A myth about the Me 262? (1 Viewer)

[silence]

Parsifal said,

"German defeat was not just about the failure of a few individuals at the top. its defeat was total, from top to bottom, a defeat of all things and all people who aligned with the german cause. german methods, ideas, procedures, organizations, strategy and tactics were all comprehensively and irrecoverably defeated."


Sorry Parsifal, I don't get that.

Yeah, they lost the war, but methods, procedures, tactics? Their weapons were pretty good, procedures are just procedures, and almost everyone used similar tactics in simnilar situations at SOME time. Not saying you are wrong ... saying I don't understand why all things German were defeated.

If nothing else, at least they gave us Sauerbratten and sauerkraut ... gotta' say "thanks" for those ... cheers.

I read an interesting book where the author's thesis was basically that the Germans lost WWI and WWII because of overconfidence, underestimating their enemy, and flaws in their strategic thinking. The campaign against Soviet Russia perfectly illustrates this.

Don't forget the St, Pauli Girl, Greg!

 

[tyrodtom]

I read an interesting book where the author's thesis was basically that the Germans lost WWI and WWII because of overconfidence, underestimating their enemy, and flaws in their strategic thinking. The campaign against Soviet Russia perfectly illustrates this.

Don't forget the St, Pauli Girl, Greg!

You can say the same thing about most countries that come out on the losing side of a war.
Very few nations would enter into a war if they thought they had no chance at winning it.

 

[GregP]

Absolutey can't forget the beer ...

Though I don't want to put words into Parsifal's mouth, I think he means that all things Nazi were defeated. Though the Nazis were largely associated with Germany, not all Germans were Nazis and not all Nazis were German. People also tend to forget (not saying Parsifal forgot ...) that millions of Germans were killed in concentration camps along with millions of Jews. It wasn't all one-sided.

I decry the Nazis ... not Germans or things German. Another point, many people in Germany HAD to join the party in order to survive. Doesn't mean they agreed with the Nazis. Means they wanted to eat and survive.

One of my old friends was a WWII vet who married a German girl after the war. When it ended she was a 16-year old aircraft spotter in a tower. She had to join the Nazi party to eat, but was never a Nazi. Her weapon consisted of a pair of binoculars and she would call in planes she sighted with altitude, speed, and heading. She didn't need to call in position because the tower number located her on the map.

Her descriptions of what life was like in 1944 - 1945 in German were very emotional and telling. She said that after the war, when she got to the USA, she was called "Nazi" in her neighborhood, and all she could do was cry about it. Her war efforts were making soup and spotting airplanes. Big, bad German woman, huh? Her main concern in the late war was where her next meal was going to come from. Sometimes they were several days apart.

 

[silence]

Very true.

 

[pattle]

insufficient numbers of 262's on any front the only real unit was JG 7 and look where the over-worked had to serve, a couple adhocs made ground attack impressions and some voctires aerially against the soviets in the lat months. the lack of suitable ground to air defenses was a definite trouble for the jet units

the Ta was no batter than any mark of the 51 no operational records during the war to even compare so don't try..........

As I said in my original post I was not asserting that the Ta152 would have been a better bet than the Me262, I was only suggesting it. Having said that you can't say in the same breath that the Ta152 was no better than the Mustang and that both planes can not be compared, it is contradictory.

 

[pattle]

The Ta 152 might have been better than the P-51, but that is not what the Germans needed. If the Germans wanted to tip the scales, they needed an aircraft which was far advanced to anything the Allies had. This is the only way they could break free from their numerical inferiority.
In fact, that was the idea behind the wonder weapons: Germany could not outproduce its enemies, so it had no choice but to rely on technological superiority. They failed to achieve this, or at least in time.

I wasn't saying the Ta152 would of won the war for the Germans, I was only suggesting that it may have proved more successful than the Me262 under the circumstances that existed, and there were a lot of unfavourable circumstances conspiring against the Me262.

 

[pattern14]

I'm under the impression German pilot quality was still pretty good during 1943.

It was, and many aces were produced during that year as they got amongst the bombers prior to being outnumbered by escorts. Much the same against the Russians, which rarely get a mention by comparison. By late 1944/early 45, pilot training dropped to an average of 25 hours each ( compared to 150 hours for an average U.S pilot, who also trained without the continuous bombardment, marauding ground attack aircraft, sabotage, lack of fuel etc). By that stage, it was all over bar the shouting.

 

[Civettone]

It was, and many aces were produced during that year as they got amongst the bombers prior to being outnumbered by escorts. Much the same against the Russians, which rarely get a mention by comparison. By late 1944/early 45, pilot training dropped to an average of 25 hours each ( compared to 150 hours for an average U.S pilot, who also trained without the continuous bombardment, marauding ground attack aircraft, sabotage, lack of fuel etc). By that stage, it was all over bar the shouting.

I assume you are talking about specialized fighter training, not the whole training. For instance, American pilot training was well over 300-400 hours.

I wasn't saying the Ta152 would of won the war for the Germans, I was only suggesting that it may have proved more successful than the Me262 under the circumstances that existed, and there were a lot of unfavourable circumstances conspiring against the Me262.

Understood. My point is that Germany could no longer hope to win the air war with any piston-engined fighters, no matter how good. In order to still make the difference, it needed weapons which were a generation ahead of its opponents.

Kris

 

[stona]

Understood. My point is that Germany could no longer hope to win the air war with any piston-engined fighters, no matter how good. In order to still make the difference, it needed weapons which were a generation ahead of its opponents.
Kris

I think that view was held by some Germans at the time. I think with hindsight we can say that even with the deployment of the Me 262 and other advanced aircraft Germany was in no position to win the air war.
She was being overwhelmed and nothing would have prevented the situation that developed by mid 1944 onwards.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Erich]

my statements are not contradictory. the Ta and P-51 never met in combat. Tanks version while flying the C and leaving P-51 D's far behind is probably very spurious. lets not bring uy the disasters we have with what if's and a bazillion silly charts.....

the Ta was created to engage the high alt P-51 marks not to engage heavy bombers of course it was never able to carry out this missions 99 % activity was against the Soviets at medium alt with a few Tempest engagements at same alt. the Lw freely admitted amongst it's circles it had to knock out US/BC heavy bomber formations at whatever cost, that included a dynamic and pushed up non t4ried Me 262 program what was produced in the A variants to be supplanted and replaced by more streamlined-updated versions reset fule tanks and arms. something of course never allowed yet time enough to be approved and committed. even Kurt welter with his merry little band of NF's knew full well that chasing Mosquitos of intruder and LSNF was a waste of time and the future would be the two seater but re-arraigned to more his and his crew experience - again never seen, so they dealt with modified crappy trainers and inadequate radar systems.

 

[stona]

And yet the "cutting edge" revolutionary aircraft to knock down the bombers were the rocket powered Ba 349 and Me 163 (what happened to that idea for an interceptor?) or jet aircraft like the Me 262 and He 162 which at least were a doorway to the future.
What realistic chance did Germany have?
Cheers
Steve

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal said,

Yeah, they lost the war, but methods, procedures, tactics?

Absolutely.Particularly on the eastern front..at the beginning the limited resources avaliable to the germans dictated that they adopt narrow points of breakthrough....schwerepunkts, followed by deep penetrations. Tanks would then be forced to sit there and wait whilst the slow moving infantry formations completed the encirclements and cleaned up. generally worked, but it was innefficient, and many Soviets that should have been captured got away.

german logistics was terrible, and pretty much cost them the war. The idea that they could tack on a few mobile units to an unmotorized main body was busted, particualalry as the motorized elements of the infantry (what little they had) fell out of the floor, and then even the horsedrawn elements also lost mobility

And the list goes on and on....this is just one example

Their weapons were pretty good, procedures are just procedures, and almost everyone used similar tactics in simnilar situations at SOME time.

Dont agree, sorry.Some weapons were excelent, some were technically excellent, but the wrong tool for the job, others were downright awful. Examples of excellent include the Nebelwerfer, MP38, MG42, Stug III Me 109 ju88, type VII. Examples of technically excellent but the wrong tool for the job include Tigers, Panthers, most of theiir truck MT in Russia, their artillery in winter(it wouldnt work), their battleships and short range cruisers. examples of terrible equipment...type II,Narvik DDs, F-boote, early war torpedoes, Me 110, Me 210. The problem for the germans though isnt that their weapons were not good, in the main they were excellent, in the field. the problem was that there were never enough of them. okay, so they were behind the 8 from the start, but their production decisions certainly did not help them. The 262 is very much in this category. It wasnt really ready for squadron service in 1944, or even 1945, yet it was eating into their production at a time when they needed everything they could get their hands on. it was criminal how the germans tended to waste their production.

procedeures make all the difference. if procedures didnt matter,why did the french lose in 1940, why did the british get nowhere for 3 years (in NA),why did the germans clobber the russians 41-2. but the germns did not adapt as fast or as well as the allies, and allied/soviet methods were not the sameas german methods. German armoured warfare was fundamentally different to the allies. They focused on the tank, and centred their firepower around it, whereas by 1944, the allies, with their far greater levels of mobility wre able to implement integrated assault teams to a much greater extent than the germans. Dont get me wrong, the germans had some of that, but their formations and techniques of 1940were nothing like allied techniques of 1944, they werent like german techniques of 1944 either, and allied and German techniques remained fundamentally differtnt in 1944.

Russians adapted and produced a unique style of warfare that was all their own. They began the war with essentially western TOE and thinking....but it failed them badly. they simply did not have the technical skills to do what was the norm in the western armies. in the west, a division was more or less the main combat unit,with high levels of integration and a variety of weapins that its commandrs had to co-ordinate. But this required high levels of technical proficiency to produce a fully integrated team.The russians did not have the leadership skills, the technical skill, the mobility to dod any of that. sothey simplified the command problem...rifle divisions weredevoid of nearly everything except the basic weapons...almost quite literally a rifle division was a division with just rifles. what little artillery there was, was mostly for los shooting. The russians formed fuge artillery armies that were magnificant assault TOEs, but hopeless in defence. They found their tank formations hopeless as well, far too complicated for them to be workable, so they formed smaller, simipler Tank and mech brigades, with a few SMG armed men and afew mortars in support, so that such formations were within the level of complexity that their commanders could handle.

because of that lack of C&C, even later in the war the russians adapted. their formations were never as flexible as their German counterparts, So that meant complicated narrow front assaults wouldnt work. Instead the Russians adopted broad front tactics, and something the russians nicknamed a "Zhukov symphany" or "Zhikov orchestra". basically one offensive after another in rapid succession to keep the germans reeling and off balance. Eisenhower used the same approach in france in 1944. germans never used those sorts of tactics.

 

[Civettone]

I think that view was held by some Germans at the time. I think with hindsight we can say that even with the deployment of the Me 262 and other advanced aircraft Germany was in no position to win the air war.
She was being overwhelmed and nothing would have prevented the situation that developed by mid 1944 onwards.
Cheers
Steve

I disagree. Given more time, the Me 262, Me 263, Ba 349 and He 162 armed with R4Ms would have stopped the Bomber offensive. In the end, it failed to do so, because there was not enough fuel and trained pilots. Plus, I assume the early radar warning system had collapsed in the Spring of 1945.

But that does not take away that the jet interceptor was definitely the only way to go.
Kris

 

[jim]

Parsifal said,




Absolutely.Particularly on the eastern front..at the beginning the limited resources avaliable to the germans dictated that they adopt narrow points of breakthrough....schwerepunkts, followed by deep penetrations. Tanks would then be forced to sit there and wait whilst the slow moving infantry formations completed the encirclements and cleaned up. generally worked, but it was innefficient, and many Soviets that should have been captured got away.

german logistics was terrible, and pretty much cost them the war. The idea that they could tack on a few mobile units to an unmotorized main body was busted, particualalry as the motorized elements of the infantry (what little they had) fell out of the floor, and then even the horsedrawn elements also lost mobility

And the list goes on and on....this is just one example



Dont agree, sorry.Some weapons were excelent, some were technically excellent, but the wrong tool for the job, others were downright awful. Examples of excellent include the Nebelwerfer, MP38, MG42, Stug III Me 109 ju88, type VII. Examples of technically excellent but the wrong tool for the job include Tigers, Panthers, most of theiir truck MT in Russia, their artillery in winter(it wouldnt work), their battleships and short range cruisers. examples of terrible equipment...type II,Narvik DDs, F-boote, early war torpedoes, Me 110, Me 210. The problem for the germans though isnt that their weapons were not good, in the main they were excellent, in the field. the problem was that there were never enough of them. okay, so they were behind the 8 from the start, but their production decisions certainly did not help them. The 262 is very much in this category. It wasnt really ready for squadron service in 1944, or even 1945, yet it was eating into their production at a time when they needed everything they could get their hands on. it was criminal how the germans tended to waste their production.

procedeures make all the difference. if procedures didnt matter,why did the french lose in 1940, why did the british get nowhere for 3 years (in NA),why did the germans clobber the russians 41-2. but the germns did not adapt as fast or as well as the allies, and allied/soviet methods were not the sameas german methods. German armoured warfare was fundamentally different to the allies. They focused on the tank, and centred their firepower around it, whereas by 1944, the allies, with their far greater levels of mobility wre able to implement integrated assault teams to a much greater extent than the germans. Dont get me wrong, the germans had some of that, but their formations and techniques of 1940were nothing like allied techniques of 1944, they werent like german techniques of 1944 either, and allied and German techniques remained fundamentally differtnt in 1944.

Russians adapted and produced a unique style of warfare that was all their own. They began the war with essentially western TOE and thinking....but it failed them badly. they simply did not have the technical skills to do what was the norm in the western armies. in the west, a division was more or less the main combat unit,with high levels of integration and a variety of weapins that its commandrs had to co-ordinate. But this required high levels of technical proficiency to produce a fully integrated team.The russians did not have the leadership skills, the technical skill, the mobility to dod any of that. sothey simplified the command problem...rifle divisions weredevoid of nearly everything except the basic weapons...almost quite literally a rifle division was a division with just rifles. what little artillery there was, was mostly for los shooting. The russians formed fuge artillery armies that were magnificant assault TOEs, but hopeless in defence. They found their tank formations hopeless as well, far too complicated for them to be workable, so they formed smaller, simipler Tank and mech brigades, with a few SMG armed men and afew mortars in support, so that such formations were within the level of complexity that their commanders could handle.

because of that lack of C&C, even later in the war the russians adapted. their formations were never as flexible as their German counterparts, So that meant complicated narrow front assaults wouldnt work. Instead the Russians adopted broad front tactics, and something the russians nicknamed a "Zhukov symphany" or "Zhikov orchestra". basically one offensive after another in rapid succession to keep the germans reeling and off balance. Eisenhower used the same approach in france in 1944. germans never used those sorts of tactics.

I am spechless.... Thats an unbelieving post even for parsifal
DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA OF THE ORDERS OF BATTLE AFTER MID 1942??????????
Even in the final stages of the war when soviets attacks met organised german resistance were crashed. The "great" tactic of the soviets was that the germans could not defend efficiently the entire front and the soviets were braking through the weak spots with their massive numerical superiority. Even in the battle of berlin were unable to pierce the external defences before the defendrs spent all their ammo. In Kurland were defeated in 6 great battles by the isolated and badly outnumbered Army group North .GREAT TACTICS
In west the americans had so many tanks that were equiping with them, even the infantry divisions.
The german army hugely outnumbered on all fronts, under totaly hostile skyies, with its communications codes broken , with its alleis (finlad,rumania,bulgaria,italy) betraying him, with the "neutal" countries clearly supporting the alleis,with no raw materials fought a fighting retreat to the end without colapsing and launching painful local counter attacks .Did not collapse like the french and the english in 1940 or the soviets in 1941 (saved only by the stupid western support). Even the american pushed them back only when they had massive superiority
Thats speaks about tactics effectivenes on TACTICAL level

 

[CobberKane]

What I don't know about strategy would fill books, but it does seem to me that if 262 was ever going to have any chance of halting the allied bombing campaign it would have had to have been available in numbers before things wound up by 1944. By that I mean the 262 might have retained air superiority for the LW, but I don't think it could ever have regained it.
My thinking is that, hypothetically, had the LW been able to send up, say, 200 262s with well trained pilots in 1944 they would undoubtedly have given the USAAF quite a mauling - for a while. But the 262s themselves would have become the prime object of Allied tactics. Allied fighters - which were never particularly vulnerable to the 262 - would have been swarming over LW airfields before and after raids. Bombing, including night bombing, would have been directed towards anything to do with it. I don't think 262 production could have stood that for long. I know German industry managed to re supply the LW with conventional aircraft even in the face of allied bombing, but I think the 262 would have been particularly vulnerable in this respect. It was far more time consuming to build than even the most advanced conventional fighters. It's engines required replacement every ten hours. In an operational sense, it shot itself down every two weeks or so. In the face of concentrated Allied attention, I think the 262, for all it's potential would have withered on the vine.
Now, if the 262 had been available in number before the daylight bombing campaign got under way, that might have been different. In fact I can feel a new thread coming on. I'm off to post it now.

 

[Jenisch]

I disagree. Given more time, the Me 262, Me 263, Ba 349 and He 162 armed with R4Ms would have stopped the Bomber offensive. In the end, it failed to do so, because there was not enough fuel and trained pilots. Plus, I assume the early radar warning system had collapsed in the Spring of 1945.

But that does not take away that the jet interceptor was definitely the only way to go.
Kris

Indeed. We should not underestimate the WM. Even the D-Day was not something that Commanders were not sure it would work.

 

[GrauGeist]

I disagree. Given more time, the Me 262, Me 263, Ba 349 and He 162 armed with R4Ms would have stopped the Bomber offensive. In the end, it failed to do so, because there was not enough fuel and trained pilots. Plus, I assume the early radar warning system had collapsed in the Spring of 1945.

But that does not take away that the jet interceptor was definitely the only way to go.
Kris

The Luftwaffe's use of the Komet was a waste of resources. Even considering the Natter Viper was a pure waste of time.

Had they promoted and funded the jet program in it's early days, they would not have been grasping at fantasy projects while trying to fight a defensive war. The He280 and the Me262 would have made thier debut before the Allied bombers started pounding them into ruin and desperate last-ditch fighters like the He162 would have never been drawn up.

 

[vikingBerserker]

A-Fricken-Men!

 

[Civettone]

The Luftwaffe's use of the Komet was a waste of resources. Even considering the Natter Viper was a pure waste of time.

Had they promoted and funded the jet program in it's early days, they would not have been grasping at fantasy projects while trying to fight a defensive war. The He280 and the Me262 would have made thier debut before the Allied bombers started pounding them into ruin and desperate last-ditch fighters like the He162 would have never been drawn up.

If we look at kill-loss ratio, the Komet was a successful point defence interceptor, but lack of fuel and inefficient unit location limited its usefulness. Only few flew missions in 1945. It would have been a real asset as the Me 163C or 263 and armed with the R4M. The Natter was probably the best wonder weapon the Germans came up with in 1945. If time had allowed it, it would have revolutionized air combat over Germany. The idea was pure genius: basic trained pilots in a manned air defence missile whose only job was to fire the R4M or Foehn rockets towards the bombers, and then eject with the vital parts of the plane ready for re-use. Brilliant !

Kris

 

[FLYBOYJ]

If we look at kill-loss ratio, the Komet was a successful point defence interceptor, but lack of fuel and inefficient unit location limited its usefulness. Only few flew missions in 1945. It would have been a real asset as the Me 163C or 263 and armed with the R4M. The Natter was probably the best wonder weapon the Germans came up with in 1945. If time had allowed it, it would have revolutionized air combat over Germany. The idea was pure genius: basic trained pilots in a manned air defence missile whose only job was to fire the R4M or Foehn rockets towards the bombers, and then eject with the vital parts of the plane ready for re-use. Brilliant !

Kris

???

From Wiki...

"The first actions involving the Me 163 occurred on July 28, 1944, from I./JG 400's base at Brandis, when two USAAF B-17 Flying Fortress were attacked without confirmed kills. Combat operations continued from May 1944 to spring 1945. During this time, there were nine confirmed kills with 14 Me 163s lost. Feldwebel Siegfried Schubert was the most successful pilot, with three bombers to his credit."