- Thread starter
- #6,001
A new book in my library.
- Thread starter Wayne Little
- Start date
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Received this one in the mail last week. It's about French aircraft flown by the Regia Aeronautica. Great pictures, Italian and English text with bunch of profiles thrown in. This was an Ebay purchase, that even though it wasn't expensive, I still wish I bought for less.
Robert Porter
Senior Master Sergeant
Oh! No controversy in that book! No siree! But I would love to hear your thoughts on her take on the evolution of the strategic bombing roles of both services.
I haven't read the book yet, but I know that she would broadly agree with Max Hasting's sentiment, which I do not share, that,
'The cost of the bomber offensive in life, treasure and moral superiority over the enemy tragically outstripped the results that
it achieved.'
That doesn't mean I won't read it! I also know from some of her other work that she, along with others like Neville Jones, Philip Meilinger and Malcolm Smith, have traced the development of British strategy from WW1 through the 1930s and into WW2 with similar, if slightly differing, conclusions and these are conclusions with which I broadly agree.
All of this is good, anything to dispel what the British political historian David Watt described in 1962 as the 'Air Force view of history.'
I am much, much less familiar with the way in which US bombing strategy developed, only familiar with the broad outline of interwar doctrine, so I look forward to seeing what she makes of this.
Cheers
Steve
'The cost of the bomber offensive in life, treasure and moral superiority over the enemy tragically outstripped the results that
it achieved.'
That doesn't mean I won't read it! I also know from some of her other work that she, along with others like Neville Jones, Philip Meilinger and Malcolm Smith, have traced the development of British strategy from WW1 through the 1930s and into WW2 with similar, if slightly differing, conclusions and these are conclusions with which I broadly agree.
All of this is good, anything to dispel what the British political historian David Watt described in 1962 as the 'Air Force view of history.'
I am much, much less familiar with the way in which US bombing strategy developed, only familiar with the broad outline of interwar doctrine, so I look forward to seeing what she makes of this.
Cheers
Steve
Robert Porter
Senior Master Sergeant
While a Security Specialist, tasked with guarding Nuclear Alert aircraft and Nuclear Missile Silos we would often receive update use of force training. Invariably, in cases where we were supposed to shoot to wound, not many such granted, the instructor would call the class to attention and march us outside. There he/she would say something along the lines of "If you shoot to wound, wound them between the eyes, or wound them 20 times in the abdomen." I heard from bomber and missile crews that that line of thinking extended all the way to the Pentagon and the doctrine was to literarily bomb a target area and its population flat. Not official policy mind you, more of an unofficial realization that an annihilated enemy is unable to return the favor.
buffnut453
Captain
Please let us know your thoughts, Steve. I, for one, would be most interested in your take on the book.
Cheers,
Mark
- Thread starter
- #6,011
Nice Paul.
- Thread starter
- #6,013
Cheers Paul, must get that Ki-61/Ki100 book myself.
It's the best book I have found so far on the subject that is in english
- Thread starter
- #6,015
Kagero usually do a good job...
MiTasol
1st Lieutenant
And one of the reasons the Vietnam war continued so long and ended in failure is that in their attempts to annihilate the enemy they caused massive "collateral damage" to the innocents who wanted nothing to do with either side.
Military Intelligence always fails to recognise that shooting, bombing and napalming innocent non-aligned civilians who want nothing more than to be left alone and not be involved always results in those civilians becoming either enemy supporters or enemy guerrillas.
In the Middle East we have major terrorist groups like Hezbollah who have learned from America and its allies stupidity in Vietnam.
They are building schools and health facilities so that those who do not want to be involved in the war have good reason to support them against the Israelis when the Israelis leave their own territory.
While I am generally firmly on the side of the the Israelis they learnt their tactics from the US in Vietnam and, like the US military, cannot understand why there is so much support for those who actually provide basic services to the probable collateral damage instead of just using them for weapons targets.
Not the case in WW2, in which German workers' housing, hence by inevitable extension the workers themselves and their families, were not deemed 'innocent' but rather a valid target. How this came to be the case for the Anglo-American CBO, despite the public pretence by both that this was not the case is the gist of Biddle's's book.
One essential point that she, I and most others agree on, is that it did not become about as a result of the technical limitations of bombing from altitude, by night or in poor visibility. This is the facile explanation often given in 'Air Force' histories which ignores the development of the strategies dating back to at least WW1 and arguably before heavier than air flight.
Cheers
Steve
Robert Porter
Senior Master Sergeant
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Shortround6
Major General
Or see shore bombardment from ships of cities dating back to muzzle loading cannon and/or see sacking/looting and burning of enemy cities dating back to.................
Aircraft were just a different way of delivering rocks/bombs/incendiary/nasty devices.
