1930's Japanese Navy - What would you have done differently?

[Garyt]

But even high tensile steel is much less resistant to penetration than real armor.

It's not as much of a difference compared to steel armor. I would think you are familiar with Nathan Okun's work, probably the best work out there on naval armor penetration? Here is the number he gives for high tensile steel, commonly used in naval ship's hulls:

AVERAGE HIGH-TENSILE CONSTRUCTION AND LIGHT ARMOR STEEL (HT/HTS)
USAGE: Ship construction, light armor, "Protective decks," and anti-torpedo bulkheads.
AVERAGE QUALITY: Estimates: 1895 = 0.8, Post-World War I = 0.85 (when hit by projectiles up to 8", dropping off slowly and steadily when hit by projectiles above this size at a rate equal to German Ww)

That's 85% of class A armor, which comes in at 1.0 the best US armor available. Japanese armors don't even receive a full 1.0.


So while not as tough as armor grade face hardened steel, it works pretty well. And ironically perhaps, it works it's best on shells of 8" or under. It's really not designed nor does it function well against battleship sized shells.

The extra range was pretty much an illusion unless you can find combat reports of destroyers actually hitting at 12,000 meters and above.

Again, it's not as much about extreme range as it is the inherent accuracy at shorter ranges. Even at 5,000 meters, a 5"/50 is going to have a flatter trajectory than a 5'/40 round, making it more accurate.

For example, I'm sure the MK108 cannon has a range far outside it's effective range, but even at half of it's effective range it is inherently less accurate than a Mk103 30mm cannon for instance.

 

[parsifal]

Accuracy is an issue, but by far the most important factor was rof. And rof had not much to do with the hardware. US DDs in theory had a clear advantage in their rofs, but often were just milling about not knowing whether to open fire or not. Hesitation is what causes fire rates to vary, not much to do with the gun (or the mounting) itself. If the hardware was an issue, the dominant effect was the ready use supply of ammunition rather than the rate they could be put into the breech. In that regard, it would be interesting to know how fast the 5/38 actually was on a sustained basis, say over 300 rounds, compared to the 5/50. I would hazard a guess and say...not much faster.

5000 yds is actually a fairly long range for a night engagement. They might get down to 2 or 3000 sometimes even less. Day engagements you could count on one hand just about. at that range it was how fast you could fire, and how well your team could work together without having to constantly re-assure each other

 

[Garyt]

Accuracy is an issue, but by far the most important factor was rof.

Again, really does not have much of an effect on surface to surface combat.

ROF again is misleading. The question is simple, is the rate of fire quick enough to reload by the time the round gets to the target. The answer is yes in the case of the 5"/50.

It's really rather simple. You fire rounds for a straddle. Until you straddle the target, you are waiting for a round to splash before firing another. Once you straddle the target some aspects of a superior rate of fire can come into play, but if you again miss you are trying to correct your fire, again requiring time for the shell to hit and then see the splash. If and at what range manual corrections actually work as opposed to looking for the splash I do not know. Another issue is that rate of fire with naval cannon is not proportional to the amount of hits. Mount dispersion is the culprit here.

EDIT:

At 2-3000 meters or yards, we are looking about 3-4 seconds to impact, which would require a 15-20 rounds per minute to maximize IF there were no adjustments after each hit or miss. I'd think you would have to allow at least a few seconds to make adjustments, which may put is in that 10 round rate. If no adjustments need to be made, we might be at that 15 or so rate per minute.

In that regard, it would be interesting to know how fast the 5/38 actually was on a sustained basis, say over 300 rounds, compared to the 5/50. I would hazard a guess and say...not much faster.

I think crew fatigue would be the biggest issue here. And without a power rammer, I would think the Japanese would fatigue faster.

Of course, 300 rounds is a lot, I think the standard destroyer carried in the 200-400 range per gun, so you might be looking at exhausting the boats entire main armament ammo supply.

 

[parsifal]

what you are describing regardimg fall of shot is very true for day engagements, but far less so at night. It did happen, and often enough to matter, but also, there were occasions when observation of the shot fall was not possible. As often as not the fight was a blindfire exercise. Sometimes its just a matter of assessing the range speed bearing and course of the target, firing off 10 rounds or so, observing if there were any results, adjusting the bearing and ranges for your guns and doing it all again. The Japanese would often use searchlights to locate and range a target, but searchlights would rapidly lose effect in a smoke filled battlefield and of course made that ship a target.

Of course, 300 rounds is a lot, I think the standard destroyer carried in the 200-400 range per gun, so you might be looking at exhausting the boats entire main armament ammo supply.

Happened a lot actually

 

[Garyt]

but also, there were occasions when observation of the shot fall was not possible. As often as not the fight was a blindfire exercise. Sometimes its just a matter of assessing the range speed bearing and course of the target, firing off 10 rounds or so, observing if there were any results, adjusting the bearing and ranges for your guns and doing it all again.

I'd think also that at close enough ranges during the day this would be the case too. Though I'd think for this to make any sense during the day you would have to be at a kilometer or less (preferably less), and/or ave very obscured vision. Heck, to maker it intact to that close of range there would probably need to be somewhat obscured vision in the first place.

One amazing thing though to me is Yamato's hit or damaging near miss if you prefer at 34,000 yards on the Gambier Bay. And this was done with both parties on the move strictly with optics, no radar. I think the Japanese fire control is not often given the credit that it should get. Their optics were the best in the world, and optics during the daytime were a match for radar. BTW, many of the companies that worked on optics for Japans Navy such as Nikon would go on to gain a large market share of the camera industry after the war.

 

[Shortround6]

Actually rate of fire was fairly important.
Depending on weather and ships rolling a high rate of fire gave you more firing opportunities. Ships tried to fire at the same point in the roll for consistency. Period of roll rarely matched the rate of fire.
More importantly, once the range was found at the low rate of fire, waiting for the salvo to land before firing the next one, the rate of fire would be increased. Aside from trying to smother the enemy before he hit you, this gave a faster "data" stream on the range or range change. If the enemy dodged a salvo after the last full time of flight time period he had that much longer to keep dodging until the next one arrived. With faster salvos the range data gets updated quicker and the 'miss' distance is less.

Large danger spaces worked pretty well at short distances and were a big help to guns in local control. Once range data was coming from a range finder on a gun director the 'flatness' of trajectory became somewhat less important. At longer ranges where the angle of decent was around 45 degrees (or above) the deck of the ship was a bigger target than the side.

 

[Garyt]

Actually rate of fire was fairly important.

I was speaking to someone who's had some experience (3rd hand actually) on a destroyer in WW2, and said if they were at a range of 5000 yards, they would be in rapid fire mode not waiting for splashes.

I had also read (forget where, might be Larry Bond) that rate of fire is not proportionate to hits, they greater the rate of fire the lower the accuracy.

A light bulb then kind of went off.

Let's say we have a US and Japanese destroyer exchanging fire at 5000 yards, and the US destroyer base ring mount with internal hoist giving the higher rate of fire (interestingly enough, sometimes a destroyer would have both types of mounts.

The US Vessel can fire a round every 3-4 seconds, the Japanese every 6 seconds. The rounds are airborne for about 8 seconds. The US destroyer fires at it's maximum rate, allowing little time to adjust fire. The Japanese destroyer fires either every 6, or waits for the splash and is firing maybe every 10 seconds.

While the US destroyer may pump out 19 rounds to the Japanese guns 10, the hits obtained will be much closer.

 

[Garyt]

Dupe post

 

[Glider]

More important than ROF was who hit first. Once you have a straddle then go to high ROF, if you don't do that then all you are doing is spraying shells around at least as importantly tiring out the gun crews.

 

[Garyt]

More important than ROF was who hit first. Once you have a straddle then go to high ROF, if you don't do that then all you are doing is spraying shells around at least as importantly tiring out the gun crews.

Very true, the initial staddle is indeed important. But we also have to realize these are not stagnant objects - you have a firing ship moving at 20 knots+ and a target ship moving at 20 knots +, one or both of who may be moving evasively.

With two objects moving at 25 knots each somewhat towards each other, the targets relative position moves roughly 85 feet per second. Even on a rapid firing 5 inch (20 rounds per minute) that is 250 feet between each round.

 

[Shortround6]

Which is a good reason why once they found the range, or got close, they fired at a pretty quick pace and didn't tie the rate of fire to the time of flight. They wanted fast feedback/updates on the firing solution.

 

[Garyt]

Which is a good reason why once they found the range, or got close, they fired at a pretty quick pace and didn't tie the rate of fire to the time of flight. They wanted fast feedback/updates on the firing solution.

Problem is here that by the time they can look at where round 1 hit and how it needs to be adjusted, rounds two and 3 will have already been fired. SO you are in essence firing 3 rounds, adjust, repeat. I can't see in a combat situation where they will be able to keep which rounds are hitting/missing seperate. Kind of like hosing down a target.

And yes, the rate of fire will be higher (maybe with a US 5"/38 2x that of a Japanese 5"/50), but you are also going to have a lot more misses. How many is hard to say, but you are certainly not getting 2x the hits on average.

It would be interesting to see any info that references accuracy at a given rate of fire and how it changes according to rate of fire. I remember reading that it's certainly not straight line when comparing rate of fire to hits, but I forgot where I read this.

 

[parsifal]

These are some basic stats on battles. If you look at a few of them, it will be seen that the gun crews had to be firing more or less flat out to achieve the expenditures they did. On the basis of the statistics...rof is far more important than waiting for accuracy

This might take several posts

Italian theatre
On 28th June 1940 RN needed nearly 5000 x 6" shells to sink one Italian Destroyer

At Calabria [July 6th 1940] reportedly 923 x 6" shells from two British CL = 1 hit. In a long-range battleship duel 335 big gun shells produced only one hit and 5 near misses, while the 12th Italian destroyer squadron expended 400 shells without any hits.

Cape Spada [July 19th 1940] 1300 British 6" shells produced 5 hits; while 500 x Italian 6" shells yielded one hit.

At Cape Passero [12th Oct 1940] the British Cruiser HMS Ajax unleashed 490 x 6" shells getting between 8-10 hits on the Italian T-boats DD in the rather one sided short-range night ambush.

Long-range duels at Cape Spartivento [27th Nov 1940] reportedly 666 Italian Cruiser shells resulted in only 2 hits while 4 British Cruisers obtained two 6" shell hits after "expending their typical prodigious quantities of 6-inch shells,"

Pantelleria 10th January 1941; The HMS Jaguar expended 94 shells and " closed to within three hundred yards and raked the helpless torpedo boat, igniting fires along her entire length". Meanwhile the HMS Bonaventure expended 600 x 5.25 " shells without any results.

14th June 1940 RN destroyers required 700 shells to sink an Italian sub that could not submerge due to toxic gases.

Off Harmil Island Oct 20-21 1940, RN cruiser HMS Leander plus the destroyer HMS Kingston required 129 x 6" shells plus 693 x 4.7" Shells to sink the Italian Destroyer Nullo.

RN attack on Tripoli harbor sunk 3 small merchant ships [1500-2700 tons] with 478 x 15" shells plus 1500 x 6"/4.7" shells.

June 9th 1941 HMS Jackal expended 611 x 4.7" shells and achieved 1 hit and 1 near miss on the French Destroyer Leader Guepard, which was able to land a 5.45" shell hit on HMS Jackal in return [no mention of ammo expended].

Nov 9th 1941.An Italian escort of a dozen cruisers and destroyers fumbled around blind while a well lead RN squadron of four radar equipped destroyers and Cruisers shot up and massacred a convoy of 7 German ships. Contrasting the achievements, two Italian CA got one near miss after expending 207 x 8" shells and 82 x 3.9" shells. British were short on ammo at Malta, but as example one of the two RN cruisers expended 259 x 6" shells. No info on just how many hits these RN warships attained, however they managed to sink all 7 of the merchant ships plus a destroyer and damaged 4 more destroyers. Clearly a good day for the British and a bad day for the Axis. One of the most basic lessons of modern naval warfare is demonstrated in this action. Superior training and leaderships trumps numbers and potential firepower any day of the week.

Maritza convoy was attacked 24th Nov 1941; two Italian torpedo boats expended 304 x 3.9" shells and just got a near miss.

Second Battle of Sirte, 22 March 1942 fought in rough seas with gale force winds, 1492 Italian shells produced two confirmed 6" shell hits causing major damage on two destroyers plus 4 near misses with 15" Shells caused light damaged on 4 RN warships. The RN responded with 1600 shells from the Cruisers and 1300 from the destroyers and netted only on hit.

During Pantelleria June 15th 1942, two Italian Cruisers fired an estimated 800 x 6" Shells and obtained 14 hits.

During the Battles of Oran 8-9th Nov 1942, the French Destroyer Leader Typhon expended 220 x 5.1" shells and got a single hit, while the British Cruiser HMS Jamaica got only one hit with 501 shells. Another British Cruiser in this same battle got 6-8 hits but no info on the number of shells fired [could be similar?].

In the Messina convoy battle June 2nd 1943, the HMS Jervis got two hits on 142 x 4.7" shells expended.

16 battle actions summarizing 13224 shells of 4"–15" guns obtained 43 hits and 7 near misses and 8708 shells to sink 10 merchants + 2DD + TB+ Sub

Battleship fired 813 shells produced one hit and 5 near miss
Cruiser fired 8941 shells produced 37 hits
Destroyer fired 3677shells produced 5 hits and 2 near misses.

Italian warships fired 4856 shells and got 19 hits and two near misses.255:1
British warships fired 8364 shells and got 23 hits and five near misses.363:1
French warships fired 220 shells and got one hit. 220:1
Unfortunately the British are not forthcoming with much of their ammo expenditure info so some of their best battles have to be left out. Which is probably for the better since they would just skew the data. Most of these best battles were ambushes set up with Enigma information and exploiting the lack of Italian Radar to ambush at close quarters at night by Radar equipped RN warships. You can see the effects since these actions usually start when the Italians finally detect the British ships at just a few kms range.

 

[Shortround6]

If you are using director control you are not "hosing down a target" you are firing salvos. All shells fired together and all shells landing together (or with in a fraction of a second). This means that your salvo rate is tied to your slowest gun/crew. Any fire control officer worth his stripe/s should be able to figure out which salvo is which.

 

[parsifal]

Japanese vs Allies. (Part I of II)
Balikpapan 24th Jan 1942 ; USN got 3 hits with 25 torps.

Badung Strait 19-20th Feb 1942; IJN got 9 hits with 662 x 5" shells

Battle of Java Sea, 27th Feb 1942 IJN got ;
1619 x 8" shells = 5 hits
221 x 5.5" shells= no hits
515 x 5" shells = no hits
153 x LL Torps = 3 hits.

Bali Strait 1st March 1942 USN; John D Edwards expended 240 shells with no hits.

Borneo Battle 1st March 1942, USN DD expended 345 x 4" shells without any hits. IJN expended 1171 x 8" shells and 1479 x 5" shells plus 25 torps to sink the crippled cruiser HMS Exeter and two DD escorts.

1st March 1942, a USN DD was sunk in a battle with two IJN Battleships plus a pair of heavy cruisers. To sink this destroyer they had to expended 297 x 14" shells and 844 x 8" shells plus 194 x 5-6" shells.

2nd March 1942, two USN DD were sunk in a battle with two IJN heavy cruisers and three DD, that expended 799 x 8" shells plus 635 x 5" shells

Battle of Savo Island 9th Aug 1942; Japanese cruisers ambushed 5 American cruisers at night and massacred them. The 6 x IJN Cruisers surprised the Americans at long range with 57 Long Lance torps that resulted in 6 hits, and in the follow on close battle launched 1872 shells getting 215 hits. The 5 USN Cruisers and two DD replied with 471 shells getting just 8 hits.

In Sealark Channel 25th Oct 1942, a pair of old American DD battled with three modern IJN DD, with each side suffering one Damaged DD. In this exchange 450 IJN shells produced 2 hits, while 120 USN shells resulted in splinter damage from near misses.

First Battle Guadalcanal 13th Nov 1942, many warships were hit with numerous shells, but no record of ammo expenditure on each side. The most decisive weapons seem to be the 72 Long Lance torps that resulted in 6 hits finishing off 5 American warships.

Second Battle Guadalcanal 14-15th Nov 1942. Again many warships were hit on each side but not much record of ammo expenditure on each side. What we have is two USN BB firing in total 232 x 16" shells and getting 9 hits, while 510 x 5" shells resulted in 40 hits. Since the battle was at night in amongst islands most fighting was done at short range and finding the enemy in such a confused battle was the biggest issue by far.

Battle of Tassafaronga, 30th Nov 1942. Five American heavy cruisers plus 6 DD fought an veteran force of 8 Japanese DD.. What ammo details we have, report that the USN fired 425 x 5-8" shells plus at least 9 salvos from a CA and resulted in a number of hits that sunk a IJN DD her and splinter damaged another DD. In return the Japanese appear to have fired 44 Long lance undetected and got at least 5 hits, sinking one Cruiser and another three crippled by the Long Lance. Again the battle was at night in amongst islands and at short range.

Battle of Komandorski Islands, 27th March 1943. 4 Japanese cruisers and 3 DD chased 2 USN Cruisers and 4 DD in a long-range gunnery clash at morning light in moderate seas. Americans expended 1103 x 6" 8" shells without registering any hits at 16-20,000 yards, while 1611 Japanese 8" shells registered 8 hits and a near miss, that badly damaged an American CA DD. Fearing the Cruiser lost the US commander ordered his remaining DD to counterattack and drive off the pursuing IJN force. This they achieve when they got a couple of hits with 985 x 5" shells, while the Japanese in return registered one 5.5" hit plus a near miss after expending 231 x 5.5" shells from there screening DD.

Battle of Vila-Stanmore, March 6th 1943. A force of 3 x USN CL plus 3 x DD ambushed a pair of Japanese DD on a moonless night using SG radars. Both IJN DD were quickly sunk at close range [few km] with the expenditure of 1101 x 6" shells and 538 x 5" shells. Resembled RN ambushes of Italian fleet in the Med.

In surface battles From after Pearl Harbor to march 1943, the allies had only sunk 9 major Japanese warships [DD on up] plus the BB Hiei, while they had lost 37 in exchange. Even including other actions [air/sub], the Japanese had sunk 77 Allied warships [546,000 tons], while they had lost 46 major warships in return [305,000 tons]. Looks like 7181 IJN shells registered 234 hits or 31:1. In response the Americans fired 4006 shells getting 59 hits 68:1 hit rate. IJN Long Lance seemed to have been most effective registering 20 hits on 326 torps launched or 16:1 hit rate. USN appeared to have launched about 25 Torps with 3 hits or 8:1 hit rate. Low numbers mean that the limited range probably inhibited their use however.

Encounter off Rice Anchorage 5th July 1943, 4 IJN x DD rushed troops to New Georgia but abandoned the mission when the detected USN force of 3 cruisers and 4 DD. In the first use of new Japanese radar equipped ship, they launched a volley of 10 Long Lance at 11,000 yards and got one hit on a USN DD that sunk.

Battle of Kula Gulf, 6th July 1943. 11 Japanese DD landed 1600 troops plus supplies to New Georgia, while a force of 3 USN Cruisers and 4 DD escorted USMC troops in a moonless night. Again the Japanese using Radar surprise the USN and launched about two-dozen Long Lance torpedoes, before the Americans were aware of their presence. The Americans firing by radar were then able to hit at least a dozen times with 5-6" shells sinking two IJN DD and damaging four more. However during the action a USN Cruiser was clobbered by 4 Long Lance torpedos and sank so quickly that they were unaware of her loss until after the battle.

Battle of Kolombangara, 13th July 1943. A force of 5 Japanese DD plus a Cruiser transported troops yet again up the New Georgia Sound. USN Scout seaplanes detected these and a force of 3 Cruisers and 10 DD intercepted them in failing moon light night. The USN launched 19 + 17 torpedoes at long range in an effort to duplicate Japanese tactics but it was too late since 29 Long Lances were already in the water. Then the radar controlled 6" guns of the USN cruisers launched a deluge of 2630 x 6" shells sinking the Japanese cruiser. The Americans already believing they had sunk the bulk of the force, went after the escapes only to be ambushed themselves. The Japanese had withdrawn to reload there torpedo tubes and launched another batch of about two-dozen Long Lance Torps, which obtained 5 hits sinking a DD and crippling all 4 allied cruisers. The Japanese were still able to land their troops.

Vella Gulf 6-7th August 1943 Americans pulled off a perfect ambush with 6 DD attacking 4 IJN DD overnight, in Squalls. They launched 22 of 34 Torps unknown to the Japanese, who then lost 3 of the DD to 6 torpedo hits. In total USN got 8 torpedo hits on 34 fish launched. They also expended 655 x 5" shells getting 'numerous hits', after the torps had halted the targets. The Americans were finally learning how to fight the Japanese way.

Horaniau battle, 18th August 1943 .USN force of 4 DD attacked a small Japanese troop convoy [16 barges and boats plus 6 armed trawlers] escorted by 4 IJN DD. The USN engaged the Japanese DD with 3028 x 5" shells and got a couple of hits, after which they ran down the convoy but were only able to sink two of the armed trawlers and one barge. Japanese were able to land their troops.

Vella Lavella, 6th Oct 1943. A dozen small Japanese craft sought to evacuate 590 troops on Vella Lavella, covered by 6 IJN DD. A force of 3 USN DD were ordered to intercept. In another confusing night battle 48 Japanese Long Lance torpedos sunk one DD and crippled another, while gunfire battered the other USN DD. The Americans sank one of the IJN DD with 680 x 5" shells getting 5 hits at long range, while 2 out of 16 torps fired finished this target. The evacuation was a success.

Empress Augusta Bay, 2nd Nov 1943. The Japanese force of 4 cruisers and 6 DD was sent to land troops on Bougainville to counter American landings already there. An American force of 4 Cruisers and 8 DD sought to intercept this force and drive it off. The USN, finally understanding the threat of the Long Lance and their own advantage in radar, planned a long-range night battle with a surprise massed torpedo attack followed by radar directed cruiser firepower to destroy the IJN force. In a dark night with showers and minimum visibility, the Japanese at the last moment avoided the initial massed torpedo barrage and the battle quickly broke down into confusing action where both sides suffered ship on ship collisions to add to the carnage. Reportedly 5296 American 6" 5" shells netted about a dozen hits sinking a cruiser and a DD plus damaging 3 more DD. The Japanese netted about 6 major hits damaging 3 DD [ammo expended unknown], while one long Lance crippled a DD out of about 34 fired.

Cape St George, Nov 25th 1943: 5 x Japanese DD escorted a reinforcement convoy to Buka base, while 5 x USN DD rush to intercept them. Again the Americans pulled off a successful torpedo ambush resulting in 3-4 hits from 15 torpedos mass launched at moonless night. One IJN DD sank right away while another was slowed so it could be finished off with gunfire and more torps. They finally ran down another IJN DD with gunfire and finished it with torps at short range. However the Japanese troop convoy got through.

Truk 17th Feb 1944; After the Japanese abandoned the forward base of Truk, a fleet of 11 American fast carriers and 6 BB with 32 escort Cruisers and Destroyers surged across the Western Pacific to seize this critical island base. Air attacks damaged several last minute stragglers sinking an AMC, before the screening USN Destroyers caught up with them. USN was able to run down these DD and sunk two of them expending 58 x 16" shells + 400 x 8" shells and 124 x 5" shells. This featured the longest-range salvo at 39,000 yards, which claimed to get straddles.

 

[parsifal]

Japan vs Allies (Part II of II)

Battle for Biak 8-9 June 1944. Japanese planned landings near New Guinea with a force of 5 x DD towing troop barges in moderate seas on a moonlight night. A large USN force of 3 cruisers and 13 DD moved to intercept them after being tipped off by a nearby US sub. The Japanese detected them in time to launch a torpedo barrage, which the Americans detected and avoided. Then the Japanese DD cut loose their barges and fled. In a long range gun duel the USN expended 2005 x 5" shells and obtained 2 hits , damaging one of the retreating Japanese DD. After the DD were driven off the USN was disappointed to find and sink only one troop barge.

Muka Jima, Aug 4th 1944. Typical of late war actions the USN fast carrier task group hunted down a convoy with 8 transports and three escorts [DE and 2 x DC]. Carrier planes found and sank 4 of these transports before a taskforce of 4 Cruisers and 3 DD ran down the convoy and sunk the other four transports plus the DE.

Battle of Surigao Strait, Oct 25th 1944; The Japanese command developed a number of plans to counter American advances on Japan, when it became clear that Macarthur planned to move on the Philippines, Toyoda executed the naval component of "Sho-Ichi-Go'. Four separate fleets converged on the Philippines to defeat Nimitz's Third and Seventh Fleets. In the south, Admiral Shima's Third Strike Force with 2 CA + CL+ 6DD plus Admiral Nishmura's 2 BB a CA and 4 DD and clashed with USN Admiral Kinkaid's Task Group 38.4 with 6 BB + 4 CA + 4 CL 26 DD. This moonless night battle lasted 5 hours and the out number Japanese were outfought and defeated loosing both BB and 3 DD, while 2 cruisers were crippled and another damaged along with a DD. The Americans only suffered one DD crippled in the exchange from friendly fire. Americans were again successful in torpedo attacks launching about 90-100 torpedos resulted in about 10 hits helping to sink both BB and two DD. USN BB expended 273 x 14-16" shells and got 6 hits finishing off one Japanese BB. American Cruisers expended 553 x 6-8" shells getting 11 hits crippling an IJN CA. Overall the Americans fought well, while the Japanese fought poorly apparently suffering from conflicting leadership and poorly trained crews.

From the summer 1943 on the USN fired 11835 shells getting roughly 36 hits for a rate of 328:1 hit rate. There do not appear to be much reliable info on hits rates for IJN. The bulk of the American shells were launched using radar, suggesting its hit rate is an order of magnitude lower than direct sight. Looks like IJN best response was launched 169 Long Lance getting about 14 hits for a 12:1 hit rate. Americans in response launched 191 torps getting 24 hits for about 8:1 hit rate.

 

[parsifal]

German vs RN/allies
Look at River plate. Graf Spee got ; 9 x 11" shell hits on 405 shells expended. no hits on 600 x 6" shells expended 2 hits on 200-230 4" flak shells expended.

RN were not any better, they got 200 x 8" shells yielded only 3 hits plus 2065 x 6" shells expended yielded just 17 hit

To sink Glowworm the nazi expended 31 x 8"= 2 hits and 104 x 4" shells expended = 4 hits ...which seems alright for shooting.

In 1940 Renown fired 230 x 15" shells and got 1 hit on Gneisenau, while it took 1065 x 4" shells to get one hit on Scharnhorst as well.
Return fire looks the same, the Germans got 2 hits on Renown with 249 x 11" shells expended. The German secondaries got no hits on 91 shells expended.

Most of the serious damage done at Narvik seems to be done with Torpedos even the Warspite mighty guns didn't do much... and Narvik was much more restricted waters than any Pacific battles. The bay was only 2-4 miles wide over most of its 30-mile length!

To sink HMS Glorious the 'twins' expended 387 x 11" shells registering only 5 hits plus 1148 x 6" shells, which don't seem to have hit anything.

Off 'The channel' in Oct 1940 the British struck again with 5 DD and two Cruisers firing 1200 shells and got only two hits , one on each of two out of four German DD.

On Christmas day 1940 the Hipper attacked a British convoy and got four hits on British Cruiser HMS Berwick with 185 shells and a couple of hits on convoy ships with 113 x 4" flak shells fired. The three British cruisers fired some 6-8" shells but got nothing for their efforts.

Sinking of HMS Hood and battering the POW at "the Denmark Straits", the Bismarck expended 93 x 15" shells getting about 7-9 hits, while PE got 5 hits on 178 shells fired….not bad shooting at all. Sinking the Bismarck , like Narvik and the HMS Hood sinking, has to be acknowledged with qualifiers, She could not maneuver and could barely make 10 knots; making her a easy target since her speed slowed and the ranges got down to couple of kms, towards the end. However the total expended by Rodney and KGV was 375 x 16" shells and 339 x 14" shells. It appears about 40 major hits were registered on Bismarck possibly 1/3 14" and the rest 16". The secondaries plus the cruisers fired 2157 x 6-8" shells getting something like 300 hits. Had this been any other ship it should have sunk after ½ of these hits.

At St Nazaire in 1942 the 5 German TBoot got two hits on ~ 300 shells fired [estimates 240-360 shells].

On May 1942 German destroyers attacking a British convoy expended 584 shells and only got 2 hits plus two near misses, causing light ship damage from splinters.

In the Barents Seas battle 31st Dec 1942, Hipper struck again hitting 3 times with 120 shells, crippling the destroyer HMS Onslow.

Typical of German convoy escorts, in one battle in January 1943 four UJaggers fired 41 x 88mm shells at a pair of Soviet Destroyers getting a single hit and driving them off.

In the North Cape battle at the end of 1943, the HMS Duke of York managed 13 hits with expenditure of 446 x 14" shells. Infact it seems the 55 torpedos producing 11 hits, are what finally sunk the Scharnhorst, although the long range 14" gun fire was instrumental in slowing the German battleship down to be torpedoed.

The Battle of Biscay action December 1943 saw 11 German Torpedoboot and Zerstörer's battle a couple of British Cruisers in rough seas The British cruisers expend the bulk of their ammo, sinking a German Destroyer and two Torpedoboot, while the Germans expended 34 torpedos in 8 separate attacks with nothing to show for it, infact it appears the British didn't even notice most of these attacks. Franz Kohlauf recommendation on a couple of long-range surprise mass torpedo firings at the start of the battle was ignored with predictable results. When ever he pulled off this tactic it usually paid off with handsome dividends.

In naval counter attacks around 'Normandy landings', the German Torpedoboot flotillas launched a total of 55 torpedos getting only one hit.

So in summery 4768 German shells from 5-15" guns registered about 47 hits or about 101:1. Breaking this down further we see 34 hits from BB/CA primary batteries shooting 1398 shells or 41:1 rate, and the smaller guns got 13 hits on 3370 shells expended or 259:1. So enough info to suggest that the bigger guns generally do much better.

The British in seven documented cases reportedly fired 8077 shells and got 377 hits for an astonishing rate of 21:1. That is until we look closer as most of those hits were the Bismarck, which would not sink [340 hits out of 2871 shells fired 8:1]. If those are removed the figures group average become 33 hits on 5206 shells fired or about 158:1.

 

[Garyt]

Impressive amount of info there, Parsifal

Unfortunately what we don't see is the amount of hits based upon what range and ROF were being used at the time, unfortunately I don't think this is something that can be effectively researched without a huge amount of time being spent on the subject.

One interesting thing though:

So enough info to suggest that the bigger guns generally do much better.

I agree. And it might be mere coincidence (though I doubt it) that large guns have a much higher hit rate, and they also have a much slower rate of fire.

If you are using director control you are not "hosing down a target" you are firing salvos. All shells fired together and all shells landing together (or with in a fraction of a second). This means that your salvo rate is tied to your slowest gun/crew. Any fire control officer worth his stripe/s should be able to figure out which salvo is which.

That is of course, unless you are firing under local control, correct? And I really have my doubts that you can fire a round every 3 seconds or so in anything but local control, so matching the 5"/38 ROF of 15-22 rounds per minute would be very difficult. Local control though fares much better as the range gets much closer.

 

[parsifal]

Thanks, but its not my work.......the guy that did write this is an absolute genius at naval warfare.

 

[Garyt]

You know Parsifal, this discussion on rate of fire really has me thinking. It just does not seem feasible that one could fire a round(s), get input from the director, assessed by the plotting rooms, instruction then relayed to the guns for the next round to be fired, all in a 3 second interval that would be required to match a 20 rounds per minute pace.

Maybe I've got this wrong, but I would have to think for such a high rate of fire the stations would have to be in local control, unless I am missing something here. Which could indeed be the case

Finding someone with experience though on firing procedures for manually loaded 5 inch guns would be tough.