Airwar over France with no Operation Torch, instead 1943 invasion of France

[gjs238]

Wow, looks like oil targets were barely touched in '43

 

[parsifal]

So, if the USSR was near collapse, could the western allies mount ANY kind of action to draw off German pressure?
Thinking Sledgehammer, Roundup and Roundhammer here.

Survival of the Soviets as a major allied partner was a vital interest for the allies, and they made extraordinary sacrifices to try and ensure this remained the case, as the losses in PQ-17 and other operations clearly illustrate. There were other costs, perhaps less obvious, but no less real. One example I can think of is the horrendous famine in Bengal in 1942-3, brought on, not by a shortage of food, rather by a shortage of rail transport, after most of it had been shifted to the middle east to support the transfer of Lend Lease through through Iran.

Both ROUNDUP and the earlier SLEDGEHAMMER were devised to exploit German weakness in the event of an Axis collapse in Russia, or aas a desperation measure to try and relieve pressure on the Soviets in the event that they (the Soviets) showed signs of wavering. Both plans were thoroughly unrealistic. Both were dependant on BOLERO, the US build up of forces in the UK for the cross channel attack. By the end of August 1942, the BOLERO movement had transferred 386 airplanes: 164 P-38's of the 1st and 14th Fighter Groups; 119 B-17's of the 97th, 301st, and 92nd Bomb Groups; and 103 C-47's of the 60th and 64th Troop Carrier Groups, all of which became part of the Twelfth Air Force in Africa before the end of the year. 920 airplanes had been sent from the United States to England by the end of 1942, and 882 had arrived safely. This was a welcome addition to the defences in the UK, but hardly a decisive reinforcement able to take on the German garrison in France in anything like winnable terms.

For the ground forces by July 1, 1942, demands from other theaters, and the constant need to split formations so as to serve as cadres for other units following the training pipelines, had caused a massive downward revision of the BOLERO build-up to a total of 54 air groups and 194,332 men for the army. Later that month USAAF Headquarters estimated that by December 31, 1943, the BOLERO build-up could have in place 137 groups (approximately half of the entire projected strength of the USAAF), including 74 bomb groups of all types and 31 fighter groups. It estimated that 375,000 airmen would comprise the force, 197,000 in combat units and 178,000 in the service organizations. The estimate proved to be remarkably close, particularly the size of the heavy bomber force, to the actual strength of the combined Eighth and Ninth Air Forces at the time of Operation Overlord. I dont have the figures for the army in 1943, but it was of a similar scale I have read. Impressive, becoming a credible threat to German security in the West, but still hardly enough to realistically entertain serious thought to a cross channel attack

In London the BOLERO Committee estimated that in order to take on the defences of Western Europe, the Americans alone, in 1943, would need 1,147,000 US troops, including 137,000 replacements. They were at about 30% of that strength as at June 1943. To pull off the attack, there would need to be a massive German drain out of troop concentrations in the west.

So, my opinion is that the SLEDGEHAMMER, ROUNDUP and ROUNDHAMMER plans were all mostly bluff, and not a workable threat.If the Soviets had really needed additional help, the allies could have shut down the Pacific build ups, considered peripheral attacks into places like Spain or other peripheries, but an attack on the main front was really just not a realistic option.

 

[drgondog]

Bill - there is no upcoming Sicily op without Torch, that being the main premise of the thread. Without Torch, most of the US aircraft historically shipped to the North Africa end up in UK in 1942/43, and a good deal of RAF.

Tomo - conversely the German air and ground forces consumed by operation Torch and the reserves available to move to France are considerable. Combine that with green USA forces and fewer total US Fighter groups in UK than available in Jan 1944. Stona and Parsifal's arguments are sound IMO.

Summary - Germany was considerably stronger in December 1942 than December 1943 and the Commonwealth/US forces in Europe were considerably weaker during the same timeframe.

The sustained build up of infantry, armor and invasion fleet from US in early 1944 tipped the balance (IMO) for June 6, 1944 - combined with the rapid disintegration of LW air assets in the west during that same five month period.

 

[gjs238]

"Europe First"
Is some of this situation due to the Europe First policy not being strictly adhered to and a greater push against Japan?

 

[wiking85]

This couldn't be done a year earlier.


It's not because the aircraft are committed elsewhere, it's because most of them haven't even been built.

Don't make too much of the numerical inferiority of the Luftwaffe in NW Europe.

The ratio in favour of the western allies is already substantial in mid 1943. Quantity was not the issue for the Luftwaffe, quality, and later the ability to operate at all, were.

Cheers

Steve

The problem with your numbers is that that only factors in the strategic bombing directive that was initiated in 1943. USAAF/RAF army support and operations in the Mediterranean, especially against Sicily. So much of the bombing of 1942-43 was not strategic/economic in nature, it was in support of the army via bombing enemy airfields and units. That was then operational and tactical in nature, which the bombing in 1943 in support of an invasion would be, not strategic in nature as your chart is. So its measuring two different things and is thus not relevant to the discussion about what would be possible.

For the 2nd chart you're leaving out the 5.2:1 section for 1943 in the Mediterranean. As per the OP those Allied forces would be directed to the UK for 1943, so that huge Allied numerical advantage would appear there instead of the Mediterranean.

 

[wiking85]

Survival of the Soviets as a major allied partner was a vital interest for the allies, and they made extraordinary sacrifices to try and ensure this remained the case, as the losses in PQ-17 and other operations clearly illustrate. There were other costs, perhaps less obvious, but no less real. One example I can think of is the horrendous famine in Bengal in 1942-3, brought on, not by a shortage of food, rather by a shortage of rail transport, after most of it had been shifted to the middle east to support the transfer of Lend Lease through through Iran.

What do you think the Allies would do if the Soviets did collapse in 1942, say due to Moscow falling in 1941 and Stalin being couped and a power struggle breaking out? Would the Allies then make peace or continue to fight the war to the bitter end?

 

[wiking85]

In London the BOLERO Committee estimated that in order to take on the defences of Western Europe, the Americans alone, in 1943, would need 1,147,000 US troops, including 137,000 replacements. They were at about 30% of that strength as at June 1943. To pull off the attack, there would need to be a massive German drain out of troop concentrations in the west.

Okay this is just silly. You're completely leaving out that there was Operation Torch/Tunisia/Sicily going on, which sucked in thousands of aircraft and hundreds of thousands of US and UK troops. Sicily alone had almost 500k men involved at its peak.

As per the OP that wouldn't happen here, all that would be directed to the UK instead.

 

[stona]

The problem with your numbers is that that only factors in the strategic bombing directive that was initiated in 1943. USAAF/RAF army support and operations in the Mediterranean, especially against Sicily. So much of the bombing of 1942-43 was not strategic/economic in nature, it was in support of the army via bombing enemy airfields and units. That was then operational and tactical in nature, which the bombing in 1943 in support of an invasion would be, not strategic in nature as your chart is. So its measuring two different things and is thus not relevant to the discussion about what would be possible.

it is measuring the tonnages dropped against the principal target systems. These were not substantially different in 1943 and 1944, though priorities varied as directives were issued. 1942 is irrelevant as the strategic bomber forces comprised Bomber Command which was still struggling to hit anything.

I have a long list of all the directives issued throughout the war and the 'German Air Force'/aircraft industry and oil feature on just about every one from May 1940 on. Even before the 'Transport Plan' communications are listed on some directives, first appearing on 20th June 1940.

The chart also represents in an easy to read way the tonnages dropped which directly relates to the lift capacity of the three air forces involved. In 1942/43 no matter what the targets, that level of bombing was impossible because the aircraft to carry it out were not in Europe, in fact they hadn't been built. To carry out the sort of bombing that was executed in support of the 1944 invasion of NW Europe you would somehow, magically, have to conjure up the hundreds of bombers required do it at least a year earlier.
My argument is that any invasion of France was totally dependant on many factors including the contribution of the strategic air forces.

Maybe a chart of the aircraft available and total bomb lift capacity would make this clearer.

The large spike in bomb lift relative to the number of operational aircraft in 1944 is due to the shorter missions being flown in support of the invasion allowing a heavier average bomb load per sortie.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

The chart also represents in an easy to read way the tonnages dropped which directly relates to the lift capacity of the three air forces involved. In 1942/43 no matter what the targets, that level of bombing was impossible because the aircraft to carry it out were not in Europe, in fact they hadn't been built. To carry out the sort of bombing that was executed in support of the 1944 invasion of NW Europe you would somehow, magically, have to conjure up the hundreds of bombers required do it at least a year earlier.
My argument is that any invasion of France was totally dependant on many factors including the contribution of the strategic air forces.

Maybe a chart of the aircraft available and total bomb lift capacity would make this clearer.

The large spike in bomb lift relative to the number of operational aircraft in 1944 is due to the shorter missions being flown in support of the invasion allowing a heavier average bomb load per sortie.

Cheers

Steve

Again that is only the RAF and USAAF units involved directly in strategic bombing, not all bombers operating against Europe. It specifically states 8th AF and RAF BC only, not 9th AF or 15th or tactical bombing units in Britain or the Mediterranean. A strategic bombing force of 1944 size isn't necessary to a successful invasion, they did help, but that was highly wastefully done in Spring 1944 in indirect rail interdiction (which didn't stop the flow of Germans to the battlefield). What was much more crucial was tactical air power, which overwhelmed the Germans in the Mediterranean historically and would be massed against an invasion area to interdict it. Given that Tunisia alone saw over 3k Allied aircraft demolishing the Axis air forces in the Mediterranean with 5:1 numbers in June 1943 (per your chart) that would be available in Europe. Take the island of Pantelleria. It was hit with 4500 bombing sorties in 10 days and surrendered as a result. That sort of air power would be available in June 1943 for France if we go by the OP.
OPERATION CORKSCREW - PANTELLERIA

In the June of 1943 14,203 bombs amounting to 4,119 tons were dropped on 16 batteries. Out of 80 guns bombed 43 were damaged 10 beyond repair.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Corkscrew
http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090529-104.pdf

 

[tomo pauk]

Maybe this will put the numbers in perspective - USAF aircraft in the ETO vs. total USAF aircraft in theaters vs. Germany. Total minus ETO = MTO; MTO > ETO. Please open the pic separately for hi res.

Actually:

 

[stona]

Well the chart does include the 15th AF.

We fundamentally disagree if you believe that a successful invasion could have been carried out in 1944 without the concerted campaign by the allied strategic bombing forces.

As for tactical air power, we've already shown the lack of aircraft in the 8th and 9th air forces as well as the RAF's 2nd TAF (which was created by breaking up Fighter Command in any case).

4,000 tons of bombs is a pin prick compared to the quantities dropped in support of Overlord. Between 6th March and D-Day 67,000 tons of bombs were dropped on railway targets in France, Belgium, Luxembourg and to a minor extent Western Germany, east of the Ruhr.

Whether it stopped German troop movement I don't know, but it certainly stopped the trains:

Then there is the Oil Plan. Around the time of the invasion oil production (including imports and captured stocks) fell from around 500,000 tonnes/month to less than 200,000 tonnes/month. Total consumption (civil (including exports) and military) always hovered around 500,000tonnes/month, despite ever more severe rationing. At the same time oil reserves started a near vertical fall from about 1,300,000 tonnes in March 1944 to just 400,000 tonnes in January 1945 (last known figure). This was almost entirely due to a combination of loss of territory and the strategic bombing force. Without it the German forces in the west may have been able to operate without one hand tied behind their backs. They certainly could have in 1943 when demand exceeded supply only to fuel offensive operations in Russia.

The destruction of the Luftwaffe fighter forces was also entirely due to the strategic bombing offensive. Without USAAF daylight raids the Luftwaffe could not have been forced up to its destruction. This was not achieved in time for an invasion in 1943. German fighter production did increase under the bombing, but in 1944 single engine fighters comprised 65% of total production, compared with 17.3% in 1940 and 37.7% in 1943. It is estimated that in the second quarter of 1943 German aircraft production was running at 100% of its potential, that allied bombing had no effect. By the same period in 1944 it was reduced to 91%, by the third quarter 80%. That's a lot of aircraft that weren't built. Who would have flown them, had they been built, is a moot point!

Next up landing craft, or lack thereof in 1943. You are going to need something over 4,000 landing craft and landing ships for your invasion. That's on top of the 2,400 aircraft and nearly 900 gliders for your airborne operations.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

Maybe this will put the numbers in perspective - USAF aircraft in the ETO vs. total USAF aircraft in theaters vs. Germany. Total minus ETO = MTO; MTO > ETO. Please open the pic separately for hi res.

View attachment 308399

Actually:

View attachment 308400

Alright these are the numbers that matter. And that's just the USAAF, not even RAF numbers. With 5000 first line aircraft in Europe in June 1943 with just the USAAF that's plenty to invade and provide the necessary air support.

 

[stona]

With 5000 first line aircraft in Europe in June 1943 with just the USAAF that's plenty to invade and provide the necessary air support.

Really. Those figures show 346 fighters in the ETO for June 1943 and 2,048 in the MTO. Are you seriously going to count the 347 P-39s and 717 P-40s as viable for operations in NW Europe against the Luftwaffe? The USAAF clearly didn't. It had a combined total of these types of 5 in the ETO.

Take just them out (not figures for 'others') and you now have 984 first line fighters in the MTO which, added to the 346 in the ETO gives a total of 1,320 first line fighters to take on the Luftwaffe. This might be the figure that matters.

I'd suggest leaving the P-38s behind in the MTO as well, now you've got well less than 1,000 first line fighters

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

Really. Those figures show 346 fighters in the ETO for June 1943 and 2,048 in the MTO. Are you seriously going to count the 347 P-39s and 717 P-40s as viable for operations in NW Europe against the Luftwaffe? The USAAF clearly didn't. It had a combined total of these types of 5 in the ETO.

Take just them out (not figures for 'others') and you now have 984 first line fighters in the MTO which, added to the 346 in the MTO gives a total of 1,320 first line fighters to take on the Luftwaffe. This might be the figure that matters.

I'd suggest leaving the P-38s behind in the MTO as well, now you've got well less than 1,000 first line fighters

Cheers

Steve

P154 shows over 5000 combat aircraft in the European theater. The P-40s fought and killed the LW in Tunisia and Sicily in 1943.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curtiss_P-40_Warhawk#Operational_history

Tomahawks and Kittyhawks bore the brunt of Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica fighter attacks during the North African campaign. The P-40s were considered superior to the Hurricane, which they replaced as the primary fighter of the Desert Air Force.[9]

The P-40 initially proved quite effective against Axis aircraft and contributed to a slight shift of momentum in the Allied favor. The gradual replacement of Hurricanes by the Tomahawks and Kittyhawks led to the Luftwaffe accelerating retirement of the Bf 109E and introducing the newer Bf 109F; these were to be flown by the veteran pilots of elite Luftwaffe units, such as Jagdgeschwader 27 (JG27), in North Africa.[31]

The P-40 was generally considered roughly equal or slightly superior to the Bf 109 at low altitude, but inferior at high altitude, particularly against the Bf 109F.[32] Most air combat in North Africa took place well below 16,000 ft (4,900 m), thus negating much of the Bf 109's superiority. The P-40 usually had an edge over the Bf 109 in horizontal maneuverability (turning), dive speed and structural strength, was roughly equal in firepower, but was slightly inferior in speed and outclassed in rate of climb and operational ceiling.[9][31]

 

[stona]

There is no way that P-40s could have operated at the combat altitudes of the ETO. That's why they were in the MTO. You are just paddling furiously to stay afloat

The total number of combat aircraft isn't the relevant number. I'm sure the RAF still had plenty of Hurricanes and other older types on its books as well. They were sensibly sent to other theatres where they continued to serve. They didn't take on the Bf 109Gs and Fw 190 As in the ETO.
To defeat the Luftwaffe you need competitive fighters. Allowing the P-38s the USAAF can provide about 1,300. That's more than the single engine fighters that the Luftwaffe had in the west, but it too could free resources from elsewhere in this scenario.
I don't think that the Americans could provide enough fighters in 1943. They certainly couldn't provide enough bombers.
Cheers
Steve

 

[wiking85]

There is no way that P-40s could have operated at the combat altitudes of the ETO. That's why they were in the MTO. You are just paddling furiously to stay afloat

Funny. I could apply that to you below. If the fight is low and there is a need for fighter-bombers then the P-40 is just fine. High altitudes in Europe were only an issue for strategic bombing, not tactical combat that would be the issue for an invasion. You keep comparing apples to oranges and think you're making a sound point.

The total number of combat aircraft isn't the relevant number. I'm sure the RAF still had plenty of Hurricanes and other older types on its books as well. They were sensibly sent to other theatres where they continued to serve. They didn't take on the Bf 109Gs and Fw 190 As in the ETO.

A winner from WW2 did rightly say "numbers have a quality all their own". Swamp an already overloaded defender and he's done for. By mid-1943 the Germans were outnumbered ~5:1 overall in the air according to your own chart.

To defeat the Luftwaffe you need competitive fighters. Allowing the P-38s the USAAF can provide about 1,300. That's more than the single engine fighters that the Luftwaffe had in the west, but it too could free resources from elsewhere in this scenario.
I don't think that the Americans could provide enough fighters in 1943. They certainly couldn't provide enough bombers.
Cheers
Steve

Not really, just force him to fight on your terms in an area you can keep covered and you'll wear him down even if you're taking 2:1 losses. Worked for the Soviets at Kuban and historically for the USAAF in Tunisia and over Sicily. As it was in terms of combat aircraft the Luftwaffe was outnumbered over 5:1 in the Mediterranean in June 1943 and 3:1 in Western Europe.
According to Tomo's chart the USAAF alone, not counting the RAF at all, had 2400 first line fighters in Europe as of June 1943. And 1300 1st line strategic bombers. And over 1000 medium bombers. Plus the RAF and you've at a minimum have at least doubled that. What did the Germans have against the Wallies? Against the Wallies alone they had again according to your own chart a ratio of more than 4:1 against them.

 

[tomo pauk]

There is no way that P-40s could have operated at the combat altitudes of the ETO. That's why they were in the MTO. You are just paddling furiously to stay afloat

The total number of combat aircraft isn't the relevant number. I'm sure the RAF still had plenty of Hurricanes and other older types on its books as well. They were sensibly sent to other theatres where they continued to serve. They didn't take on the Bf 109Gs and Fw 190 As in the ETO.
To defeat the Luftwaffe you need competitive fighters. Allowing the P-38s the USAAF can provide about 1,300. That's more than the single engine fighters that the Luftwaffe had in the west, but it too could free resources from elsewhere in this scenario.
I don't think that the Americans could provide enough fighters in 1943. They certainly couldn't provide enough bombers.
Cheers
Steve

In the air war against Germany, USAF have had in June 1943 some 1300 B-17/24s and 2400 fighters. USAF of 1943 was not the USAF of 1942, let alone of 1941.

 

[drgondog]

Tomo - In June 1943, there were only 3 8th AF and zero 9th AF FG's in ETO. There 11 B-17 BG's and ALL the B-24 groups were TDY to north Africa for Tidalwave attack on Ploesti. The B-26 BGs were in theatre but ltd ops.

Whatever you pull from MTO enables the LW to respond by moving to ETO

 

[gjs238]

Would it have been more effective for the western allies to "invade" via the Persian route and fight on the Caucasian Front?

 

[parsifal]

Okay this is just silly. You're completely leaving out that there was Operation Torch/Tunisia/Sicily going on, which sucked in thousands of aircraft and hundreds of thousands of US and UK troops. Sicily alone had almost 500k men involved at its peak.

As per the OP that wouldn't happen here, all that would be directed to the UK instead.

No as these figures show, the numbers sent to England in the earlier part of 1942 were used in the latter part to form 12th AF. As is so often the case for the allies at this time, there is an element of creative double accounting, as a/c sent to England initially are again counted in the MTO figures in the later part of 1942.

Similarly, the troops and lift capacities as well as the available MT was drawn from the BOLERO forces that had been used to painfully build up the forces in Britain prior to the decisions being made about TORCH. It would not be until the following September (1943) that the allies would restore the ground forces deployed in the UK to their pre-TORCH levels.