Airwar over France with no Operation Torch, instead 1943 invasion of France

First, a sortie rate of three for an average inventory of 5000 - per month translates to one sortie every 10 days for every aircraft - assuming all were operational - and they weren't.

Second, the logistics and Service/Modification/Maintenance resources in Africa were to be kind - primitive when compared to the capabilities of US Base Air Depots and Strategic Air Depots that started in 1942 in the UK. With a Lot of Brit assistance relative to Burtonwood, Warton, etc.

Stona and Eagledad and Shortround are correct that neither the supply chain nor the warehousing of critical parts like Engines nor the machine shops and sheet metal capability and trained personnel were in adequate numbers to support more than a token of the 8th AF in 1942 and well into 1943.

By first quarter 1944, when 8th AF was close to its target TO&E, not only were the BAD's and SAD's capable of rebuilding a badly damaged airplane, modifying all inbound new aircraft to ETO operational benchmarks in a factory assy line format - but many sophisticated functions like replacing a wing or a damaged lower cowl/radiator from a belly landing were re-located to Airfield centric Service Groups.

The turnaround time for engine changes, equipment mods and replacements, etc. were dramatically enhanced via both learning curve and distribution of key functions from BAD/SAD's to the airfields.

This said, it was much worse in the PTO than MTO, and MTO/ETO were pitiful (for US) in 1942 versus 1944.

eagledad said:

Gentlemen,

Since the strategic situation in June of 1943 was different than the situation in June of 1944, the air forces were given different tasks. The sortie numbers IMHO are reflective of the different tasks. I am not saying or implying that the Western Allies were doing less than max effort in June of 1943, I suspect that the Air Forces were giving max efforts giving the respective priorities. What needs to be asked is could the western allies mount a similar effort in June of 1943 as they did in June of 1944 given the same priorities that the Air Force in June of 1944 had?

As to the idea of whether there was enough air support for a cross channel invasion in June of 1943, Parsifal idea of incorporating serviceability numbers is a good start. We would also have to look at numbers by type as well as the quality of the Allied aircraft and pilots available in June 1943 v June 1944. The dreaded logistics trains would also have to be compared.

Eagledad

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That might be the case, but seems unlikely. A bombing mission is a bombing mission isnt it, though you have low level strike, and then high altitude level b ombing ? Same for all the other mission types I can think of. Serviceability might drop if the level of opposition, and damage suffered was greater in the 1943 environment than it was in the 1944 battle, which I would concede is a distinct possibility. Possibly because of greater ability by the Germans to inflict damage. That I can accept, That might do it. But if the 1943 air force assumed the same strategic outcomes as 1944, and undertook the same mission types, I cant see serviceability rates improving. They still will be facing the same, or greater German resistance. moreover, my opinion is that ground support and tactical operations are the toughest there are. You dont need damage per se to ground an aircraft. It flies, you break something then you have to fix it. I believe there was a higher propensity for things to break in ground support than there was with high level formation flying simply because it was harder flying. .

After the invasion Luftwaffe fighters were almost irrelevant to the fighter bombers of the various Tactical Air Forces.

The 2nd TAF divided it's sorties into two categories, 'Immediate and Pre-arranged Support Sorties' and 'Armed Reconnaissance'. Of the two most losses were sustained on armed reconnaissance sorties which were further sub-divided into 'Deep' and 'Shallow'. Losses to enemy aircraft were very low (even zero by February 1945) on 'Shallow' sorties and low on 'Deep' sorties. Losses to flak were generally 3 to 4 times those to enemy aircraft.

The only US figures I have to hand are for the P-47s of the 1st(Provisional)TAF from November '44 to February '45. There are many more sub-divisions in the US statistics for mission types (dive bombing, armed recce, ground support, fighter sweeps,escort and even a few categorised as miscellaneous). Overall these show a similar trend with 7 aircraft lost to enemy aircraft and 33 to flak.

Had the TAFs existed a year earlier and attempted these sorts of operations over continental Europe I suspect the results would have been very different.

Cheers

Steve