You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940

[Shortround6]

It's to be expected the port will need to be reseeded with mines on a weekly basis. As long as the seaport remains closed Germany wins.

try nightly, or at best 3 times a week. The British only have to clear a path 500-1000ft wide. The Germans have to "reseed" with in that width or additional mines are useless. Just to make it interesting the British can also lay out a dogleg approach to the port given enough depth of water so there isn't a 2-3 mile long straightaway to drop the mines into.

Sweeping techniques varied but even the magnetic mine was forseen and provided for including aircraft.

Vickers Wellington DWI

This is not a difficult conversion and the more the Germans rely on mines instead of normal bombs the more effort goes into mine sweeping instead of other weapons.

 

[wiking85]

Britain is an island. It has many ports.

If I had plans to go to war with Britian I would consider that as a navy war. And I would build U-boot not bombers.

In 1940-1 Britain only imported via the Western Ports, because they were the only ones that were not interdicted. The Southern and Eastern ports were too dangerous to use. London, Britain's most active port pre-war, was totally shut down except for local coastal convoys supplying the city with coal. Something like 1 million+ residents had to leave the city to lessen the need for supply via shipping.

But as far as ports went there were only three that could handle sufficient volume coming from overseas AND had a rail link sufficient to handling increased imports:
by descending order of importance they were Liverpool, Glasgow, and Avonmouth/Bristol. Liverpool handled 85% of imports during 1940-1, while Glasgow took in about 12%, with Avonmouth/Bristol the remainder. Closing Liverpool in 1940 via mining or bombing would have been catastrophic to the war effort, as it was the central hub of war shipping, both imports and exports; if it were shut down Glasgow and Avonmouth together could not handle even a fraction of Liverpool's volume. Also the exporting of war materials to the Mediterranean (including Gibraltar), Africa, and the Middle East came from Liverpool.
So if all of the effort to bomb London were instead directed at Liverpool for the period from August 1940-May 1941 Britain very well might have had to leave the war, even excluding mining efforts. Just bombing alone would have seriously disrupted importing and exporting materials, especially food. Liverpool's docks also had a serious flaw in that there was no direct link to the port with a rail line; instead all transport from the warehouses to the rail yards had to be done via truck or horse cart. That means if the roads leading from the warehouses on the docks to the rail lines are blocked by rubble and unexploded ordnance, then the goods are just stacking up on the docks/warehouses. Then they become very good targets for bombers and incendiaries.

 

[Shortround6]

Britain is an island. It has many ports.

If I had plans to go to war with Britian I would consider that as a navy war. And I would build U-boot not bombers.

Subs don't do well in shallow waters. Putting subs just off the ports is a sure way to change the U-boat loss ratio in favor of the British sooner than it did. Increased submarine construction would also be spotted earlier and the British would have spent more money/effort on anti-sub equipment. There was good reason that the U-boats stayed clear of land based air craft when they could.

 

[davebender]

I agree.

Port at War ~ Liverpool 1939-1945 ~ Mersey Docks and Harbour Board
Page 24 of booklet.
26 April to 10 May 1941.
Weekly cargo throughput declined from 181,562 to 35,026 tons.
80% reduction.

Historically Liverpool was heavily bombed for only a single week. Results were dramatic but Germany cannot drive Britain from the war by closing Liverpool for a couple weeks. Liverpool must remain at 20% capacity for several months. That means a sustained night bombing campaign with plenty of sea mines to complete the carnage.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Viking makes a convincing case for a prolonged attack on Liverpool .... but I believe air superiority is the paramount objective.

Taking radar out on the Chanel is critical, The more I think on it the more I am temped to believe that German paratroops and glider troops should have dropped on the sites in the dark taking them and personnel out with demolitions - attempting escape by E-boats by dawn. Losses would be very high naturally - but higher than Crete the following year ..? not necessarily, and, if successful in the campaign to bring England to the peace table via air superiority - there would be no need for Crete at all. Peace Adolphicus would have been achieved ... and Mr. Churchill and the Royal Family would be in exil in Canada.

In the summer of 1940 German comandos and paras were on a roll .... from Holland, to Denmark, to Norway to France they had managed to strike with cunning, preparation and surprise - and succeed. The radar would have been a worthy objective for them, IMHO

MM

 

[wiking85]

Viking makes a convincing case for a prolonged attack on Liverpool .... but I believe air superiority is the paramount objective.

Why is air superiority the paramount objective if Britain could be knocked out with much less cost (in terms of losses) by night bombing of ports like Liverpool?

Liverpool Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Liverpool Blitz was the heavy and sustained bombing of the British city of Liverpool and its surrounding area, at the time mostly within the counties of Lancashire and Cheshire but commonly known as Merseyside, during the Second World War by the German Luftwaffe.

Liverpool, Bootle, and the Wirral were the most heavily bombed areas of the country outside of London,[1] due to their importance to the British war effort. The government was desperate to hide from the Germans just how much damage had been inflicted upon the docks, so reports on the bombing were kept low-key. Around 4,000 people were killed in the Merseyside area during the Blitz.[1] This death toll was second only to London, which suffered 30,000 deaths by the end of the war.

Liverpool, Bootle, and the Wallasey Pool were strategically very important locations during the Second World War. The large port on the River Mersey, on the North West coast of England, had for many years been the United Kingdom's main link with North America, and this would prove to be a key part in the British participation in the Battle of the Atlantic. As well as providing anchorage for naval ships from many nations, the Mersey's ports and dockers would handle over 90 per cent of all the war material brought into Britain from abroad with some 75 million tons passing through its 11 miles (18 km) of quays. Liverpool was the eastern end of a Transatlantic chain of supplies from North America, without which Britain could not have pursued the war.

The May blitz
May 1941 saw a renewal of the air assault on the region; a seven night bombardment that devastated the city.[3] The first bomb landed upon Wallasey, Wirral, at 22:15 on 1 May.[4] The peak of the bombing occurred from 1 – 7 May 1941. It involved 681 Luftwaffe bombers; 2,315 high explosive bombs and 119 other explosives such as incendiaries were dropped. The raids put 69 out of 144 cargo berths out of action and inflicted 2,895 casualties[nb 1] and left many more homeless.

One incident on 3 May involved the SS Malakand, a ship carrying munitions which was berthed in the Huskisson Dock. Although its eventual explosion is often attributed to a burning barrage balloon, this fire was put out. However flames from dock sheds that had been bombed spread to the Malakand, and this fire could not be contained. Despite valiant efforts by the fire brigade to extinguish the flames, they spread to the ship's cargo of 1,000 tons of bombs, which exploded a few hours after raid had ended. The entire Huskisson No. 2 dock and the surrounding quays were destroyed and four people were killed. The explosion was so violent that some pieces of the ship's hull plating were blasted into a park over 1 mile (1.6 km) away. It took seventy-four hours for the fire to burn out.[5]

Bootle, to the north of the city, suffered heavy damage and loss of life.[6] Over 6,500 homes in Liverpool were completely demolished by aerial bombing and a further 190,000 damaged.

The Times on 5 May 1941, carried the following report:" The Germans stated that Saturday night's attack on Liverpool was one of the heaviest ever made by their air force on Britain. Several hundred bombers had been used, visibility was good and docks and industrial works, storehouses and business centres, had been hit. In addition to many smaller fires, one conflagration, it was claimed, was greater than any hitherto observed during a night attack."

Perhaps a firestorm could be created:
Firestorm - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

As Sir Arthur Harris, the officer commanding RAF Bomber Command from 1942 through to the end of the war in Europe, pointed out in his post-war analysis, although many attempts were made to create deliberate man made firestorms during World War II, few attempts succeeded:

"The Germans again and again missed their chance, ...of setting our cities ablaze by a concentrated attack. Coventry was adequately concentrated in point of space, but all the same there was little concentration in point of time, and nothing like the fire tornadoes of Hamburg or Dresden ever occurred in this country. But they did do us enough damage to teach us the principle of concentration, the principle of starting so many fires at the same time that no fire fighting services, however efficiently and quickly they were reinforced by the fire brigades of other towns could get them under control."
—Arthur Harris, [8]

Perhaps if the efforts against London were shifted to Liverpool?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Great_Fire_of_London

Probably the most devastating strike occurred on the evening of 29 December, when German aircraft attacked the City of London itself with incendiary and high explosive bombs, causing a firestorm that has been called the Second Great Fire of London.[112] The first group to use these incendiaries was Kampfgruppe 100 which despatched 10 "pathfinder" He 111s. At 18:17, it released the first of 10,000 fire bombs, eventually amounting to 300 dropped per minute.[113] Altogether, 130 German bombers destroyed the historical centre of London.[114] Civilian casualties on London throughout the Blitz amounted to 28,556 killed, and 25,578 wounded. The Luftwaffe had dropped 18,291 short tons (16,593 t) of bombs.[115]

The "Second Great Fire of London" is a name used at the time to refer to one of the most destructive air raids of the London Blitz, over the night of 29/30 December 1940. Between 6 pm and 6 am the next day, more than 24,000 high explosive bombs and 100,000 incendiary bombs were dropped.[1] The raid and the subsequent fire destroyed many Livery Halls and gutted the medieval Great Hall of the City's Guildhall.

The largest continuous area of Blitz destruction anywhere in Britain occurred on this night, stretching south from Islington to the very edge of St Paul's Churchyard. The area destroyed was greater than that of the Great Fire of London in 1666. The raid was timed to coincide with a particularly low tide on the River Thames, making water difficult to obtain for fire fighting. Over 1500 fires were started, with many joining up to form three major conflagrations which in turn caused a firestorm that spread the flames further, towards St Paul's Cathedral.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz#British_ports

The Luftwaffe could inflict huge damage. With the German occupation of Western Europe, the intensification of submarine and air attack on Britain's sea communications was feared by the British. Such an event would have serious consequences on the future course of the war, should the Germans succeed. Liverpool and its port became an important destination for convoys heading through the Western Approaches from North America, bringing supplies and materials. The considerable rail network distributed to the rest of the country.[130] Operations against Liverpool were successful. Around 75% of the ports capacity was reduced at one point, and it lost 39,126 long tons (39,754 t) of shipping to air attacks, with another 111,601 long tons (113,392 t) damaged. Minister of Home Security Herbert Morrison was also worried morale was breaking, noting the defeatism expressed by civilians.[129] Other sources point to half of the 144 berths rendered unusable, while cargo unloading capability was reduced by 75%. Roads and railways were blocked and ships could not leave harbour. On 8 May 1941, 57 ships were destroyed, sunk or damaged amounting to 80,000 long tons (81,000 t). Around 66,000 houses were destroyed, 77,000 people made homeless, and 1,900 people killed and 1,450 seriously hurt on one night.[131] Operations against London up until May 1941 could also have a severe impact on morale. The populace of the port of Hull became 'trekkers', people who underwent a mass exodus from cities before, during, and after attacks.[129] However, the attacks failed to knock out or damage railways, or port facilities for long, even in the Port of London, a target of many attacks.[39] Port of London in particular was an important target, bringing in one-third of overseas trade.[132]

 

[Shortround6]

It's 179 miles from London to Liverpool. Roughly an hours flying time each way, all over enemy territory. It could be done, it was done. But the losses would be higher than attacking London. The fuel burn would be higher and the bomb loads may (or may not) be smaller.

The Luftwaffe also has to keep up enough diversionary attacks to keep much in the way of reinforcements from going to Liverpool, which would divert some of the effort.

If Liverpool was hit bad enough, the British might have brought ships into the east coast ports, at least on a temporary basis.

Hull suffered as it was: Hull Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Portsmouth was also bombed heavily but as a navel base had some defenses in place.

The Luftwaffe was bombing a number of places besides London. Concentrating on one city leaves too much of the rest of the country alone.

The best and easiest thing would be the wide spread use of drop tanks as soon as possible.

The Luftwaffe has to inflict enough damage on a wide spread part of the country in order to convince the people that they will pay a terrible price if they don't surrender ( and with no TV that means they have to inflict local damage, blowing up stuff 300 miles away isn't going to count) and they have to convince the people in power that they cannot defend the people/cities. Which means they have to at least contest control of the air. Leaving the RAF alone and going over to night bombing early leaves the RAF with little to do except figure out how to make mischief for the Luftwaffe. They will not sit idly by. Increased night patrols? day light raids against Luftwaffe air fields?

 

[wiking85]

It's 179 miles from London to Liverpool. Roughly an hours flying time each way, all over enemy territory. It could be done, it was done. But the losses would be higher than attacking London. The fuel burn would be higher and the bomb loads may (or may not) be smaller.

The Luftwaffe also has to keep up enough diversionary attacks to keep much in the way of reinforcements from going to Liverpool, which would divert some of the effort.

If Liverpool was hit bad enough, the British might have brought ships into the east coast ports, at least on a temporary basis.

Hull suffered as it was: Hull Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Portsmouth was also bombed heavily but as a navel base had some defenses in place.

The Luftwaffe was bombing a number of places besides London. Concentrating on one city leaves too much of the rest of the country alone.

The best and easiest thing would be the wide spread use of drop tanks as soon as possible.

The Luftwaffe has to inflict enough damage on a wide spread part of the country in order to convince the people that they will pay a terrible price if they don't surrender ( and with no TV that means they have to inflict local damage, blowing up stuff 300 miles away isn't going to count) and they have to convince the people in power that they cannot defend the people/cities. Which means they have to at least contest control of the air. Leaving the RAF alone and going over to night bombing early leaves the RAF with little to do except figure out how to make mischief for the Luftwaffe. They will not sit idly by. Increased night patrols? day light raids against Luftwaffe air fields?

The Blitz took place at night; there was very little loss to British defenses at night and the accuracy was surprisingly high. Terror bombing did not work, but starving the people out would, especially in winter, which was very cold in 1940-1. Britain did not produce enough coal to satisfy all of its needs and it had problems moving it around via rail, so needed to use coastal convoys, which were disrupted frequently by German mining, coastal uboats, and S-boats.
You're right that the RAF left to its own devices would get aggressive. But they have the same problem the Luftwaffe did during the day historically: short range for their fighters, which crossing the Channel eats in to, and very vulnerable, slow bombers:

Bristol Blenheim - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Blenheim units operated throughout the battle, often taking heavy casualties, although they were never accorded the publicity of the fighter squadrons.
There were also some missions which produced an almost 100% casualty rate amongst the Blenheims; one such operation was mounted on 13 August 1940 against a Luftwaffe airfield near Aalborg in north-eastern Denmark by 12 aircraft of 82 Squadron. One Blenheim returned early (the pilot was later charged and due to appear before a court martial but was killed on another operation), the other 11, which reached Denmark, were shot down, five by flak and six by Bf 109s.[13]

Remember that the Germans had their own radar systems which were actually better than the British ones in 1940-1; in fact British attempts to bomb Germany during the day were so badly slaughtered because of early radar warning that the British discontinued daylight bombing over Europe in 1939 with some exceptions.

Also what did the British get up to during the Blitz? Not much. They didn't have much in the way of bombers after the losses in France in 1940 as they had only saved their fighters by holding them back. British fighters on their own were pretty much useless on the offensive. Sure they might try and wrest back control of the Channel from the Germans, but that's a fight on equal ground, which the Germans had an advantage on, because of their greater experience and doctrine. Eventually the British would catchup, but it would be at a high cost and do nothing to stem the tide of German bombers crushing their imports.

Speaking of which, the British were already dangerously low in terms of fuels stocks, being down to 3 million tons as of August 1940; they used over 300k per month. The LW was pretty good at hitting British oil refineries and their associated storage tanks, which held much of the British reserves, at night thanks to radio guidance navigation. Britain again had three oil stations that fuel was imported via, with Liverpool again being the most important, especially as it had the majority of storage facilities for reserves once London was unable to import after the Fall of France (too dangerous for tankers).
HyperWar: Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War (UK Civil Series)
Oil: a study of war-time policy and administration - Derek Joseph Payton-Smith - Google Books
According to the British official history of the economics of WW2, the ports and oil stations were seriously vulnerable to interdiction by sustained bombing and Germany missed out on a serious opportunity to cripple Britain by hitting its oil import stations; crushing Liverpool would have been enough, as the other facilities were a fraction of the potential imports that Liverpool processed.

British night fighters were a joke, at no time generating more than 1% of losses of sortees per month: the RAF determined that 4% was the magic number to make bombing too costly for an air force. In fact until April 1941 British night fighters kills were less than aircraft lost to accidents for the Luftwaffe! Even their use of Hurricane fighters as night fighters proved a disaster, as they kept crashing or being shot down by their own AAA, killing more Brits than Germans until April 1941. The British innovated the 'Wilde Sau' tactics the Germans would later rediscover in 1943, with similar problems: they had to operate below cloud cover to attack aircraft backlit by search lights; the Luftwaffe operated above this to avoid AAA fire, meaning often the only aircraft that British AAA saw were the British fighters, which they then targeted! In fact the British AAA claimed more British night fighters until Spring 1941 than they did Luftwaffe aircraft!

Using the historical Blitz as a heuristic, we can see that avoiding daylight combat except over the Channel generates very little trouble for the Germans and very much trouble for the British, who had based their entire defensive strategy on fighting a daylight fighter battle over their own soil. Their production was not geared toward night fighters and they would require many months and the import of lots of US machine tools to build up their night fighter forces; bombing the ports prevents those tools and American aluminum (Britain did not have her own domestic source) from reaching the factories that produced night fighters for Britain. In any event the British did not put together an effective night fighter defense until 1942-3. So Germany has nothing to lose from a night Blitz from August on and everything to gain IF their bombing is properly directed at the critical pressure point, which was Liverpool and to a lesser degree Glasgow and Avonmouth.

 

[bob44]

[QUOTEWhy is air superiority the paramount objective if Britain could be knocked out with much less cost (in terms of losses) by night bombing of ports like Liverpool?

][/QUOTE]

Bombing the enemy does not win wars. The infantry ultimately does. And for a succsessful invasion of Britain, Germany needs air superiority. Same as the Allies needed in Normandy.
All the bombing, alone, against Germany and Japan did not defeat either one. With perhaps the exception of Hiroshima/Nagasaki.
I do not believe the there ever could be a peace between Britain and Hitler at this point of the war.
I remember reading something that Churchill said, his biggest concern during the war was the ships being sunk by Germany's u boats. Perhaps indicating far more involvement by the US then we realize at this time of the war?

 

[Jabberwocky]

In 1940-1 Britain only imported via the Western Ports, because they were the only ones that were not interdicted. The Southern and Eastern ports were too dangerous to use. London, Britain's most active port pre-war, was totally shut down except for local coastal convoys supplying the city with coal. Something like 1 million+ residents had to leave the city to lessen the need for supply via shipping.

London never closed completely as a port during WW2, not even during the BoB or the Blitz. At worst, London's tonnage fell to about 1/4 of pre-war levels, which would imply it still handled 10-12 million tons annually.

Keep in mind though, that UK imports had fallen almost 50% by 1942 and exports were down by about 45%.

 

[N4521U]

I vant Schpitfires!

 

[stona]

The bombing and mining of British ports would be a long term effort,somewhat like the Battle of the Atlantic. It is an effort to starve Britain out of the war. Even completely closing a port like Liverpool for periods won't accomplish this overnight. The British had many other options,don't under estimate their capacity for utilising other facilities to keep some supplies coming in.
You'd imagine that axis forces based in Sicily,60 miles from Malta,an island with only one major port,would have been able to starve her out but they didn't. Noone thought that more than 1/3 of a million troops could be retrieved from the beaches of Dunkirk either.

Many nations have shown themselves able survive blockades (which this is a version of) for extended periods.

Time is something the Germans didn't have. I have already posted their oil situation three months prior to the launch of Barbarossa.To remove Britain from the war in time to proceed unhampered in the East they had to force terms on her by early 1941 at the latest,more practically before the winter weather closed in late 1940. The objective Dowding set himself and Fighter Command before the BoB was to avoid defeat until November 1940. It was by achieving this that he very probably cost Germany the war.

I still believe Germany's best chance was to defeat the RAF with all the consequences that would have had for Britain's coalition government.Another defeat on this scale after the humiliation of Dunkirk would have been disastrous,particularly for Churchill.Churchill's first famous broadcast was on 19th May 1940, I have no difficulty imagining his last,resignation broadcast,being in October.

I also believe that with a few relatively minor tweaks to the Luftwaffe's historical campaign that they could have done it. History is full of "what ifs" and "if onlys".

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

Bombing the enemy does not win wars. The infantry ultimately does. And for a succsessful invasion of Britain, Germany needs air superiority. Same as the Allies needed in Normandy.
All the bombing, alone, against Germany and Japan did not defeat either one. With perhaps the exception of Hiroshima/Nagasaki.
I do not believe the there ever could be a peace between Britain and Hitler at this point of the war.
I remember reading something that Churchill said, his biggest concern during the war was the ships being sunk by Germany's u boats.

You know what also wins wars? Politics. If the Churchill government can be toppled by the public after the war effort falls apart due to the collapse of imports, then the war is won. Britain doesn't need to be conquered, just brought to the table. Just as you say that Churchill was most concerned about shipping, which really means imports, it works to cut those imports at the end destination, just as well as in transit; its just more efficient to strike the port where you can hit both the ships, the goods, and demoralize the locals.

London never closed completely as a port during WW2, not even during the BoB or the Blitz. At worst, London's tonnage fell to about 1/4 of pre-war levels, which would imply it still handled 10-12 million tons annually.

London was not used for international shipping in 1940-1. It was deemed to dangerous and it therefore only took local coastal convoys shipping in coal and food that were loaded at Liverpool. Its shipping was not direct imports, so hitting Liverpool would put a serious dent in London imports.
Liverpool however was much more vulnerable to being bombed, because unlike London, it did not have a direct connection to the rail station with its port and warehouses. Blocking the streets with unexploded ordnance and rubble would prevent the goods being moved to the rails for distribution to the rest of the country. Then with more goods pilling up on the docks/warehouses, they can be destroyed, which forces the British to spend more of their dwindling financial resources rebuying those goods and using their shipping to reimport, making them vulnerable again to Uboats.

Yes Britain was able to eventually work out its rationing system and rationalize imports by 1942; that took time to work out effectively and it was much more costly financially to do so. There is a reason that it primarily happened after Lend-Lease started, because then the British could import finished goods instead of raw materials without worrying about the cost. As it was Britain was pretty much broke in January 1941 from all of the spending they had to do for the war; in March 1941 they had to have the Belgians pay for their imports because they couldn't pay for it anymore.

The bombing and mining of British ports would be a long term effort,somewhat like the Battle of the Atlantic. It is an effort to starve Britain out of the war. Even completely closing a port like Liverpool for periods won't accomplish this overnight. The British had many other options,don't under estimate their capacity for utilising other facilities to keep some supplies coming in.
You'd imagine that axis forces based in Sicily,60 miles from Malta,an island with only one major port,would have been able to starve her out but they didn't. Noone thought that more than 1/3 of a million troops could be retrieved from the beaches of Dunkirk either.

Yes to a degree; Britain was at a very low point in her stocks by July-August 1940, so was especially vulnerable to a coordinated, sustained effort at a trade war. Closing Liverpool at this point (I mean in the sense of badly disrupting shipping like during the May Blitz), a time when Britain had to totally reorient its trade and imports to account for the fact that now southern and eastern ports were shut down to international imports, especially London, would virtually collapse British abilities to import. They were already badly disrupted as it was and the waiting time to offload goods and oil in Liverpool was up to 10 days for things like oil tankers. It was very vulnerable to disruption, which would have shut down the disorganized mess that it was in mid-1940. There were only two other ports that had the ability to import goods and they were even more disorganized that Liverpool with far less capacity to import: Glasgow and Avonmouth/Bristol.
I'm not pulling this out of thin air, this was the conclusion of the British themselves in their official history of the civilian side of the war:
Merchant shipping and the demands of war. (Book, 1955) [WorldCat.org]
Britain did NOT have the ability to shift their shipping. It was one of three ports and Liverpool alone far outstripped the remaining capacity of the other two together to handle the volume necessary to keep Britain in the war.

Remember too that the point isn't to totally collapse British society, which would take more than a year likely, but rather convince the public and politicians to cut a deal, which could happen much more quickly and IMHO be accomplished before May 1941.

Many nations have shown themselves able survive blockades (which this is a version of) for extended periods.

Right, but Britain was very disorganized for one and the Germans never really attempted seriously to blockade Britain in WW2 until 1942. By then it was already far too late and the effort put in was absurdly small. Its also not about 'surviving', but about politics; if there is little hope of changing the negative dynamics developing, its very likely for the Churchill government will fall and whomever replaces him will cut a deal. That is all Germany needs/wants: convince Britain to deal. Hitler did not want to crush the British at this point, he wanted to deal and have a free hand to fight the USSR.

Time is something the Germans didn't have. I have already posted their oil situation three months prior to the launch of Barbarossa.To remove Britain from the war in time to proceed unhampered in the East they had to force terms on her by early 1941 at the latest,more practically before the winter weather closed in late 1940. The objective Dowding set himself and Fighter Command before the BoB was to avoid defeat until November 1940. It was by achieving this that he very probably cost Germany the war.

Depending on the dynamics, it can very easily be the British who don't have time. Germany at least has the Romanians and Soviets supplying them to help get around the import problem; the Spanish were also helping the Germans transship goods; the British are far more vulnerable to having their imports disrupted, because they didn't have domestic sources of supply. Everything for the British had to be brought in via overseas shipping, so if that shipping/importing could be disrupted even for a long enough period, politically it because impossible for the British to stay in the war. Dowding set November as an objective, because then they knew there would be no Sealion if the Germans were held off until then; here the situation is much different, because if the Germans had been bombing Liverpool at night from August with over 1000 bombers rotating in (not at once) night after night, by November Britain would be extremely desperate because they would have some very serious shortages of war materials.

BTW I screwed up earlier when I said the British consumed 300k of fuel a month, that was actually the weekly consumption. So in August 1940 they had 10 weeks of fuel. Bombing would disrupt import of fuel, as Liverpool was the main oil station left to import that. So if the RAF and RN are short of fuel, they won't be able to fight and stop the Germans...which means a political deal is on the horizon. The British had no idea of German fuel issues, just that the Soviets were supplying the Germans. Also the Germans have the benefit of knowing if Britain is knocked out of the war, then they can start importing fuel from overseas again, offsetting whatever the fuel spent knocking out Britain.

I still believe Germany's best chance was to defeat the RAF with all the consequences that would have had for Britain's coalition government.Another defeat on this scale after the humiliation of Dunkirk would have been disastrous,particularly for Churchill.Churchill's first famous broadcast was on 19th May 1940, I have no difficulty imagining his last,resignation broadcast,being in October.

I disagree for all of the above reasons. I don't think Britain was beatable even if they had to withdraw from some of their southern airfields. The Radar stations were too hard to knock out and keep out of service, especially thanks to the mobile radar stations that could be brought in to plug the holes in coverage.

I also believe that with a few relatively minor tweaks to the Luftwaffe's historical campaign that they could have done it. History is full of "what ifs" and "if onlys".

Cheers

Steve

We agree that changes were needed and Britain was certainly beatable. I just think that the RAF was too strong to beat during the day, so it would cost far too much to achieve a 'victory' during the day, which IMHO was not possible even if the RAF had to abandon their forward airfields. Also the lack of sufficient long range escorts like the Fw187 made it just that much more difficult. Having a night campaign against British imports could cost Germany a fraction of the casualties and cut off the flood of British weapons at the source.

 

[DonL]

You'd imagine that axis forces based in Sicily,60 miles from Malta,an island with only one major port,would have been able to starve her out but they didn't. Noone thought that more than 1/3 of a million troops could be retrieved from the beaches of Dunkirk either.

Stona I didn't disagree to your post.
I'm with you with the concentration and the defeat of the RAF.

But your above statements are little "confusing" without the circumstances.
Malta was starved out, the people were rebelling against the government since April 1940 through starving and Malta could only be again provided (June 1940) since the X Fliegerkorps was alone at the whole Mediterranean area and the other units were at the East to fight Barbarossa. Without Barbarossa it is near fact that Malta would be starved out.
I think this major circumstances should be known.

Also Dunkirk had his circumstances!
Guderian was on the short leash, through totaly stupid orders from Hitler and the OKW, without this orders and a Guderian without a leash, there would be no successful Dunkirk for the british troops.
And Goering totaly over estimated the potential of the LW against ships (at this timeline), because this was a whole new duty for major parts of the LW and at the time from Dunkirk the LW wasn't that sophisticated at anti ship performance. It needs a little time to train a new duty.

 

[wiking85]

Stona I didn't disagree to your post.
I'm with you with the concentration and the defeat of the RAF.

But your above statements are little "confusing" without the circumstances.
Malta was starved out, the people were rebelling against the government since April 1940 through starving and Malta could only be again provided (June 1940) since the X Fliegerkorps was alone at the whole Mediterranean area and the other units were at the East to fight Barbarossa. Without Barbarossa it is near fact that Malta would be starved out.
I think this major circumstances should be known.

Also Dunkirk had his circumstances!
Guderian was on the short leash, through totaly stupid orders from Hitler and the OKW, without this orders and a Guderian without a leash, there would be no successful Dunkirk for the british troops.
And Goering was totaly over estimate the potential of the LW against ships, because this was a whole new duty for major parts of the LW and at the time from Dunkirk the LW wasn't that sophisticated at anti ship performance. It needs a little time to train a new duty.

Of course if Germany had waited to use their magnetic trigger naval mines until the Battle of France, they could have used a couple hundred mines and prevented the Dunkirk evacuation.

 

[DonL]

That is not necessary.

Guderian had his panzer troops at starting position to do the final knock against the troops of Dunkirk, long before any fleet was organized or on the way from Britain. But Hitler took him on the short leash and forbid the last knock.

There were some very loud and heavy words at the german OKW, OKH and the Heeregruppe Rundstedt and Guderian smashed his commando to the feets of General Kleist, only Rundstedt could do an intervention and could convince Guderian to take his commando back.
Dunkirk was the first real crises between parts of the leading Generals of the Wehrmacht and the OKW/Hitler.

 

[stona]

Malta was starved out, the people were rebelling against the government since April 1940 through starving and Malta could only be again provided (June 1940) since the X Fliegerkorps was alone at the whole Mediterranean area and the other units were at the East to fight Barbarossa. Without Barbarossa it is near fact that Malta would be starved out.
I think this major circumstances should be known.

Also Dunkirk had his circumstances!
Guderian was on the short leash, through totaly stupid orders from Hitler and the OKW, without this orders and a Guderian without a leash, there would be no successful Dunkirk for the british troops.
And Goering totaly over estimated the potential of the LW against ships (at this timeline), because this was a whole new duty for major parts of the LW and at the time from Dunkirk the LW wasn't that sophisticated at anti ship performance. It needs a little time to train a new duty.

Yes Don, but Malta was not subdued. It remained a thorn in the side of the Axis in the mediterranean and had a profound influence of the outcome in North Africa. This was a trend in the German execution of the war.
When they had a chance to invade Malta they didn't because as you correctly say other campaigns were given priority. The Italians also proved a liability....again.
When they had a chance to drive on Moscow it was deemed more important to clear the Crimea and push into the Caucasus.
There are many similar examples,leaving Britain in the war when I think most agree there was a real chance of forcing her out may have been the biggest blunder of all. We may disagree about exactly how Britain might have been forced into some kind of compromise peace,but it was possible.
The nazi political leadership and the OKH/OKW simply dropped the ball more often than their opponents.

As for Dunkirk,you are absolutely right. I have no idea what the Germans were thinking and I don't think they did either. There was a staggering lack of coordination and muddled objectives which really let the British (and to a lesser extent the French) off the hook. When you've got your man down,kick him to death.

Goering always over estimated the abilities of the Luftwaffe,he was at least consistent in that

Cheers

Steve

 

[Hop]

The Blitz took place at night; there was very little loss to British defenses at night

Certainly in the early stages of the Blitz, but by 1941 British night fighters were starting to overcome the problems with their radar. In the first week of May they shot down 38 German bombers over Britain. The long flights to Liverpool provided the RAF with plenty of opportunity for interception.

and the accuracy was surprisingly high.

Accuracy was rarely good. In the first large scale attack on a British city in late August 1940, the Luftwaffe claimed to have dropped several hundred tons on Liverpool. British records describe scattered attacks on the West Midlands, with no idea that the Luftwaffe had been attacking Liverpool.

Accuracy was best in coastal cities close to the continent. The longer the flight, the lower the accuracy.

Britain did not produce enough coal to satisfy all of its needs

Britain produced far more coal than it needed. France was the main export destination, when France surrendered Britain was left with more coal than was needed, and miners were allowed to join the armed forces.

Speaking of which, the British were already dangerously low in terms of fuels stocks, being down to 3 million tons as of August 1940; they used over 300k per month

Stocks of fuel and lubricants in the UK in August 1940 were 6,226,000 tons (source, war cabinet papers, oil report August 1940). Consumption was around 900,000 tons per month, imports around 1,000,000 tons.

To put the figures in perspective, the UK had stocks of 3,400,000 tons of petrol and diesel in August 1940. In May 1940 the Germans had stocks of less than 1 million tons. By June the addition of captured French stocks had increased the German total to about 1.5 million tons. That was the best position Germany achieved during the war. By the end of 1941 they were down to around 800,000 tons.

In other words, British stocks were more than adequate. By November the Air Ministry was sounding apologetic about the amount of aviation fuel they had in storage, pointing out that it would be worth a lot of money on the civil market when the war ended.

The LW was pretty good at hitting British oil refineries and their associated storage tanks, which held much of the British reserves, at night thanks to radio guidance navigation.

From the report, covering August:

During the month bombs fell on ten oil installations and depots, but at one only, the Admiralty depot at Pembroke, was there serious damage.

September:

Enemy activity against oil installations and depots
increased during the month and substantial damage was done
at some of these particularly in the Thames Estuary.

The total quantity of oil lost during the month was
76,500 tons at civil installations.

October:

The damage during October was much less than during September.

(the total was about 5,500 tons)

November:

In spite of the intensive raids on several provincial towns
which occurred during the month, damage to Civil oil installations
was slight. There was, however, a serious fire at the Admiralty
oil fuel depot at TURNCHAPEL, PLYMOUTH, on 28th November, which
lasted for four days and resulted in the loss of approximately
15,500 tons of oil.

December:

During the month a considerable number of incendiary bombs fell on oil installations and depots, but the damage done was slight.

(total from the summaries about 5 - 6,000 tons lost)

Bombing was a game of move and counter move. The Germans bombed the ports closest to France, the British moved shipping to the west coast. It created disruption at first, then the position improved. The Germans targeted oil installations, the British built blast and splinter proof tanks. The Luftwaffe did little damage to oil supplies after that.

What effect did the large Luftwaffe attack on Liverpool in early May 1941 have on the UK oil position? From the May oil report:

A few incidents occurred during the month, but fortunately
they were of a relatively minor character. During the raid on
Manchester, on the night of 7th/8th May, damage was sustained to
various installations at Barton where 9 tanks were badly damaged
or destroyed, and certain lubricating oil plants suffered
considerably. Losses of oil during the period under review were
inconsiderable.

Imports for May were 1,052,400 tons, up from 966,300 tons in April.

Using the historical Blitz as a heuristic, we can see that avoiding daylight combat except over the Channel generates very little trouble for the Germans and very much trouble for the British, who had based their entire defensive strategy on fighting a daylight fighter battle over their own soil.

This is true, but for every problem there is a counter. The fundamental fact is the Luftwaffe was incapable of delivering the tonnage required to force Britain to surrender. Hindsight would allow them to improve their showing, but still wouldn't be enough to deliver victory.

Their production was not geared toward night fighters and they would require many months and the import of lots of US machine tools to build up their night fighter forces

The problem wasn't so much a lack of night fighters, it was getting their on board radar to work effectively.

 

[wiking85]

Certainly in the early stages of the Blitz, but by 1941 British night fighters were starting to overcome the problems with their radar. In the first week of May they shot down 38 German bombers over Britain. The long flights to Liverpool provided the RAF with plenty of opportunity for interception.

38 Bombers was 1% of sortees in May. It also took from September 1939, when night operations over Britain started, until May 1941 to achieve a night fighter kill ratio of 1%. That was far below expansion rate for the LW.

Accuracy was rarely good. In the first large scale attack on a British city in late August 1940, the Luftwaffe claimed to have dropped several hundred tons on Liverpool. British records describe scattered attacks on the West Midlands, with no idea that the Luftwaffe had been attacking Liverpool.

Not all raids were highly successful, but on balance Liverpool was hit pretty badly during the Blitz, which itself was a fraction of the bombing London received. They certainly learned after their first deep raid how to improve accuracy, especially when KG100 showed up, which wasn't until August 24th. It had been misused as a naval bombing unit in Norway until then, when it could have been leading pathfinding missions; once they did accuracy went up markedly.

Accuracy was best in coastal cities close to the continent. The longer the flight, the lower the accuracy.

Sure, but radio navigation certainly helped once KG100 showed up. Conventry, a non-coastal city pretty far north of London was very accurately bombed. Manchester too.

Britain produced far more coal than it needed. France was the main export destination, when France surrendered Britain was left with more coal than was needed, and miners were allowed to join the armed forces.

Sourcing on that? The UK Civil Series states that production was 18 million tons and Britain consumed 20 million, so needed to import 2 million tons of coal from abroad.

German radar was not better, there was also a shortage of sets and a lack of an integrated defence network.

It was more accurate than Chain Home sets. Germany lacked a command and control system like the Dowding system, which hampered efficiency, but the readings the German sets of 1940-1 gave were more accurate than the British Chain Home system.

Stocks of fuel and lubricants in the UK in August 1940 were 6,226,000 tons (source, war cabinet papers, oil report August 1940). Consumption was around 900,000 tons per month, imports around 1,000,000 tons.

How much of that was lubricants? Later you claim there were 3,400,000 tons of fuel, which is pretty close to my number. Imports were lower than 1 million in August 1940. They did rapidly climb to that number once shipping had be reorganized, but it took considerable effort and wasn't seriously hampered by German bombs until the problems in organization were worked out.

To put the figures in perspective, the UK had stocks of 3,400,000 tons of petrol and diesel in August 1940. In May 1940 the Germans had stocks of less than 1 million tons. By June the addition of captured French stocks had increased the German total to about 1.5 million tons. That was the best position Germany achieved during the war. By the end of 1941 they were down to around 800,000 tons.

Germany also had supply from domestic production, Russia, and Romania. Britain had to ship theirs in, as they were totally dependent on outside oil. There were three oil stations handling that import: Liverpool (Ellesmere, which supplied Stanlow), Glasgow, and Avonmouth. They were targetable in August 1940 especially when there was a ten day wait to unload at Ellesmere, which was a ripe target if KG100 had led a raid in August on Liverpool.

What effect did the large Luftwaffe attack on Liverpool in early May 1941 have on the UK oil position? From the May oil report:

Oil imports would have been higher had the attacks not been launched, but that was a fraction of the pressure that could have and should have been brought to bear in August 1940. By May 1941 most of the organizational problems at the port had been worked out, but in August 1940 there was mass congestion and long wait times to unload, which a well led mass raid by LW pathfinders and sustained bombing could have turned into a mess.

The problem wasn't so much a lack of night fighters, it was getting their on board radar to work effectively.

No it was both. The Beaufighter wasn't really available in numbers until 1941 and the Blenheim couldn't even catch up to the German bombers. Night fighter training was very minimal for most units being used (including the hurricane fighters switched from day duty), and only a few had specialized training. Part of the problem was lack of aircraft, lack of training, lack of proper aircraft, lack of experience, and lack of an effective AI radar.

 

[stona]

The ability of the Luftwaffe to actually hit and destroy the docks of Liverpool is being over estimated.

In August 1940 there were raids on 9,10,17,28,29,30 and 31. Bombs dropped across the entire Liverpool area. On only two occassions were the docks or their facilities hit. On the 17th Queen's Dock was damaged and on 31st warehouses in Stone Street and Vandries Street were hit.

In September there were raids on 3/4/5/6/10/11/12/14/15/16/17/18/19/21/24/26/27 and 29. The docks or warehouses were damaged on the 14th by a nuisance raid,only one aircraft was reported. On the 21st warehouses at Alexandra docks were set ablaze.
Now the Luftwaffe's luck changes. On the 24th Liverpool city centre and the docklands are hit. Parker Street, Clayton Square, Church Street, Great Howard Street and Love Lane recieve hits. The Stanley Tobacco Warehouse, Silcocks Cattle Foodmill and a Cotton Warehouse on Glegg Street are damaged in the raid. On the 26th Wapping, Kings, Queens, Coburg and Brunswick Docks are hit hard with many warehouses alongside them ablaze. The Dock Board and Cunard Buildings are damaged. On the 29th a grain warehouse at Duke's dock was destroyed.

October the luftwaffe visits on 7/10/11/12/13/14/16/17/18/19/21/25/26/27/29. On the 11th the North Docks were damaged,particularly Alexandra and Langton docks. The Luftwaffe then bombed just about everything except the docks until the 29th when Queen's Dock was set afire again.

The Luftwaffe has missed its chance. Anyone familiar with the sort of weather prevalent in the winter months in the British Isles will understand why. In November the Luftwaffe does attempt some raids on 1/4/8/12/18/22/28/29. Only on the night of the 28th are the docks hit. A large fire is started in sheds at Queen's Dock. Tragically an Auxiliary Fire Service post in the dock is hit,killing three firemen.

In December nothing happens until what scousers call "the Christmas blitz". On three successive nights on 20/21/22 December there were heavy raids.
On 20th Bombs fall across the docklands area. In the worst incident A parachute mine lands at Waterloo Dock killing 9 people.
On 21st,in what is considered the heaviest raid of all,Canada, Gladstone, Brocklebank, Princes, Wapping, King's and Carriers Docks all bombed.
On 22nd Canada, Huskisson and Alexandra Docks bombed.

These three nights caused more damage to Liverpool's docks than all the previous raids. It was too little and too late. The Luftwaffe failed to come back to finish the job.
The question is what would have happened if these raids had taken place months earlier and then been repeated over a significant period? I don't think that the Luftwaffe had the ability to do it. Would it have been worth a try? Absolutely yes.

Cheers

Steve