What I don't know about strategy would fill books, but it does seem to me that if 262 was ever going to have any chance of halting the allied bombing campaign it would have had to have been available in numbers before things wound up by 1944. By that I mean the 262 might have retained air superiority for the LW, but I don't think it could ever have regained it.
My thinking is that, hypothetically, had the LW been able to send up, say, 200 262s with well trained pilots in 1944 they would undoubtedly have given the USAAF quite a mauling - for a while. But the 262s themselves would have become the prime object of Allied tactics. Allied fighters - which were never particularly vulnerable to the 262 - would have been swarming over LW airfields before and after raids. Bombing, including night bombing, would have been directed towards anything to do with it. I don't think 262 production could have stood that for long. I know German industry managed to re supply the LW with conventional aircraft even in the face of allied bombing, but I think the 262 would have been particularly vulnerable in this respect. It was far more time consuming to build than even the most advanced conventional fighters. It's engines required replacement every ten hours. In an operational sense, it shot itself down every two weeks or so. In the face of concentrated Allied attention, I think the 262, for all it's potential would have withered on the vine.
Now, if the 262 had been available in number before the daylight bombing campaign got under way, that might have been different. In fact I can feel a new thread coming on. I'm off to post it now.
This is exactly as I see things myself, and very well explained.