Another 'Gem' from Greg - just released.

[BarnOwlLover]

Other than casual viewing (mostly to see if informational posts get posted), I further refuse to give a damn about this thread until those terms are met. As I said, it's boring, I think those who had points to prove have proven them, and it's time to move on. I don't care how that's achieved at this rate.

I came here to learn primarily. When something goes against what I had come to know but it's presented in a factual, well-presented manner, I learn. I'm not learning nothing from the past couple of pages on here. I hope that this can be reversed, no matter how that comes about.

As for Greg, I do have to say, though, screw him until he learns to be open to learning and does so when confronted with well-researched facts and information. At least most here have gotten that concept.

 

[Marcel]

Other than casual viewing (mostly to see if informational posts get posted), I further refuse to give a damn about this thread until those terms are met. As I said, it's boring, I think those who had points to prove have proven them, and it's time to move on. I don't care how that's achieved at this rate.

I came here to learn primarily. When something goes against what I had come to know but it's presented in a factual, well-presented manner, I learn. I'm not learning nothing from the past couple of pages on here. I hope that this can be reversed, no matter how that comes about.

As for Greg, I do have to say, though, screw him until he learns to be open to learning and does so when confronted with well-researched facts and information. At least most here have gotten that concept.

It doesn't help that you keep bringing it up. I already asked to stop the discussion and go back to the original subject. So stop moaning and start acting please.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Yes, Marcel is the voice of reason. Let's get back to the topic at hand.

I know my last response did not help either.

 

[drgondog]

Thanks for the very informative replies.

BarnOWL: I never said 8th AF leadership dominated by bomber guys. I said USAAC/AAF leadership dominated by bomber guys, and I think that was key to Greg's original contention. Its an interesting topic, the leadership mix. For example, in the USN you have basically 3 branches: Aviation, Surface Warfare, and Submarine. Yes there are other parts of the makeup, but generally those are the 3. They try to equally distribute the flag positions to those 3 branches, and even then some outstanding officers like Edward L. Beach, jr. do not make flag rank. I think the basic assertion is that the bomber mafia dominated the USAAF, and that their biases affected force structures, and thus outcomes. Thanks also for the reference to the book, which I keep seeing mentioned but had not yet seen the actual title.

When I pressed Greg to be specific regarding names in the Bomber Mafia he was somewhat evasive and then named Arnold. Who are your nominees?

The Vision for an independent Service Arm, co-equal to Army and Navy was to build a Strategic Air Combat arm capable of destroying enemy Industrial capacity, while sill serving the needs of the Army with respect to Pursuit, Attack, Transport and Observation.

Ponder a 1939 Budget pre-Poland Invasion in which the Armed Services were extremely small and the budget by reuirement was very low. Then, in your mind's eye envision the leadership structure trying to control explosive growth in anticipation of engaging a war for which we (US) were woefully unprepared for.

Place yourslf as the critic, given full hindsight of the outcomes, of War Planners trying to plan and allocate priorities of a nation that 'can do anything- but not everything'. Your country is isolated frm Europe and Asia by watery logistical nigtmares for a foe to solve - if contemplating war with US. What priority for range for Pursuit do you see as desirable, recognizing that fuel fractions are the bane of performance attainment. I suspet command and control of the airspace over CONUS and a band offshore might even be your huckleberry.

Forget for the moment the fierce battles for favor by the Navy and Army for the President's ear and approval. What are your priorities for the AAC/AAF in November 1941? Remember that the 1939 priorities are being executed and the 1940 priorites are really just getting started.

Tell us what your agenda is (in Fy 40/41 for US Strategic Air Force (fledgling) for 1943?

Mr. Sinclair: Thanks for your long and informational reply. It appears that you have shown that I over-stated the bomber crew casualties caused by lack of fighter escort in the early part of the war. Having said that, those casualties were still very significant, far more than were anticipated. Whenever I listen to videos or read narratives from USAAF veterans, I always ask myself WHEN they were in combat. There aren't very many from 1942/43, a staggering number were killed. It would appear that the life expectancy of a bomber crewman arriving in the theatre in June/July/Aug/Sept of 1943 was very short indeed. Your question about the number of senior leaders coming from the bomber pipeline hits to the core of the claimed issue. I confess I don't know the percentages, but it APPEARS that the bomber mafia had undue influence over decision making, even if the %'s of general officers don't show that. Thanks also for the Eaker quote that 2/3 of the casualties on the Munster raid in Oct 43 could have been avoided with fighter escort. If I was FDR or Marshall, and Eaker said that to me, I would have unloaded on him, "So why weren't they provided? Don't you or the other USAAF leadership know what you are doing? You told me that this force could do this job, and now these boys are being hacked to pieces and we don't have the tools to protect them!"

Asst Secy War Lovett HAD the ear of Stimson AND the President AND General's Marshall and Arnold - and reported his findings during his tour of ETO/England in Spring of 1943. General Deloss Emmons, former equal (and well respected) of Arnold was quite clear that escort fighters all the way to the targets were essential for success of POINTBLANK. Bot recommended dispatching P38s and P-51s ASAP. Eaker pleaded with Arnold for Mustangs and Lightnings in June, 1943 - and Arnold responded by re-routing 20th and 55th FG to ETO and directing the soon to be equipped tactical FG's (P-51B) to 9th AF.

You are blaming Eaker (and by proxy rnold) for the unexpected resistance of the LW and the 'massive transfer' of experienced LW units from OST and SUD fronts to the Defense of the Reich beginning summer 1943. That is an intelligence failure coupled with over optimistic claims by 8h AF gunners which led Eaker to believe 8th AF could win a bloody war of attrition.

My guess is that those leaders never heard those words from the horse's mouth, since you say that they were in a letter to another person.

Mr Gunn: Thanks for your comments Oblique references such as the one to the Colonel are frustrating to newbies like me. Which Colonel, and when? There are a lot of those kinds of "toss off" remarks made in this forum that require hours of reading of old threads to figure out. There was a Colonel that was holding up the Merlin Mustang? I guess I need to read the book.

No need, Col (1940), B.Gen (1941), MGen (1942) Oliver Echols CO Materiel Command including Wright Field Development Ceter as well as AirService Command. He was stonewalled by Kindelberger when requesting NAA build P-40s for the Brits. There is ample evidence that he held a grudge to the extent that he fought Operational Requirements specific order to buy the A-36, was treated 'roughly', tried aain to kill Mustang production but was over-run with exedited priority for Merlin Powered Mustang prototype and once again, for continuation of Mustang with P-51A orders.

Echols also bought into the worst turkey ever ordered by Mat.Command - namely the XP-75 - to meet Arnold's demand for a Fighter with 1500 mi range and peformance equal to best in world (Dec 1940).

Flight Testing for Operational Suitabiity was peeled away from his hands and dispatched to Orlando and Eglin Fields - primarily because of the god awful issues incountered with P-47 and P-38 early in combat operations

The bottom line to me is that the USAAF was poorly equipped and trained to carry out the planned operations, not unlike other services such as the submarine service I have mentioned several times. (How someone didn't end up in the stockade over the torpedo problems alone is beyond me but I digress.) I still see Greg's central argument as valid: the lack of drop tanks was scandalous and unforgiveable. (By "lack of drop tanks" I mean the whole program for tactical use: engineering, design, testing, implementation, production, training, etc.) I haven't seen anyone really refute that, and will look forward to the "debate" if and when it happens.

To the above, think about a nation growing from 320,000 active duty military peronnel in 1938 to 13 million in 1944 and an unlimited budget with few adult supervisors to anticipate the battle requirements to win.

 

[pbehn]

On topic. One of many things that worked against strategic bombing theory is the fact that aircraft reflect radio waves. We take this for granted today but the initial request from the Tizard committee in 1934 was to investigate the possibility of producing "death rays" or radio wave weapons which Germany was reported to have. From that request in 1934 to experiments in 1936 a working system started to be deployed in 1938. In 1940 it had been much improved and Dowding was optimistic but not certain it and his CAC system would work. 90 years after these events how much can US strategists be blamed for not knowing how future defences could and would be organised? In 1940 German RADAR tech was just as advanced as that of the UK possibly better but Goering and Kesselring didnt figure out exactly what they were up against or what to do about it in the BoB.

 

[BarnOwlLover]

Now this is what I'm talkin' 'bout! And it's a lesson I sort of had to learn when I came here. Us in the here and now have the benefit of usually 20/20 hindsight. We can Monday Morning Quarterback (for those of us who aren't as well informed of the inner workings) and ask "why didn't this happen?" or "why didn't this happen sooner?"

Fact is that what is obvious to us now 80 or so years later, wasn't necessarily so obvious to those in the trenches back then. Not to mention that World War II was the dawn of air power as we know it. At the start, most people in charge didn't exactly know what it was, or how to exploit it. They had to learn, and often times that meant trial and error, as with the actual design of the aircraft themselves.

Things that we still take for granted today or are common knowledge today, was in its infancy in 1939. And the US was trying it's damnedest to stay out of direct involvement in World War II, or at least for as long as it possibly could, though by 1941, almost everyone knew that that time was basically running out.

And that's why I do come to this forum. I'm more interested in the technology and such of the aircraft, but that's just one facet of what made the successful (or not). That's why even the crappiest aircraft often does have an interesting story to tell, and why I'm interested also in infantry weapons, cars, etc. What made them successes, what made them failures, what made them in between. And it's usually not just one thing that's make or break.

 

[GrauGeist]

Regarding weather effecting missions, here is an excellent thread by someone who was there in the ETO and sheds some light on the subject.

Mission Weather

Weather conditions in the UK and over the Continent during the January - April period were challenging. The fourteen missions I was on only three drops were visual. On the others a radar system PFF(Path Finder Force) was used. The Lead Squadron aircraft had special equipment that enabled us to...

ww2aircraft.net

By the way, the thread's author, Bill, is greatly missed.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Regarding weather effecting missions, here is an excellent thread by someone who was there in the ETO and sheds some light on the subject.

Mission Weather

Weather conditions in the UK and over the Continent during the January - April period were challenging. The fourteen missions I was on only three drops were visual. On the others a radar system PFF(Path Finder Force) was used. The Lead Squadron aircraft had special equipment that enabled us to...

ww2aircraft.net

By the way, the thread's author, Bill, is greatly missed.

Yeah it was nice hearing his actual experiences.

Sadly the passage of time cannot be halted.

 

[fubar57]

And that's why I do come to this forum.

I come here for the buffet

 

[PlanesandShips]

Regarding weather effecting missions, here is an excellent thread by someone who was there in the ETO and sheds some light on the subject.

Mission Weather

Weather conditions in the UK and over the Continent during the January - April period were challenging. The fourteen missions I was on only three drops were visual. On the others a radar system PFF(Path Finder Force) was used. The Lead Squadron aircraft had special equipment that enabled us to...

ww2aircraft.net

By the way, the thread's author, Bill, is greatly missed.

I note that he does not mention any thunderstorms.

I have found great value in some first hand accounts. A great interview, IMHO, is that of Mr. William Pennebaker who at one point talks about the difficulties of flying a constant IAS at different altitudes as the stream climbed having the effect of spreading out the formation and extending the time to form up. Realistic peace time training could have helped with these difficulties. Although he doesn't mention it here, I've seen videos of long lines of bombers que-ed up for takeoff, and it occurred to me that the ones at the back of the line, which would later be flying full throttle struggling to catch up due to the problem mentioned above, would also be burning the most fuel on the ground waiting to get to the runway.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9VgaED9h-f8

 

[Snautzer01]

Oef, can we stop the discussion please?

E Engineman please know that your remarks are noted and will be considered.

To all: We do appreciate helpful suggestions. Just be aware that it does not always mean they are implemented directly or sometimes at all.

E Engineman thats is indeed what they do. I am here quite some time, in years and so and have seen this happening. They work not with rules in stone or concrete. More as in common sense.

They are on the whole quite a good bunch.
I have seen things i do not agree with and have spoken out. Its there if you want to read it.

But there is not an instace, not one, those guys do not take a bit of criticism serious.
Now just give it a bit of time. I am sure they will do something with it.

And if you do not like a members response, there is an ignore function.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I note that he does not mention any thunderstorms.

Does that mean that thunderstorms do not exist, and why does a weather system have to be a thunderstorm to cause a flight to divert?

 

[33k in the air]

I come here for the buffet

Warren Buffett posts here?!?

 

[pbehn]

Warren Buffett posts here?!?

Lets not go down that rabbit hole.
No one holds buffets in a warren

 

[Airframes]

Peter rabbit did ....................

 

[pbehn]

Does that mean that thunderstorms do not exist, and why does a weather system have to be a thunderstorm to cause a flight to divert?

I cant see how it is a point of dispute dispute. The allies expended a massive amount of effort on recon of all types to find out the weather conditions en route and at the target, the US wanted more Mosquitoes or that purpose. This was either because drinking too much afternoon tea had given them the British weather obsession or it was actually a serious and important issue that impacted all aspects of a mission. One thing not mentioned so far is wing icing, which I believe is much worse in some cloud conditions.

 

[PlanesandShips]

Does that mean that thunderstorms do not exist, and why does a weather system have to be a thunderstorm to cause a flight to divert?

Low visibility and clouds were much more of a problem in Europe, then as now, than thunderstorms. It is fair to say that "weather" caused a lot of problems in every phase of flight, but it was mostly due to the dependence upon airplanes of that time upon needing visual cues to do almost everything, and especially to do them with any degree of precision. The whole debate about TRW's is because that is one of the comments I chose to challenge, and have been challenged in return. Its emblematic of the way discussions go around here, and why (along with the time involved), I have chosen not to engage to some/most of those challenges. I'm aware of the horseshoe nail, and that professionals talk about logistics, but at some point a conclusion has to be reached. Constant bifurcation of each sub element of each element of each argument seems to me to be rather argumentative and non-productive. I described some of this to my 21 year old son at dinner last night, and he remarked that the more niche the topic in an online forum, the more pedantic that the participants seem to be. I was astonished at his observation, given what I have experienced here.

The part about faulty airspeed procedures causing the groups to be spread out starts in the 49th minute. He flat out says that no one thought of this problem previously. That tells me that in peace time they didn't do sufficiently realistic practice missions.

Edit: just read the comment re: icing. Yes, I agree wholeheartedly that given the location on the globe, icing would be much more of a concern in the EU than perhaps elsewhere. Having said that, most of the information I have seen regarding weather difficulties in WW 2 EU aviation revolves around visibility, in every phase really.

 

[GrauGeist]

I note that he does not mention any thunderstorms.

I have found great value in some first hand accounts. A great interview, IMHO, is that of Mr. William Pennebaker who at one point talks about the difficulties of flying a constant IAS at different altitudes as the stream climbed having the effect of spreading out the formation and extending the time to form up. Realistic peace time training could have helped with these difficulties. Although he doesn't mention it here, I've seen videos of long lines of bombers que-ed up for takeoff, and it occurred to me that the ones at the back of the line, which would later be flying full throttle struggling to catch up due to the problem mentioned above, would also be burning the most fuel on the ground waiting to get to the runway.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9VgaED9h-f8

Severe weather, including heavy overcast (like the sort that grounded Allied aircraft during the German Ardennes offensive) can play a major role in how missions were conducted.

Rn vs IJN

In your opinion! The following article paints a rather different picture of that first raid. 12 B-24 took off. 3 failed to reach the target due to "weather, mechanical problems and fuel shortages" only 9 reached the target. In doing so they encountered 3 separate "vicious" weather fronts that...

ww2aircraft.net

Maneuverability vs Speed

It was more comfortable dying in the ETO.I'd be as worried about trying to find the airfield. Or even the end of the runway while trying to take off! Those conditions existed frequently in ETO fall, winter and spring. When my father lead the 355th home from Foggia Italy to Steeple Morden...

ww2aircraft.net

Allied Fighter vs Fighter: Is it really necessary ???

And NG and Burma has no mountains? If there was one thing the ETO/MTO didnt have that made the Pacific theater so unusual was the severe weather factors that couldn't be forecast as accurately as in Europe. Many times the aircraft had to fly high, or through thunderstorms with more than a few...

ww2aircraft.net

There's a wealth of reference material regarding T-storms on the forums, I just don't have time to hunt them all down.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Low visibility and clouds were much more of a problem in Europe, then as now, than thunderstorms. It is fair to say that "weather" caused a lot of problems in every phase of flight, but it was mostly due to the dependence upon airplanes of that time upon needing visual cues to do almost everything, and especially to do them with any degree of precision. The whole debate about TRW's is because that is one of the comments I chose to challenge, and have been challenged in return. Its emblematic of the way discussions go around here, and why (along with the time involved), I have chosen not to engage to some/most of those challenges. I'm aware of the horseshoe nail, and that professionals talk about logistics, but at some point a conclusion has to be reached. Constant bifurcation of each sub element of each element of each argument seems to me to be rather argumentative and non-productive. I described some of this to my 21 year old son at dinner last night, and he remarked that the more niche the topic in an online forum, the more pedantic that the participants seem to be. I was astonished at his observation, given what I have experienced here.

The part about faulty airspeed procedures causing the groups to be spread out starts in the 49th minute. He flat out says that no one thought of this problem previously. That tells me that in peace time they didn't do sufficiently realistic practice missions.

Edit: just read the comment re: icing. Yes, I agree wholeheartedly that given the location on the globe, icing would be much more of a concern in the EU than perhaps elsewhere. Having said that, most of the information I have seen regarding weather difficulties in WW 2 EU aviation revolves around visibility, in every phase really.

I'm well aware of how weather effects flying in Europe. I have years of experience doing it over Germany. As I already stated in a previous post, it does not need to be a Thunderstorm to cause a diversion.

As for not performing sufficient practice missions, I don't think that is necessarily the case. strategic bombing was a relatively new thing, we were still figuring it out.

Why is challenging your challenge emblematic, nonproductive, or argumentative? It's not. That is how debate take place. Sometimes you come to an agreement, sometimes you don't. But without discussion, there is no opportunity.

 

[EwenS]

Every 8th AF Bomb Group had it own designated form up area where the various Group boxes could form up before departing for the target area, when Groups would form into Wings and Divisions

Form up was aided by multi-coloured unarmed formation ships like these.

Assembly Ships of the Eighth Air Force | Classic Warbirds

Introduced during 1943 these brightly painted aircraft were used to help B-17s and B-24s get into formation safely. Includes images of 6 aircraft.

www.classicwarbirds.co.uk