I think your general point is reasonable, but I'd question the numbers somewhat on B-29's. The USAAF Statistics Digest gives 414 B-29's lost on combat missions (how I would interpret 'on operations') of which 147 were specifically attributed to enemy action. (that represented a 1.3% per sortie loss rate for the total; and it includes both China and Marianas operations; 8th/15th sortie loss rate was 1.6%). Maybe your total includes training including in the US? Also, some B-29 losses to 'other cause on combat mission' might be planes damaged over Japan by enemy action. On a tangent, it's often said that that's true of B-29 loss accounting in Korea but tracking down each one I found it was rarely true, the official combat loss number was approximately correct in that war, but I've seen several examples in WWII where damaged planes that couldn't make it back all the way to the Mariana's were counted as 'other'. The % might be higher than in Korea also, though I'm not sure how high. At some point somebody may go through all the WWII B-29 losses from original records and reclassify their causes (or maybe somebody has, but not that I know of); AFAIK the details still exist.
Also turning your point around about opposition, lack of consisently highly tough opposition is one reason the proportion of operational losses was higher for the B-29; the more difficult operational conditions, distance particularly, were another. Also, the opposition varied a lot, was not consistently weak. The intial campaign from the Marianas v Japan Nov '44-Feb '45 was unescorted in daylight, with no 'milk runs' available v targets in occupied Europe like the 8th could do when it needed a break from its attempt at unescorted raids over Germany ca. 1943. And the Japanese rammed extensively, see Henry Sakaida's "B-29 Hunters of the JAAF" for two-sided treatment; that accounted for most of the B-29's downed by hostile action in that initial phase, and was quite a difficult tactic the 8th and 15th seldom had to deal with. Later on opposition waned, both in the night raids from March 1945 for which Japan was less prepared and when daylight ops resumed alongside night from April to the end of the war.
But I agree with you, the B-29 in its early WWII operation mid 1944- early 45 was a pretty buggy airplane, I don't think anyone familiar with its history would contest that as general statement. And not all those bugs were ever competely ironed out; it still suffered a somewhat elevated operational loss rate even in Korea, though much lower by then, and lower even as 1945 went on.
Joe
Joe, hello.
I did the numbers from memory. I am sure more than 2,000 B-29s were produced during the war -around 2500- but no more than that (2,000) were sent into combat operations in the PTO.
One person told me once that nearly 4,000 B-29s were built during WW2, but i did not believe the figure; after further asking i was confirmed the 4,000 airplane figure was for the entire B-29 production era, which of course includes post WW2 versions of the B-29 that were produced.
Now, the ~650 B-29s lost from all causes during WW2 did not include training losses that ocurred in the U.S.A.
Now according to numbers posted by Herr Delcyros here total losses are somewhat higher, quote:
Losses B-29 during it´s ww2 career:
in combat:
to enemy action (confirmed): 148
to operational factors: 151
to unknown causes: 115 (some been rammed)
to training accidents / ferry flights on theatre of action: 97
written off / canibalized due to damage received in action: 286
Total: 798 B-29´s lost
It´d be interesting to know what should we understand by "operational factors" though; losses from engine or other technical problems (bugs) perhaps?
As for those lost in training flights in the U.S.A. i was familiar with the figure of ~260 ships lost, consistent with the number on Herr Delcyros´ posting.
This should be critical in comprehending how buggy and complex the aircraft was in reality: ~260 planes lost in training flights in the U.S.A. would account for nearly 10% of the approximate total number of B-29s produced during WW2...not what you´d call a low figure eh?
So the poor He 177, which was pressed into service during a time when it was not really required, and in limited numbers only -also belonging into the defeated "evil" side- gets all the rotten eggs and tomatoes thrown at. This is bizarre, the Germans seemed to have finally fixed all bugs on the He 177, while U.S. engineers seemed uncapable of solving their own for the most part of the operational history of the B-29 during WW2.
I was of course referring to loss % examined against total number of B-29s deployed in operations; yes, it is only one approach, but it is exactly the same thing done by the Allied boys when referring to the Steinbock raids of the Luftwaffe against Great Britain in the first 5 months of 1944, when a bomber force of ~550 planes was assembled and launched against England. They say that by the end of May, 1944 that from the initial number (~550) only a few bombers remained, thus the "catastrophic" nature of the Steinbock raids.
We seem to agree here Joe, the B-29 was not a less buggy plane than the He 177, but for some "odd" reason such details are oftenly overlooked in the case of the B-29 focusing mainly on his battle exploits (ie. incinerating Japan´s paper and wood housing and cities, slamming their industry, the atomic bomb, etc.); we can not say the same about the He 177...search the internet for "He 177" and you will find loads of crappy webpages focused mostly -and mainly- on those "troublesome engines catching fire"; someone first came across such data, put it on a webpage, then like a virus spreading across the land, many others simply copied the same data without bothering to read or research further and put it on several other webpages. Selective use and manipulation of information that is, tainted with the vision of the victors.
As for operational conditions i agree: the B-29´s flying from the Marianas had to fly across a vast extension of ocean but the He 177s too had to operate in the open sea, and they did it in the majority of missions flown, mainly in KG 40 and KG 100; acknowledged is the fact distances covered by He 177s of KG 40 and KG 100 over the sea were not of the dimension observed in the PTO, but its still open sea and the plane performed very well in that scenario losing only a few from technical problems.
Finally Joe, i came along with this to state my view that ~30% of B-29s deployed against Japan were lost from all causes. Overall that´s certainly high. Understood are your arguments of operational conditions and enemy oppossition (fighter force and AA defence), but i believe you will agree with me that by the time the B-29 commenced flying from the Marianas (late 1994) the Japanese were horribly mauled and their home defence systems were way behind those of Germany; if the enemy they confronted was not strong enough to threaten B-29 formations, perhaps the B-29 itself was its own most dangerous enemy; they were lucky the Japanese proved uncapable of organizing and developing a more effective fighter/AA system.
Also do you have any numbers of B-29 losses over Japan during the time they flew unescorted...i do not, but i am confident to affirm that any B-17 or B-24 pilot that flew over the Reich prior to the arrival of long rage escorts (P-51s) in 1943 and early 1944 would have found flying unescorted bomber missions over Japan the most joyous of the rides.
Had the B-29 then faced the type of Flak defence systems and fighter strength similar to that of the Germans, then it is not daring to assume their losses could of been quite higher.
