You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940

[davebender]

During 1940 the British main effort was to secure military cooperation with Soviet Union and USA. That's why time was not on Germany's side.

1940 Britain must be coerced into quitting the war. Handing the RAF an easy victory over England will only encourage Britain to keep fighting.

 

[bob44]

[QUOTE

The clear strategic objective should be to defeat the RAF

Steve ][/QUOTE]

I agree with this. To win the war, Germany needs to defeat the British at home. Britain will never negotiate a peace. Bombing Britain is not going to win the war, Germany will need to invade and occupy. And they cannot do this without air superiority.

 

[The Basket]

The war was lost in the USSR not in England. Stalin was Hitlers ally in this time frame. The Germans couldnt invade Britain so it was a bluff.even with air supremacy they simply didnt have the shipping to do it. Plus bad weather and its just gets worse. Raeder was very sure of that

 

[davebender]

Any rationally led nation will negotiate for peace if the cost of peace is less then the cost of continuing the fight.

 

[Shortround6]

Since I am forced to do this the hard way....
Daylight air attacks will take place only over the English Channel. Main air battle will be at night with the intent to close Port of London and Liverpool to British shipping.

Good plan, since the vast majority of over seas shipping is coming into Liverpool closing London does very little.

Purchase Order #1.
Procure 100 Fw-187 long range fighter aircraft per month. As soon as we have two operational and full strength Jagdgeschwader the Luftwaffe can consider daylight bomber raids over England. Otherwise there will be no daylight attacks over England.

There will be NO daylight attacks over England then. There is no production line for the Fw 187. It Generally takes 6 months to a year to go from the 5TH production model to the 500th. and it takes a number of months to go from the initial order to the 5th production model. You would be lucky to have ONE Jagdgeschwader operational until winter/spring.

Purchase Order #2.
Procure 40 long range Fw-200 maritime attack aircraft per month rather then the historical 4. When the Luftwaffe have two operational and full strength Kampfgeschwader they will make a serious dent in British shipping. One Fw-200 KG will operate from Norway. The other Fw200 KG will operate from Cherbourg Peninsula.

Another plan that will take months to see any real effect. While you don't need ten times the factory space to produce ten times the aircraft you are going to need more space and more workers. Of course you could always cancel the aircraft FW was working on at the time to make space and labor available and/or delay their dispersal plan.

Purchase Order #3.
Procure 5,000 aerial mines per month for use against British seaports.

You can order anything you want, doesn't mean you are going to get it. The LMA aerial mine had a 300kg charge and a total weight of 550kg. 750 metric tons of HE per month.

The LMB aerial mine had a charge of 705kg from a total weight of 960KG.

The standard SC-250 contained 125-130kg of explosive. The SD-250 contained 80KG. The SC 500 contained 25--260kg of explosive and the SD-500 (5 models) went from 75 to 180 KG.

Purchase Order #4.
Procure 1,000 F5B aerial torpedoes per month for use against British shipping.

Once again, You can order anything you want, doesn't mean you are going to get it.

A. the F5B torpedo didn't enter service until late 1941.
B. as an indication that even Hitler couldn't get this purchase order fulfilled. In April of 1942 Hitler ordered that development of aerial torpedoes be stepped up by all possible means. Luftwaffe takes over from the Navy and sets a goal of 3000 torpedoes a month by the end of 1943 (18 months away).highest production attained was 700-900 month in the first half of 1944 (almost two years after initial order).

Purchase Order #5.
Procure 2,000 300 liter drop tanks per month. They will extend combat radius and loiter time of our aircraft.

Only one that makes sense except it is too little. You have arranged for 67 drop tanks per day for a 30 day month, Granted the planes cannot fly every day due to weather but you have hundreds of fighters available.

 

[wiking85]

So Shortround, what's your suggestion then?

 

[The Basket]

The Battle of Britain was never planned so you asking for a plan.

Have you thought that there is no actual way the Germans can win in 1940? none at all?

There...the Germans cannot defeat the British in 1940.

 

[stona]

The war was lost in the USSR not in England.

Several German commanders disagreed with this view in their post war debriefings/memoirs.
What they meant was that by failing to remove Britain from the war and thus being forced to fight both the Western Alliance and the Soviet Union they lost the ability to force a decision anywhere.
I do not believe that the Germans had to invade to remove Britain from the war. I don't believe they had the means to do so and neither did they. I agree with Davebender that any rational government can be forced to the negotiationg table. Don't imagine that Churchill and his clique were irremoveable. The coalition was fragile and a major defeat in the BoB would certainly have entailed a change of leadership.There were plenty within the British elite who had wanted a deal with Germany before the war started,they would have been forced to accept one now on less favourable terms.
The perception was that if they could have removed Britain from the war,having already removed France,the US would never have become involved in Europe and Germany would have had a free hand in the East and that they would have prevailed. Ultimately Britain was seen as a potential ally in the war against bolshevism.

Cheers

Steve

 

[The Basket]

Forced to fight? The Germans invaded the USSR!

 

[stona]

Forced to fight? The Germans invaded the USSR!

The objective of the nazis and the reason they went to war was expansion of the Reich in the East. The timing of the attack,initially on Poland (East) was based on economic grounds. This is not the topic of this thread but it had been expressed time and again,both by Hitler and other nazi ideologues from the earliest days of the movement.
Germany was always going to attack the Soviet Union. She was "forced to fight" on two fronts because she had failed to remove Britain from the conflict.
Cheers
Steve

 

[DonL]

The objective of the nazis and the reason they went to war was expansion of the Reich in the East. The timing of the attack,initially on Poland (East) was based on economic grounds. This is not the topic of this thread but it had been expressed time and again,both by Hitler and other nazi ideologues from the earliest days of the movement.
Germany was always going to attack the Soviet Union. She was "forced to fight" on two fronts because she had failed to remove Britain from the conflict.
Cheers
Steve

I agree, but to be fair it was only Hitlers and parts of the Nazis goal to go East and fight the UDSSR.
From a rational viewpoint there was no single reason to invade the UDSSR.

Also I agree to all your statements in this thread, very good summary.

 

[Hop]

As the title says, you are in charge of the Luftwaffe right after the Fall of France, but before the Battle of Britain.
You will have no interference from anyone with your conduct of the air war against Britain; how do you fight the British?

With the advantage of post war hindsight: Begin the Blitz immediately. Forget about daylight attacks. Increase orders for bombers, bombs, and divert more trainees in to bomber schools so that by the end of 1940 the bomber effeort will be growing, not declining. Hope that constant bombing of cities will force the British to accept peace terms.

Without hindsight: pretty much what Goering did. Begin attacks on Britain, see what works. When losses get too great (as they will) switch to night attacks.

There are no easy answers for the Luftwaffe. They simply didn't have enough aircraft or pilots, and the ones they did have didn't have any major advantages over the RAF's. They were always going to lose, no matter what decisions Goering took. They fought over the Channel, German losses were too high. They attacked airfields, German losses were too high. They started bombing London in daylight, German losses were too high. No matter what targets they attacked the RAF were always there in enough strength to inflict unacceptable losses. Only by bombing at night could the Luftwaffe carry out operations with sustainable loss levels.

 

[stona]

I agree, but to be fair it was only Hitlers and parts of the Nazis goal to go East and fight the UDSSR.
From a rational viewpoint there was no single reason to invade the UDSSR.

Also I agree to all your statements in this thread, very good summary.

Thanks Don. My views are not exactly radical,I think it is a fairly mainstream view now that we have the benefit of 70 years of hindsight

As regards attacking the USSR I would suggest that Germany's difficult economic situation,particularly regarding her supply of oil, led to the decision to strike East. The second phase of the invasion,leading to the Crimean campign and ultimately to Stalingrad was driven by economic not military considerations.
For example the Luftwaffe alone had drawn 25% of its oil supply in 1941 from reserves which had fallen from 613,000 tons in 1940 to a mere 254,000 tons.The KM's famous Channel dash consumed 20,000 tons of fuel and on April 1st 1942 the Navy's reserve was only 150,000 tons. Ciano noted in his diary on 8th February 1942 that the Italian Navy was practically immobilised by a lack of fuel. In January 1942 the Italian Navy received only 13,500 tons of the 40,000 tons promised.
I believe that part of the developing conflict between the nazi leadership (particularly Hitler) and the commanders of the Eastern Forces was caused by economic criteria,primarily the need for oil and to a lesser extent Manganese and other vital materials,overiding military and strategic political objectives.Few OKW and OKH officers expressed much doubt about the Caucasian campaign (Fall Blau) nor challenged its feasibility at the time,but they certainly did after things went wrong.
Moscow apparently could wait. It is barely mentioned in "War Directive No.41".

"All available forces are to be assembled for the main operation in the Southern sector,with the objective of destroying the enemy forward of the Don,in order to secure the oil regions of the Caucasus and the passes through the Caucasian range itself."

Now of course we all know that it would end with the disaster at Stalingrad.

Apologies for the diversion,this doesn't have much to do with getting Britain out of the war in 1940

Cheers
Steve

 

[DonL]

As regards attacking the USSR I would suggest that Germany's difficult economic situation,particularly regarding her supply of oil, led to the decision to strike East. The second phase of the invasion,leading to the Crimean campign and ultimately to Stalingrad was driven by economic not military considerations.
For example the Luftwaffe alone had drawn 25% of its oil supply in 1941 from reserves which had fallen from 613,000 tons in 1940 to a mere 254,000 tons.The KM's famous Channel dash consumed 20,000 tons of fuel and on April 1st 1942 the Navy's reserve was only 150,000 tons. Ciano noted in his diary on 8th February 1942 that the Italian Navy was practically immobilised by a lack of fuel. In January 1942 the Italian Navy received only 13,500 tons of the 40,000 tons promised.
I believe that part of the developing conflict between the nazi leadership (particularly Hitler) and the commanders of the Eastern Forces was caused by economic criteria,primarily the need for oil and to a lesser extent Manganese and other vital materials,overiding military and strategic political objectives.Few OKW and OKH officers expressed much doubt about the Caucasian campaign (Fall Blau) nor challenged its feasibility at the time,but they certainly did after things went wrong.
Moscow apparently could wait.
Now of course we all know that it would end with the disaster at Stalingrad.

I agree to most of this statement.
But there are two major issues.

1. The war at the East consumed 80-90% of all oil/fuel out of Rumanias oil fields and other sources, witout this war the reserves and stockpiles would be much higher for the LW, KM and even the italian naval force.
2. To my opinion a clear strategic focal point to Britain, Mediterranean and NA without any war at the East has much more benefits and to my opinion it is more possible to get oil out of such a campaign then out of Barbarossa.

I'm working on a major new thread/post to present my arguments.

But now back to topic and your post Nr.3 had pretty much summed it up for this topic.

 

[wiking85]

Thanks Don. My views are not exactly radical,I think it is a fairly mainstream view now that we have the benefit of 70 years of hindsight

As regards attacking the USSR I would suggest that Germany's difficult economic situation,particularly regarding her supply of oil, led to the decision to strike East. The second phase of the invasion,leading to the Crimean campign and ultimately to Stalingrad was driven by economic not military considerations.
For example the Luftwaffe alone had drawn 25% of its oil supply in 1941 from reserves which had fallen from 613,000 tons in 1940 to a mere 254,000 tons.The KM's famous Channel dash consumed 20,000 tons of fuel and on April 1st 1942 the Navy's reserve was only 150,000 tons. Ciano noted in his diary on 8th February 1942 that the Italian Navy was practically immobilised by a lack of fuel. In January 1942 the Italian Navy received only 13,500 tons of the 40,000 tons promised.
I believe that part of the developing conflict between the nazi leadership (particularly Hitler) and the commanders of the Eastern Forces was caused by economic criteria,primarily the need for oil and to a lesser extent Manganese and other vital materials,overiding military and strategic political objectives.Few OKW and OKH officers expressed much doubt about the Caucasian campaign (Fall Blau) nor challenged its feasibility at the time,but they certainly did after things went wrong.
Moscow apparently could wait. It is barely mentioned in "War Directive No.41".

"All available forces are to be assembled for the main operation in the Southern sector,with the objective of destroying the enemy forward of the Don,in order to secure the oil regions of the Caucasus and the passes through the Caucasian range itself."

Now of course we all know that it would end with the disaster at Stalingrad.

Apologies for the diversion,this doesn't have much to do with getting Britain out of the war in 1940

Cheers
Steve

Germany also captured some 2 million tons of fuel with the Fall of France, so I'm not sure when in 1940 your numbers are taken, nor your 1941 numbers; if anything I think the 600k figure is prior to the Battle of France and the 200k figure after Barbarossa, i.e. in December 1941.

 

[stona]

Germany also captured some 2 million tons of fuel with the Fall of France, so I'm not sure when in 1940 your numbers are taken, nor your 1941 numbers; if anything I think the 600k figure is prior to the Battle of France and the 200k figure after Barbarossa, i.e. in December 1941.

The Luftwaffe figures are from 2 seperate and contemporary German sources. I'm not typing the rather long names full of abbreviations here,so you can choose not to believe me if you wish.
The KM figures are from the minutes of a Fuehrer conference on naval affairs. I doubt that they were giving Hitler the wrong figures.
The Italian figures are from the same source with the comment,as indicated,from Ciano's diary.

The quantity of aviation fuel captured in France was 250,000 tons according to Tugendhat and Hamilton. That was a nice windfall,representing 5 months domestic (German) production.
I don't have a figure for oil as a whole but Germany undoubtedly,as you say,came out of the French campaign with more oil than she went in with

Perspective is required. In the last full year of peace Germany consumed 7,500,000 tons of oil. About a third was produced domestically. The other 5,000,000 tons was imported mostly from Venezuela,Iran and the United States. With the exception of the 461,000 tons from Romania this supply was cut off in September 1939.
Germany imported only 2,075,000 tons in 1940,most came from Romania,1,000,000 tons. A significant 619,600 tons came from the USSR,but that would obviously soon stop. The rest came from other continental European countries.

It must be remembered that after the fall of France,Norway,Denmark,The Low Countries etc Germany had to provide oil to all the occupied territories as well as its own domestic and military consumption. This put a strain on her reserves,not helped in June 1940 when Mussolini declared war on Britain. Italy had virtually no domestic production and the supply from Albania was blocked. She too,like all the occupied territories from Scandinavia to the Spanish border was totally dependent on Germany for oil.

In March 1941 (three months before Barbarossa) General der Infanterie Georg Thomas,head of the War Economy and Armaments Office warned both Goring and Keitel that Germany's reserve stocks of oil would be exhausted by late October 1941. The rest as they say,is history.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Timppa]

Playing the evil Nazi / "Butcher" Harris here:
-Mining all the harbors with the help of the Kriegsmarine to cause famine.
- Using mustard gas/tabun/soman (if available) against cities.
- Using biological weapons, like tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism against the population.

 

[wiking85]

Playing the evil Nazi / "Butcher" Harris here:
-Mining all the harbors with the help of the Kriegsmarine to cause famine.
- Using mustard gas/tabun/soman (if available) against cities.
- Using biological weapons, like tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism against the population.

Germany didn't have a bioweapons program except later in the war and was behind all of her enemies in that research. The USSR and Britain had very advanced and nasty programs; look up operation vegetation to see how the British would have responded to a German first use of gas on them.
I agree that the mining strategy coupled with bombing ports works the best in a conventional sense and avoids the British using anthrax on Germany.

 

[wiking85]

The Luftwaffe figures are from 2 seperate and contemporary German sources. I'm not typing the rather long names full of abbreviations here,so you can choose not to believe me if you wish.
The KM figures are from the minutes of a Fuehrer conference on naval affairs. I doubt that they were giving Hitler the wrong figures.
The Italian figures are from the same source with the comment,as indicated,from Ciano's diary.

The quantity of aviation fuel captured in France was 250,000 tons according to Tugendhat and Hamilton. That was a nice windfall,representing 5 months domestic (German) production.
I don't have a figure for oil as a whole but Germany undoubtedly,as you say,came out of the French campaign with more oil than she went in with

Perspective is required. In the last full year of peace Germany consumed 7,500,000 tons of oil. About a third was produced domestically. The other 5,000,000 tons was imported mostly from Venezuela,Iran and the United States. With the exception of the 461,000 tons from Romania this supply was cut off in September 1939.
Germany imported only 2,075,000 tons in 1940,most came from Romania,1,000,000 tons. A significant 619,600 tons came from the USSR,but that would obviously soon stop. The rest came from other continental European countries.

It must be remembered that after the fall of France,Norway,Denmark,The Low Countries etc Germany had to provide oil to all the occupied territories as well as its own domestic and military consumption. This put a strain on her reserves,not helped in June 1940 when Mussolini declared war on Britain. Italy had virtually no domestic production and the supply from Albania was blocked. She too,like all the occupied territories from Scandinavia to the Spanish border was totally dependent on Germany for oil.

In March 1941 (three months before Barbarossa) General der Infanterie Georg Thomas,head of the War Economy and Armaments Office warned both Goring and Keitel that Germany's reserve stocks of oil would be exhausted by late October 1941. The rest as they say,is history.

Cheers

Steve

Ah, I thought you were talking about overall fuel, not just Avgas. Yes, your numbers are right on target for Avgas. My 2 million figure was for all types of fuels, most of which were not usable for aircraft.

 

[stona]

Ah, I thought you were talking about overall fuel, not just Avgas. Yes, your numbers are right on target for Avgas. My 2 million figure was for all types of fuels, most of which were not usable for aircraft.

Sorry for the confusion. 2 million tons,in the context of a total peacetime (1938 ) consumption is still a lot of oil,which is why I agree that at the end of the French campaign the Germans were,temporarily,better off. I have,but can't seem to locate,the figures for German consumption of oil throughout this early period of the war and it is surprisingly low. I suppose distances were relatively short and a lot of horse power,literally,was used!
Cheers
Steve