Aircraft Economics the forgotten consideration

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As others have pointed out when and how the costs were measured is important. Note the variation just within the P-47. Generally the later in the war the lower the cost for standard components like radios, more P-47 were ordered before P-51. Also there are well reported P-47 radio problems, which may have required a more costly communications installation to fix.

Roger Freeman, early 1943 in Britain, "Strangely, radio communications with many P-47s were almost impossible due to noise, soon diagnosed as interference from the engine's powerful ignition. ... Static electricity from the corrosion of magneto seals was the principle cause and bonding insulation of magneto distributor caps was the solution, albeit temporary, as the trouble was not completely eliminated until much later with the pressurisation of magnetos."

More costs,
Tomahawks to Russia from UK listed in three groups according to which contract their engines were built under.
1st Group, 40 aircraft, Airframe $38,307.00 contract A.84, Engine $17,413.67 contract F.207, Propeller $4,182.31 contract F.731, total $59,902.98
2nd Group, 79 aircraft, Airframe $38,307.00 contract A.84, Engine $17,417.63 contract F.223, Propeller $4,182.31 contract F.731, total $59,906.94
3rd Group, 52 aircraft, Airframe $38,307.00 contract A.84, Engine $18,635.77 contract A.196, Propeller $4,182.31 contract F.731, total $61,125.08
 
Hi
It was not even as simple as that as in 1943 there were also other demands for H2S. On 15 march 1943 Ira Eaker put in an urgent request for the radar to fit to US 8th AF bombers due to not finding their targets in the European overcast (the US had not thought much of H2S previously and this was a complete change of mind on their part), Sir Bernard Lovell covers this in his book 'Echos of War' Chapter 23. During the same period of his team having to deal with this request the Royal Navy also requested (14 April 1943) H2S equipment to fit to LCTs (coded SCENT SPRAY) which were used in the Op. Husky landings (Chapter 20). In March 1943 Lovell's team were also involved in fitting modified H2S equipment to Wellington aircraft at Chivenor to operate over the Bay of Biscay (Chapter 18). Lovell's development team was under a lot of pressure during this period.

I think it would also been a bit strange to deny use of H2S by Bomber Command, especially when the Butt Report had been critical of their earlier failure to find targets and now stop them using equipment to improve that situation.

Mike
 
I was just using that as one example in the whole debacle of the Atlantic battle. In WW1 Germany attempted a submarine blockade and the first sonar underwater detection device was patented and used around 1917. Yet when war was declared in 1939 despite the British and Americans having submarines they had almost no provision of countermeasures against them. The allied response to the submarine war was as if the U Boat was an unknown secret weapon, at almost every stage it was only when a problem was presented that corrective action was considered and then others were frequently given priority even though millions of tons of shipping and tens of thousands of men were being lost. It is the complete opposite of the air defence with the Dowding system chain home RoC and the RAF fighter force.
 
But the RAF was going to bomb the shipyards totally halting any new construction and the RAF was going to bomb the U-boat bases so the RN only had to deal with the few U-boats that were at sea.
Any resources used for convoy escort or sub hunting at sea would take away from the RAF's ability to stop the U-boats at the source and would lengthen the war.


I am selling beach front property at bargain prices, usable 1/2 year, at 12 hours per day.
 
pbehn said:
others were frequently given priority even though millions of tons of shipping and tens of thousands of men were being lost.
Click to expand...
In his book "Hitler's U-Boat War" Clay Blair points out that the U-boats never really endangered the Allied war effort, and at their best only sank 10% of the ships, which was not going to win the war for them any more than shooting down 10% of the USAAF and RAF bombers was going to stop the bombing. The Allies and the Germans tried different tactics and technologies throughout the war, convoys, aircraft microwave radar, the escort carriers, the long range Liberators, and the acoustic homing torpedo being probably the most significant Allied developments. At one point the Germans added more AAA to their boats and encouraged them to fight it out on the surface, since too many subs were being sunk following crash dives; they did not know about the homing torpedo. The Bat fire and forget radar guided air-launched missile originally was envisioned to attack U-boats but by the time it was ready the Battle of the Atlantic had been won. The Bat probably would have been terrific at attacking U-boats, especially at night, but in situations where there was more than one target or it was not in a broad ocean area or the target was shooting at the aircraft it was not so great.
 
If Blair acknowledged that U-boats were a problem, that would be painting Admiral King in a bad light since he all but ignored advice and warning from the British. We can not allow that, now can we?
 
Hi
There was a lot of development work on ASDIC (Sonar) systems during the 1930s (especially from about 1932) with a number of different sets being introduced, 'Seek & Strike, Sonar, anti-submarine warfare and the Royal Navy' by Willem Hackmann, has the following chart on page 407 showing the outline of this development:

Chapter 1 'Echos of the past, 1917-40' in 'The Royal Navy and Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1917-49' by Malcolm LLewellyn-Jones' has some interesting detail on this period including the different types of anti-submarine exercises carried out.

Mike
 
Tht is true, but how many ships with weapons carried these devices from Sept 1939?
 
pbehn said:
Tht is true, but how many ships with weapons carried these devices from Sept 1939?
Click to expand...
D.K. Brown says about 200 ships.
Including 100 of the more modern Destroyers, 45 sloops and 20 A/S Trawlers.

However there were 200 sets stockpiled to be fitted to requisitioned trawlers and stock piles of Quartz and been built up with purchases of one to three hundred weights each year from 1935 on.

Page 15 of Atlantic Escorts.
 
tomo pauk said:
If Blair acknowledged that U-boats were a problem, that would be painting Admiral King in a bad light since he all but ignored advice and warning from the British. We can not allow that, now can we?
Click to expand...

King surviving Paukenschlag may be evidence of divine intervention. His obstinance there cost many Allied lives, both at sea and on the other end of unfulfilled supply lines.
 
Hi
Reference radar for CC, early equipment for ASV was in the air by 1938 however, ground air defence radar and AI radar were given priority due to the fear of German air attacks dropping HE and gas bombs which it was believed could kill or injure 100,000s of civilians. This changed in November 1939 when ASV I was given priority, the AI team being sent to sort out the ASV equipment on 12 Hudsons of CC (this delay has been criticised by some authors as AI was not considered fully ready by late 1940). The better ASV II started to come available from June 1940, however, ASV I equipment is also diverted to RN destroyers as a surface radar for detecting E and U-boats, ASV II was also used and by the end of 1940 about 32 ships had been fitted with these sets (as type 286 and 286M respectively. Delays in these early years were not down to BC but FC and the RN itself. It was ASV II that was given to the USA who, for some reason appear not to have had any equivalent, this was produced in the USA by Philco (7000 sets ordered). As for 10 centimetre range radar, the RN started fitting that to destroyers (as type 271) by mid July 1941 (when 25 were fitted or being fitted), however, already having 10 cm radar did not prevent them from requesting 10 cm H2S from the RAF as well for the LCTs mentioned previously. The only 'delays' to CC radar equipment by BC appear to be over the H2S, which was designed as a 'Bomber Navigation' radar, in the 1942/43 period. Also of note is that HF/DF shipboard equipment started to be fitted to ships in July 1941, although there were still some problems with it, but by January 1942 twenty-five escort ships were fitted with it.

Sources:
'Radar at Sea' by Howse.
'Echos of War' by Lovell.
'A Radar History of World War II' by Brown.
'Airborne Maritime Surveillance Radar, Volume 1, British ASV Radars in WWII 1939-1945' by Watts.
'The History of Air Intercept Radar & the British Nightfighter 1935-1959' by White.

I hope that is of interest.
Mike
 
Its obviously a factor, but I think unless the economy of manufacture provides you with an entire order of magnitude advantage in numbers for a small performance deficit, its not a good choice for aircraft.

The Allies and the British discovered very early on that highest possible performance was the overriding maxim.

Although the ground war isn't my field, I think calling the Tiger "absolute rubbish" is pretty indefensible as a statement. The Allies went to very considerable effort to ship working captured Tigers home for study, so clearly they didn't think it was "absolute rubbish" at the time. Indeed if you look, you`ll find many people saying the Sherman was absolute rubbish for brewing up at the drop of a hat an incinerating the crews. So you can make the arguments both ways.

So, to finalise, quality is the absolute #1 requirement above all else, UNLESS, the quantity of machines you are talking about is of the order of 10x that of the enemy, which was extremely rarely the case, and even then you still cant afford much of a performance deficit, or you`ll just lose too many crews, which CANNOT be bought for any money. I think that is really the limit to the "just make loads of them" argument, if, by doing, you start losing a lot of highly trained men, you`ll come up against that brick wall first.

Its ok if you`re Stalin and couldn't care less if you lose a few million men here or there.
 
Snowygrouch said:
Although the ground war isn't my field, I think calling the Tiger "absolute rubbish" is pretty indefensible as a statement.
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Agreed.

Like many German equipment types (including aircraft), the Tiger was eventually asaigned tasks it wasn't designed for.

One machine that did excel in an alternate role, was the StuG.
 
Again, a lot after WW II experts use the wrong example.
If they use the Panther to compare to the Sherman or T-34 things make a lot more sense on the quality vs quality balance beam.
The Panther was intended to replace the MK IV as a general issue tank. It didn't for actual production reasons but............................
There is no "quote" that says a Panther was worth 5 Shermans.
The Tiger has more formidable reputation and sounds better in the headline/sound bite.
 
Snowygrouch said:
Its ok if you`re Stalin and couldn't care less if you lose a few million men here or there.
Click to expand...
In principle, was there any huge difference between Stalin's and allied policy in the Atlantic war. The allies would produce ships faster than the Germans could sink them and so they would win. The people manning those ships could be found and replaced when lost and were paid less than factory munitions workers.
 

I think thats a slight disservice to Sailors, only a small minority on board would be mere labourers. It takes years of training to be a decent captain and you certainly need one of those per boat.

Also the Atlantic war was not won because we made more ships than could be sunk, we very nearly lost it, and only prevailed because a combination of ULTRA intercepts and electronic warfare technology made life harder for the submarines. Not only that but the bigger issue was the cargo, much of it could not be replaced in any sort of timely fashion (loss of US machine tools by U-Boat action cost Rolls-Royce dearly in engine production, stuff like that takes months and months to make more of no matter how many ships you have to send it.

If your view is we won it by brute mass sacrifice, you`re quite wrong.



 
Not at all, my father spent the whole war on escorts protecting convoys in the N Atlantic and Arctic before going to the far east. He was interred with Merchant seamen in Russia. The whole principle of the Liberty ship was to ensure production exceeded losses. I was just discussing the principle, convoys were not halted due to losses, to wait for new technology as various other campaigns were like leaning into France, RAF daylight raids in 1940 and US daylight raids in 1943. Millions of men lost could not be accepted but tens of thousands could, just a question of magnitude not principle.
 
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