Airwar over France with no Operation Torch, instead 1943 invasion of France

Its the sortie rate that makes the difference. it matters not if you have 10000 a/c and they don't fly much, or more specifically, cant fly much. If you've got 5000 a/c flying 2.9 sorties per unit of time compared to 15000 a/c flying 8.5 sorties per unit of time, your 1944 air force compared to your 1943 Air force is going to do 127500 units of (work) compared to 14500 units of (work). that means, disregarding all other efficiency factors, your 1944 air force is 8.7 times more powerful. If your 1944 version of airpower is akin to a Chev muscle car, then the 1943 is the equivalent of a Morris Minor.....

I don't know exactly what combat multipliers to assign to airpower in a ground campaign, but in the western military, it has to be substantial. As a wargamer, if you have normal odds of say 5:1 and then you add effective air support, you could modify those odds to 8 or 9:1 easily. if the 1943 version of airpower could, on average increase your battlefield odds by one shift, you would go from say 5:1 to 6:1. allowing or guesstimating diminishing returns, the 1944 scenario could easily transform that match up to 10 or 11:1.

Id very much like to hear peoples opinions on the quantitative effects airpower might have on a land battle. We tend to know that airpower was usualy critical, but its hard to be precise.

parsifal said:

Id very much like to hear peoples opinions on the quantitative effects airpower might have on a land battle. We tend to know that airpower was usualy critical, but its hard to be precise.

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I'll have a look when I have a chance, but the effect of 1940's air power was very difficult to quantify. What figure can be put on denying the enemy freedom of movement in day light hours? Preventing his ability to concentrate forces? Wreaking havoc on his logistical tail?

Much research has shown that WW2 air power was not very good at destroying enemy forces, particularly armour, but also artillery,dug in infantry, at or near the front. It was also not very effective at shifting enemy forces from well prepared defensive positions. It did however have a debilitating effect in other ways.

In the context of the original thread it is not just air power at the front that is relevant but also the application of strategic forces in the preparation for the invasion and then in direct support of it and the ensuing campaigns.

Without all these 'aerial' factors, as well as much else, the invasion of NW Europe would have failed. These factors were not in place in 1943 which is why the Allies did not attempt the invasion at that time.

Cheers

Steve

Ive read somewhere that even at its best, airpower might account for 3-5% of losses. So I have no problem in accepting that as a direct killer, under normal circumstances, airpower was at best a pinning agent, not a direct killer. Against exposed ground forces, not dug in, and concentrated, such as at Falaise, the effects of airpower were far more dangerous, it has to be noted.

Artillery remained the primary firepower of the army. You are hitting the right nails by inferring the main effect was on mobility. Obviously reducing the freedom of movement to an army, increases its risk to being encircled and pinned, but there are other flow on effects as well. Even in defence an army engaged places enormous strain on its supply train, with the main eater of that supply being the artillery . Without supply to its artillery, a units firepower is reduced, and if its firepower is reduced, its ability to resist also decreases. Add to that if airpower is being applied, the mobility of the target is also decreased. Denied both firepower and mobility, the targets ability to resist is reduced exponentially.

Moreover a unit restricted to night movement only effectively has both its firepower and its mobility halved. The supply issue is worth having a look at. A German Infantry Div would typically carry with it a 5 day supply load out. A German Infantry Div had four primary supply needs, Fuel, Food (and water), POLs, fodder and ammunition. Ammunition rates had wild fluctuations, depending on the level of engagement. A 1943 Infantry Div had 12000 men at full strength, and its five day load out when not engaged was 1902 tons, when not engaged. If engaged to full capacity and if the division is in a mobile situation, At a low end of activity, it might expend 70 tons per day, but at the high end it could expend, on average 600-800 tons per day. At that rate, with an assumed distance to the rail suppy head of 30 miles, the units 600 motor vehicles would be fully stretched, night and day, just to get the supply to the divisional depots. Reduce the available movement time by roughly 2/3 and your division will suffer fatal losses in logistic support. And its the soft skinned vehicles that you should be going after, not the tanks. Its against the soft skinned supply tails that FFARs were most deadly. You only need to get your rocket within about 30m of the target and your truck is a goner.

So, with an air force in 1943, 1/8 as capable in terms of the amount of work it could undertake, and an unknown loss of efficiency compared to the 1944 air forces. That isnt even considering any other qualitative changes that might be at work. With 1/8 the amount of work potential, are we looking at a German army with the ability to 8x as efficient? I think not that much, but certainly far more efficient than the 1944 army that faced the allies

The allied tactical air forces wreaked havoc on German supply. By far the most accurate weapons these aircraft had were the 20mm cannon (RAF) and .50 calibre machine guns (USAAF), both of which were ineffective against armoured vehicles, fortifications etc. Against soft skinned vehicles, the trucks, tankers and horse drawn carts on which the Germans depended they were devastating.

Shortly after the Falaise 'pocket' was closed No.2 ORS conducted a survey to determine the losses to the Germans caused by air attack and the effectiveness of the various air to ground weapons. They surveyed three areas, the 'Pocket' itself, the area at the mouth of the 'Pocket' around Chambois referred to as 'Shambles' and the area leading to the Seine crossings known as 'Chase'.

In the 'Pocket', of 133 armoured vehicles located only 33 had been the victim of any form of air attack. The remaining 100 had been destroyed by their crews or abandoned.
Of 701 soft skinned vehicles found in the 'Pocket' 325 had been the victim of air attack and of these 85% had been hit by cannon or machine gun fire.. Nonetheless of the 885 vehicles of all types found in the 'Pocket' 60% had been destroyed or abandoned by their crews. The next question is why? The most obvious answer is that they had run out of fuel, and that too may well have been due to the contribution of tactical air power.

In the 'Shambles' so many vehicles were found, around 3,000, that the ORS could not examine them all and simply took samples of various types. 82 of the 187 tanks and SP guns found in this area were examined. Only 2 were determined to have been destroyed from the air.
A sample of 330 soft skin and 31 'lightly armoured' vehicles was also taken. 110 soft skin vehicles and 6 lightly armoured vehicles were the victims of air attack. The effectiveness of strafing against these targets was once again confirmed.

The 'Chase' area was more difficult to assess, many minor roads were not checked. The ORS estimated that some 5,000 vehicles were destroyed in this area. 301 tanks and SP guns were examined and 10 were found to be victims of air attack. 2nd TAF pilots alone had claimed 222! Again the strafing of soft skinned vehicles had been most effective. The blocking of roads and increasing congestion as well as destroying mobile fuel supplies the ORS reckoned that the almost constant fighter bomber attacks were largely responsible for the abandonment of so many tanks and other vehicles. This view was supported by PoW interrogations. German PoWs described how the threat of air attack had restricted movement to night time until congestion and haste had compelled movement by day. Whenever air attacks materialised crews would stop to take cover and vehicles would be driven off the main roads, into side roads, which in turn became blocked. The continuous air attacks, in a limited area, certainly prevented many tanks and other vehicles escaping, even though they did not directly destroy them. Air attacks also had an acute demoralising effect on the troops subjected to them. This is impossible to quantify, but significant.

It is no accident that the subsequent German offensive in the Ardennes was carried out in conditions that negated the effect of allied tactical air power. It is a testament to the ability of that power to limit the ability of the Germans to carry out large scale armoured operations, but it is still difficult to put numbers to it.

Cheers

Steve

parsifal said:

...
So, with an air force in 1943, 1/8 as capable in terms of the amount of work it could undertake, and an unknown loss of efficiency compared to the 1944 air forces. That isnt even considering any other qualitative changes that might be at work. With 1/8 the amount of work potential, are we looking at a German army with the ability to 8x as efficient? I think not that much, but certainly far more efficient than the 1944 army that faced the allies

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Wonder why the RAF and USAF of, say, mid 1943, will represent just 1/8th of capability, when compared with mid 1944?

Because 5,928 available aircraft with a sortie rate of 2.9 gives a product for total possible sorties of 17,191 in June '43.

15,210 available aircraft with a sortie rate of 8.5 gives a product for possible sorties of 129,285 in June '44.

It's why the sortie rate is so important. In June '44 the allied air forces were potentially flying 7.52 times more sorties than in June '43. It's yet another measure of effectiveness, like load/personnel factors and a host of others.

I don't have figures for Luftwaffe sortie rates in either period, but I'd bet they compare very unfavourably with allied rates. By 1944 the Luftwaffe still had aircraft but they didn't fly for a variety of well documented reasons. How many Luftwaffe sorties were flown, or even attempted against the invasion beaches? Having a couple of thousand aircraft can be rendered irrelevant by other factors.

In August 1944 No.83 Group 2nd TAF alone flew 13,054 sorties. I wonder how many the entire Luftwaffe in NW Europe flew in the same month! Incidentally another measure of how well you are doing is loss/sortie. For No. 83 Group that month it was 126.7 sorties per loss which is exceptionally good.

Cheers

Steve

I don't know where the number of <6000 of combat aircraft for June 1943 comes from. Just the USAF have had on hand 5100 of '1st line' combat aircraft deployed against Germany; plus a likely number of RAF aircraft?
The sortie rate is dependant on how close the target is, and how hard one wants to push their assets. Being sattisfied with less thaan 3 sorties per month is not a great thinking?

Milosh gave a source for the figures. An increase in sortie rate is, essentially, an increase in efficiency. There may be many factors causing the sortie rate to have been lower in June '43 than a year later. These can be logistical and organisational as well as operational.
I would bet that operational ready rates for USAAF aircraft in Europe was significantly higher in 1944 than 1943, simply for logistical reasons, but I don't have the figures. I would also bet that the Luftwaffe's were a lot lower in 1944 than 1943, I have those figures but not time to look them up. These things make a huge difference to the effectiveness of any fighting force.
Cheers
Steve

IF the number of sorties is combat sorties the numbers for the US are quite understandable. Many US Squadrons/groups were working up in 1943. That is debugging aircraft after ocean voyages, training crew men and slowly introducing the new units to combat. Many bomber squadrons/groups flew their first missions to coastal France or the low countries and didn't try to penetrate to Germany until a number of missions had been flown. Sometimes a number of days or even a few weeks passed between missions over enemy territory while working up. Bomber crews that had trained flying over the the southern US might have difficulty with flying (navigating) over Europe and the Channel/North sea. Glimpses of land through cloud cover when you are unfamilar with what you are even looking for is a good way to get lost.
Throwing green crews and partially sorted aircraft into long range missions would have been fool hardy given the effort it took to get the planes, men and equipment to England.

The effort to ship the men gear into MTO, operate from airbases of lower quality than in UK, while expecting them to perform against the enemy was what USAF was doing from late 1942 on. In much greater quantity than in ETO.

tomo pauk said:

Wonder why the RAF and USAF of, say, mid 1943, will represent just 1/8th of capability, when compared with mid 1944?

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Steve explained this pretty well , but we aren't even considering other improvements in efficiency. I think between June 1943 and June 1944, the Allies added to their knowledge of what buttons to push, what to go after , where, and with what. its just not possible to be precise, but its something to at least think about.

So, its pretty clear that between 1943 and 1944 the allies derived massive increases in work potential for their air forces. by "work potential' I mean, "things they could do."

The question is, with the (reduced) level of "work potential" available in June 1943 versus the available response the LW could mount at that time, could a less experienced, less capable, smaller allied ground force have any hope of success. I don't think that it did, but Im willing to at least listen to the counter argument.

I would also bet that the Luftwaffe's were a lot lower in 1944 than 1943, I have those figures but not time to look them up.

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On D-Day, Ive read the germans managed about 300 sorties over Normandy and the beaches. No idea what they were. These included a few critical recon missions, which I don't know the results of. Typically, however recon is the single most important thing your air force can do.

These things make a huge difference to the effectiveness of any fighting force.

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Bingo! You can say that again

parsifal said:

Steve explained this pretty well , but we aren't even considering other improvements in efficiency. I think between June 1943 and June 1944, the Allies added to their knowledge of what buttons to push, what to go after , where, and with what. its just not possible to be precise, but its something to at least think about.

So, its pretty clear that between 1943 and 1944 the allies derived massive increases in work potential for their air forces. by "work potential' I mean, "things they could do."

The question is, with the (reduced) level of "work potential" available in June 1943 versus the available response the LW could mount at that time, could a less experienced, less capable, smaller allied ground force have any hope of success. I don't think that it did, but Im willing to at least listen to the counter argument.

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Thanks for being open-minded.

We can discuss how much of 'work potential' was lost in 1943 due to USAF having 2 times more of the 1st line combat aircraft in the MTO (= longer supply chain, lower quality of air bases) vs. what they had in the UK. As for the ground forces of less capability vs. German defences - the Atlantic wall was not in early 1943 what was in early 1944.
The USA was, despite knowing the lack of experience in 1942-43 and sea lines of communications not yet 100% cleared, very willing to bring the war to the Axis, not just in rhetoric.

Gentlemen,

In regards to sorties per aircraft,

I am not sure that the sortie rate per aircraft per unit of time is an accurate way to measure power of an Air Force because the military situations may not be comparable. IMHO the work that was undertaken in June of 1943 was not equal to the work undertaken in June of 1944. June 1944 sortie numbers include the Overlord invasion and Operation Diadem in the Mediterranean. Both projects would require an increased effort to succeed. The only extra operation in June of 1943 was the reduction of Pantelleria.

Perhaps the 1943 sorties per aircraft are low compared to 1944 because the amount of work required was not the same in June of 1943 as in June of 1944.

Eagledad

I think what you may be saying, and correct me if I misunderstand, is that the sortie rate per aircraft per day was lower in 1943, because the airforce at that time didn't need to work as hard as it did in 1944. There was less urgency in the tasks before it, so they could go more slowly at it.

If Im understanding correctly, its a valid suggestion. A good surrogate measure to apply in parallel to the sortie rate would be to also look at serviceability rates at the same time. If the serviceability rate in 1943 was lower than in 1944, AND the sortie rate was lower as well, then that would suggest, by surrogate standards of measurement admittedly, that the 1943 air force wasn't able to lift its game. if not, it might be reasonable to assume the '43 air force wasn't working as hard as it should, or could.

The '44 air force did maintain a higher sortie rate, and didn't have to take a breather at the end of that period. by definition we therefore know that it was a sustainable rate of operations in '44. the unknown variable is whether the sortie rate in '43 could be lifted and sustained or not.....

eagledad said:

Perhaps the 1943 sorties per aircraft are low compared to 1944 because the amount of work required was not the same in June of 1943 as in June of 1944.
Eagledad

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The Casablanca Directive was issued on 21st January 1943. The implication in your comment is that the allied air forces were not making a maximum effort to carry out the object of "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."
On 10th June 1943 the Casablanca Directive was modified with the issue of the Pointblank Directive, essentially targeting the German Air Force and its supporting industries etc (hence raids on Schweinfurt for example). This remained in force until control of all allied air forces passed to the Supreme Commander A.E.F. on 27th March 1944. The priorities remained the same, specifically "German Air Force, particularly fighters. Facilities supporting G.A.F." By 17th April the Railway Plan, in direct support of the invasion was added.

My point is that I don't believe that the allied air forces were making anything less than a maximum effort in carrying out their directives in 1943. I don't believe that they had the same capability in 1943 that they would have a year later. The RAF didn't have a tactical air force in Europe until Fighter Command was divided in mid (June?) 1943, and 2nd TAF didn't become a relevant force until Coningham took over in early 1944.

Cheers

Steve

Gentlemen,

Since the strategic situation in June of 1943 was different than the situation in June of 1944, the air forces were given different tasks. The sortie numbers IMHO are reflective of the different tasks. I am not saying or implying that the Western Allies were doing less than max effort in June of 1943, I suspect that the Air Forces were giving max efforts giving the respective priorities. What needs to be asked is could the western allies mount a similar effort in June of 1943 as they did in June of 1944 given the same priorities that the Air Force in June of 1944 had?

As to the idea of whether there was enough air support for a cross channel invasion in June of 1943, Parsifal idea of incorporating serviceability numbers is a good start. We would also have to look at numbers by type as well as the quality of the Allied aircraft and pilots available in June 1943 v June 1944. The dreaded logistics trains would also have to be compared.

Eagledad

If the Allied air forces were making a maximum effort in 1943 with a sortie rate of around 3, then something changed to enable this to rise to more than 8 in 1944. Many factors can influence this number, most obviously serviceability rates and crew availability, but also something beyond anyone's control like the weather (though June in NW Europe would not normally have terrible weather, many targets for the bombers might be cloud covered).
Cheers
Steve

As example of why sortie rates may be off one might look at the P-47. It didn't come into it's own until late summer of 1943. Spring and early summer saw P-47 Groups (3 of them?) with chronic radio problems, in flight fires, oxygen system problems, and other system problems. I will ignore the drop tank situation as that had little bearing on short range missions. It wasn't a question of flying missions on day, landing and refueling, rearming and being ready to go the next day ( or when weather permitted) but trying to sort out a number of problems in a large percentage of the units aircraft before trying another large scale mission. One Squadron or group only got into action in the Spring of 1943 after refitting all their P-47s with English radios because their own were useless (and apparently unfix-able, at the time).
By late 1943 and 44 many problems were being fixed at the factory, New groups/squadrons were loaned (or transferred) a few experienced ground crewmen and pilots so their ability to go into action was much quicker than the early groups.

The Americans certainly seem to have had a logistical issue as they deployed to Europe. In the simplest terms if they needed a bit for one of their P+W engines it was likely to be several thousand miles away, not in Birmingham or Derby. This MUST have had a debilitating effect on serviceability and therefore sortie rates. I would be very interested to see some data on crew availability rates at this time too.
The huge build up of men and materiel for Overlord which took place throughout 1943 would have gone a long way towards alleviating the situation. At the end of 1942 there were about 140,000 US personnel in the UK, at the time of Overlord this had risen to 1.5 million.
It seems to me, whatever the Americans were trying to do in 1943 they were doing much more efficiently in 1944.
Cheers
Steve