I wouldn't call that an accurate statement.
As a crewman in the ETO, would you rather serve in a B-24 or a B-17?
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I wouldn't call that an accurate statement.
Lighthunmust
Banned
Ploesti was bombed several times. The second USAAF mission "Operation Tidal Wave" on August 1, 1943 flown from North Africa is the most famous. The B-24 was chosen because of range and payload capability. I am not sure but I think the mission was beyond the capability of the B-17 or beyond it's capability to be effective. The losses for Tidal Wave were comparable to the Schweinfurt raids that same month and in October. Horrendous. It was one of those missions were just about anything that can go wrong did. It is the only mission I know of that American Heavy Bomber gunners engaged in a duel with a train carrying Flak guns.
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Lighthunmust
Banned
".....the most successful means of bringing down bombers was undoubtedly the Luftwaffe's Company Front technique, evolved early in 1944 and practised with deadly effect throughtout that year by the Sturmgruppen. The heavily armed and armoured FW190s attacking as a body reduced the effectiveness of counter fire though saturation." - "The Mighty Eighth" by Roger A. Freeman
The concept of daylight precision bombing was a strategy adopted and prepared for prior to the entry of the United States into the war. Techniques and equipment were designed for daylight precision bombing and being available were the perfect complement to night area bombing as practiced by the RAF Bomber Command. When casualties became unacceptably high, the daylight campaign was shortly suspended and then reinitiated with casualty reducing mission criteria. No target or mission was ever considered valuable enough that aircrews were considered expendable. Even the most dangerous and casualty producing mission ever conducted on a POL producing target as planned never expected losses to be as high as they were.
Jabberwockey, I am happy you returned to the thread. I am interested in your opinion of comments posted regarding the methodology used to determine B-17 and B-24 loss percentages. I think that actual loss percentages may be skewed and that it also is not necessarily a good method to determine individual aircraft ability to survive attack.
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Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
Take it up with the USAAF, it's their conclusion, not mine.
Their post-war studies of German combat records and film concluded that the Fw 190 was over five times more effective in a nose to tail attack on a heavy bomber than a Bf 109.
Based on the data from 824 combat reports, the probability that a FW 190 would kill a B-17 in a "good" (ie accurate and short ranged) tail attack was 51%, with a 47% chance of lighting a fire in the target.
The same study shows that the chance of an Bf-109 achieving a kill under the same conditions was 9%, with an 8% chance of starting a fire in the target.
In attacks from all angles, a Fw 190 was two and a half times more likely to hit a B-17, and seven times more likely to start a fire in the target.
Bf 109 pilots typically fired from twice the range of FW 190 pilots and they broke off much earlier. They also showed a larger order of target tracking mistakes as they were firing from further off.
Conversely, the Bf 109 was about more likely to hit a fighter target, despite firing from longer range, but only one third as likely to start a fire in a fighter target. Admittedly, this data is drawn from a much smaller pool of samples (51 vs 800-odd) so is probably less statistically significant.
On bomber survivability, the B-24 was marginally less likely (~8%) to catch fire after a fighter pass, according to the USAAF analysis.
Lighthunmust
Banned
Do you know of an online source for this analysis? If not online do you know of an available print source?
Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
I've got data on all ~6800 8th AF bomber losses at home. I can do some statistical analysis, but it will only be by time series. Collating with 8th AF missions will take a while longer, as I'm working two (real) jobs at the moment. Might be able to provide more thorough analysis in a few days.
For the B-17 vs B-24 loss rates, was relying on some else's analysis, and I admit I dont know the methodology, but it appears to be simply combat losses (not total) divided by total sorties flown.
A quick look and dirty look at 8th AF heavy bomber losses per mission (from HERE) gives a figure of 0.44 aircraft losses per mission for B-17 groups and 0.29 aircraft losses per mission for B-24 groups, lending more credence to the theory of lower overall loss rates for B-24s. Of course, this doesn't indicate WHEN the losses occurred, against what targets ect, ect.
For the B-17 vs B-24 loss rates, was relying on some else's analysis, and I admit I dont know the methodology, but it appears to be simply combat losses (not total) divided by total sorties flown.
A quick look and dirty look at 8th AF heavy bomber losses per mission (from HERE) gives a figure of 0.44 aircraft losses per mission for B-17 groups and 0.29 aircraft losses per mission for B-24 groups, lending more credence to the theory of lower overall loss rates for B-24s. Of course, this doesn't indicate WHEN the losses occurred, against what targets ect, ect.
Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
The data is from US Ballistic Research Laboratories report No. 727, dated July 1950.
Its available online at Germanluftwaffe.com, and probably floating around elsewhere as well.
Its pretty heavy going, a fairly serious attempt to correlate the efficiency of German fighter attacks on US bombers, as well as some other data on German attacks on fighters and USAAF attacks on German aircraft.
Lighthunmust
Banned
You are a very busy man. While I appreciate your efforts, please don't think I am expecting you to jump through hoops to support your statistics. You have posted some impressive information that I really appreciate and will try on my own to find sources. I am probably not as good a researcher as you are but will do my best. This is a fascinating and complex topic that is much like a detective story. I am not primarily an Aviation history student. I spend much time reading history from many eras and cultures. I am not a scholar in any of them, but it is amazing just in the span of my lifetime how many things academia thought they understood and found later they really did not. My views have greatly changed over the decades of my life. Thank you for providing really thought provoking stuff.
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
High altitude precision bombing is an oxymoron.
Area bombing is more likely.
The only true precision bombing was at low level usually by the RAF at celebrated raids like operation "Chastise" and raids like the pinpoint attacks on Amiens Prison.
Cheers
John
Area bombing is more likely.
The only true precision bombing was at low level usually by the RAF at celebrated raids like operation "Chastise" and raids like the pinpoint attacks on Amiens Prison.
Cheers
John
Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
Amiens and the low-altitude bombing by Mosquitos in Northern Europe, along with 617 Sqdn, might be the most celebrated example of 'precision' bombing operations in the West, but these are hardly the only examples.
Ploiesti/Operation Tidal Wave seems to fit that mold as well, despite the less than successful nature of the mission.
You might also want to specify level bombing, otherwise German dive bombing operations all across Europe (France, Crete and Malta all spring to mind) would count. There was little bombing in WW2 that was much more accurate than a Ju-87 in an envelope of air superiority.
Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
Ok 'level bombing' for the examples I gave. Although two totally different attacks in execution.
With the greatest respect to your countryman's appalling loss rate Ploiesti is not an example of 'precision' bombing. Most of the refinery was left intact after the raid.
From wiki.
Allied assessment of the attack estimated a loss of 40% of the refining capacity at the Ploiești refineries,:75 although some refineries were largely untouched. Most of the damage was repaired within weeks, after which the net output of fuel was greater than before the raid.:75 Circa September, the Enemy Oil Committee appraisal of Ploiești bomb damage indicated "no curtailment of overall product output" as many of the refineries had been operating previously below maximum capacity.
The USAAF got a bit better at area bombing as WW2 progressed, perfecting the technique in Vietnam. But, precision? No, that's the RAF's speciality alone.
We invented 'dive bombing' at Orford Ness in WW1.
We then proceeded to be the only major force not to deploy a dedicated dive bomber. The Royal Navy attempted to introduce their own on several occasions, but were never able to do so due to various reasons, not the least of which was political interference by the RAF. They only produced hybrid aircraft: the Blackburn Skua, a dive bomber/fighter that was used for a short time and in small numbers, and the Fairey Barracuda, a dive bomber/torpedo bomber. Rather ironic eh.
The Stuka? devastating in the circumstances you describe. As much as a terror weapon with the sirens etc.
Cheers
John
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Shortround6
Major General
While this maybe true it ignores that many air forces took time to realize that results did NOT follow pre-war theory. The result of this is that many air forces not only entered the war with planes incapable of performing their intended tasks but with aircrew inadequately trained to even perform their "theoretical" missions let alone perform in actual war conditions.
As far as Ploiesti goes, as least the majority of the crews FOUND the oil refinery, which would have been considered precision in 1939-41
The USAAC is not the only force in history to keep going with a tactic in the face of growing evidence that it wasn't working.
Once you had a steamroller of production, training, operational planning/strategic goals and such pointed and moving in one direction it might have taken 1-2 years to get it to really change direction.
Definitely. The 8th AF carried out their own study in 1945. From that, a table comparing accuracy against altitude:
Note this table is for accuracy in good conditions only (less than 14% of total bombing september - december 1944). Most 8th AF bombing was carried out in poor visibility with radar aiming, and accuracy was much, much worse. (35% of all 8th AF bombs dropped sept - dec 1944 were through complete cloud using radar, only 0.2% of those landed within 1,000ft of the aiming point)
Incidentally, total accuracy from the same report, for the period September - December 1944:
Within 1,000 ft of aiming point - 5.9%
Within 1 mile of aiming point - 32%
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Readie
Chief Master Sergeant
(1)While this maybe true it ignores that many air forces took time to realize that results did NOT follow pre-war theory. The result of this is that many air forces not only entered the war with planes incapable of performing their intended tasks but with aircrew inadequately trained to even perform their "theoretical" missions let alone perform in actual war conditions.
(2)As far as Ploiesti goes, as least the majority of the crews FOUND the oil refinery, which would have been considered precision in 1939-41
(3)The USAAC is not the only force in history to keep going with a tactic in the face of growing evidence that it wasn't working.
(4)Once you had a steamroller of production, training, operational planning/strategic goals and such pointed and moving in one direction it might have taken 1-2 years to get it to really change direction.
(1) Fair point. But, is that unusual to find that any 'pre war' model is just that.. a model? Reality is another thing entirely.
(2) Fair point. But, its not correct to laud Ploiesti as 'precision bombing' as that puts it in the damn busters category.which it clearly is not.
(3) Blimey...where would all be without the mindless 'just carry on' ? Its the British way you know
. WW1 must be the classic example of that attitude. Europeans manged to kill a high percentage of men to gain nothing. Even the USA's arrival in 1917 didn't really change things. We had got quite good at killing each other by then...(4) Possibly but,we had engaged in a war of attrition (rather like WW1) and our course was set. I don't believe that the bombing of Germany would have ceased until either they surrendered or there was nothing left to bomb.Or, the Germans were obliterated by A bombs when they were available and the powers that be decided to use them.
Cheers
John
I thought the Bf109 had better high altitude performance than the Fw190 (?)
While this maybe true it ignores that many air forces took time to realize that results did NOT follow pre-war theory. The result of this is that many air forces not only entered the war with planes incapable of performing their intended tasks but with aircrew inadequately trained to even perform their "theoretical" missions let alone perform in actual war conditions.
As far as Ploiesti goes, as least the majority of the crews FOUND the oil refinery, which would have been considered precision in 1939-41
The USAAC is not the only force in history to keep going with a tactic in the face of growing evidence that it wasn't working.
Once you had a steamroller of production, training, operational planning/strategic goals and such pointed and moving in one direction it might have taken 1-2 years to get it to really change direction.
I go through this sort of thing both at work and in the woods, you engage in a course of action, but it isn't bearing fruit...
Is it because you haven't given it enough time, or because it's the wrong course of action?
yes, the Bf109 was better at altitude. Funny though about the USAAF records concerning the 109 vs 190 in shooting
down their bombers.. the vast majority were shot down with 109's ( their 9% chance according to the USAAF).
Lighthunmust
Banned
While this maybe true it ignores that many air forces took time to realize that results did NOT follow pre-war theory. The result of this is that many air forces not only entered the war with planes incapable of performing their intended tasks but with aircrew inadequately trained to even perform their "theoretical" missions let alone perform in actual war conditions.
As far as Ploiesti goes, as least the majority of the crews FOUND the oil refinery, which would have been considered precision in 1939-41
The USAAC is not the only force in history to keep going with a tactic in the face of growing evidence that it wasn't working.
Once you had a steamroller of production, training, operational planning/strategic goals and such pointed and moving in one direction it might have taken 1-2 years to get it to really change direction.
Definitely. The 8th AF carried out their own study in 1945. From that, a table comparing accuracy against altitude:
Note this table is for accuracy in good conditions only (less than 14% of total bombing september - december 1944). Most 8th AF bombing was carried out in poor visibility with radar aiming, and accuracy was much, much worse. (35% of all 8th AF bombs dropped sept - dec 1944 were through complete cloud using radar, only 0.2% of those landed within 1,000ft of the aiming point)
Incidentally, total accuracy from the same report, for the period September - December 1944:
Within 1,000 ft of aiming point - 5.9%
Within 1 mile of aiming point - 32%
In my post Precision Daylight Bombing from High Altitude is a concept and doctrine of USAAC/USAAF, not a reality. I do not think any of the planners of Tidal Wave thought the mission an application of that doctrine. The thing about doctrine is that it often is crafted by Military leaders who make their careers in creating it and often vigorously defend it even when it fails. If you have ever spent time around Generals you understand the enormous egos involved. More than politicians, Generals within their service are treated as demigods. The same defense of ego is true in the corporate and academic sphere. People are fired and transferred to prevent exposure of corporate inefficiency and Scholars faced with facts contradicting a life of belief often attempt to obfuscate and discredit the individuals presenting the facts.
Precision is a relative term. Obviously the precision expected, claimed, and demonstrated did not match. It was more precise than RAF Area Night Bombing which early in the campaign sometimes bombed the wrong city; but both had about the same ultimate effectiveness. Bomber advocates have been twisting the truth of how precise they can bomb since bombing began. The chart Hop provided indicates those must have been very big pickle barrels they were hitting with the Norden Bomb Sight. As recently as the 1990-91 Gulf War there is deception. While precision strikes occurred and were presented as the norm, they were actually a small percentage of strikes.
The bombing of Ploesti by Tidal Wave was without a doubt a failure from the standpoint of mission objectives. It is more of an intelligence failure than a Bombing failure in than the mission was planned using inaccurate information. The aircrews and aircraft performed magnificently under the conditions of the mission. Tidal Wave was conducted very early in the timeline of the USAAF bombing campaign and much still needed to be learned about what could be done with the tools available. Please remember USAAF had yet to experience the Schweinfurt missions.
Miltary doctrine and established industrial production inertia is very difficult to redirect. The best hope is that the structure of leadership and weapons designed have enough flexibility to adapt quickly when doctrine crashes into reality.
The Bf109s altitude performance was significant versus other fighters but less valuable than the versatility of Fw190s attacking Bombers that were flying at the speeds and altitudes of typical missions. But there were many more Bf109s produced than Fw190s.
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Operation Tidal Wave was one of the costliest for the USAAF in the European Theater, with 60 aircraft and 700 aircrewmen lost.
the intelligence was there, they knew it would be heavily defended. the USAAF entered with their eyes wide open.
Give credit where credit is due. the Luftwaffe Flak crews did there job, with stunning results.
the intelligence was there, they knew it would be heavily defended. the USAAF entered with their eyes wide open.
Give credit where credit is due. the Luftwaffe Flak crews did there job, with stunning results.
davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
I suspect that the data was somewhat skewed by the carpet bombing of B-52s. Also, the amount of precision guided weapons may have been limited. With the advent of GPS guided weapons and their cheaper procurement, precision strikes have become all important and non-precision strikes are probably now in the background, unless we see another heavily fortified line we have to cross.
