Admiral Graf Spee: Fight to the death (no scuttling)

[psteel]

Regarding the enemy's tactics, Captain Parry said the 'outstanding and most satisfactory feature seemed to be a complete absence of the offensive spirit.' He certainly made skilful use of smoke to conceal himself from the 6-inch cruisers when their fire became effective, while continuing his main engagement with the Exeter. But in the end he retired from the Ajax and Achilles behind a smoke screen without attempting to finish off the Exeter, although he appeared from his subsequent reported statements to have known that she was out of action. 'The only possible explanation seems to be that he had been severely handled himself. In confirmation, it was noticed that his after turret was not firing for a long time towards the end of the action and that his 5·9-inch gunfire became increasingly ragged and ineffective.'

Yet, according to the German account of the action, the Admiral Graf Spee had sustained only two 8-inch and eighteen 6-inch hits. One officer and thirty-five ratings had been killed and sixty wounded. 'The fighting value of the ship had not been destroyed,' the report said. The main armament was 'fully effective', but there remained only 306 rounds of 11-inch ammunition, representing about 40 per cent of the original supply. The secondary armament was effective with the exception of one gun on the port side and the ammunition hoists of the forward 5·9-inch guns. In consequence, only the four ammunition hoists aft were available for use and the forward guns would have to be supplied from aft. More than 50 per cent of the ammunition supply for the secondary armament remained. The engines were available for maximum speed with the exception of defects of long standing in the auxiliary engines.

CHAPTER 4 — The Battle of the River Plate | NZETC


Another report shows that the AGS had 186 shells, mostly AP rounds, but that was after the pursite that consumed atleast 65 more shells. So the 306 figure is accurate. Which suggests she had roughly 1/2 HE and 1/2 AP at the critical jucture, when he chose to run to port. Like I said his poor control of the AGS lowered the hit percentage and had it been more along the lines of the PE all the British Cruisers would have been put out of action, especially if they chose to attack at night since they had no radar, while the AGS did.

Langsdorff may have been an honorable man , but he was not aggressive enough as a wartime commander.

 

[Juha]

... So the 306 figure is accurate. Which suggests she had roughly 1/2 HE and 1/2 AP at the critical jucture,

Nearer to 1/3 HE and 2/3 AP because AGS used almost exclusively HE shells during the battle. And if it had engaged Cumberland it would have had only very few HEs left and would have had rely on APs.

 

[Wavelength]

One of the most common misperceptions about this battle is that Langsdorf charged in resulting in a short range battle throwing the advantages of his heavier artillery away. The secondary literature on this battle is badly in error.

The primary documents give an entirely different view of Langsdorf's tactics. Most interesting is the German track chart indicates the following:

The enemy was reported in sight at 0552 hours range 31,000 meters to its south, south east. The enemy was making 14 knots on course 60* T.
At 0615 Graf Spee turned from course 140* to course 97*, to clear its arc of fire, accelerating to 24 knots.
At 0617 Graf Spee opened fire on Exeter, range 20,600 meters (22,500 yards).
Exeter turns to its starboard coming around to course 275* (this increases the range)
A &A continue on course 60* for the next few minutes and then turn to course 30* or north east
At about 0626 Graf Spee turns to course 60* and then to 06* to prevent A&A from crossing it T. Range to A&A still exceeded 16,000 meters at that time.

German analysis dated Feb1940 point out that Langsdorf made a tactical error at this point by turning north and shifting fire to the light cruisers instead of finishing off Exeter. In the view of the Artillery Research Command he should have turned south at this point and kept the hard hit Exeter engaged. Turning south would have neutralized the two light cruisers for the time being, having them going the wrong direction and placed the Graf Spee in a perfect position to finish off Exeter with both artillery and torpedoes.

The German analysis also point out that Langsdorf missed a second chance to finish off Exeter at 0634 when it re-engaged Exeter from its port side having turned on to course 320*. It quickly scored three more hits on Exeter despite the long range, but it once again shifted fire and turned to course 283*, letting Exeter off the hook. Shortly before this time Graf Spee received a 6" hit from the Ajax from a range of 16,000 meters from starboard to port which exploded in the fighting top. The radar set and the range finder lost electrical power and the cabling was cut to the inclinometer which disabled the RPC. From this point onward Langsdorf sought disengagement. It goes without saying that its shooting fell off.

Up until that time its shooting was really outstanding. Graf Spee's AO Paul Ascher opened the battle with a classic 400 meter bracket to confirm his firing solution: One just short (causing damage), one just long, and the third straddling. It then hit the Exeter four times in as minutes before shifting fire. When it shifted fire back to the Exeter it hit with the first salvo followed by two more in a just a few minutes. It scored 7 direct hits and 3 damaging near misses on the Exeter before the battle was 15 minutes old.

The services of the range finder, radar set, and the RPC was restored by the time it reached Montevideo.

Even during the historical battle AGS was close to destroying the British force in detail.

 

[parsifal]

here are then extracts from the DKM Admiralty, giving details on the information about the ship, the damage suffered, and the main problems being faced by the ship after the battle
Part of the initial communication sent by Langsdorf 14 December

Further more detailed report received 16 December 1939

AGS was short of ammunition according to its own commander. It had suffered light damage, but that damage affected the ships seaworthiness. There is no mention of damage to the fuel system, but it does mention that seawater was getting into certain compartments. Im not sure which compartments at this stage and Langsdorfs reports dont really reveal the detail


I accept that there was some sort of damage to the fuel feeder system,. but i cant find a primary source to support that. Id love to know where the notion comes from

 

[Wavelength]

I have seen the detailed German damage report caputered after the war ended. It does not list damages caused by each hit. Instead it goes through each system listing any problems and if they have been addressed yet. For example it will go through the condition of the SA (heavy battery) and its supporting systems. Most of the damage had been addressed. There is no mention of the fuel purification system.

There were 15 6" hits and two 8" hits. Almost all caused only superficial damage, although two 6" deck hits on the forecastle left large exit wounds in the port side bow flare, which could have caused see keeping problems in a heavy sea way. The gun systems and the ship's vitals remained untouched. The one critical hit, on which the battle turned, was the 6" forecastle hit. This affected AGS fighting ability.

The two 8" hits were scored early. They were scored with Exeter's 3rd and 4th salvoes. Exeter scored no other hits for the rest of the day. The first 8" hit was a plunging fire deck hit. It passed through an armoured hatch closure before passing through 2 decks and detonating above the main armoured deck. It damaged the fresh water purification system. This may have had an indirect impact on the fuel purification system because steam was used to pre-heat the fuel as part of the fuel purification procedures. The second 8" hit was a dud which passed through the foretop tower cleanly and then bounced off the lightly armoured oberdeck and into the sea.

In 1964 a damage listing by Sir Millington-Drake mistakenly listed a 8" belt penetration on the port side forward. This was in error as was proven by the photographs taken by British agents after Graf Spee arrived in Montevideo and given to Harwood.

 

[Wavelength]

My point is that Langsdorf essentially fought a long range battle in keeping with German doctrine at least to begin with. It was going very well up until the 6" foretop hit which handicapped Graf Spee's firecontrol. Without that Graf Spee was well along to destroying or incapacitating each British unit one at a time.

The Artillery Research Commands review of the battle determined that Langsdorf had sought battle because he had them in sight and was stalking them with radar for 22 minutes before the British became aware of his presence. He could probably have quietly turned away and avoided any trouble. Maybe he thought he needed to destroy or incapacitate the enemy to prevent them from shadowing him until more powerful units could arrive, given his speed disadvantage? A factor was certainly the misidentification of Ajax and Achilles as destroyers instead of cruisers

 

[parsifal]

she had still suffered enough damage for chief engineer Krakenhagen to say it would take two weeks of dock time to repair. that's not light damage. Light damage would take 1 or two days for own crew to repair. I would p[lace that in the category of moderate damage.

I don't understand some aspects of this situation. Why describe the damage as "Light", yet assess the repair time as two weeks. In the "In this day in Europe" thread Im going through the daily reports for all the navies, and a two week repair time is a fairly extended repair time

 

[Wavelength]

I agree, it is a bit puzzling because the detailed damage survey certainly does not describe any heavy damage. One thing about it, they were somewhat dependent upon the yard to provide materials and specialized labor, and the British were putting pressure on to not to provide them anything. I have heard it described that the damaged steam piping could not be repaired in timely way because it required special materials, probably a stainless steel or monel piping, which was difficult to obtain, but once again such is not listed in the damage survey or other documents. They may have been overstating their case to make excuse to buy more time as well.

Regarding the ammo question they used HE during battle (as the doctrine specified) and probably were about out of that. AP is about useless against merchant shipping and not much good against cruisers either.

 

[Garyt]

I'd think the Graf Spee would do well against the initial british forces, barring a lucky hit like the one that knocked out her fire control. I think what is sometimes overlooked is that in addition to her 6 x11" guns, she also had the 8 x 5.9" guns, which was roughly the equivalent of an Ajax or Achilles main armament.

The real problem I see is after the battle. If she takes much damage that effects her speed and sea worthiness, running from the other british forces searching for her becomes very tough.

Regarding the ammo question they used HE during battle (as the doctrine specified) and probably were about out of that. AP is about useless against merchant shipping and not much good against cruisers either.

Against destroyers and merchants it's overkill, but it's only an 11.1 inch gun, and not quite in the same class as the Scharnhorst's 11.1". The cruisers have a good 3-6 inches of belt armor, so overpenetration should not be an issue.

 

[Denniss]

Using the 28cm AP shell to punch through a destroyer or cruiser still makes a big hole in their hull with associated damage. It may be sufficient to cause flooding, depending on angle of impact and penetration.

 

[Garyt]

Using the 28cm AP shell to punch through a destroyer or cruiser still makes a big hole in their hull with associated damage. It may be sufficient to cause flooding, depending on angle of impact and penetration.

True Denniss, but if the shell fails to detonate or passes through the vessel prior to detonation, you lose much of the potential damage that could be done. With 1 inch or less of metal, destroyers and merchants vessels do not offer a shell of this type enough resistance to detonate within the vessel with regularity.

Three to six inches though of belt armor definitely gives enough resistance to detonate. One must remember though that these AP rounds were no where near 100% reliable - passing through x inches of armor and both shell and fuse staying intact to effect detonation is no easy task.

As an aside, a Common Round was expected in real rough terms to penetrate armor equal to 1/3 it's diameter, so a common round from the Graf Spee would be expected to penetrate roughly 3.7 inches of armor, which makes cruisers right on the borderline of effectiveness for HE rounds.