Admiral Graf Spee: Fight to the death (no scuttling)

[renrich]

No ships got their nose blown off at the Plate. I question strongly if the Graf Spee after being at sea as long as she had could make 28 knots. I don't know what condition the RN ships were in but they would have a significant advantage in speed. The hit summary by Exeter does not really equate with Cumberland since she has two more eight inchers. Since AGS could not sink any RN ships in the first battle, there is little reason to believe she could sink any in a second battle. In a running battle, unlike the first engagement, the Spee will be at a severe disadvantage since only her aft turret could bear with little or no help from the 5.9s. I suspect that Harwood would try to force Langsdorff into that running battle in anticipation of reinforcements from Force K. The aircraft from The Ark could engage a number of hours before the gunships could.

 

[Juha]

IMHO AGS had lost some of its fighting power if we look damage it had suffered during the BoRP
Once damage control had made an assessment of the damage received, the following items were found to be damaged beyond repair with the means on board:

Fwd Flak director
Starboard 3,7cm mount
right barrel of Port 10,5cm mount
starboard 10,5cm chain hoist
port #1 15cm hoist
foretop range finder
torpedo tube 2
torpedo spread apparatus
starboard torpedo filling room
Port torpedo training mechanism
catapult traversing gear
spotting plane
steam piping to after part of ship (scavenged to repair fuel and lube oil piping?)
radiators for after part of ship
upper deck fire fighting mains in section X
hole in freeboard section XV (bow)
petty officers baths.

Ammunition available:
full stock of 2 and 3,7cm
423 rounds of 15cm
306 rounds of 28cm
2470 rounds of 10,5cm

On British side Ajax was in effect 5 6" gun ship, X-turret remained unusable, but Y-turret was freed soon after the battle but one of the forward guns was unuseable because of a technical reason. Both CLs were low of ammo.

Juha

 

[psteel]

Exeter was one torpedo hit away from sinking. She was down in the bow ; flooding ; listing and burning from end to end with all main guns destroyed or out of action and limping away at 12 knots. It's unfortunate Langsdorff lost his cool and ran away from the fight, since this doomed him. His best chance was to use the second half of his ammo to run down the Exeter and sink her. This would force the balance of Harwood's force to attack and get battered until they were crippled too. Only at that point could AGS escape before the rest of the RN fleet arrived a couple of days later.

Since AGS had been at sea for months her hull was fouled so she could only make 24 knots....but had enough fuel to run for 16 days at that speed. The British Cruisers could only manage that speed for a few days before they would fall out due to lack of fuel and return to port. The purification plant was destroyed by a 6" gun hit , but the AGS could still run on the basic un refined diesel oil. It would foul the engines over time, but not right away. Given the choice of running or death, it would be a worthwhile risk.

At the end of the day naval clashes are determined by command decision, and the near miss that wounded Langsdorff may have influenced his following actions and cost them the battle. Otherwise they had established a clear tactical victory. But without a well planned 'end game escape clause', AGS was doomed.

More importantly this very first major naval battle in WW-II was a test of the main German principle of warship design….to be able to 'out run what they could not defeat'. It clearly did not work very well for commerce raiders and should have lead to avoiding all enemy combat. That's why my view is that HSK auxiliary cruisers were far better raiders than super expensive surface raiders.


I already adjusted the salvo/'hit rate for Cumberland for 8 guns over 6, that is why she would have the same hit rate of the AGS. The Exeter salvo/hit rate was more like 11:1 than 8:1.

 

[renrich]

Most ships especially cruisers or smaller or "one torpedo hit from sinking." The Spee's engines were in need of overhauling before she left on the cruise. I doubt she could make 24 knots and she had no guarantee that she could make it home even without enemy interference. Juha, I was almost sure that at least one 5.9 was out of action.

 

[psteel]

There are many examples of RN DD being hit by two torpedoes and surviving, it all depends on where they hit. While the British would do every thing the could to stop the AGS, but most returning raiders made it home through 1941, without too much difficulty. If AGS lays low in the Indian Ocean with Altmarck for weeks an attempt could be made while a follow on raider attempts another break out....thats the way it was supposed to work.

 

[Freebird]

Exeter was one torpedo hit away from sinking. She was down in the bow ; flooding ; listing and burning from end to end with all main guns destroyed or out of action and limping away at 12 knots. It's unfortunate Langsdorff lost his cool and ran away from the fight, since this doomed him. His best chance was to use the second half of his ammo to run down the Exeter and sink her. This would force the balance of Harwood's force to attack and get battered until they were crippled too. Only at that point could AGS escape before the rest of the RN fleet arrived a couple of days later.

Not at all.
If he used up the rest of his ammo on the Exeter, the AGS would be a sitting duck for the larger RN forces on the way, unable to continue the mission, and trying to limp home without primary armament.
What makes you think Harwood would be "forced to attack"? If the Exeter was finished off Harwood would do exactly the same as he did, shadow the AGS while staying out of range of the larger guns.
He did what was the best choice of options, get away to a neutral port, quickly repair battle damage and then try to escape.

Since AGS had been at sea for months her hull was fouled so she could only make 24 knots....but had enough fuel to run for 16 days at that speed. The British Cruisers could only manage that speed for a few days before they would fall out due to lack of fuel and return to port.

The British cruisers only needed to shadow AGS for 36 hours or so, long enough for Force K (and others) to arrive.
AGS had already made several attempts to engage the Ajax Achillies on the run into Mentivideo, without getting any hits, they could almost certainly shadow the AGS while staying out of range.
The question really is could the AGS evade the Allied warships in the 6 hours or so of darkness, and escape detection by Allied aircraft the next morning.
The Achillies carried a Walrus floatplane, and the Cumberland carried 3, the Ajax had a Seafox floatplane.

Given the choice of running or death, it would be a worthwhile risk.

He obviously felt that escape in AGS's current condition was impossible, so attempting to sortie could likely doom most of the 1,000 man crew

At the end of the day naval clashes are determined by command decision, and the near miss that wounded Langsdorff may have influenced his following actions and cost them the battle. Otherwise they had established a clear tactical victory. But without a well planned 'end game escape clause', AGS was doomed.

 

[psteel]

I am proposing he run down Exeter at the end of the battle as he was running south making 24 knots . British never left a ship sinking at that point in the war, they always rushed to the rescue of the fallen ship. In fact when Harwood realized that AGS was closing to finish off Exeter , he ordered both light cruisers to top speed [which was 29 knots in those seas and moderate breeze, and attacked with a deluge of shells. All Langsdorff has to do is to close with Exeter and torpedo her and then use the rest of his ammo to cripple the light cruisers and make good an escape , using a combination of smoke and fire plus failing light and bad weather. The distance would have been much less than 8 nm.

The British reinforcement warships were up to 3000 nm away and would take 2-5 days to get there [ Dec 14-19 reported on this wiki site]. BTW to do that would require them averaging 25 knots which mean most of their warships would arrive with little fuel for any pursuit.

Battle of the River Plate - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

At this time of the year the seas and weather below the 45th parallel was bad and Langsdorff could use the bad weather to escape, since the British have no radar. That's about 40 hours at 24 knots. If AGS cannot shake off the cruisers there would be another clash with the Cumberland coming from the Falklands in the south and the cruiser shadowing from the north. This could be a repeat of the plate battle, but the British might also get lucky with a torpedo hit and slow the AGS more, otherwise she should escape into the bad weather of north of the Antarctic seas.

When he meets up with Altmark and they head to the Indian Ocean or the Pacific and affect temporary repairs..

 

[The Basket]

I have always thought the Grad Spee mission to be a fools errand.

No support...no friendly bases against not just the British but also French as well.

To say Langsdorff should have killed his crew in a suicide fight to the death so they can all go to Valhalla is not one I subscribe to.

Maybe Langsdorff was too good a man for such dirty work. We often see Germans as evil Nazis. But Langsdorff was a true hero in my book. And was respected as a decent honourable man.

 

[vikingBerserker]

Were there any U-Boats in the area to assist AGS?

 

[Juha]

Hello VB
at that stage of war I doubt that there were U-boats so South, but Langsdorff clearly believed that there was a RN sub around, he had reported to the SKL on his action report ¨attack from submarine south of Lobos failed¨, Germans believed that this happened on 1818 Dec 13.

In fact what had sealed the AGS destiny was that in the morning of December 15, 1939, Captain Paul Ascher, Chief Gunnery Officer and third in command, was on watch at the foretop of the Spee. Using the powerful rangefinders and glasses that were supposed to look up to 50 Km in clear weather, he reports he has identified Ark Royal and Renown in the vicinity.

Langsdorff prepares his report to Berlin, the evening of December 15, the one upon which Raeder and eventually Hitler had to decide upon, with the words: Strategic position off Montevideo: Besides the cruisers and destroyers, Ark Royal and Renown. Close blockade at night. Escape into open sea and break-through to home waters hopeless.

So superior opponent, Renown, and a CV, means at least constant shadowing during daytime or overwhelming air attacks depending on how high or low was Langsdorff's (and Reader's and Hitler's) regard on FAA. After all the unrepairable battle damages had badly reduced AGS's AA armament, which had been fairly weak from beginning.

Unnoticed leaving from Montevideo was impossible because of close surveillance by British in Montevideo and the narrow timewindow left between the last allied merchant ship sailing and the end of the time-limit given by Uruguai's Gov. On the other hand numerous sandbanks would have limited manoueuvres of both sides. But all in all Renown with her 15" guns simply was too powerful opponent. In reality she and AR were still far away, but Langsdorff (and Reader and Hitler) had to decide on the info they had.

Juha

 

[renrich]

An interesting point about the battle is how history seems almost to repeat itself. In WW1, the German Armored Cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau along with lighter ships had decimated a Brtiish force at the Battle of Coronel. The commander of the German force was Von Spee. That force was going to raid the base in the Falkland Islands only to find a British force there including two BCs, Invincible and Inflexible. The German armored cruisers were outgunned and were too slow and were sunk. Now in the same vicinity, in a ship named after Von Spee and commanded by a man, Langsdorff, who was in the same mold as the officers of the Kaiser's navy another German raider could have been confronted by a British BC , faster and more heavily gunned. I wonder if Harwood ever revealed what his tactics were going to be if the Spee had come out to do battle with the RN cruisers?

The situation Langsdorff faced at the Plate would make an excellent plot for an alternative history.

 

[renrich]

In looking at the track chart of the battle it looks as if Exeter turned to leave the battle at about 07:40. At that time Spee was about ten miles away proceeding at right angles to the Exeter's course after she had turned away. Ajax and Achilles were at that time crossing the Spee's wake while making smoke so as to come out after a 90 degree turn on the port side of Spee. In other words Spee was headed at roughly right angles to the course of the CLs presenting her stern to them. If Spee makes a 90 degree turn to port in order to close the retiring CA she presents her broadside to the CLs and would be more vulnerable to torpedo attack. I suspect that Langsdorff, a torpedo specialist, took that into account as well as that at that time he had only (according to several accounts online) 16 hours of fuel left without effecting repairs in port.

 

[parsifal]

Maybe Langsdorff was too good a man for such dirty work. We often see Germans as evil Nazis. But Langsdorff was a true hero in my book. And was respected as a decent honourable man.

Never a better summation of the man , and a great clue as to why he chose to scuttle rather than go down in a pointless, unwinnable battle. Langsdorfs decision to run for harbour after the first fight was done on the basis that he thought he could get his ship ready for a run home. He was refused permission for sufficient time to do that. If he had then chosen to run from harbour, his ships would have been shadowed until heavy units arrived to finish her off.

Ther was no escape for this ship once she failed in the original battle. To win she needed to sink or disable all three of the RN cruisers. With even one cruiser on her tail she was a doomed ship. At 22-24 knots, British cruisers had an endurance of about 8 days, more than enough to maintain their shadowing role until help arrived.

Langsdorf scuttled his ship for good reason. He was an honourable man, thoughtful and compassionate. He deserves better from history and his countrymen, rather than being presented with a fools errand that somehow the dhip could be saved.

 

[psteel]

An interesting point about the battle is how history seems almost to repeat itself. In WW1, the German Armored Cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau along with lighter ships had decimated a British force at the Battle of Coronel. The commander of the German force was Von Spee. That force was going to raid the base in the Falkland Islands only to find a British force there including two BCs, Invincible and Inflexible. The German armored cruisers were outgunned and were too slow and were sunk. Now in the same vicinity, in a ship named after Von Spee and commanded by a man, Langsdorff, who was in the same mold as the officers of the Kaiser's navy another German raider could have been confronted by a British BC , faster and more heavily gunned. I wonder if Harwood ever revealed what his tactics were going to be if the Spee had come out to do battle with the RN cruisers?

The situation Langsdorff faced at the Plate would make an excellent plot for an alternative history.

Hence my proposal. But you are absolutely right. I often wonder about Grand Admiral Raeder's strategy, which was essentially an attempt to marry an experience like the first battle of the Falkland's with Scheer's battle cruiser sweep later in the war. If the Battle cruiser sweep was timed right it would catch the home fleet 'weakened'.

This was the basis of the surface raider strategy and its obvious that the raider becomes a 'sacrificial pawn'. Hardly an encouraging role for any skipper and crew to be trained for and face. Looking back to WW-I the experiences of the auxiliary raiders should have made more of an impact because they were able to operate on the oceans for months on end and survived fighting for years in both wars. I gather before WW-II Germany possessed 50-70 diesel merchant ships with enough size and endurance to be converted into such roles and since the cost of doing this was less than the cost of an R-boot coastal craft, it should have been a 'no brainer'.


I gather the skipper of the Ajax never understood why Langsdorff didn't run down Exeter and finish her off. The AGS was only 6 miles away while the Light cruisers were 10 miles astern with a 3-5 knot speed advantage.

 

[renrich]

Looking again at the track chart, Spee did turn as if to close on Exeter prior to the time Exeter turned away but the CLs had gotten very close and were getting hits and he apparently changed his mind. I read an account of the battle written by a Lt. in Exeter and he did not mention that the Captain of the Exeter was "chasing salvos" prior to the time B turret was hit and most on the bridge were killed. If Exeter was steering a straight course it simplified the gunnery of Spee. One of my uncles was in CA25 in the Komondorski Battle and the CO's ability to "chase salvos" aparently helped Salt lake City to be hit as few times as she was. That battle reminds me a little of The Plate.

 

[The Basket]

If Germany had a huge numbers of auxiliary cruisers on the high seas then they would need huge numbers of supply ships and vast amounts of fuel. Germany was a feeble naval power and had zero advantages. It achieved what it did out of all proportion to its real capabilities.

Raeder was directly responsible for lack of auxiliary cruisers as he didn't know war would start in 1939. The difference between the German auxiliaries in WW1 and WW2 were of course Radar,radio and aircraft which made a big ocean seem a lot smaller. Again ships like the Atlantis achieved because of the crew.

The Graf Spee was outnumbered and far away from home without any support. It was basically stuffed and only knocking out all 3 RN cruisers without damage was its only hope. Langsdorff was in a no win situation. The Admiral Scheer did so well coz it met was the Jervis Bay.

 

[psteel]

No argument about Langsdorffs some what impossible situation.

Well German already had these ships and used them through out the war in other naval roles , so the fuel issue and supply is not as big issue as it might first appear. These ships could do 40-60,000 nm @ cruise speed on about 2000-3000 tons of diesel fuel. That means they had an endurance of 1/2 year and until the end of 1942 they were able to make their own way into and out of Germany. So they would not need any more supply ships than Germany had. Infact if it was done well enough these ships could play a duel role of HSK and Uboat supply ship. The HSK code was the last major code the allies cracked and that was not until 1943.


If you want to blame any one for the lack of naval readiness for war, you must place the blame squarely on the C-in-C of the Wehrmacht, Adolf Hitler. He was the one who demanded that the navy be gutted and turned into a coastal defense fleet. It was him who forbade any preperation for war with the UK and it was him who demanded that his admirals and Generals conform to his view that a major war with the big European powers could be avoided until the mid 1940s. It was also his decision in 1935 to abandon the overall argeed upon strategic plan and force a massive change in direction through the 1936 four year plan. Amongst the many problems it created it forced a delay in the naval building program that saw all the warships delayed by an average of 11 months.

Ultimatly it was his change of heart after Munich that dragged Germany into war prematurely, since he had decided that there was no point in waiting any longer for his ultimte struggle with 'American led international Jewry'. This is why many historians see WW-II as "Hitlers War".

 

[delcyros]

Langsdorff an officer with background of the Torpedo inspection. He was a torpedo school officer for much of his career.
The command over ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE was his first primary artillery fighting ship command.
Throughout the battle he chaged courses repeatedly, organised speed and set course changes after potential torpedo lanes (which he would have fired had he been the british commander, for sure) and dictated the distances about what he guessed was on the edge of effective torpedoing distance.
All this pretty much ruined the work of the gunnery officer, who preferred a steady course, loosing his firing solutions with every change and had little hope to engage effective rapid fire (order "gut- schnell", requiring at least two successive straddles for confirmed range). That Langsdorff choose his GO´s platform to command the ship from and not the armoured CT probably didn´t made the IGO´s task easier...
With all respect for him as a respective and sensible personality, he handled the pocket battlship like a DD, not like a cruiser armed with capitalship guns.

 

[psteel]

Did Germany really have such a lack of trained officers that they had to resort to DD skippers? The same thing happened with the Scharnhorst at North Cape battle, or so I'm given to understand!!!

I gather that the Germans had a couple of Linienschiffe as 'training ships' plus a couple more as heavily armored remote controlled target ships. I assumed this meant they would have a alot of training for atleast cruiser level or higher commanders?

 

[delcyros]

It was not uncommon -in all navies- that high performing, selected officers were allowed the opportunity of cross purpose charges to widen their horizon and let other people participate from their skills.
It´s not a question of shortages, the KM naval officers circulated a lot in and out of command of the very few major fleet units.
That´s not saying it always worked out as intended...