Airwar over France with no Operation Torch, instead 1943 invasion of France

As far as I can tell the Allies had over 3000 total aircraft for the Tunisian campaign, maybe more. By the end of it they had some 2500 operational according to Ellis in "Brute Force".
Meanwhile the Germans alone lost some 2400 aircraft in 6 months (having only a few hundred operational at any one time):
Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945

The impact of the Tunisian campaign on the Luftwaffe far outweighed whatever strategic advantage the Germans gained in closing the Mediterranean for six more months. In the period between November 1942 and May 1943, the Germans lost 2,422 aircraft in the Mediterranean theater (40.5 percent of their total force structure as of November 10, 1942). Table XXXII89 gives the Mediterranean losses in terms of major aircraft types during the period and suggests their significance for the Luftwaffe.

What makes such losses so appalling is the fact that Luftwaffe strength in the Mediterranean varied from 200 to 300 fighters and from 200 to 300 bombers throughout the period.90 Thus, combat wastage was well over 200 percent of unit strength. Admittedly, some losses were unavoidable. Nevertheless, the impression left by the North African debacle is that had the Germans cut their losses at Libya, they could have defended Sicily with ground forces deployed to Tunisia. In the air, the Luftwaffe could have used the strategy it had waged so successfully in western Europe over the past year and a half: fighting only on its own terms or for a decisive strategic object. However, the commitment to Tunisia placed the Luftwaffe in a position where it had to fight at great disadvantage with a resulting high rate of attrition.

At the end of June, air operations in the Mediterranean heated up. The Germans launched a number of bomber and fighter bomber sorties against Allied shipping. In addition, they attempted to neutralize the air forces building up on Malta and Pantelleria; such efforts required strong fighter support. Facing numerical superiority, German fighters had difficulty in fending off enemy fighters much less protecting bombers and fighter bombers. The air struggle soon turned into a battle for air superiority over Sicily and Sardinia.97 By the start of Operation "Husky" on July 10, the Allies had achieved general air superiority over the island. German fighters had trouble protecting their own airfields from high and low level attack. Sorties against the invasion achieved little and suffered exorbitant losses. Within a week, much of the Luftwaffe had withdrawn to the mainland and used Sicilian bases only as forward operating areas.98 Losses for the month were heavy. In July, the Luftwaffe lost 711 aircraft (10 percent of the German air force at the end of June) of which 246 were fighters (13.3 percent of all fighters) and 237 bombers (14.4 percent of all bombers). In August, Allied air forces, now operating from Sicily, pounded southern Italy and inflicted a further 321 losses.99 At this point, reinforcements and resupply to units in Italy dried up, while a number of squadrons (with total complement of 210 aircraft) withdrew from Italy after a severe mauling over Sicily. Only one unit returned to the Mediterranean; the rest remained at home to help defend the Reich.100

Click to expand...

According to Ellis again for Sicily the Allies mustered 3462 aircraft and the Axis 1750 of which half were German and serviceability was low. The Allies had better supply and spare parts stocks, plus greater numbers of airbases, while in Sicily the Axis was confined to a few dozen that were constantly attacked. The Axis had low serviceability due to losing so many aircraft and supplies in Tunisia and on route, so they were operating with leftovers by July, especially as many had to be retained to defend Germany and then fight at Kursk, both of which had priority in June-July over Sicily.

Extra airpower would help but attaching historical Afrika Korps to German Army Group B as mobile reserve would help a lot more. Indeed, that powerful force (2 x armored divisions. 2 x motorized infantry divisions.) is likely to convert Soviet Uranus offensive into a German victory on a scale similar to Mars offensive.

Late 1942 Soviet defeat on such a scale dovetails nicely with this scenario as historical USA did have contingency plans for early invasion of France in order to save Soviet Union from outright defeat.

The 'powerful force' would not go intact in the Stalingrad area, but will slug it out along with other German units, suffering losses in process. For any extra train of something that goes to Stalingrad area, one less train of something else will not get there. So we'd have more German units in the area, that have less supplies per unit - that ain't end up well for the Axis forces, that have dangerously over-extended supply lines.

davebender said:

Extra airpower would help but attaching historical Afrika Korps to German Army Group B as mobile reserve would help a lot more. Indeed, that powerful force (2 x armored divisions. 2 x motorized infantry divisions.) is likely to convert Soviet Uranus offensive into a German victory on a scale similar to Mars offensive.

Late 1942 Soviet defeat on such a scale dovetails nicely with this scenario as historical USA did have contingency plans for early invasion of France in order to save Soviet Union from outright defeat.

Click to expand...

The Afrika Korps is more than a bit busy in Africa at the time, so that's not an option. 5th Panzerarmee is stuck in France if its not in Tunisia. So really there isn't much of a force that could be put into the East other than perhaps some paras and extra airpower/transport capacity. For the sake of argument let's say Stalingrad's outcome doesn't change, the extra airpower batters the Soviets worse, but doesn't change the outcome or course of events as far as 3rd Kharkov. So the Kursk bulge still happens, but no there is no Kursk offensive plan due to fears of an Allied invasion in France in summer.

tomo pauk said:

I mean how many ground units, with their tanks, arillery, manpower etc. each beligerent can muster in both sides of La Manche before the invasion and immediately after.

Click to expand...

Not sure raw numbers, but in terms of Allied armies its the British 1st army and the American 5th and 7th armies.

The Germans would have the forces used in Sicily, the 5th Panzer army, and the forces used to defend Italy historically (10th and 14th armies), plus whatever is in France in 1943 (not sure). The SS Panzer corps might well end up in the west rather than in the East, leaving German forces there to deal with whatever the Soviets throw at them without that powerful force.

I'm not sure what the French would do, probably get operation antoned and have the British 8th army occupy Algeria and raise Free French troops and eventually get ready for an invasion of Sicily or Sardinia in 1944. Or perhaps even an Operation Anvil once the landings in Normandy suck in German reserves.

That's unrealistic as Army Group B was desperate for additional armor and motorized infantry. One of the first German Tiger tank battalions is not going to sit idle in France while T-34s more numerous then sand on the seashore steamroll Romanian light tanks.

A more likely option is for the fresh 5th Panzerarmee to be sent east. This allows gutted out east front units such as 14th and 24th Panzer Korps to reconstitute in France.

tomo pauk said:

So we'd have more German units in the area, that have less supplies per unit - that ain't end up well for the Axis forces, that have dangerously over-extended supply lines.

Click to expand...

Tomo, wouldn't it be right to assume that since the North African assets have been deployed on the Ost front, that the support and supply infrastructure would come with it?

Also, a large number of Ju52, Me323 and other supply transports were lost over the Med historically. These aircraft would have been a tremendous boost to moving supplies along the east.

The same can be said for ground vehicles, personnel and tons of equipment supplies that were lost in the African campaign.

davebender said:

That's unrealistic as Army Group B was desperate for additional armor and motorized infantry. One of the first German Tiger tank battalions is not going to sit idle in France while T-34s more numerous then sand on the seashore steamroll Romanian light tanks.

A more likely option is for the fresh 5th Panzerarmee to be sent east. This allows gutted out east front units such as 14th and 24th Panzer Korps to reconstitute in France.

Click to expand...

What? At the time of Stalingrad 2nd El Alamein is going on, there was no way the Afrika Korps was available. 5th Panzer army wasn't ready for deployment really, they were rushed into combat from France out of desperation; HG Panzer division wasn't even formed yet and arrived in pieces. Perhaps 10th Panzer division would be rushed East, but that was all that was potentially available if the Germans don't mind risking thinning out France when the Allies still might invade in 1942.

GrauGeist said:

Tomo, wouldn't it be right to assume that since the North African assets have been deployed on the Ost front, that the support and supply infrastructure would come with it?

Also, a large number of Ju52, Me323 and other supply transports were lost over the Med historically. These aircraft would have been a tremendous boost to moving supplies along the east.

The same can be said for ground vehicles, personnel and tons of equipment supplies that were lost in the African campaign.

Click to expand...

My point is that railroad capacity in the captured part of the USSR was incapable to sustain the German war effort of such magnitude over such a distance. North Africa didn't put any strain on railroads there (close to non-existant), so there is nothing of that to be relocated East. The aircraft and trucks will help a bit, despite the shortcomings - aircraft unfit to move large weights of war material, while the trucks were not heavy duty types, suitable for moving in rasputitsa or in snow. Bad weather also curtails the cargo aircraft operations, much more the issue in SU than in N. Africa. Plus - the cargo shipped by truck, let alone by aircraft puts another strain on German gasoline supply.

Don't be so sure. Historical British 8th Army received priority for USA produced tanks, especially Sherman tanks. This was based on the assumption USA would not be invading France anytime soon.

Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa forced Germany to occupy Vichy France and Tunisia. It also pressured Portugal and Spain to align against Germany and Mussolini to lose political support in Italy.

Cancelling Operation Torch and implementing early invasion of metropolitan France will force a multitude of changes resulting in a very different WWII. Suggesting that nothing changes in the overall German war effort just won't work.

A nightmare scenario for the allies.

In June 1943 there were 85 German divs in western Europe, mostly on various garrison duties. Without the invasion of TORCH the Italians will not be easily defeated, even with the loss of North Africa. This frees up close to 12 Divs in Italy, about the same number waiting on the borders of Vichy France, and about 6 divs in the Balkans to replace the Italian units providing garrison forces in the locality. In addition ther are about a dozen Italian Divs in France or along the French med coast, a PG and an Infantry Div in Sardinia and Corsica.

On the Allied side there are three armies, incompletely equipped, and lacking in any experience. 8th Army would need to remain in the Med to keep watch on the southern arm. A significant proportion of 1st Army, say half would need to remain uncommitted to provide a reaction force to protect Gibraltar, and react to either or both Vichy North African belligerency, and/or Spanish aggression.

In other words, far from gaining the initiative by an achievable goal, the allies allow the Axis to retain the initiative and hand them the opportunity to recover,pick up their ally from the flooring they had suffered.

For the Italians the breathing space is vital. They lost more than 800 a/c over Tunisia, and threw away more than a dozen divs in 1943 in Fr Nth Africa. In Sicily another 6 divs were lost.

At the time of her capitulation, the Italians were rebuilding two of their three armoured divs with new tanks about the equivalent of a sherman. They were introducing some formidable new a/c, the RE2005, G-55 among them.

For the Allies they have two US armies, incompletely trained and lacking a lot of equipment. They have about half a British Army. There are no solutions as yet to getting supplies across the beaches, no mulberries, and an assault lift capacity of about a Corps strength, three divs. In the OVERLORD planning the allies could count on a reduced rate of reinforcement to the front for their opponents , thanks to the efforts of IX AF and 2 TAF, but in 1943 neither of these formations were up to that task as yet. The Germans, who relied heavily on rail transport, could expect a much greater re-supply effort from their rail network, whilst the allies were saddled with a a resupply and reinforcement rate about 1/3 of that they historically enjoyed.

A cross channel invasion in 1943 almost certainly would have been a complete failure for the allies, massively delaying them until 1946-47 at least. British manpower reserves were so low by them that any losses in frontline units was a permanent one. Wholesale front wide shut downs would have resulted, probably the shut down of Burma, and a general retreat from the Far East, as well as abandonment of the middle east except near the oil wells.

There were good reasons for Churchills insistence that ROUND UP be abandoned, and he was absolutely right to do it.

tomo pauk said:

My point is that railroad capacity in the captured part of the USSR was incapable to sustain the German war effort of such magnitude over such a distance. North Africa didn't put any strain on railroads there (close to non-existant), so there is nothing of that to be relocated East. The aircraft and trucks will help a bit, despite the shortcomings - aircraft unfit to move large weights of war material, while the trucks were not heavy duty types, suitable for moving in rasputitsa or in snow. Bad weather also curtails the cargo aircraft operations, much more the issue in SU than in N. Africa. Plus - the cargo shipped by truck, let alone by aircraft puts another strain on German gasoline supply.

Click to expand...

The logistics of North Afrika was complicated in the fact that supply by the Kreigsmarine was challenged by Allied naval assets and the DAK did rely heavily on resupply by air.

However, the KGzbV units were mauled heavily by Allied interception and the Luftwaffe was hard pressed to defend the lumbering Me323 or the Ju52 transports and lost a great deal of those assets and their cargo.

So if the DAK and all related assets were pulled back and committed to the eastern front instead of being wasted in the Med, the supply system would have seen a boost over historical system that entailed rail, land and air.

If you stop and think about it, Germany had already allocated fuel, men and equipment to supply the DAK, so it would not add to the historical burden, it would simply be shifted in this case.

What was to be the US 9th AF was still in Italy in 1943. It wasn't transferred to the ETO til the fall of 1943.

Milosh said:

What was to be the US 9th AF was still in Italy in 1943. It wasn't transferred to the ETO til the fall of 1943.

Click to expand...

The 9th AF was still based in Cairo and other portions of North Africa, like Tunisia, in 1943. Some portions were transferred to England for D-Day and some were transferred to France after the invasion.

Perhaps you're thinking of the 15th AF that was formed from elements of the 12th AF and 9th AF in Tunisia November 1943 that transferred newly captured southern Italian territory (Foggia) courtesy of the British around the first of the year, 1944.

GG, see the bottom of page 1, http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100924-018.pdf

Also, https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/III/AAF-III-5.html

Yes was mistaken saying Italy.

No reason it cannot remain in this scenario with an emphasis on attacking Ploesti. USA might also base an air force in Iran to directly assist Soviets Union.

davebender said:

No reason it cannot remain in this scenario with an emphasis on attacking Ploesti. USA might also base an air force in Iran to directly assist Soviets Union.

Click to expand...

Unescorted raids stopped with the Tidal Wave disaster. So no they wouldn't continue attacks without bases in Italy to enable escorts.

wiking85 said:

Unescorted raids stopped with the Tidal Wave disaster. So no they wouldn't continue attacks without bases in Italy to enable escorts.

Click to expand...

Especially flying the historical bombing route from North Africa into the oil fields in Romania, as the Bulgarian Air Force, Romanian Air Force and Luftwaffe units made the bombers pay dearly.

So given that the majority of the Allied air units in Africa will then end up in Britain for the invasion and a large part of the German air units do too (let's say 75% of each) that is about 750 fighters for the Germans (1000 were lost from November 1942-August 1943) and several hundred other aircraft, and some 2500 or more Allied aircraft plus what they already had in Britain. So that means 4000-5000 front line Allied aircraft? Not sure how many the Germans would have then, probably 2500-3000 total?

Attach P-38s for escort. They should perform ok at medium and low level. For that matter Mustang (with Allison engine) was available too during 1942.

Dare I suggest USN F4U as escort for medium / low altitude bombing missions? It had a relatively large fuel capacity and exceptional aerial performance compared to other USA fighter aircraft during 1943.