Another question for the LW experts

[Erich]

Reich defense in it's entirety was on a written order in July of 1943 this order came 8into existence to bring back unwanted T/E ZG units especially to be re-armed and new tactics against Us 4 engine bombers. aces and top pilots abounded and this continued even into late winter of 1944; in March of 44 when the operations against the German capital transpired the LW quality of pilots/crews dropped.

Let us not forget that even the NJG's Bf 110G-4's and Ju 88C-6's equipped with wr 21 rocket launchers were used during day time ops, all 6 NJG's and as the crews have stated it was suicidal in attempts to knck out B-17's from the belly and night time tactic used early war.

 

[stona]

in March of 44 when the operations against the German capital transpired the LW quality of pilots/crews dropped.

Erich unusually I have to disagree with you about the timing of the collapse in Luftwaffe pilot quality.
No organisation can lose 141% of its strength in pilots over a 12 month period (1943) and maintain its quality. Yes,units could be bolstered by bringing in surviving experienced men,but overall the quality has to have fallen. This was compounded in the Luftwaffe by the virtual collapse of the training system in late '42 and early '43.

I might do a little project if I get some time off. How many of the Luftwaffe's Staffelkapitan who survived the BoB,let's say from August 1940, were still alive in December 1943? I don't know the answer but it might be revealing

Cheers

Steve

 

[drgondog]

Erich unusually I have to disagree with you about the timing of the collapse in Luftwaffe pilot quality.
No organisation can lose 141% of its strength in pilots over a 12 month period (1943) and maintain its quality. Yes,units could be bolstered by bringing in surviving experienced men,but overall the quality has to have fallen. This was compounded in the Luftwaffe by the virtual collapse of the training system in late '42 and early '43.

Steve - it isn't cast in concrete but I was told by Galland in the company of Tolliver that a significant population of air losses in 43 were 'churn' of replacement pilots (in the West). The skilled pilots and wingmen started a higher % of the attrition rate in the fall as combined RAF sweeps and US fighter escort incursions to locations like Solingen, near Hamburg Frankfurt, etc forced more engagement by JG1, JG 11, major elements of JG3 and ZG 76 etc set up behind JG26 and JG2. The fall and winter declines were more serious because skilled resources were also being drawn from the East and a higher percentage of East replacement pilots were going down

I might do a little project if I get some time off. How many of the Luftwaffe's Staffelkapitan who survived the BoB,let's say from August 1940, were still alive in December 1943? I don't know the answer but it might be revealing

Cheers

Steve

Erich is right about the deployment of NJG's to LuftFlotte 3 and Reich to augment the daytime Zerstroyer Gruppe's - until withdrwan to preserve the extremely valuable skill and experience. Their attition rose from November 1943 through March 16, 1944 when all daytime s/e were withdrawn east and south of Berlin and Leipzig.

 

[stona]

I'm sure that experienced pilots suffered a lower loss rate than the inexperienced replacements throughout 1943. I'm certainly not going to contradict Galland
My argument is that the overall quality of Luftwaffe pilots was seriously damaged throughout 1943 due to the high rate of attrition. The typical number of fighter pilots serving with the Luftwaffe throughout 1943 was something over 2,000. We probably know the names of the "experten" serving at this time,a very small minority. Experienced leaders were lost throughout the year though I don't doubt that many of these men survived for longer,at least until the Luftwaffe was completely overwhelmed in 1944.
For the first four years of the war (39-42) pilot losses ran at a level where they were,arguably,just about sustainable and replacements were still receiving adequate training. The wheels came off in 1943. Losses throughout 1943 until the war's end were unsustainable by any measure and the replacements were less well trained.Towards the end of 1943 they were barely trained at all compared with their Anglo-American opponents.

The commitment of the night fighter groups to the day time defence of the Reich smacks of desperation. I've seen it argued that the higher level of skill and instrument ratings of these crews would give them an advantage,particularly in bad weather. Not a view that I share. It was just a further waste of highly qualified aircrew.

Cheers
Steve

 

[drgondog]

Steve - neither of us (yet) are in a position to cross examine Galland or Tolliver. If I could wind the clock back I would have probed this question much better.

I don't disagree any of your point - only to point out that to parse the data and draw serious statistical data regarding pilot log time in s/e fighter on date of death, number and type and location of day fighter sorties, number of times engaged in actual combat (to draw conclusions of actual experience versus , say, ferry time or instructor time or training time) IMO is impossible to nearly impossible today.

The commitment of night fighters to the day fight was balanced against loss rate perceptions, pilot/crew fatigue, attrition on valuable aircraft, re-training, etc versus pulling more day fighter strength from East and South Fronts. LW choices dismal. They became grave when the daytime losses surged in Feb-May timeframe and sucked into Germany their East and South reserves to dire levels.

 

[Erich]

Steve have checked my sources which are many for the Reich defense think your figures might be fore all LW losses inbclusi9on of Ost front, MTO and Jg 26/Jg 1's protection against British incursions on the channel. from Priens major studies on most of the "Reich defensive gruppen I do find many ranking aces still going strong and newcomers with multiple kills in late 43, and as said it was the advent of feeling the longer ranges of the US fighter escorts that brought this to an end in spring of 44. it has been proven that the LW kids were not poorly trained in late 43 we did not hae overall air supremacy yet, the4 US bomber formations felt the wrth of the LW even in desperation of throwing up numbers of T/E both day and night, the numbers of attacking LW fighters and bombers relegated to fighter work proves this, we obviously see the drop of point after the Berlin operations with then piecemeal efforts especially by the Sturmgruppen in the summer and fall months of 44 and only really by JG 7 in effect during 1945 with Jg 300 and 301 with Jg 53 barely hanging on with existence in defense.

 

[stona]

Yes Erich the percentage loss figures are for the entire Luftwaffe,not just those units engaged in "Reichsluftverteidigung". My argument (sounds a bit strong ) is for the entire Luftwaffe.

Surviving experten would always be the ones doing most of the killing in 1943 just as they were on all sides throughout the war. I'm sure that we all know that the vast majority of air to air kills were achieved by a small minority of pilots flying in combat.

I think we essentially agree,particularly about the fate of the highly trained night fighter crews. I do believe that the level of training on the young men emerging from what was left of the Luftwaffe's training system in 1943 was way below that of previous years. According to figures compiled by the USSBS from German sources a pilot joining a Luftwaffe unit after mid 1943 had a fraction of the training of his Allied (Western) counterpart or his own Luftwaffe predecessor.

I know absolutely nothing about Soviet training systems.

Cheers

Steve

 

[bobbysocks]

was it ever "officially" researched what the average life expectancy of a new LW recruit was during this time ( 1943-4 )? i have read anywhere from 2-5 sorties to 4 weeks...but these were all authors opinions and i doubt they were taken from records. those numbers sound feasible, as i have had some us airmen remark that they were told if they survived their first half dozen missions they had a decent chance of completing their tour. just wondered if it was ever covered in a study...