You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940

[wiking85]

The ability of the Luftwaffe to actually hit and destroy the docks of Liverpool is being over estimated.

In August 1940 there were raids on 9,10,17,28,29,30 and 31. Bombs dropped across the entire Liverpool area. On only two occassions were the docks or their facilities hit. On the 17th Queen's Dock was damaged and on 31st warehouses in Stone Street and Vandries Street were hit.

In September there were raids on 3/4/5/6/10/11/12/14/15/16/17/18/19/21/24/26/27 and 29. The docks or warehouses were damaged on the 14th by a nuisance raid,only one aircraft was reported. On the 21st warehouses at Alexandra docks were set ablaze.
Now the Luftwaffe's luck changes. On the 24th Liverpool city centre and the docklands are hit. Parker Street, Clayton Square, Church Street, Great Howard Street and Love Lane recieve hits. The Stanley Tobacco Warehouse, Silcocks Cattle Foodmill and a Cotton Warehouse on Glegg Street are damaged in the raid. On the 26th Wapping, Kings, Queens, Coburg and Brunswick Docks are hit hard with many warehouses alongside them ablaze. The Dock Board and Cunard Buildings are damaged. On the 29th a grain warehouse at Duke's dock was destroyed.

October the luftwaffe visits on 7/10/11/12/13/14/16/17/18/19/21/25/26/27/29. On the 11th the North Docks were damaged,particularly Alexandra and Langton docks. The Luftwaffe then bombed just about everything except the docks until the 29th when Queen's Dock was set afire again.

The Luftwaffe has missed its chance. Anyone familiar with the sort of weather prevalent in the winter months in the British Isles will understand why. In November the Luftwaffe does attempt some raids on 1/4/8/12/18/22/28/29. Only on the night of the 28th are the docks hit. A large fire is started in sheds at Queen's Dock. Tragically an Auxiliary Fire Service post in the dock is hit,killing three firemen.

In December nothing happens until what scousers call "the Christmas blitz". On three successive nights on 20/21/22 December there were heavy raids.
On 20th Bombs fall across the docklands area. In the worst incident A parachute mine lands at Waterloo Dock killing 9 people.
On 21st,in what is considered the heaviest raid of all,Canada, Gladstone, Brocklebank, Princes, Wapping, King's and Carriers Docks all bombed.
On 22nd Canada, Huskisson and Alexandra Docks bombed.

These three nights caused more damage to Liverpool's docks than all the previous raids. It was too little and too late. The Luftwaffe failed to come back to finish the job.
The question is what would have happened if these raids had taken place months earlier and then been repeated over a significant period? I don't think that the Luftwaffe had the ability to do it. Would it have been worth a try? Absolutely yes.

Cheers

Steve

I would also like to add that hitting the docks themselves wasn't necessary, as the streets needed to be clear to move the goods from the warehouses to the rail yards. Blocking the streets with rubble and unexploded ordnance disrupts the distribution of the goods inland and the more that it builds up the greater the chances it will be hit eventually when bombers pummel the area night after night.

Had the Luftwaffe started in July-August against Liverpool and focused their efforts against the Liverpool area instead of London, the weight of ordnance would have been several times greater than what they had historically. If we skip the battle of Britain then there are some additional 1000 bombers available (though perhaps 600-700 were level bombers that could reach Liverpool, i.e. He 111s and Ju88s.
Still 600 extra bombers over the historic numbers would be a huge number more.


Edit:
http://sturmvogel.orbat.com/LWOB.html
So after part of the BoB there were nearly serviceable 1000 LW bombers; to August 17th there had been 279 bombers, both dive and level, lost. Assuming 40% were dive bombers (112), that leaves us 167 level bombers lost, so that puts our bomber total at 1127 as of July first. I think during most of July there was the Kannalkampf, which was mostly Ju87s lost, so that shouldn't reflect on the level bomber totals too much.

Assuming August 1st is the start date of when bomber operations commence, let's say that we have 1100 serviceable level bombers. Of these probably 20% are Do17s, which cannot reach Liverpool, so 220. We then have 880 bombers that are serviceable that can reach and hit Liverpool.

That number will increase as other aircraft are made serviceable (IIRC by August 1st serviceability was 58%, so we have hundreds of bombers being worked on to bring them up to combat operational status) and replacements arrive.
So assuming that we are focusing on Liverpool we have 880 bombers use, which gives us 440 per day if they alternate raids. The He111 could reach Liverpool with 2 tons of bombs and the Ju88A1 and A5 could reach it with 1.5-2 tons IIRC.
That would be about 800-880 tons per day depending on accuracy and serviceability. Let's say that's around 600-700 per day that is on target. Within one month the total would around 18,000 tons assuming we multiply 600 tons by 30 days.
Let's say that weather means that we have to delete some days from that total, like 10 days. That still leaves us 12,000 tons in one month.
Even adjusting for losses, which were a fraction of 1% in night missions prior to 1941, let's subtract another 2000tons.
So we have 10,000 tons of bombs on Liverpool (really the Merseyside area).
That's enormous. What effect would that have on operation of the docks, the morale of the workers, the clearance of the material from the docks, the offloading of ships, which cannot now que up in the Mersey river and at night have to disperse elsewhere to avoid providing a target to German bombers?

 

[stona]

I would also like to add that hitting the docks themselves wasn't necessary, as the streets needed to be clear to move the goods from the warehouses to the rail yards. Blocking the streets with rubble and unexploded ordnance disrupts the distribution of the goods inland and the more that it builds up the greater the chances it will be hit eventually when bombers pummel the area night after night.

Railways proved to be easily and quickly repairable throughout the war. Streets were cleared in hours. The major problem is pummeling the area night after night. Take a look at where the bombs fell on London in the first two weeks of the London Blitz,a time when the docks were explicitly the target.
The Luftwaffe,over the 50+ raids between August and December 1940 achieved a decent concentration of bombing in the area of the docks only on four or five occassions. Bombs fell on Birkehhead that were aimed at the Liverpool docks!
That's what I meant when I doubted the Luftwaffe's ability to pull it off. It might have been interesting had it tried.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Hop]

38 Bombers was 1% of sortees in May.

38 bombers was the total shot down in the first week of May, not the whole month. When the bombers were hitting short range targets like London they were hard to intercept. Deep penetration missions resulted in higher losses.

It also took from September 1939, when night operations over Britain started, until May 1941 to achieve a night fighter kill ratio of 1%. That was far below expansion rate for the LW.

The Luftwaffe bomber force was not expanding. Throughout the first few months of 1941 losses kept place with replacement aircraft, pilot training didn't keep up at all. According to Murray Luftwaffe bomber losses rose from 5.8% of total strength in January to 10% in April and 12% in May.

Not all raids were highly successful, but on balance Liverpool was hit pretty badly during the Blitz, which itself was a fraction of the bombing London received. They certainly learned after their first deep raid how to improve accuracy, especially when KG100 showed up, which wasn't until August 24th. It had been misused as a naval bombing unit in Norway until then, when it could have been leading pathfinding missions; once they did accuracy went up markedly.

And went down pretty fast again once the beam countermeasures were in operation.

Conventry, a non-coastal city pretty far north of London was very accurately bombed. Manchester too.

They were area bombed. There wasn't much "accuracy" required.

Sourcing on that? The UK Civil Series states that production was 18 million tons and Britain consumed 20 million, so needed to import 2 million tons of coal from abroad.

Which volume of the civil series? The British War Economy, part of the civil series:

In the short term, part of the British stockbuilding programme was sacrificed to meet French needs. But this hard decision was only a month old when France collapsed, and with her, the coal production problem. A ten percent increase in British production was no longer wanted; instead, demand was now expected to be no more than 215 million tons a year, or ten percent less than current production. Even feverish stockbuilding at home in the summer of 1940 could not prevent unemployment in the coalfields of South Wales and the north-east.

I don't understand where the 18 and 20 million ton figures come from, they are around 10% of the true total.

The statistical summary presented to the war cabinet in October 1944 lists UK coal exports:

1938 - 35,900,000 tons
1939 - 36,900,000
1940 - 19,600,000
1941 - 5,100,000
1942 - 3,600,000
1943 - 3,400,000

I also know from previous research that the first UK coal imports didn't begin until 1974.

It was more accurate than Chain Home sets.

And shorter range. It was no more accurate than Chain Home Low, the low altitude stations that were integrated with the existing Chain Home stations in 1940.

How much of that was lubricants? Later you claim there were 3,400,000 tons of fuel, which is pretty close to my number.

353,000 tons of lubricants, 327,000 tons of crude, 2,162,000 tons of admiralty fuel oil.

Britain had to ship theirs in, as they were totally dependent on outside oil. There were three oil stations handling that import: Liverpool (Ellesmere, which supplied Stanlow), Glasgow, and Avonmouth.

There were more than those 3. Swansea, for a start. Llandarcy was the first oil refinery in Britain, most of the oil for it came through Swansea docks. I know that as much as 200,000 tons of oil a month was unloaded at Swansea.

They were targetable in August 1940 especially when there was a ten day wait to unload at Ellesmere, which was a ripe target if KG100 had led a raid in August on Liverpool.

I suggest you read what the USSBS has to say about attacks on German oil facilities. Bombing an oil plant, even with the massive force the RAF and USAAF were able to muster later in the war, usually resulted in short term reductions in output. To keep production down they had to bomb again and again and again.

The Luftwaffe didn't have those sorts of resources. The RAF and USAAF dropped 190,000 tons on the German oil industry alone. Germany managed about 40,000 tons in total during the Blitz, and much of that was against London, an extremely short range target.

Germany just didn't have the force available. If the Luftwaffe didn't bomb at all by day they could drop a significantly larger tonnage during the Blitz. But if they are going to targets further than London most of the time, that will reduce the tonnage. So we are left with the luftwaffe dropping about 40,000 tons over 9 months. It's just not enough. Nowhere near enough. The combined RAF and USAAF effort in 1944/45 was probably enough to defeat the Germans even without the land fighting, but that amounted to about 100,000 tons a month, 20 times the German effort against Britain, and delivered in a more concentrated and more accurate fashion.

 

[stona]

Much of the above reinforces my suspicion that the Luftwaffe simply didn't have the means to achieve this objective.

I do believe that the Luftwaffe,with very minor and achievable technical adaptations and a different strategy employing different tactics could have defeated the RAF in 1940.

As Luftwaffe commander I like the idea of attempting to bomb Britain's ports into oblivion,I just think that this was far less likely to be achievable than the other option.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

38 bombers was the total shot down in the first week of May, not the whole month. When the bombers were hitting short range targets like London they were hard to intercept. Deep penetration missions resulted in higher losses.

Source on that? I've looked at E.R. Hooton's numbers of losses during the Blitz and there is no reference to that number being only for the first week in May.
Also May is at the tail end of things; we are talking about in August through December when losses to night fighters could be counted on one hand.

The Luftwaffe bomber force was not expanding. Throughout the first few months of 1941 losses kept place with replacement aircraft, pilot training didn't keep up at all. According to Murray Luftwaffe bomber losses rose from 5.8% of total strength in January to 10% in April and 12% in May.

In 1940 they were during the Blitz. The losses you cite are for all fronts, not just over Britain. By 1941 they were being diverted to the Mediterranean to fight there, which increased overall losses. Of course there were also naval battles in the North Sea and Atlantic which took their toll on the overall bomber strength, but the losses you are citing include Me110s, Ju87s, and other bombers used exclusively for naval operations and weren't included in the level bomber strength of units over Britain.

German losses over Britain during the Blitz are listed here:
The Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

And went down pretty fast again once the beam countermeasures were in operation.

According to postwar British memoirs talking up their achievements; the reality was quite a bit different. Kenneth Wakefield has done a bunch of research into the LW pathfinder operations and contradicts the efficacy of British jamming and beam bending efforts. In fact those memoirs, including R.V. Jones', have incorrect information about the G- and Y-Verfahren systems. Jones claims that Y-Verfahren was jammed on its first attempt and abandoned by the Germans, while German records show that the system was being used months before Jones claims it was, not to mention that it was successfully used months after successfully.
The First Pathfinders - The Operational History of Kampfgruppe 100, 1939 - 41: Kenneth Wakefield: 9780947554200: Amazon.com: Books

The Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

From the German point of view, March 1941 saw an improvement. The Luftwaffe flew 4,000 sorties that month, including 12 major and three heavy attacks. The electronic war intensified but the Luftwaffe flew major inland missions only on moonlit nights. Ports were easier to find and made better targets. To confuse the British, radio silence was observed until the bombs fell. X- and Y-Gerät beams were placed over false targets and switched only at the last minute. Rapid frequency changes were introduced for X-Gerät, whose wider band of frequencies and greater tactical flexibility ensured it remained effective at a time when British selective jamming was degrading the effectiveness of Y-Gerät.[122]

German counter-counter measures worked out, though there were moments in 1941 where the British were successful in their jamming. Degrading the effectiveness didn't work out all that well all that often, because the LW learned the tricks the British used to trick them, so could pick out the differences. Often the British were reduced to jamming the full band of frequencies, which also degraded the performance of their interception of German bombers.

Liverpool Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
It certainly didn't help Liverpool in May 1941 long after the British supposedly 'mastered' the German beams.

They were area bombed. There wasn't much "accuracy" required.

Exactly, perfect accuracy isn't necessary.

Which volume of the civil series? The British War Economy, part of the civil series:



I don't understand where the 18 and 20 million ton figures come from, they are around 10% of the true total.

The statistical summary presented to the war cabinet in October 1944 lists UK coal exports:

1938 - 35,900,000 tons
1939 - 36,900,000
1940 - 19,600,000
1941 - 5,100,000
1942 - 3,600,000
1943 - 3,400,000

I also know from previous research that the first UK coal imports didn't begin until 1974.

Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, Behrens, C. B. A. London: HMSO and Longmans, Green, 1955
Coal, Court, William H. B. London: HMSO, 1951
I based my post on these.

And shorter range. It was no more accurate than Chain Home Low, the low altitude stations that were integrated with the existing Chain Home stations in 1940.

The difference was that the German radar could detect aircraft at a greater altitude than Chain Home Low, which was only for the altitudes of 500 to 800 feet. Its great that they were more accurate, but they didn't have the range of the German units. Of course by 1942 the British radar started to outstrip the Germans, which by 1943 it was far ahead.

353,000 tons of lubricants, 327,000 tons of crude, 2,162,000 tons of admiralty fuel oil.

Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration, Payton-Smith, D. J. London: HMSO, 1971
This contradicts that.

There were more than those 3. Swansea, for a start. Llandarcy was the first oil refinery in Britain, most of the oil for it came through Swansea docks. I know that as much as 200,000 tons of oil a month was unloaded at Swansea.

When was that though? Swansea wasn't importing in 1940.
Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration, Payton-Smith, D. J. London: HMSO, 1971

I suggest you read what the USSBS has to say about attacks on German oil facilities. Bombing an oil plant, even with the massive force the RAF and USAAF were able to muster later in the war, usually resulted in short term reductions in output. To keep production down they had to bomb again and again and again.

That's comparing apples to potatoes. Germany produced her own oil at several massive facilities that dwarfed the British refineries, but Britain wasn't refining oil on site anymore once France fell; instead they were importing refined fuels, so the vulnerable spots aren't the large refineries, but rather the storage facilities and the oil stations in the ports. That's a much more concentrated target that is easier to damage and requires far less tonnage than the German cracking facilities.

The Luftwaffe didn't have those sorts of resources. The RAF and USAAF dropped 190,000 tons on the German oil industry alone. Germany managed about 40,000 tons in total during the Blitz, and much of that was against London, an extremely short range target.

Part of the German problem during the Blitz was that they lost so many bombers during the BoB. Then they had more siphoned off in February for other fronts, and in January/February winter limited operations. Its not that the Germans couldn't have delivered more tonnage, they just mismanaged their bombers and used them for other duties, which reduced the number of bombers operating over Britain.

Germany just didn't have the force available. If the Luftwaffe didn't bomb at all by day they could drop a significantly larger tonnage during the Blitz. But if they are going to targets further than London most of the time, that will reduce the tonnage. So we are left with the luftwaffe dropping about 40,000 tons over 9 months. It's just not enough. Nowhere near enough. The combined RAF and USAAF effort in 1944/45 was probably enough to defeat the Germans even without the land fighting, but that amounted to about 100,000 tons a month, 20 times the German effort against Britain, and delivered in a more concentrated and more accurate fashion.

Germany was producing her own oil and had massive refineries to do so, which greatly increased the number of targets to hit, which were well defended.
Britain was importing refined fuels, not crude, so weren't using their refineries; instead its the storage facilities which needed to be hit and there were far fewer of them, thus requiring much less bombing to damage. Of course they didn't have to hit all or even most of stocks, but rather take out some of the stored stocks and damage the import facilities. The Allied efforts against German oil production did have a pretty damaging effect in late 1944-5.

 

[fastmongrel]

Y

Liverpool however was much more vulnerable to being bombed, because unlike London, it did not have a direct connection to the rail station with its port and warehouses. Blocking the streets with unexploded ordnance and rubble would prevent the goods being moved to the rails for distribution to the rest of the country. Then with more goods pilling up on the docks/warehouses, they can be destroyed, which forces the British to spend more of their dwindling financial resources rebuying those goods and using their shipping to reimport, making them vulnerable again to Uboats.

Never been to Liverpool docks have you. Because if you had you would realise how wrong that statement was about the docks. Only one dock was not directly rail connected Albert Dock which was only used by coasters. Mersey Docks and Harbours board had 107 miles of its own rail lines and there were 12 direct rail connections to the LMS, LNER, GWR and CLC rail networks via tunnels and level crossings. The Port even had its own railway stations. I worked for a short time at Gladstone Docks and everywhere you went there were rails set into the ground.

Wapping Tunnel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Waterloo Tunnel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Subterranea Britannica: Sites:
Liverpool Riverside railway station - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Alexandra Dock railway station - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Canada Dock Branch - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[stona]

The Luftwaffe bomber force was certainly not expanding. In fact, largely due to the efforts of the RAF and the incompetence of the German aviation industry it was diminishing.
In May 1940 the Luftwaffe had 1,758 bombers.
In December 1940 it had only 1,393.
In June 1941 the number was 1,511.The Luftwaffe embarked on the invasion of the Soviet Union,whilst still fighting Britain,with fewer bombers (in fact fewer aircraft full stop) than it had at the beginning of the Battle of Britain.
Figures exclude dive bombers and are total strength.Serviceability is even more depressing for a Luftwaffe commander,and are from "Luftwaffe Strength and Serviceability Tables,August 1938-April 1945", from the German, AHB translation VII/107.
Cheers
Steve

 

[wiking85]

Never been to Liverpool docks have you. Because if you had you would realise how wrong that statement was about the docks. Only one dock was not directly rail connected Albert Dock which was only used by coasters. Mersey Docks and Harbours board had 107 miles of its own rail lines and there were 12 direct rail connections to the LMS, LNER, GWR and CLC rail networks via tunnels and level crossings. The Port even had its own railway stations. I worked for a short time at Gladstone Docks and everywhere you went there were rails set into the ground.

Wapping Tunnel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Waterloo Tunnel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Subterranea Britannica: Sites:
Liverpool Riverside railway station - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Alexandra Dock railway station - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Canada Dock Branch - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Where you there in 1940? My information about this comes from this:
HyperWar: Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War (UK Civil Series)

Looks like the information about discharging the docks to rail might well be wrong, but I hesitate to say that information based on the current situation was the same in 1940.

The Luftwaffe bomber force was certainly not expanding. In fact, largely due to the efforts of the RAF and the incompetence of the German aviation industry it was diminishing.
In May 1940 the Luftwaffe had 1,758 bombers.
In December 1940 it had only 1,393.
In June 1941 the number was 1,511.The Luftwaffe embarked on the invasion of the Soviet Union,whilst still fighting Britain,with fewer bombers (in fact fewer aircraft full stop) than it had at the beginning of the Battle of Britain.
Figures exclude dive bombers and are total strength.Serviceability is even more depressing for a Luftwaffe commander,and are from "Luftwaffe Strength and Serviceability Tables,August 1938-April 1945", from the German, AHB translation VII/107.
Cheers
Steve

Let me clarify: the loss rate during the Blitz was below the expansion rate for the LW; losses during the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain badly tore into Luftwaffe units, so by December they still had not recovered from the dual losses of May-June 1940 and July-September 1940. They were expanding compared to their numbers at the end of the Battle of France, but losses in the Mediterranean during early 1941 until Barbarossa blunted this recovery and set them back a bit.

So if we are discussing a scenario like I am suggesting, that there is no Battle of Britain, and the historical loss rates hold, then by 1941 the Luftwaffe would be expanding to its relative numbers at the start of this version of the Blitz. It may still be below the pre-Battle of France numbers, but to say they were expanding would be true, just that that expansion is relative to their post-BoF and pre-Blitz numbers.

Avoiding the Battle of Britain save some 1800 aircraft, less those that would still be lost during the Channel Struggle and during the daylight hours during this version of the Blitz.

 

[Tante Ju]

And shorter range. It was no more accurate than Chain Home Low, the low altitude stations that were integrated with the existing Chain Home stations in 1940.

Chain Home was an obsolate and dead end and very much exploitable radar technology. CHL was based on the same simplistic technology - it has trouble even picking off single aircraft, let alone having any 'accuracy'. Both were inferior in accuracy to Freya and Würzburg systems, which were gun laying radars also.

But it was useful and practical as an early warning system. Its range come from a single factor, that it was mounted on a 360 ft high tower, and therefore, could see further beyond the horizon at altitude. It only worked near the sea because its lack of resulution, and was completely blind and useless over inland. Put a Freya or any other radar on a large hill and it will see further, and it will cover a complete 360 degree arc if needed - one of the reasons why you needed so many CH towers, since it could only see a fixed 100 degrees forward...

With all its limitations and primitiveness, CH was extremely useful for the RAF (as in better than nothing) and also the LW later in the war who had simply exploited this primitivess of the system and used it for their own ends with the own parasite radar installations; the latter used the signals the CH emssion and could detect British bombers taking off from 400 km..

 

[fastmongrel]

Where you there in 1940? My information about this comes from this:
HyperWar: Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War (UK Civil Series)

Looks like the information about discharging the docks to rail might well be wrong, but I hesitate to say that information based on the current situation was the same in 1940.

I am not basing anything on the current situation as only one rail line connects to Seaforth and the North docks these days though things are getting better with the re-opening of the Olive Chord. I am basing my information on the Docks and its railway connections from contemperaneous evidence easily found on Google and the information supplied by family members and friends family members who worked on the docks at the time. Liverpool and Birkenhead Docks was heavily served by rail connections which is not surprising as Liverpool was the main port of the American trade.

You can walk along the Dock roads in Liverpool, Bootle and Birkenhead and still see the rail lines coming out of long blocked warehouse doors and gates and disappearing under modern concrete and tarmac. I havent read anything of the link you posted above but if it says that horse drawn wagons were used to get goods off the docks then I am afraid the information is wrong and wrong on a similar scale to Goerings intelligence on the RAF. Horse wagons were used on the docks but not in anything the number that would have been required if the rails had not been there.

 

[Tante Ju]

The Luftwaffe bomber force was certainly not expanding. In fact, largely due to the efforts of the RAF and the incompetence of the German aviation industry it was diminishing.
Cheers

Steve

It has very little to do with either, they simply retired a lot of Do 17s and other older stuff in the Winter and started replacing them en masse with modern Ju 88s. The RAF itself never managed to shot down enough German bombers to even slow down the bombing.

 

[fastmongrel]

Chain Home was an obsolate and dead end and very much exploitable radar technology. CHL was based on the same simplistic technology. Both were inferior in accuracy to Freya and Würzburg systems, which were gun laying radars also.

It was todays technology and was good enough. Freya and Wurtzburg were tommorows technology if the UK had tried to build a system as good as the German then there wouldnt have been a chain of any radars. Better to have something that works than something which is still in development in 1938 when Chain Home got going.

 

[wiking85]

I am not basing anything on the current situation as only one rail line connects to Seaforth and the North docks these days though things are getting better with the re-opening of the Olive Chord. I am basing my information on the Docks and its railway connections from contemperaneous evidence easily found on Google and the information supplied by family members and friends family members who worked on the docks at the time. Liverpool and Birkenhead Docks was heavily served by rail connections which is not surprising as Liverpool was the main port of the American trade.

You can walk along the Dock roads in Liverpool, Bootle and Birkenhead and still see the rail lines coming out of long blocked warehouse doors and gates and disappearing under modern concrete and tarmac. I havent read anything of the link you posted above but if it says that horse drawn wagons were used to get goods off the docks then I am afraid the information is wrong and wrong on a similar scale to Goerings intelligence on the RAF. Horse wagons were used on the docks but not in anything the number that would have been required if the rails had not been there.

No, it was that trucks were used mostly to clear the docks and bring imports to the rail yards. I could have misunderstood what they were trying to say; unfortunately I don't own a copy, because its hundreds of dollars and I'm going on memory from the time that I ordered it via interlibrary loan. Thanks for the information, I want to be accurate about what I'm posting.

 

[Tante Ju]

It was todays technology and was good enough. Freya and Wurtzburg were tommorows technology if the UK had tried to build a system as good as the German then there wouldnt have been a chain of any radars. Better to have something that works than something which is still in development in 1938 when Chain Home got going.

I agree realisation was logical in UK. Radar was important since it shares more or less accuracate information on enemy aircraft dislocation.

IMHO German operational mistake early in the Battle was to operate bombers very much like as in France, in smaller units attacking many different targets. Correct employment as Battles show in September was mass attack, which could overload the rigid British defense. But even then mass tactics were not employed to enough strenght and skillfull British fighter guidance could ensure local superiority in numbers for British, and thus, acceptable results.

LW leadership had short time frame so objectives should have been decided early on, and use maximum effort to achieve, unlike in Battle. Either select FC infrastructure or sea lane import, then simply amass 500 bombers every day with 1000 fighters and batter the way through for annihilating attack on that target (and any fighter trying to intercept - RAF control cannot provide local air superiority this way).

 

[wiking85]

I agree realisation was logical in UK. Radar was important since it shares more or less accuracate information on enemy aircraft dislocation.

IMHO German operational mistake early in the Battle was to operate bombers very much like as in France, in smaller units attacking many different targets. Correct employment as Battles show in September was mass attack, which could overload the rigid British defense. But even then mass tactics were not employed to enough strenght and skillfull British fighter guidance could ensure local superiority in numbers for British, and thus, acceptable results.

LW leadership had short time frame so objectives should have been decided early on, and use maximum effort to achieve, unlike in Battle. Either select FC infrastructure or sea lane import, then simply amass 500 bombers every day with 1000 fighters and batter the way through for annihilating attack on that target (and any fighter trying to intercept - RAF control cannot provide local air superiority this way).

The only problem was that the LW lacked 1000 fighters in August 1940. They had some 800, which meant that mustering the full force every day would see them burned out very quickly, both the pilots and machines. They needed rest in between, time to train, service, and upgrade equipment.

 

[bobbysocks]

the LW may have lacked planes but there were more to be had. how many italian fighters flew in the BoB?? and how many more could you have pulled in? how many french fighter ac were laying around and how would they stack up to RAF fighters?

 

[davebender]

If you create a major fire while attacking a seaport it will be an accident such as Rotterdam where a small number of German bombers hit a margarine warehouse.

 

[fastmongrel]

Were there enough pilots to fly 1000 fighters and 500 bombers. Also were there enough airfields to cope with 1000 fighters and 500 bombers taking off in one raid.

 

[wiking85]

Were there enough pilots to fly 1000 fighters and 500 bombers.

No to the fighters, yes to the bombers; the Germans put their best crews in bombers, so fighters were shortchanged when it came to replacements.
Overy states that the British fighters pilots outnumbered the German fighter pilots:
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0393322971/?tag=dcglabs-20

Also were there enough airfields to cope with 1000 fighters and 500 bombers taking off in one raid.

Probably, as there were some 3000 aircraft stationed in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, and Denmark that operated against Britain in 1940.

 

[Balljoint]

Change the fighter's mission from protecting the bombers to destroying the RAF fighters, i.e. gain air superiority. Rather than flying S-curves in close proximity to the bombers, position the 109s at altitude above the bombers. The interceptors have the disadvantage of needing to avoid the defending fighters to get at the bombers. Take advantage of this to gain a favorable attrition ratio.