Airwar over France with no Operation Torch, instead 1943 invasion of France

[parsifal]

"Europe First"
Is some of this situation due to the Europe First policy not being strictly adhered to and a greater push against Japan?

To a very limited extent , yes. The truth is, the US were not decisive in any TO until the latter part of of 1943. In the Pacific, substantial ground forces were needed to be held back on the west coast to parry a possible Japanese invasion of the continental US. In the Hawaiian Islands there were the equivalent of 3 divs. There was a a single div deployed defensively in the SWPAC, and I think a similar force deployment to cover Alaska. In Australia there were two grossly incomplete US divs in training and of course there was the one Marine div on Guadacanal. The lions share of ground troops at the disposal of the PTO commanders were Indian and Australian (Aus had 10 incomplete divs in Aus for example, I think in India there were skeletal elements of nearly 20 divs. and overwhelmingly for both, these were needed for home defence. There were the equivalent of two Aus divs in PNG and something similar on the Burma front. There was one NZ div in NZ.

A complete abandonment of any offensive in the PTO and Burma, whilst retaining the defences around the core base areas, might yield 4-5 divs, at a 2 brigade TOE limited MT and no AT capability. Artillery for these formations would be very limited. It would be possible to suck out more manower, but only if the US could increase its weapons production and somehow the manpower could be trained quicker than it was. For the US in particular, training capacity was the major limiting factor, and would remain so until wars end.

The big advantage of remaining on the defensive in the Pacific would be the shipping released. The limited offensive in the Pacific sucked out huge quantities of shipping. A division as a rule of thumb needed 3-5 times the shipping capacity on the attack as it did whilst idle and on the defence, and compared to the ETO, about 3 times the shipping per unit was needed per unit. Going over to the defensive in the PTO would yield a lot of shipping for the ETO, and give options as far as release of troops in that TO. Difficult choices, dangerous choices would need to be made in the PTO to yield this dubious value capability in the ETO.

 

[parsifal]

What do you think the Allies would do if the Soviets did collapse in 1942, say due to Moscow falling in 1941 and Stalin being couped and a power struggle breaking out? Would the Allies then make peace or continue to fight the war to the bitter end?

The allies had already shown they would continue to fight, as the British had demonstrated June 1940 to June 1941.

A german victory in front of Moscow in 1941 is a far more difficult proposition that might be expected. It is often touted that if the Kiev offensive had not been pushed the Germans would have been in a position to press on to the capital. Thats true, but fails to take into account that the Germans at the beginning of winter would have been faced with a disjointed, dangerously bulged front line with the vital Rumanian oilfields badly exposed as well, and the Red Army with reserves nearly 70 divs stronger than they were historically. The chances of Stalin being removed is a highly debatebale claim, and no historical precedent exists to support that notion. When Napoleon occupied moscow, there was no catastrophic collapse of the govt of the day, and as Napoleon was to find, Moscow was to prove impossible to hold through the winter.

If the the Germans sucked out substantial reserves from the west to push their offensives to the limit, Churchill (and in '42 it was Churchill who would decide), the British might be induced to commit forces to establish a bridgehead either in Brittany or the Cotentin Peninsula. This would depend on whether the Vichy could be induced to change sides and probably would need the PTO initiatives to be completely abandoned, and it would need a massive bleeding out of available German forces in the West.

In the event of a separate Soviet peace, better described as a temporary truce I think, there would remain substantial partisan activity and the need to retain massive German forces in garrison in the East even after the "peace". The German office of economic development estimated a garrison strength of at least 70 divs, the commitment of at least 1 million workers, the absorption of 3/5s of German rail capacity for a minimum of 2 years to reconstruct the Soviet infrastructure. This would so badly retard the German war effort that the allies would easily achieve an unassailable lead in that period .


This is all speculation of course, but based on known predictions and known capabilities

 

[bobbysocks]

what was NAs max run capability in 41 to produce 51As? the RAF was flying them in limited amounts in 41 weren't they? if the scenario changed to where every available plane that could be produced was put on the line how many mustangs could we have fielded by the end of 41?

 

[stona]

Funny. I could apply that to you below. If the fight is low and there is a need for fighter-bombers then the P-40 is just fine. High altitudes in Europe were only an issue for strategic bombing, not tactical combat that would be the issue for an invasion. You keep comparing apples to oranges and think you're making a sound point.

How do you imagine the Luftwaffe fighter were destroyed? The RAF had tried to lure them up with it's fruitless operations in 1941/42. The fighters came up when they wanted to and fought on their terms, inflicting unacceptable casualties on Fighter Command.

If you believe that the RAF or USAAF was prepared to accept 2:1 losses in support of the invasion, then we'll disagree again. The Anglo-Americans are not Russians.

The Luftwaffe HAD to rise to the challenge of the strategic bombers and it was in doing so that it was destroyed. Our fundamental disagreement is that you believe an invasion could have been carried out without the strategic bombing campaign and I don't. On that we'll just have to disagree.

Why wasn't the P-40 deployed in the ETO in 1943? It had good range, for which the USAAF was desperate. I think the reason that there were no P-40s in the ETO is summed up in this contemporary report on the N-1. There would have been more Fs and Ks, with lower performance actually available:

PROOF DEPARTMENT
ARMY AIR FORCES PROVING GROUND COMMAND
EGLIN FIELD, FLORIDA
7 June 1943

FINAL REPORT ON
TEST OF OPERATIONAL SUITABILITY OF P-40N-1 AIRPLANE

CONCLUSIONS. It is concluded that:

a. In speed, maneuverability, and rate of climb up to approximately twenty thousand (20,000) feet the P-40N-1 is the best of the P-40 series tested to date. While the P-40N-1 is the superior in performance of the P-40 series, it is generally inferior to all other current types of fighters tested at this station.

b. The P-40N-1 is of a design which is believed to have reached its limit in performance unless major changes in control surface design, wing form, structure and horsepower are made.

Over Anzio P-40s were used to patrol between 5,000 and 8,000 ft (where it was hoped they could survive) and did nothing but waste fuel. The Fw 190 Fighter bombers simply dived in under them and sped away at speeds above the capability of the P-40.

The air situation in the MTO and Italy never bore any resemblance to that in NW Europe. In February 1944 B-17s and B-24s were able to operate unescorted north of Anzio. They couldn't do that in NW Europe at that time in 1944, never mind 1943.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

what was NAs max run capability in 41 to produce 51As? the RAF was flying them in limited amounts in 41 weren't they? if the scenario changed to where every available plane that could be produced was put on the line how many mustangs could we have fielded by the end of 41?

Not sure that we can arrive at the right number, but some comments can be made. There was 138 Mustangs accepted in 1941, including 68 in December. NAA produces 84-86 examples max in 1st half of 1942 monthly. In the same time they produce Mitchels in Inglewood 8and Texans?). Mustangs are to be paid by UK government. Between September 1942 and March 1943, NAA didn't delivered any Mustang.

For the USAF to acquire them, they will need to expedite the testing of the received prototypes (second half of 1941 already), evaluate and place orders. That, combined with existing and future RAF needs, migh mean that Mitchel is earlier farmed out to Kansas City, or maybe Dallas, and similar proposal is for the Texan. of course, that means the Mustang is produed instead of the A-36. Meaning maybe 250 Mustangs delivered to the USAF in 1942.

The service use would probably be at the end of 1942, however.

 

[tomo pauk]

Tomo - In June 1943, there were only 3 8th AF and zero 9th AF FG's in ETO. There 11 B-17 BG's and ALL the B-24 groups were TDY to north Africa for Tidalwave attack on Ploesti. The B-26 BGs were in theatre but ltd ops.

Whatever you pull from MTO enables the LW to respond by moving to ETO

I have no problem with your numbers, Bill. Just was trying to show that USAF commited much more aircraft in the MTO than in ETO in the time of interest - 1942-43. Will try to find the best Luftwaffe numbers and post that.

edit: this table so far (your work?), fighters only?:

 

[stona]

I have a chart which shows the distribution of the Luftwaffe across all three theatres, but only as a percentage of total aircraft of all types. It's not really helpful because the type of aircraft is important. Just as 700+ US P-40s would not be useful in the ETO so ,for example, the numerous Bf 110s operating in the east would be no good to the Luftwaffe in the ETO.
Cheers
Steve

 

[drgondog]

Tomo - that isn't my chart. Dr. Greuhler IIRC

I understand your point about airpower disposed to Torch being available for Overlord in the thesis but the key factor for successful attack is Ground strength and logistics to support them during the invasion. Second factor, following the first, is control of the air.to prevent German movement flexibility on the ground as well as reinforcement/re-supply from reserves.

Steve also brings up a good point about relative quality of Africa based aircraft and pilots for Allies. The P-40 and P-39 was not helpless but they were worthless for high altitude work so only the three MTO P-38 FG's plus 3 P-47 FGs are available for escort work, RAF would operate same.

Contrast the TO&E for June 1944 for Allied air and ground and sea assets versus 1943. The PTO was being starved to build up and supply Africa/MTO in 1942-1943 in a desperate fight against the Japanese. The Battle of the Atlantic was turning against Germany but the sea lanes were still under major threat when the build up of US Army in Britain was just beginning.

If you believe that a force multiplier of 3X for attacking force for a land battle, and the Wermacht could drain much of Italian strength, and Rommel could more successfully either tie down Commonwealth forces absent US presence in Africa or find a way to extract muc of his command, then,

How do you get the necessary forces in the UK, train them, acquire the seaborne assets for a beach assault, have essentially zero Airborne infantry assets trained and blooded in early 1943 when only a battalion of the 82nd Abn had experience in Africa before Sicily? True there were enough seaborne assets to invade North Africa but do you think that would have been enough to successfully take and consolidate French coastal positions? Then, more importantly, build up the reserves to push out, much less resist being pushed back into the sea?

I realize this is a 'what if' and also realize a lot of opinions are floating. I just happen to have the opinion that an invasion in 1943 squanders a huge amount of Allied resources, with a maximum opportunity to re-create WWI stagnation or worse, complete disaster. The stagnation scenario helps the Soviets, but is a complete disaster for the west with great potential for a large scale Dieppe.

 

[tomo pauk]

Going by the table from the USAF statistical digest, by end of March 1943 there were 472 P-38s and 203 P-47s in theaters vs. Germany. The numbers don't show the Spitfires in the USAF inventory, perhaps these are listed elsewhere in the Digest. Granted, the P-47 is not that long legged until they got the drop tanks question answered.
The RAF would've not operated as historically, preparation for invasion would mean most of the Spitfire VIII is in the ETO, not in MTO and CBI/PTO, plus sizable chunk of other RAF assets doing the same.

I believe in 3:1 ratio attacker vs. defender, ground forces, that ratio can be skewed by bringing the majority of USAF and daylight RAF forces in the ETO.

How do you get the necessary forces in the UK, train them, acquire the seaborne assets for a beach assault, have essentially zero Airborne infantry assets trained and blooded in early 1943 when only a battalion of the 82nd Abn had experience in Africa before Sicily?

It would be easier to bring US forces to the UK than in the MTO, plus there is no need to ship British and Canadian forces in the MTO, bar necessary reinforcements to the 8th Army. Granted, there will not be that much of combat experience, but then most of the forces that invaded Sicily remained in the MTO, the US ground units in Overlord were mostly fresh from training?

 

[stona]

And actually making the landings? The British and Canadians used 418 LCAs just to get infantry ashore on D-Day. For 'Torch' they used 94. The Americans used 839 LCVPs on D-Day, never mind all the rest of the various specialised landing craft, support ships etc.. You can't just magic this sort of equipment up out of thin air.

I'm still wondering where all the gliders, tugs and aircraft to drop paratroops are coming from!

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

The 3:1 ratio concept just doesnt hold up when comparing allied combat effectiveness to German combat effectiveness. Dupuy and Zetterling have each done a mountain of research on this, and in 1942, each German soldier was the equivalent of 2.52 Allied soldiers. This qualitative advantage steadily reduced such that by late 1944 it was closer to 1.38.

The 3:1 is a very rough comparison, based on the assumption that the quality of each opposing army , and the FPF per man was the same , which it just isnt . Quality was not the same, and firepower per unit also differed. The 3;1 ratio is based on nothing better than under ideal conditions you have 1:1 pinning the enemy, 1:1 advancing and engaging in close combat and 1:1 ready in reserve to exploit.

What Dupuy refers to as the "operational score effectiveness rating" throws all of that comfortable and simple comparison out the window. In point of fact, in the ETO, based on the Dupuy institute research the US army needed combat ratios of around 8:1 in 1942 against the Germans to make forward gains. This dropped to about 6:1 in 1943, and again to about 4.5:1 by the time of the Ardennes. This seems to be corroborated by the combat experiences at various times such as Kasserine, on the Rapido and even Salerno. All of these combat experiences show that a straight 3:1 wasnt enough against the Germans

 

[tomo pauk]

How many of thes transports, both sea- and air-borne, were used for Op Husky?

 

[syscom3]

In 1943 alone, there were 597 allied ships sunk in the Atlantic. Not a good statistic to have to deal with as you are trying to build up for an invasion that year. 1942 was even worse.

I can see it now. The allies have 3000 planes available. But fuel for only a 1000 of them.

 

[stona]

The Allies had 11,590 aircraft available for D-Day (Overlord) to put the numbers in some perspective.

'Torch' is a red herring. The total number of troops landed was about the same as the US contribution to 'Overlord' (less the 15,500 airborne troops). The British and Canadians landed another 83,000 on their three beaches for 'Overlord' as well as another 7,900 airborne. The numbers are not comparable. Furthermore the, 'Torch' landings were virtually unopposed, which was just as well, particularly for those trying to land at Oran.
The point is that not executing 'Torch' and diverting all those resources does not come close to making an 'Overlord', maybe another Dieppe, just on a grander scale.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

In 1943 alone, there were 597 allied ships sunk in the Atlantic. Not a good statistic to have to deal with as you are trying to build up for an invasion that year. 1942 was even worse.

I can see it now. The allies have 3000 planes available. But fuel for only a 1000 of them.

Yet for almost all of 1943 new construction offset losses by a huge amount and German losses in the much more expensive and difficult to construct Uboat was also so high they had to call off the Battle of the Atlantic by June 1943.

 

[wiking85]

The Allies had 11,590 aircraft available for D-Day (Overlord) to put the numbers in some perspective.

'Torch' is a red herring. The total number of troops landed was about the same as the US contribution to 'Overlord' (less the 15,500 airborne troops). The British and Canadians landed another 83,000 on their three beaches for 'Overlord' as well as another 7,900 airborne. The numbers are not comparable. Furthermore the, 'Torch' landings were virtually unopposed, which was just as well, particularly for those trying to land at Oran.
The point is that not executing 'Torch' and diverting all those resources does not come close to making an 'Overlord', maybe another Dieppe, just on a grander scale.

Cheers

Steve

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Torch

Casualties and losses

479-500 dead
720 wounded
4 troopships sunk



France:
1,346+ dead
1,997 wounded
several shore batteries destroyed
all artillery pieces captured
1 light cruiser lost
5 destroyers lost
6 submarines lost
2 flotilla leaders lost

Germany: 1 submarine sunk

The Western Task Force landed before daybreak on 8 November 1942, at three points in Morocco: Safi (Operation Blackstone), Fedala (Operation Brushwood, the largest landing with 19,000 men), and Mehdiya-Port Lyautey (Operation Goalpost). Because it was hoped that the French would not resist, there were no preliminary bombardments. This proved to be a costly error as French defenses took a toll of American landing forces.

On the night of 7 November, pro-Allied General Antoine Béthouart attempted a coup d'etat against the French command in Morocco, so that he could surrender to the Allies the next day. His forces surrounded the villa of General Charles Noguès, the Vichy-loyal high commissioner. However, Noguès telephoned loyal forces, who stopped the coup. In addition, the coup attempt alerted Noguès to the impending Allied invasion, and he immediately bolstered French coastal defenses.
A flyer in French and Arabic that was distributed by Allied forces in the streets of Casablanca, calling on citizens to cooperate with the Allied forces.

At Safi, the objective being capturing the port facilities to land the Western Task Force's medium tanks, the landings were mostly successful.[13] The landings were begun without covering fire, in the hope that the French would not resist at all. However, once French coastal batteries opened fire, Allied warships returned fire. By the time General Harmon arrived, French snipers had pinned the assault troops (most of whom were in combat for the first time) on Safi's beaches. Most of the landings occurred behind schedule. Carrier aircraft destroyed a French truck convoy bringing reinforcements to the beach defenses. Safi surrendered on the afternoon of 8 November. By 10 November, the remaining defenders were pinned down, and the bulk of Harmon's forces raced to join the siege of Casablanca.

At Port-Lyautey, the landing troops were uncertain of their position, and the second wave was delayed. This gave the French defenders time to organize resistance, and the remaining landings were conducted under artillery bombardment. With the assistance of air support from the carriers, the troops pushed ahead, and the objectives were captured.

At Fedala, weather disrupted the landings. The landing beaches again came under French fire after daybreak. Patton landed at 08:00, and the beachheads were secured later in the day. The Americans surrounded the port of Casablanca by 10 November, and the city surrendered an hour before the final assault was due to take place.

Casablanca was the principal French Atlantic naval base after German occupation of the European coast. The Naval Battle of Casablanca resulted from a sortie of French cruisers, destroyers, and submarines opposing the landings. A cruiser, six destroyers, and six submarines were destroyed by American gunfire and aircraft. The incomplete French battleship Jean Bart—which was docked and immobile—fired on the landing force with her one working gun turret until disabled by gunfire. Two U.S. destroyers were damaged.

 

[syscom3]

Yet for almost all of 1943 new construction offset losses by a huge amount and German losses in the much more expensive and difficult to construct Uboat was also so high they had to call off the Battle of the Atlantic by June 1943.

The net gains in shipping in 1943 was offset by the need to replace the huge losses of 1941 and 1942.

 

[wiking85]

The net gains in shipping in 1943 was offset by the need to replace the huge losses of 1941 and 1942.

Losses for whom? The US added its huge shipping capacity to the war, which resulted in a major net increase of merchant shipping, enough so that they could field hundreds of thousands of men in North Africa, both from the West and via Egypt. That was supplied from Britain and the US. So the shipping was there for an invasion, it just needed to be concentrated in Britain.

Edit: in fact there would be a net efficiency of not having to shipping supplies to troops in Africa from Britain, nor supply combat ops in Tunisia/Sicily. They could then focus their shipping and escort assets in the Atlantic to move troops and accumulate stores in Britain, not use that shipping to move men and material to Africa from Britain and sustain them there.

 

[gjs238]

The 3:1 ratio concept just doesnt hold up when comparing allied combat effectiveness to German combat effectiveness. Dupuy and Zetterling have each done a mountain of research on this, and in 1942, each German soldier was the equivalent of 2.52 Allied soldiers. This qualitative advantage steadily reduced such that by late 1944 it was closer to 1.38.

The 3:1 is a very rough comparison, based on the assumption that the quality of each opposing army , and the FPF per man was the same , which it just isnt . Quality was not the same, and firepower per unit also differed. The 3;1 ratio is based on nothing better than under ideal conditions you have 1:1 pinning the enemy, 1:1 advancing and engaging in close combat and 1:1 ready in reserve to exploit.

What Dupuy refers to as the "operational score effectiveness rating" throws all of that comfortable and simple comparison out the window. In point of fact, in the ETO, based on the Dupuy institute research the US army needed combat ratios of around 8:1 in 1942 against the Germans to make forward gains. This dropped to about 6:1 in 1943, and again to about 4.5:1 by the time of the Ardennes. This seems to be corroborated by the combat experiences at various times such as Kasserine, on the Rapido and even Salerno. All of these combat experiences show that a straight 3:1 wasnt enough against the Germans

How did this compare with the US:Japenese?

 

[parsifal]

Losses for whom? The US added its huge shipping capacity to the war, which resulted in a major net increase of merchant shipping, enough so that they could field hundreds of thousands of men in North Africa, both from the West and via Egypt. That was supplied from Britain and the US. So the shipping was there for an invasion, it just needed to be concentrated in Britain.

Edit: in fact there would be a net efficiency of not having to shipping supplies to troops in Africa from Britain, nor supply combat ops in Tunisia/Sicily. They could then focus their shipping and escort assets in the Atlantic to move troops and accumulate stores in Britain, not use that shipping to move men and material to Africa from Britain and sustain them there.

Ah nope. US entered the war in 1939 with around 8 million tons of US flagged shipping. In 1939-40, around 2 million tons was reflagged to dodge the neutrality laws and assist the Allies in getting war cargoes across the ditch. Prewar construction in US yards was negligible in 1939-40 and still less than the British effort of 1941, which in turn was woefully inadequate and quite unable to keep up with losses.

When the US entered the war in 1941, there was barely enough to keep the US domestic economy ticking and for many months the US was heavily reliant on British controlled shipping just to keep afloat. Shipping losses by year are set out below. The Allied production efforts were roughly as follows:

1939: 376,419 (US), 300,000 (Allied);
1940: 528,697 (US), 810,000 (Allied);
1941: 1,031,974 (US), 1, 156,000 (Allied);
1942: 5,479,766 (US), 1,301,000 (Allied);
1943: 11,448,360 (US), 1,204,000 (Allied);
1944: 9,288,156 (US), 1,014,000 (Allied):

The shipping losses to all causes saw the allies reach their nadir at the end of 1942, with an overall net deficit of nearly 15 million tons worldwide. After March 1943, the loss rates slowed down, production picked up and the Uboat attrition became unsustainable, but this was not apparent until the latter part of 1943, and the allies had a lot of catching up to do. It was well into 1944 before the allies were aheasd of the 1939 shipping capacities.

Overall Allied controlled shipping suffered the following losses during the war;

1939: 935,000
1940: 4,549,000
1941: 4,693,000
1942: 8,338,000

To these outright losses should be added the vast amounts of shipping laid up from damage. I dont have exact figures for ships damaged, but some sources claim it was around 40% of the outright losses. We can probably assume a downtime of around 6 months for each ship damaged. These figures dont include shipping under 500 tons displacement.

The allies entered the war with 28 million tons of shipping. About a million tons was immediately seized by the Germans in 1939 from the Baltic Neutrals and about 1 million more was captured in that first year of the war. When the japanese attacked in 1942, about 1 million tons was captured in the Far East. None of these captures are included in the above figures.

25 million tons available after the captures are taken into account. Shipping availability with losses, damage, new construction accounted for for the allies is about as follows;

1939: 24,435,419 grt
1940: 19,624,419 grt
1941: 15,519,393 grt
1942: 11,862,159 grt


As a shipping user, for most of 1942, the US was a net user rather than a provider of allied shipping. There just wasnt enough to undertake any sort of serious offensive action until the latter part of 1943, and even then the allies had to be super careful with their shipping, until a buffer had been built up