A myth about the Me 262?

[Jenisch]

The Ta 152 might have been better than the P-51

Better than the P-51H?

 

[Erich]

insufficient numbers of 262's on any front the only real unit was JG 7 and look where the over-worked had to serve, a couple adhocs made ground attack impressions and some voctires aerially against the soviets in the lat months. the lack of suitable ground to air defenses was a definite trouble for the jet units

the Ta was no batter than any mark of the 51 no operational records during the war to even compare so don't try..........

 

[stona]

Nobody has yet pointed out that one of the reasons that there were so few Me 262s in service was that the Luftwaffe lacked the infrastructure to support them. That goes for spares and maintenance facilities as well as trained personnel.
Introducing a new type into squadron service, never mind a type with a new and novel propulsion system, is never as simple as armchair Air Marshall's would have us believe. Add to that the pressure under which the Luftwaffe was operating in late 1944/45 and it was nearly impossible. Operating the new aircraft from forests and autobahns would not have been first choice for Luftwaffe commanders.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Erich]

there was the accepted idea that the LW could operate effectively with pitso-engines and the LW seems only the pilots were wishing for a drastic change......gie us the damn jets NOW ! seems trained pilots were there or going through the stages but getting airborne without getting killed by escorts was another matter as you do a circuit, for many in JG 7 and JV 44 it was a scape goat to get out of the war which they effectively chose.......

 

[GrauGeist]

Better than the P-51H?

The P-51H never saw combat...too late for the ETO and several units made it to the PTO before Japan surrendered but again, none ever saw combat.

Comparing it to the Ta152 enters the realm of *what if*...

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The P-51H never saw combat...too late for the ETO and several units made it to the PTO before Japan surrendered but again, none ever saw combat.

Comparing it to the Ta152 enters the realm of *what if*...

Thats ok though if the allied planes numbers are superior...

 

[GregP]

The Ta 152 made the war in the last month of it. The P-51H did, too. The amount of combat the Ta 152 saw was miniscule. It is a valid comparison. Had the Germans been sucessful in extending the was in Europe (they weren't) that's exactly the plane they'd have been flying against.

The Ta 152 and P-51H would have been a good matchup with little to choose unless the GM-1 ran out.

 

[GrauGeist]

Unlike the Ta152, the P-51H never fired it's guns in anger. It arrived in the ETO after hostilities ceased and it was arriving in the PTO in the closing weeks of the war and while being in theater, it never encountered any Japanese warplanes.

The P-51H had a legacy much like the F8F Bearcat, which also arrived too late for combat duty. Both were much anticipated but never engaged the enemy. Of course the Bearcat saw sevice later on, unlike the P-51H, but that's for another thread...

 

[davebender]

Which metals are you referring to?

 

[Mike Williams]

Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, página 462:

The Me 262, the world's first operational jet fighter, was a truly extraordinary technological achievement. The fact that in 1945, in the most difficult of circumstances, Germany was capable of producing hundreds of these aircraft should give the lie to any claims about the inherent weaknesses in the German 'technological system'. In the list of dei ex machina with which Hitler might have changed the course of the war, it is amongst the most commonly cited. But it is also one of the weapons most surrounded by self-serving post-war mythology. After the war, Ernst Heinkel, Willy Messerschmitt and the chief of Germany's fighter forces Adolf Galland colluded in the construction of a highly one-sided account of theMe 262's history, designed to celebrate the genius of German technology, whilst at the same time demonstrating the incompetence of the Nazi leadership. In their account, popularized in best-selling biographies and television interviews, it was the meddling of Hitler, Göring and Milch that robbed Galland and his valiant fighter pilots of a weapon with which they might have protected Germany against the merciless onslaught of the bombers. This was a myth that appealed to numerous themes in post-war German political culture: regret at the chance of a victory wasted, the consolation provided by the supposed superiority of 'German technology', the self-righteous commemoration of the horror of Allied bombing. But contrary to legend, all the evidence, in fact, suggests that the Reich Air Ministry seized the opportunity of jet power with every possible speed. What prevented the Me 262 from exercising a decisive influence on the air war was not incompetence and conservatism, but the debilitating material limitations of the German war economy.

That's a very interesting passage and a nice piece of writing; thanks for sharing Jenisch! Adam Tooze certainly has the requisite scholarship, credentials and standing to write authoritatively about such matters. In particular the "regret at the chance of a victory wasted, the consolation provided by the supposed superiority of 'German technology', the self-righteous commemoration of the horror of Allied bombing" are indeed sentiments very evident even in historic aviation forums, this board not exempted.

 

[riacrato]

Whereas you are of course the most neutral person to ever walk the earth.

Maybe Galland has a bit of a "selective memory", how do you expect a man who actually fought the war, instead of just looking back at it from 50+ years distance in a comfy chair, to stay completely neutral and accept the eventual completeness of his defeat? People ought to be a little more sensible and maybe respectful about that.

And no, we do not live in the 50s or 60s any longer. I don't think any of our younger generation of Germans believe that the war could've been won if we had the Me 262 or Panther or V2 or <enter wonder weapon name> 2-3 years earlier. Except for some neo nazis maybe. An entirely different story. And I don't think any of those are present on this forum.

 

[Juha]

Which metals are you referring to?

Hello Dave.
chromium, tungsten, molybdeum and nickel.

Juha

 

[davebender]

Jumo 004A engine used less chromium then DB605A engine.

Germany had plenty of nickel and molybdenum during 1943. That didn't change until Finland and Donetz Basin switched sides.

Not sure about tungsten. Do you have data on tungsten requirements for Jumo 004A and DB605A engines?

 

[parsifal]

In fact there was nothing wrong with Tiger servicibility (which was pretty much the same as the ordinary German tanks like Pz IV, and better than Panther) or that of the Me 262. Its just a fact that that dogs detractors of both.

54% of Tigers were lost to non-combat related causes, more than double the rate of their mediums (not talking about the panther). According to Chris Willbeck, at Page 187 of his book, (Strengths Flaws Of the Tiger Tanl Battalions)

"The high degree of maintenance required to keep the Tiger and King Tiger tanks operating was one of their biggest deficiencies. This usually resulted in a low operational rate for tanks within the heavy tank battalions, especially after extended periods of combat. The tendency of the Tigers to break down, coupled with the weight of the tanks, made recovery difficult. The failure to field a suitable recovery vehicle, with the exception of the Bergepanther after mid-1944, or to field them in sufficient quantities, resulted in the loss of Tigers in many instances ".

This failing is perhaps best illustrated by the Tiger Tank Battalion supporting Peiper near Stavelot. 45 crossed the border, more that 20 lost due to breakdowns before any contact was made, Delyed, then fell back, Just 7 returned across the border roughly 1 week later. Many were lost, abandoned due to lack of fuel, but thats not true for the early part of the campaign. they just were junk as far as serviceability was concerned.


we can find similar abysmal serviceability rates for the 262. just ask (or read) Galland

 

[parsifal]

German defeat was not just about the failure of a few individuals at the top. its defeat was total, from top to bottom, a defeat of all things and all people who aligned with the german cause. german methods, ideas, procedures, organizations, strategy and tactics were all comprehensively and irrecoverably defeated. Why? Numbers, mismanagement, lack of resources, but the failure was comprehensive, total

 

[pattern14]

Regardless of how you approach this subject, the Me 262 could have never affected the course of a war already lost. Jet engines, swept wings, air to air rockets etc did not compensate for lack of skilled pilots, and lack of pilot training. There was almost no chance of developing effective tactics to make the best use of the new fighter, which was totally outnumbered anyway. So much has been written about this plane, but the fact remains that it made no difference to the final outcome. Its legacy lives on though.

 

[Tante Ju]

German methods, ideas, procedures, organizations, strategy and tactics were all comprehensively and irrecoverably defeated. Why?

And then copied. Why?

54% of Tigers were lost to non-combat related causes, more than double the rate of their mediums (not talking about the panther).

I am pretty sure most Tigers (meaning the big furry things with the funny stripes) die of an old age and due to diseases, probably a much larger percentage then the % of boars, pigs, deer, or whater the Tiger eats.

 

[davebender]

I'm under the impression German pilot quality was still pretty good during 1943.

 

[GregP]

Parsifal said,

"German defeat was not just about the failure of a few individuals at the top. its defeat was total, from top to bottom, a defeat of all things and all people who aligned with the german cause. german methods, ideas, procedures, organizations, strategy and tactics were all comprehensively and irrecoverably defeated."


Sorry Parsifal, I don't get that.

Yeah, they lost the war, but methods, procedures, tactics? Their weapons were pretty good, procedures are just procedures, and almost everyone used similar tactics in simnilar situations at SOME time. Not saying you are wrong ... saying I don't understand why all things German were defeated.

If nothing else, at least they gave us Sauerbratten and sauerkraut ... gotta' say "thanks" for those ... cheers.

 

[silence]

This failing is perhaps best illustrated by the Tiger Tank Battalion supporting Peiper near Stavelot. 45 crossed the border, more that 20 lost due to breakdowns before any contact was made, Delyed, then fell back, Just 7 returned across the border roughly 1 week later. Many were lost, abandoned due to lack of fuel, but thats not true for the early part of the campaign. they just were junk as far as serviceability was concerned.

Note that those were Tiger IIs, not Tiger Is.

Estimated Panzer Serviceability in Normandy:
Tiger I and II – 56% (based on a sample of 30 serviceability returns)
Panzer IV – 67% (based on a sample of 61)
Panther – 65% (based on a sample of 43)

Note that this is both short term and long-term. The Wehrmacht kept any panzer that needed two weeks or less service on its TO&E; the US Army, otoh, passed any tank needing only three days or more back to the rear and removed it from the TO&E.

Inability to recover tanks while retreating was the bane of the Wehrmacht. Its much easier to recover a tank when its not behind enemy lines!!