Admiral Graf Spee: Fight to the death (no scuttling)

RN had similar experiences, as did the US and IJN.

In the case of the RN, Cunningham was a Battleship specialist, that did very well commanding carriers. There were some other officers with similar experiences.

As a generalization, once an officer achieved flag rank (Commodore in the RN, not sure about the KM, but expect kapitan), his specialization became less important to his command capability...his ability to lead and handle ships in general over his specialization. In the RN, "wavy navy" officers were generally excluded from flag rank commissions, though ther were some exceptions.

I dont buy the argument that langsdorf lost the battle because he was a destroyer captain. I can understand why he was making rapid and repeated course and speed changes. He knew he had to emerge from the battle with as little damage as possible to his ship, if he wanted to get home. Maintaining a steady course increases the chances of success for his own gunnery, but also increases the chances of success for the RN of hitting him.

I think the Germans basically fell into this battle by accident. If I recall correctly, The Germans initially identified the British squadron as one cruiser and two destroyers. Langsdorf was also greatly disrupted by Harwoods super aggressive tactics and the splitting of his forces.

Moreover, a torpedo hit from the "destroyers" was a far greater threat than a gunnery hit. Manouvering to avoid critical hit dfrom this threat (however imaginary it proved to be with the benefiot of perfect hindsight) was the right decision given the information before him at the time.

I don't think Bey performed well at Narvik and wonder why he was put in charge of one of the last remaining capital ships in the German fleet. I also don't think Langsdorff was aggressive enough as a commander. The risk of the enemy not being what a commander had anticipated was always going to be an issue in any naval clash. What was the expected doctrinal solution in such an event, for the slower moving Panzerschiffe?

From what I can see he had no choice but to fight it out to conclusion. One may argue he acted on behalf of his crew etc but I think of leaders of other warships like KorvettenKaptain H von Brosy-Steinberg in Sept 1941 off Norway.

Escorting a troop convoy with 1500 mountain troops deploying to Northern Norway, Brosy-Steinberg was skipper of the 2000 ton Gun boat the Bremse. She could only make 28-29 knots and much less in the stormy gale that night. His ship was armed with only 4 x 5"guns against two British Cruisers able to make 31-32 knots in good weather and armed with 18 x 6"guns + 16 x 4"flak and torpedoes. Brosy-Steinberg could not run away and had to protect the convoy, so he charged the British Cruisers drawing them away while the convoy escaped.

Even though both British armored Cruisers had modern 'director' fire controls and type 273, 284 290 radars, while the Bremse had none, a confused night battle developed with smoke where the Bremse was lost and mistaken as 3 different counter attacking warships including a DD a F class escort and herself.

I don't think Bey performed well at Narvik and wonder why he was put in charge of one of the last remaining capital ships in the German fleet

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Why do you think he did not perform very well at Narvik. The first battle he won, the second one he lost....mostly because he was out of ammunition and was faced with a battleship. There was no escape from Narvik once the supply ship was intercepted and sunk.

As to his command of Scharnhorst, just rember the operational restrictions all KM COs were burdened with. There was far less individual freedom of decision for the commanders at sea.....the KM tended to try and run battles or at least operations from their fleet HQ. Look at what happened to marschall in 1940.....acted contrary to Raeders orders, sank a carrier and two DDs as a result, and stil was court martialled. he should have been treated as a hero.

and then ther is the policy of not engaging equal or superior forces. This cost the KM more than it saved, and severely restricted even further the freedom to make decisions based on local conditions for the commanders on the spot.

Beys command of his ships was entirely consistent with standard operational procedures of the KM. The fact that these procedures were over controlling and flawed in the first place cannot be laid at the feet of the fleet commanders....they are the fault of the high command, extending all the way to Hitlers but including OKM.

I also don't think Langsdorff was aggressive enough as a commander. The risk of the enemy not being what a commander had anticipated was always going to be an issue in any naval clash. What was the expected doctrinal solution in such an event, for the slower moving Panzerschiffe?

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Id have to disagree with that, in that i dont see the failure as being of Langsdorfs making. Langsdorf was subject to the same restrictions as Bey at North Cape...."do not engage an enemy of the same or superior force". Langsdorfs primary mission was mercantile raiding not sinking elements of the RN. He initially under-estimated the strength of the RN force against him...1 cruiser plus two destroyers, in reality 3 cruisers, and as soon as this became apparent, applied the rules of engagement that were applicable.....use all possible means to disengage. The fact that he is slower does not make it impossible to disengage...just harder.

Langsdorf was acting entirely within the parameters of his standing orders. If you want to blame anybody for his timidity, blame the german admiralty.

From what I can see he had no choice but to fight it out to conclusion. One may argue he acted on behalf of his crew etc but I think of leaders of other warships like KorvettenKaptain H von Brosy-Steinberg in Sept 1941 off Norway.

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There was no lack of fighting spirit in the KM, and that came out in the performance of their light forces. in particular the successes of their S bootes is worth mentioning. The performance of the bremse is another exemplary example of the KM at its best.

However, rigidly enforced standing orders applied to the commanders of capital ships, and langsdorf was obliged to follow those orders, or risk court martial

Langsdorf violated standing orders when he decided to engage a cruiser and two 'DD's' instead of rejecting action when he still had opportunity to do so. He intentionally engaged an element of RN forces instead of a merchant vessel.
A cruiser and 2 DD's would have been dangerous alone for a single raider.

delcyros said:

Langsdorf violated standing orders when he decided to engage a cruiser and two 'DD's' instead of rejecting action when he still had opportunity to do so. He intentionally engaged an element of RN forces instead of a merchant vessel.
A cruiser and 2 DD's would have been dangerous alone for a single raider.

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While difinitely true that Langsdorf violated his orders but that very probably changed nothing. The RN cruisers were readying their catapult planes for morning searches when they saw AGS, so even if AGS had turned away when it first saw the cruisers, the catapult planes would most probably have found her a little later.

Juha

Juha

Langsdorf violated standing orders when he decided to engage a cruiser and two 'DD's' instead of rejecting action when he still had opportunity to do so. He intentionally engaged an element of RN forces instead of a merchant vessel.

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You are right. I would think however that in his mind, it was an acceptable risk, and must have thought they were defending some high value target like a troop convoy. If he could deal with the Cruiser quickly, he could then turn away and run. Whilst he could not out run Destroyers, they lacked the endurance, spotter aircraft and the like, to maintain a proper shadowing role. If they attempted to close and disable the Spee with torpedoes, there was a high risk they would be sunk by the raiders guns first. From Langsdorf perspective I can see it asd a calculated fairly safe risk

I didnt think a cruiser plus two destroyers would be considered an equal or superior force to s heavier cruiser, but maybe it was.....are there any contemporary guidelines on that sort of thing......

A cruiser and 2 DD's would have been dangerous alone for a single raider.

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Ah yes, i agree with that as well, but do you think more or less or about the same threat as 3 cruisers. I would think langsdorf would view the three cruisers as more threat

From Wikipedia: Neutrality restrictions limited Admiral Graf Spee to a period of 72 hours in Montevideo before she would be interned for the duration of the war.

Maybe someone can explain this; how does Uruguay intern a battle cruiser with 11 inch guns if she doesn't want to be interned? This part of the story has always bothered me.

It was agreed to international rules. If the Graf Spee had shot her way out of Montevideo it is likely that no neutral country would have allowed any German ship to take refuge for the duration of the war. While it wound up making little enough difference as things turned out I doubt that the Germans were willing to give up this benefit that early in the war.

Remember too that the same rules kept the British from coming in after her. There was no way the Uruguay navy could have kept the British out either. Any future attempt by a German ship to seek 72 hr refuge might have been meet with an invitation by the "host" country to the RN to get the intruder out of their waters.

The neutrals were important for reasons other than military. Trade, sanctuary, foreign exchange, diplomacy. Losing the Adm Graf Spee was prefereable to losing credibility among all neutral nations. Germany had enough issues in that department already.....

Assuming that Langsdorff expected a light cruiser of the LEANDER class to engage, Heft e Unterlagen zur Bestimmung der Hauptkampfentfernung (GKdos-100), a period primary source suggest a desired range of in between 130hm and 200hm (= 14,200 to 21,870 yard) and expected a significant superiority but warned from more 6in hits at closer ranges.

Assuming Langsdorff expected a heavy cruiser of the SUFFOLK class to engage, the source suggests a desired range of in between 190hm and 260hm (20,780 yard to 28,440 yard) and additionally always keeping a target angle of nearly 40 deg.

It was unknown by then that the RN didn´t fielded APC ammunition for their cruisers 6in and 8in naval rifles but even knowing that after he realised that he had to fight both, the correct range would have been in excess of 190hm, which Langsdorff ignored and choosed to close in early in the engagement. This was a very risky move. From long range, he could mainten a more steady course for longer and let his GO doing his job best to exploit the benefits of the bigger 11.1in naval rifles and C/38k firecontroll gear in long range superiority.
That way he really messed up things. That´s at least what can be read in period primary sources dealing with conclusions based on interrogations of the crew. His AO´s from both, the fore and aft FC stations complained much about this.

The problem I have with his engagement in the first place is that assuming he expected a valuable convoi than he should also have expected more escorts. You don´t run into all escorts seperated from the convoi at once. There were no merchants spotted but I speculate that he may have been looking for the HIGHLAND PRINCESS which was reported in this area three days ago. Assuming he expected a minor element of the RN than he should have known that he was confronted with parts of a task force searching for him and he should have denied contact (in fact he was informed by the B-service about multiple TF´s set up to look for him and he was lucky not to run into the TF formed around ARK ROYAL and DUNKERQUE). That would have been possible by the time, Diesels take only minutes to go from cruise to full speed while some boilers in case of ACHILLES and EXETER needed to be lit up in the first place to make steam for speed. Langsdorff had an initial ID advantage (even assuming he miss ID ´ed) and the Ar-196 float planes were more often than once used to drive off scout planes before off Spain and later off Norway. Radar was only aviable to AGS so he could have made good his escape in the night.


Langsdorff violated standing orders to not engage naval forces and he ignored the suggestions written down in GKdos-100 particularely for such a purpose, he also messed up the gunnery element of the ship and handling a Panzerschiff like a torpedoboat represents a poor substitute for compromising the single most important asset of the Panzerschiff: It´s battleship guns and firecontroll gears cramped in a cruiser´s hull.

On Arado Ar 196As, one must remember that the 196A-1 of AGS with its one fixed and one flexible 7.9mm mg had much weaker firepower than subsequent subtypes. It was definitely better than the Seafoxes of Ajax, which had one 7.7mm flexible, but the Walrus of Exeter had 2 flexible 7.7mm mgs. So while 196 was better in air combat than the British types it wasn't overwhelmingly so.

Juha

Shortround6 said:

It was agreed to international rules. If the Graf Spee had shot her way out of Montevideo it is likely that no neutral country would have allowed any German ship to take refuge for the duration of the war. While it wound up making little enough difference as things turned out I doubt that the Germans were willing to give up this benefit that early in the war.

Remember too that the same rules kept the British from coming in after her. There was no way the Uruguay navy could have kept the British out either. Any future attempt by a German ship to seek 72 hr refuge might have been meet with an invitation by the "host" country to the RN to get the intruder out of their waters.

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Langsdorff asked for two weeks, the British were insisting on 24 hours. So, it doesn't seem like these rules were cut in stone. Also, orders from German HQ were that the ship should not be interned.

Supermarine Walrus aircraft profile. Aircraft Database of the Fleet Air Arm Archive 1939-1945



Arado Ar 196 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Looking at the above sites the Walrus could do 135mph top speed and had a wing loading of ~ 58kg/m², while Arado could make 195mph with a wing loading of 98kg/m². So the arado can attack at will but the Walrus can evade and escape close in gun fire. I would guess the wing rolling of the monoplane Arado would be much better than the Walrus biplane.

Once the Arado gets twin 20mm guns in the A-2 model in late 1939/1940, they could intercept such threats and drive them off. I gather that historically they shot down RAF Hampden bombers in 1940?

With regards to Bey at Narvik, he took command after Bonte had been killed but was slow to muster his forces and counter attack. It happened that the returning two German destroyers in an adjacent fiord ambushed the retreating British DD on their own initiative , sinking two in spite the fact that in this short violent exchange each of the 5 retreating British Destroyer had a malfunctioning torpedo pass under the hull. This could have turned the whole battle, but Bey was 10,000 yards behind and too timid and hesitant to assist his two destroyers fighting the five British Destroyers.

Worse when 'Naval Group West' told him on the 10th April that several British BB/BC were on route and ordered him to regroup his destroyers and lead them home under cover of night, Bey aborted this break when he saw some RN DD at distance and retreated to Narvik port. The British never knew he was breaking out and he could have made good an escape with two of the four functioning Destroyers. Group west ordered him again the next night to break out with the 4 functioning destroyers, but he failed to even attempt this.

Not the kind of leadership you need for a battleship admiral.

psteel said:

Supermarine Walrus aircraft profile. Aircraft Database of the Fleet Air Arm Archive 1939-1945

Arado Ar 196 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Looking at the above sites the Walrus could do 135mph top speed and had a wing loading of ~ 58kg/m², while Arado could make 195mph with a wing loading of 98kg/m². So the arado can attack at will but the Walrus can evade and escape close in gun fire. I would guess the wing rolling of the monoplane Arado would be much better than the Walrus biplane.

Once the Arado gets twin 20mm guns in the A-2 model in late 1939/1940, they could intercept such threats and drive them off. I gather that historically they shot down RAF Hampden bombers in 1940?...

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Hello psteel, that is just I was trying to say. From A-2 subtype onwards 196 has potential of being effective anti-shadower weapon, but A-1 lacked firepower to be very effective on that role. Against underpowered one mg Seafox it might be easier but against 2 mgs Walrus it would have been more difficult to utilise blind spots and arado could only count the certain superiority of a fixed gun over a flexible gun and its higher speed.

IIRC Arado 196As were used against CC Whitleys over Bay of Biscay from 1941 onwards.

Juha

The Graf Spee wins the battle coming out to sea but doesn't make it home. Too much Royal Navy between it and safety.

The Graf Spee could concentrate on the Cumberland with the 11" guns and the 5.9" on that side exposed to the Cumberland and use the opposite side 5.9" guns to keep what was left of the other cruisers at bay.

Then again, who is to say what shells land where?

The best scenario would have been to finish the first fight before the Cumberland showed up.

The 11" gun shell hits did fearsome damage to all of the British Cruisers since they had about the same level of protection. It took just 7 such hits to reduce the Exeter to a smoldering wreck limping away sinking and AGS had enough ammo to do the same to Cumberland given the hit rate of the first engagement.

It appears that closer examination of the shooting record of this ship, Langsdorff commanded poorly forcing his FC teams to constantly recalculate firing solutions as he jerked the ship around to avoid illusionary torpedoes. Even though, as a former Torpedo flotilla leader, he knew the RN never pulled enough lead to get a good torpedo firing solution. Its remarked by historians that he was adversely effected by the splinter damage that wounded him. This may also explain why the secondary 5.9" scored no hits on many shots fired.

There is no doubt that Langsdorff failed to finish off these Cruisers enough to make good an escape into the Pacific with the Altmarck for weeks weeks and perhaps find a way to effect enough repairs to cross the Indian ocean and creep back to Germany when the RN is focused on the next breakout action...which was part of the strategy of the surface raider usage.

bowfin said:

The Graf Spee wins the battle coming out to sea but doesn't make it home. Too much Royal Navy between it and safety.

The Graf Spee could concentrate on the Cumberland with the 11" guns and the 5.9" on that side exposed to the Cumberland and use the opposite side 5.9" guns to keep what was left of the other cruisers at bay.

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But you are assuming that the Cumberland would engage the Spee, which it probably wouldn't.
The cruisers would be more likely to try to shadow the damaged Spee until the Allied Battlecruisers Carriers arrived

psteel said:

The 11" gun shell hits did fearsome damage to all of the British Cruisers since they had about the same level of protection. It took just 7 such hits to reduce the Exeter to a smoldering wreck limping away sinking and AGS had enough ammo to do the same to Cumberland given the hit rate of the first engagement.

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They used far more than 7 shells in the enggagement though.
If the figures given above are correct he Graf Spee had used up 60% of the 11" ammo and had failed to sink the Exeter. There's no certainty that they can destroy the Cumberland, nor that they wouldn't suffer some critical damage while doing so.

There is no doubt that Langsdorff failed to finish off these Cruisers enough to make good an escape into the Pacific with the Altmarck for weeks weeks and perhaps find a way to effect enough repairs to cross the Indian ocean and creep back to Germany when the RN is focused on the next breakout action...which was part of the strategy of the surface raider usage.

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Had he tried to finish off the Exeter he risked further damage and torpedo attacks.
As his orders were to avoid contact with the RN, he decided to retire.
Also keep in mind that he had no idea what other British ships were in the area.
20/20 hindsight is great, but at the time he felt his best option was to find a neutral port, quickly make repairs and then escape

Thats 9 hits on 405 shells out of 711 shells for a hit rate of one for every 45 shells. So the remaining 306 shells should result in about 6.8 hits . Two hit a Britsh Light Cruiser smashing her rear gun batteries while 7 hit Exeter and almost finshed her off. With Exeter was limping away at 16 knots, listing and flooding with all batteries out and fires raging. It would have only taken one torp to finish her off. Given that the AGS had an 8 knot edge in speed she could easily have gotten into firing positions. The Light Cruisers could similarly exceed AGS top speed by 5-8 knots, but they wizely choose not to since they would be smashed by the big German guns.

If the German reports are accurate , it sounds like Langsdorff suffered some kind of 'paranoid anxity attack' after he suffered his wound. Even though he new the RN Crusiers were in very poor position to obtain any torpedo hits, he imagined a number of such torpedoes launched which he then reacted to by jerking his ship around to avoid these imaginary torpedos and also ruining each firing solutions. As I recall Prince Eugen got 5 hits on 165 shells at Denmarck Straits markedly better than AGS at Plate. Thats probably how much difference these impulsive actions cost the AGS at the 'Battle of the River Plate'. But even having said this Langsdorff still had enough stored hits to do the same to Cumberland that he did to Exeter.

saw a documentary about this the other day and a surviving crew member stated they had 168 main gun rounds left or 1 hours firing as he put it

psteel said:

Thats 9 hits on 405 shells out of 711 shells for a hit rate of one for every 45 shells. So the remaining 306 shells should result in about 6.8 hits.

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Now AGS had used almost all of its preferable shell-type against cruisers, HEs, most of remaining 11" ammo was AP, which easily went through cruiser without explosing, so were usually less damaging to the target.

psteel said:

Two hit a Britsh Light Cruiser smashing her rear gun batterie.

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Not really, it disabled the X turret and jammed the Y turret but the Y-turret was freed during the same evening, IIRC.

psteel said:

...It would have only taken one torp to finish her off. Given that the AGS had an 8 knot edge in speed she could easily have gotten into firing positions...

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Much of AGS's torpedo armament was damaged during the battle but I cannot remember when exactly.

psteel said:

...If the German reports are accurate , it sounds like Langsdorff suffered some kind of 'paranoid anxity attack' after he suffered his wound. Even though he new the RN Crusiers were in very poor position to obtain any torpedo hits, he imagined a number of such torpedoes launched which he then reacted to by jerking his ship around to avoid these imaginary torpedos and also ruining each firing solutions...

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British also fired torpedoes and noted that AGS avoided them with course chages.

psteel said:

As I recall Prince Eugen got 5 hits on 165 shells at Denmarck Straits markedly better than AGS at Plate. Thats probably how much difference these impulsive actions cost the AGS at the 'Battle of the River Plate'. But even having said this Langsdorff still had enough stored hits to do the same to Cumberland that he did to Exeter.

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Now BBs were bigger targets and they didn't try to dodge German fire, so they were easier targets to hit.

Juha