fondness Harris's methods, by now you must be very fond of the guy, but OKL was a party pooper again and declined is request. Most of the modern bombers like He 111 were withdrawn a redeployed to Germany, leaving only Stukas and obsolate Ju 52s available. No larger than 50 kg bombs were permitted by OKL. A combined air and arty bombarbment began on 23rd, but low cloud prevented air operations, limited to destruction of the besieged city's utilities. A ground assault was prepeared on the 25th and was supported by 400 bombers, including five Stuka wings and a single bomber squadron flew 1150 sorties. 560 tons of HE and 72 tons of incendinaries were dropped. Methods were described as worse than primitive, given the lack of any 'real' bombers, Ju 52s for example showeled incendinaries out of the doorway. Accuracy was absymal, made worse by strong NW wings, and even German positions were bombed, causing friendly fire casulties. Three aircraft were lost, two being Ju 52s. The inaccuracy and thick smoke that blocked the gunner's view infuriated Blaskowitz, who's troops were about to make an attack. Blaskowitz requested the ceasing of the ineffective air support but Hitler ordered Richthofen to carry on. Weather was again unpermitting so he went on supporting the attack on Modlin. In the meanwhile things weren't going too well on the ground, the Germans suffering setbacks against stout Polish defence, prompting the Luftwaffe to prepeare another massive close support raid. However, the Polish commander (you gotta love that!) general Rómmel made the best of the temporary success and surrendered in the afternoon, seeking best terms. Warsaw was out of everything anyway.

It hardly paints a pretty picture but hardly different than how the British battered their way through Caen in 1944, essentially razing the city to the ground with Lancesters aka terror raids by any measure.

This is a rather futile discussion about who did what first.

Indeed. There is a mountain of evidence against opinion...

Germany was the agressor in WW2. Basil Fawlty,an emminent historian and collector of Moose heads was correct when he said "you started it!"