Airwar over France with no Operation Torch, instead 1943 invasion of France

[parsifal]

(Part II)

As to landing choices they'd be covered by thousands of Allied fighters, in excess of 4k IIRC, while the Germans save about 1k from the Mediterranean and still need to defend Germany. They'd be at least outnumbered by 2:1 over the beachheads if not even more. Trying to have heavily armed fighters to shoot down Allied bombers then would not be able to survive the Allied fighter sweeps

.

I disagree Im afraid. Through to the end of June 1943, USAAC contributions to fighter defences in England were extremely limited, and moreover, many of them were of indifferent quality. Up until June, the priority was to get the heavy bomber forces up and working, and even as late as August, it was a good day to get 350 bombers airborne by the US.

As for the British, I frequently get into spats about the effectiveness of the RAF ofensives over the channel, France and the low countries from 1941 to the end of 1943. Suffice it to say that I am of the opinion they were vital to the Allied efforts rather than pointless as is often claimed. They enjoyed a measure of success as well, but even i would pull up to say they had achieved anything like air supremacy on na universal and general scale over the continent early to mid 1943. The numbers fighters were far less than you are suggesting. I cant be specific either, but according to the statistics in Costello, there were 5297 a/c under the RAF in December 1942, with 1500 in the Med, and a further 1000 or so in the Far East. That leaves about 2800 in the UK, that is to cover the whole of the UK.

For the US about 1900 a/c were available in total in the ETO and MTO as at December 1942. You may be able to strip out and transfer back to the UK maybe 3-400 US a/c. Another way of looking at this might be to use a surrogate measure and count bomb tonnages. The US for the whole of December 1942 was able to drop 340 tons of bombs, It hovered around the 5-800 ton mark until the following May, when it finally started to move upwards to about 2400 tons per month. Unfortunately, I dont have figures for the same time frame for the RAF, but in June 1942, it was 6300 tons per month. For the US the tonnage in June 1944 was 40784 tons, I dont have the RAF tonnages at hand, but I can if pressed, and will be massively larger than 1942. There simply is no comparison between the effectiveness of the allied air forces in 1943 and 1944. None.

So, speculatively, there might be about 2-3000 allied aircraft, not just fighters, available in early to mid'43....and thats being mighty optimistic. Others may be able to supply better numbers or projections, and I invite them to do so, but it looks highly doubtful to me. And that also means, incidentally that all bombing operations over germany would almost certainly need to be suspended whilst this cross channel attack was developing. It also is almost a certainty that the Germans would throw their reich defences into this battle, since it was a battle of immense strategic importance.

There were 940 LW a/c in the MTO as at December 1942, and a further 375 in Nth Africa. There were just short of 880 RA a/c as well. In the east, the front line effectives in the LW stood at 2430 a/c. Total front line 1st line strength in the LW as at June 1943 stood at 5003. Deducting the other TOs, that leaves about 1258 for the Reich and the west. Not enough to gain outright air superiority, but with the 940 from the med that brings the potential total under your scenario to about 2100. Still outnumbered, i agree, but also enough to avoid the air force cringe that the heer developed at Normandy.

 

[GrauGeist]

...Still outnumbered, i agree, but also enough to avoid the air force cringe that the heer developed at Normandy.

Considering Priller and his wingman were the only Luftwaffe assets that engaged Allied ground forces during the landings (a strafing pass and a fast exit), I think you're spot-on, Michael.

 

[wiking85]

(Part II)
I disagree Im afraid. Through to the end of June 1943, USAAC contributions to fighter defences in England were extremely limited, and moreover, many of them were of indifferent quality. Up until June, the priority was to get the heavy bomber forces up and working, and even as late as August, it was a good day to get 350 bombers airborne by the US.

As for the British, I frequently get into spats about the effectiveness of the RAF ofensives over the channel, France and the low countries from 1941 to the end of 1943. Suffice it to say that I am of the opinion they were vital to the Allied efforts rather than pointless as is often claimed. They enjoyed a measure of success as well, but even i would pull up to say they had achieved anything like air supremacy on na universal and general scale over the continent early to mid 1943. The numbers fighters were far less than you are suggesting. I cant be specific either, but according to the statistics in Costello, there were 5297 a/c under the RAF in December 1942, with 1500 in the Med, and a further 1000 or so in the Far East. That leaves about 2800 in the UK, that is to cover the whole of the UK.

For the US about 1900 a/c were available in total in the ETO and MTO as at December 1942. You may be able to strip out and transfer back to the UK maybe 3-400 US a/c. Another way of looking at this might be to use a surrogate measure and count bomb tonnages. The US for the whole of December 1942 was able to drop 340 tons of bombs, It hovered around the 5-800 ton mark until the following May, when it finally started to move upwards to about 2400 tons per month. Unfortunately, I dont have figures for the same time frame for the RAF, but in June 1942, it was 6300 tons per month. For the US the tonnage in June 1944 was 40784 tons, I dont have the RAF tonnages at hand, but I can if pressed, and will be massively larger than 1942. There simply is no comparison between the effectiveness of the allied air forces in 1943 and 1944. None.

So, speculatively, there might be about 2-3000 allied aircraft, not just fighters, available in early to mid'43....and thats being mighty optimistic. Others may be able to supply better numbers or projections, and I invite them to do so, but it looks highly doubtful to me. And that also means, incidentally that all bombing operations over germany would almost certainly need to be suspended whilst this cross channel attack was developing. It also is almost a certainty that the Germans would throw their reich defences into this battle, since it was a battle of immense strategic importance.

There were 940 LW a/c in the MTO as at December 1942, and a further 375 in Nth Africa. There were just short of 880 RA a/c as well. In the east, the front line effectives in the LW stood at 2430 a/c. Total front line 1st line strength in the LW as at June 1943 stood at 5003. Deducting the other TOs, that leaves about 1258 for the Reich and the west. Not enough to gain outright air superiority, but with the 940 from the med that brings the potential total under your scenario to about 2100. Still outnumbered, i agree, but also enough to avoid the air force cringe that the heer developed at Normandy.

None of the above indicates that an Allied invasion would be stopped on the beaches given that defenses were far less ready, Vichy France is going to tie down a fair number of German divisions in case they flip sides, and the Allied superiority over the likely beachheads in terms of aircraft. Also your numbers for US AC in the Mediterranean are weird. Why wouldn't all the MTO aircraft be in England instead without a US MTO involvement? As to British aircraft they don't need to defend Britain given that for both sides they will be virtually completely throwing their full weight into the invasion offensive/defense, not leaving much for the Germans to attack Britain with and even that would likely be employed against the beachheads. Meanwhile given the work of the RAF at night its the Germans that will need to keep AC tied down defending Germany.

As to your earlier point about coastal divisions being used in the East...why are you including Jaeger divisions/units in that? They aren't coast/point defense troops, they are light infantry that were used to attack. Also in the Ukraine in the winter of 1942-43 operations were way to mobile and armor based for a bunch of low quality coastal infantry divisions to make a difference and I find it bizarre that you think equipment wasn't a serious issue for the Germans at this point; it most certainly was, as there were constant unmet demands for just about all categories of equipment, especially transport and horses. Suddenly upgrading 20 divisions with everything they need to make them regular infantry is impossible in 1942-43, same with shipping and supplying them at the ass-end of a attentuated supply system in East Ukraine.

 

[syscom3]

The allies learned some bitter truth's about a cross channel attack at Dieppe. Among them were the lack of a workable amphibious doctrine. Lack of landing craft and a lack of follow on logistics that would keep the whole thing running.

Nothing was going to happen in 1943 because everyone in SHAEF knew these truths.

And until the Med was free for shipping, that was going to be objective #1 for that year.

 

[GrauGeist]

None of the above indicates that an Allied invasion would be stopped on the beaches given that defenses were far less ready, Vichy France is going to tie down a fair number of German divisions in case they flip sides, and the Allied superiority over the likely beachheads in terms of aircraft. Also your numbers for US AC in the Mediterranean are weird. Why wouldn't all the MTO aircraft be in England instead without a US MTO involvement? As to British aircraft they don't need to defend Britain given that for both sides they will be virtually completely throwing their full weight into the invasion offensive/defense, not leaving much for the Germans to attack Britain with and even that would likely be employed against the beachheads. Meanwhile given the work of the RAF at night its the Germans that will need to keep AC tied down defending Germany.

As to your earlier point about coastal divisions being used in the East...why are you including Jaeger divisions/units in that? They aren't coast/point defense troops, they are light infantry that were used to attack. Also in the Ukraine in the winter of 1942-43 operations were way to mobile and armor based for a bunch of low quality coastal infantry divisions to make a difference and I find it bizarre that you think equipment wasn't a serious issue for the Germans at this point; it most certainly was, as there were constant unmet demands for just about all categories of equipment, especially transport and horses. Suddenly upgrading 20 divisions with everything they need to make them regular infantry is impossible in 1942-43, same with shipping and supplying them at the ass-end of a attentuated supply system in East Ukraine.

Keep in mind that the German's reaction at Normandy was beset with several mistakes and had Rommel been on hand or any of the other commanders followed protocol at the onset of the invasion (6 June), there would have been a far greater defensive effort than what historically happened.

 

[Freebird]

Wiking85, the British Chiefs of Staff deemed "Roundup" unworkable in 1943, Churchill agreed, and I've not seen any documentary evidence that would make it in any way possible.
If you assert that it was you should, if asked, provide some references for the assumptions you claim, because otherwise it's just an uninformed opinion.

Since you've claimed these numbers options, what do you base it on?

BTW, you have not answered my question from earlier, how does FDR explain to Stalin that he will be going back on his word to land forces in 1942, and that he'll be hanging the Soviets out to dry?
How do the US Chiefs justify the risk of sitting idle in face of a possible Soviet collapse?

The standard that I like to use is "Reasonable and Prudent, based on the information available at the time"

One other thing to consider is that the Allies can't be making plans on the fly, force transfers take time and a cross channel operation needs a couple months preparation at a very minimum, so you can't just assume that things happen overnight.

I admit I tend to agree, though it is not a lay down mezzaire because of supply issues for the allies as they advance further west. But unlikely that Rommel could stop Monty after alamein.

I dont think this is the critical question though. The issue is, what happens after Tripoli falls? You cant leave North Africa and the middle East ungarisoned, whilst the italians are still in the ring, and without US support in the med, it is not possible to contemplate HUSKY or Salerno. Italy given the chance to take breath gives back the initiative to the Axis and prevents the allies from concentrating their forces. it has the same effect as if Rommel was holed up in Tripoli......

Assuming then Libya is lost with the Africa Corps and Italian forces.

You can't just assume that Libya is lost, given a different situation.

Parsifal, I'm not claiming that Rommel will stop Monty, only that stalemate in Libya is a possibility.

Wiking, the rapid withdrawal from Libya was a direct result of the Allied Torch landings, Rommel would be a fool to stand and fight in Central/Eastern Libya when the Allies were already racing for Tunis and all of the Axis forces sent are landing in Tunisia, much better to stand at the more defensible Mareth line.

Without Torch, these reinforcements would be landing in Benghazi or Tripoli to stiffen the DAK defence, making 8th Army's advance slower.
Note that Case Anton is still possible, even without Torch.


What I'm saying here is that you can't assume that any of the 8th Army troops or aircraft would be available to send to the UK as they would at the very best be finishing the job in early 1943, or possible still fighting into the summer.
In any event, Monty's force would take months to ship back to the UK. (And some forces like the Australians, Indians South Africans would not be sent to the UK anyways.

The Italians and other Axis minor powers were quite important additions to Axis strength and their loss was sorely felt, even if the combat power was limited. Still the divisions you're talking about in the Balkans and Aegean were mostly static 3rd rate divisions only meant to hold coastline, not be deployed for major combat operations in the East.

The strength of the Italians is not really relevant, it's the strength of the German units sent to replaced them after the sudden surrender of Italy, which was many front line units. (2nd Panzer, 5th 10th SS divisions etc)

As to landing choices they'd be covered by thousands of Allied fighters, in excess of 4k IIRC, while the Germans save about 1k from the Mediterranean and still need to defend Germany. They'd be at least outnumbered by 2:1 over the beachheads if not even more. Trying to have heavily armed fighters to shoot down Allied bombers then would not be able to survive the Allied fighter sweeps.

There were 940 LW a/c in the MTO as at December 1942, and a further 375 in Nth Africa. There were just short of 880 RA a/c as well. In the east, the front line effectives in the LW stood at 2430 a/c. Total front line 1st line strength in the LW as at June 1943 stood at 5003. Deducting the other TOs, that leaves about 1258 for the Reich and the west. Not enough to gain outright air superiority, but with the 940 from the med that brings the potential total under your scenario to about 2100. Still outnumbered, i agree, but also enough to avoid the air force cringe that the heer developed at Normandy.

How in the world do you get 4,000 Allied day fighters?
The RAF has 1,300 to 1,400 fighters in early 1943, + another 1,400 - 1,500 bombers (including Coastal Command)
but some of those fighters are night fighters.

What USAAF fighter groups are available by May of 1943?

I have: 1, 4, 14, 31, 52, 56, 78 groups, which include those sent to North Africa, this wouldn't be more than about 400 to 500 operational aircraft.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VIII_Fighter_Command#Components

So ~1,200 RAF fighters + 500 USAAF is at best about 1,700 fighters, of which the US pilots are not as experienced as the British or German pilots.

Also, having 1,600 or 1,700 fighters does NOT mean that you can put them all over an invasion beach all of the time for defence.


Aircraft deployments are not my specialty, so can anyone provide some more detail about which US fighter groups are available and how many could be in the UK instead of North Africa?

 

[wiking85]

Keep in mind that the German's reaction at Normandy was beset with several mistakes and had Rommel been on hand or any of the other commanders followed protocol at the onset of the invasion (6 June), there would have been a far greater defensive effort than what historically happened.

Like what?

 

[parsifal]

Like what?

We will never know. The best we can do is look at the basic arithmetic and then assume responses commensurate with operational experience, doctrine etc.

Firstly just to get a rough idea of force availability for the germans. In June 1942, there were 28 Divisions in France. Some were newly mobilised units raised to replace those uits rushed East after the emergency of the preceding winter, some were shattered units returned to the west for rebuilding. But as the experiences of Dieppe clearly show, not only was the experience levels for the allies extremely lacking (and far worse for the greenhorn US army units which fell apart in battles like Kasserine), but the experioence levels for the heer vastly superior to what was available in 1944. Moreover the level of mobility available to German units in 1942 was on average about 2.5 times better off than it was in 1944. On top of that the Germans will have a vastly improved road and rail network on which to rely, since at best the allies might be able to gain air parity over small parts of the coastal region where the landing is to take place. In particular this would have meant a far higher reinforcement rate than was possible at Normandy, compared to a much reduced effort that the allies could call upon.

Just to look at the raw numbers of divs available is revealing. There wre 28 divs in France and the low countries in June 1942. Another 5 1/3 at the frontiers with Vichy, another 7 or 8 in Germany being refitted, 2 in Denmark, 9 in southern Norway acting as an anti-invasion reserve, 5 or 6 in the Balkans, 4 in Greece, 9 in Italy. That gives them a potential of about 70 divs that can be called upon. Obviously not all could be used, but thats not the point. If you are an allied planner you would assume all of these divisions at some point, in some strength could potentially be used against you. If, as was the case in 1942, the ability of the allies to control the initiative, undertake countrywide interdiction they have no other option other than to assume a worst case scenario.

In 1943 its worse. As at June 1943, there were 21 combat ready divisions manning the wall, plus 10 being rebuilt but still considered somewhat ready. There 5 PZ, SSPZ or PG divs plus an armoured heavy assault bde. In the balkans there were 13 divs, in Greece there were 6 Infantry and 1 pz, in southern Norway there were 10 in reserve including 1 pz div (or Bde), and Denmark 3. In the low countries there were 5 or 6 divs. In Germany there were 3 Inf divs listed as combat ready and a further 11 Inf, 1 Jaeger, 2 PZ, and 5 PG divs being refitted. In an emergency these formations could be gotten into battle within days, as the experiences in Salerno showed. In Italy there were 9 Inf Divs on the mainland, whilst in Sicily, and sardinia there were 2 Pz, 1 Pz Bde, and 5 PG Divs . That gives a total available pool of 112 divs that could be called upon at some point, not all at once, but significant portions. The mobility and training of some units was less than in 1942, but on the other hand the mechanised formations were truly formidable. If we assume a frontage for the amphibious assaults similar to Salerno that gives a frontage of 25-30 miles for the allies, and means the Germans only 6-8 divs at any time to contain them (by comparison the allied assault frontages at Normandy were over 80 miles) . Given the available reserves in western and Southern Europe, the Germans would be in a position to completely dominate this battlefield more or less indefinately. In other words, ANZIO on steroids......

 

[parsifal]

None of the above indicates that an Allied invasion would be stopped on the beaches given that defenses were far less ready,

They were ready enough to deliver a stinging reverse at Dieppe. To argue the defences were "ready" or even "more ready" is just mouthing Nazi propaganda about the Festung Europa. As Rundstedt stated after the war, the whole idea of the Atlantic wall except in a few select locations was a Nazi propaganda lie. So, from nothing in 1944, we are still going to have nothing in 1943 or 1942......

Vichy France is going to tie down a fair number of German divisions in case they flip sides,

Historically one division was held away from the beaches with a specific mission of keeping watch on the Vichy. Once Vichy showed signs of wavering the Germans moved quickly to ramp it up, and also admittedly forces earmarked as strategic reserves held in the interior of France also had a second funtion of dealing with the french if they tried anything.

But nothing would happen unless the allies were making moves in French North Africa, which in this hypothetical they arent. One way things might change is if the allies captured Paris, but I am doubtful about that. Plus what good for the goose.......the allies will need to station significant forces in and around Gibraltar or held in reserve in England to cover against possible spanish or French moves, or, alternatively to rush to the French aid in the event the Germans and italians decide upon an aggressive takeover of the French colonies. Far from being a net liability for the germans, and uncertain Vichy is a benefit, because whilst uncertain for them, its even more uncertain for the allies....

Also your numbers for US AC in the Mediterranean are weird. Why wouldn't all the MTO aircraft be in England instead without a US MTO involvement?

Even before Torch there were significant numbers of US aircraft deployed into the Middle East , to undertake a number of vital missions. Including, support of the Yugoslav partisans, long range bombing raids over Ploesti, strategic bombing of italy, long range suppression of the italian fleet, to name a few

As to British aircraft they don't need to defend Britain given that for both sides they will be virtually completely throwing their full weight into the invasion offensive/defense, not leaving much for the Germans to attack Britain with and even that would likely be employed against the beachheads.

The British had far too many assets in Britain to leave vast areas of the country undefended. This was clearly shown to be an absolute necessity during the BoB. Despite the massive pressure bing brought to bear against the british in the SE, they always retained a credible defence in the midlands and the North. The RAF continued with this until th very end of the war. The British Isles were never left totally defenceless, no matter how weak the opposition

Meanwhile given the work of the RAF at night its the Germans that will need to keep AC tied down defending Germany.

BC by 1943 were mounting an average of 1-3 big raids per month, and these were being resisted by perhaps 250 Nightfighters. The British had tried this sought of chicanery in 1941 when the Germans had kicked off Barbarossa. Despite valiant efforts by the RAF to draw off fighters to the Reich and the west from the East, not a single fighter was pulled away from the East in response. Later, in support of their own attacksd over Malta, the Germans showed their flexibility by transfering a whole FliegerKorps to Sicily. What this suggests is that making assumptions about what your opponent might or might not do is a very unsound way to plan your campaign. The best you can do is crunch the numbers, know your ownvital interests, and then assume the worst scenario from your opponent.

As to your earlier point about coastal divisions being used in the East...why are you including Jaeger divisions/units in that? They aren't coast/point defense troops, they are light infantry that were used to attack.

They werent classified as Jaeger Divs at the time they were in France. They were regular Infantry, that were being refitted. Whilst under refit they were assigned coastal defence duties. Thats the sort of quandery this whole "coastal div" stuff present, they were often given that status temporarily, either as a mission statement, or because they werent quite fully combat ready

Also in the Ukraine in the winter of 1942-43 operations were way to mobile and armor based for a bunch of low quality coastal infantry divisions to make a difference and I find it bizarre that you think equipment wasn't a serious issue for the Germans at this point; it most certainly was, as there were constant unmet demands for just about all categories of equipment, especially transport and horses. Suddenly upgrading 20 divisions with everything they need to make them regular infantry is impossible in 1942-43, same with shipping and supplying them at the ass-end of a attentuated supply system in East Ukraine.

The majority of the units transferred East were not sent to AGS, though a few did, where they fought exceptionally well in line with their veteran experience. The majority were sent to the AGC, where they stayed in static positions for nearly two years. These werent "low grade" by any stretch of the imagination. Most of them were regular infantry that had fought with distinction in the early campaigns.

As to equipment, the heer did find ways to equip new units many times through the war, on a generally mass scale. Thats how the german replacement army worked. Maybe 3 or four times a year it would be able to release a large number of units in a single hit....they were called "waves". And as a generalisation the heer was not short of Infantry weapons or transport as such until; after 1943. Quoting Maclean in his seminal work on German Army weapons, he states onpage 190 "when home production was unable to keep pace with demand, a point reached in the mid war period (1942-3), factories in the occupied countries were brought in to fill the gaps, along with refurbished captured equipment. Some of them made German weapons others made indigenous designs for the heer. It was not a policy that endeared the heer logisitics officers, but it meant there were always enough weapons to go around. " In 1942 there were further comb outs of the French vehicle parks, which destroyed the french economy but provided vehicles needed for these transfers. Vast quantities of captured Czech, Russian, French, and Polish (mostly) equipment ensured equipment stocks always remained fairly good. The Heer for example alway maintained rifle reserves in excess of 30 million and enough artillery reserves to equip around 50-80 divs. There was not a problem in doing this sort of thing all the time.

As the war progressed things did get a lot harder. The big constraints affecting the heer were, trained manpower, shortages of motor transport, multiplicity of MT types, shortages of Draft animals, As 1943 wore on artillery stocks began to dry up as more and more effort went into flak production, Small arms were never in short supply, though some units got the short straw as they were forced to use some disheartening foreign cast offs.

 

[stona]

(Part II)



.

Another way of looking at this might be to use a surrogate measure and count bomb tonnages. The US for the whole of December 1942 was able to drop 340 tons of bombs, It hovered around the 5-800 ton mark until the following May, when it finally started to move upwards to about 2400 tons per month. Unfortunately, I dont have figures for the same time frame for the RAF, but in June 1942, it was 6300 tons per month. For the US the tonnage in June 1944 was 40784 tons, I dont have the RAF tonnages at hand, but I can if pressed, and will be massively larger than 1942. There simply is no comparison between the effectiveness of the allied air forces in 1943 and 1944. None.

Winter months always saw a decline in tonnage dropped. I agree with your point though. In December 1942 the RAF dropped just 3,927 tons. This steadily increased to a peak of 25,858 tons in August 1943 before the winter decline to just 16,326 tons in December 1943.

Contrast this with the months leading up to the invasion. March 1944 36,979 tons, April 41,686 tons, May 51,302 tons. By the August peak the RAF was dropping 87,187 tons which fell to a mere 42,594 in the January weather.

The RAF was delivering roughly three times the tonnage in 1944 that it did in 1943.

I'm firmly in the school that reckons a 1943 invasion of NW Europe would have been impossible. An attempt would have ended in catastrophe, which is pretty much why it wasn't tried.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

Further to this, according to 'The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945', the British equivalent of the USSBS, the following bombers were available at the given times. Totals are for Bomber Command and the US 8th and 15th Air Forces.

July 1943, 1,823 (51 Mosquito, 124 Wellington, 203 Stirling, 331 Halifax, 444 Lancaster, 670 Fortress and Liberators.

July 1944, 5,246 (138 Mosquito, 37 Stirling, 562 Halifax, 864 Lancaster, 3,647 Fortress and Liberators.

Though Bomber Command's total has risen from 1,153 to 1,601 it is the US build up which is more relevant, from 670 to 3,645 bombers. I fail to see how this could have been achieved a year earlier, nor how an invasion could have been carried out without it.

Cheers

Steve

 

[syscom3]

Further to this, according to 'The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945', the British equivalent of the USSBS, the following bombers were available at the given times. Totals are for Bomber Command and the US 8th and 15th Air Forces.

July 1943, 1,823 (51 Mosquito, 124 Wellington, 203 Stirling, 331 Halifax, 444 Lancaster, 670 Fortress and Liberators.

July 1944, 5,246 (138 Mosquito, 37 Stirling, 562 Halifax, 864 Lancaster, 3,647 Fortress and Liberators.

Though Bomber Command's total has risen from 1,153 to 1,601 it is the US build up which is more relevant, from 670 to 3,645 bombers. I fail to see how this could have been achieved a year earlier, nor how an invasion could have been carried out without it.

Cheers

Steve

Do you have the figures for the tactical air forces? That's what is going to decide the invasion. Not heavy bombers that will need months of work before any results are noted.

 

[stona]

Do you have the figures for the tactical air forces? That's what is going to decide the invasion. Not heavy bombers that will need months of work before any results are noted.

The Tactical Air Forces didn't decide the invasion alone. Those 5,000+ bombers worked literally around the clock for many weeks preparing the ground for the invasion. By mid February 1944 even Harris had resigned himself to supporting the Transport Plan etc. Without them there is no invasion...period.
It's also worth remebering that both pre and post invasion the 'heavy' bombers were used in a tactical role in France with mixed results, doing everything from bombing coastal defences and installations to directly supporting ground operations, often with mixed results. They would continue to be used in this way up to the end of the war, whilst also continuing the combined bombing offensive.

I don't have numbers for the Tactical Air Forces to hand, but the 9th AF went underwent a similar exponential increase in strength from 1943 to early 1944 following its re-organisation and move from North Africa. By May 1944 it was operating nearly 5,000 aircraft.

The RAF's 2nd TAF was created by dividing Fighter Command in June 1943 rather than building up an almost entirely new force.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

A table showing the build up of fighters in the 8th AF:

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

Re-reading this thread I feel I have to clarify the status of the 'Pointblank' directive (as it would become known). When this was initially issued on 10th June ('43) it amended but did not supercede the Casablanca directive. It directed that as an intermediate objective Luftwaffe fighter forces and the industries sustaining them should be first priority targets whilst not changing the primary objective of the bomber offensive. German Air Force industries, though not fighter forces, were already at number two on the list of targets agreed at Casablanca in January.
The rationale was to degrade the capability of the Luftwaffe enough to allow the Allied air forces that degree of tactical freedom which would permit German targets to be attacked at an unprohibitive cost. It was really a slight shift of emphasis as a means to an end and an acknowledgement that unless something was done with the Luftwaffe the current campaign(s) were not going to be sustainable.

Some commanders took 'Pointblank' and the input from the 'Jockey Committee' set up to help in targeting a little to seriously! Doolittle had to be reminded by Anderson in late 1944 that the output from 'Jockey' was not directives but material issued for information to help in decision making.

In the context of the original thread it must be evident that this had to be achieved before an invasion of NW Europe, and that couldn't happen in 1942. The British couldn't do it and the Americans were not yet in a position to do it so early.

Just saying

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

A table showing the build up of fighters in the 8th AF:

Cheers

Steve

Do you have one for the 9th and 15t AFs?

 

[drgondog]

I have watched this thread without jumping in simply because the notion that an invasion in June 1943 (latest) prior to June 1944 is ludicrous to me. RAF was weaker in June, AAF was a shell in 1943 compared to 1944. The LW reserves were far higher, depending on actions taken by High Command on notice of invasion from East and South.

The Allies are nowhere close to whittling pilots and crews of LW in May-June 1943 in contrast to May 1944.

The US Build up in GB is impossible with upcoming Sicily Op, and the US troops were relatively un bloodied in May 1943 vs May 1944. Airborne Ops were in its infancy prior to Sicily and Salerno. The LST and LCI inventory was totally inadequate, surface fleet security particularly at night was inadequate.

Most Commonwealth troops potential invasion reserves (absent US troops) were positioned in Africa and CBI.

The Atlantic Wall was always a fallacy - what was critical was Wermacht reserves within 100 miles of a beach invasion and the ability to counterattack while disrupting the supply chain for Allied reserves.

It was CLOSE enough in June-July 1944 with a FAR stronger ALLIED position and far weaker German position one year later to contemplate success in June 1943

 

[tomo pauk]

Bill - there is no upcoming Sicily op without Torch, that being the main premise of the thread. Without Torch, most of the US aircraft historically shipped to the North Africa end up in UK in 1942/43, and a good deal of RAF.

 

[gjs238]

So, if the USSR was near collapse, could the western allies mount ANY kind of action to draw off German pressure?
Thinking Sledgehammer, Roundup and Roundhammer here.

 

[stona]

This couldn't be done a year earlier.

It's not because the aircraft are committed elsewhere, it's because most of them haven't even been built.

Don't make too much of the numerical inferiority of the Luftwaffe in NW Europe.

The ratio in favour of the western allies is already substantial in mid 1943. Quantity was not the issue for the Luftwaffe, quality, and later the ability to operate at all, were.

Cheers

Steve