GregP
Major
Everybody has different numbers. Interesting.
Battle of Britain RAF and LW order of battle
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Freebird
Master Sergeant
It actually says 917 pilots "pres" (present?) and 676 "ready" so it would seem that there are 241 pilots wounded, sick or otherwise not "ready" to fly
GregP
Major
On what do you base that opinion? I assume you have some training graduation statistics to make you think that?
Not nitpicking ... just asking.
Not nitpicking ... just asking.
Ready means combat ready. There's no mystery here. If a crew wasn't ready it wasn't going to fly on operations. There are any number of reasons why aircrew might be present but not ready,there is no point in conjecture,they couldn't fly operationally.
This table is based on the Luftwaffe's own figures in the quartermaster returns (in BA/MA RL 2 III/708 and 709 for any archivists reading)
Operational ready rates fell throughout the period. Despite a sudden drop following "adlertag" Bf 109 pilot readiness rates did start to recover in September before tailing off again.
Cheers
Steve
This table is based on the Luftwaffe's own figures in the quartermaster returns (in BA/MA RL 2 III/708 and 709 for any archivists reading)
Operational ready rates fell throughout the period. Despite a sudden drop following "adlertag" Bf 109 pilot readiness rates did start to recover in September before tailing off again.
Cheers
Steve
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It says:
Aircraft
Establishment - 1132
On Strength - 920
Serviceable - 712
Pilots
Establishment - 1132
On Strength - 917
Ready - 676
There was a shortage of 36 pilots for the 712 a/c that were capable of flying operations.
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
Were the aircraft serviceability rates similar for the RAF and LW allowing for different methods of accounting. I have always imagined it would be harder for the LW to keep serviceability up than the RAF for the simple reason of distance to the LWs main bases and factories. Was the infrastructure in place for major repairs/servicing to be done in France or did aircraft have to go to Germany.
Luftwaffe service,salvage and repair organisation was more convoluted than the British equivalent. Only fairly minor repairs were done at the front,in this case France. There was no equivalent of the British civilian repair organisation and badly damaged Luftwaffe aircraft effectively left the Luftwaffe to go back to "industry" for repair. This was not necessarily the manufacturer but other authorised contractors. In 1940 this often meant back to Germany,by rail.
After repair the aircraft would rejoin the Luftwaffe. In the early years some major repairs would have the letter F for "flugklar" added after the werknummer. It was an indication that they were cleared for flight again.
It made for some interesting accounting regarding new parts and upgrades too. Ultimately it was the RLM who had to pay the bill,but then they already owned the damaged aircraft and all its parts. No danger of any disagreements there then
I have somewhere a diagram/flow chart illustrating the German system. If I can find it I'll post it.
Cheers
Steve
After repair the aircraft would rejoin the Luftwaffe. In the early years some major repairs would have the letter F for "flugklar" added after the werknummer. It was an indication that they were cleared for flight again.
It made for some interesting accounting regarding new parts and upgrades too. Ultimately it was the RLM who had to pay the bill,but then they already owned the damaged aircraft and all its parts. No danger of any disagreements there then
I have somewhere a diagram/flow chart illustrating the German system. If I can find it I'll post it.
Cheers
Steve
Greg, using the link provided, the following units were not based in France and the Low Countries
II./JG51 Bf 109E 39 35 28 39 34 25
I./JG52 Bf 109E 39 28 21 39 24 17 -
II./JG52 Bf 109E 39 25 24 39 29 17 -
III./JG52 Bf 109E 39 28 28 39 38 38 -
I./JG54 Bf 109E 39 24 15 39 32 23 -
Stab/JG77 Bf 109E 4 4 4 4 4 4 -
II./JG77 Bf 109E 39 42 33 39 35 35 -
III./JG77 Bf 109E 39 26 17 39 38 34 -
Stab/JG1 Bf 109E 4 4 4 4 4 3 -
On Strength - 216
Ready - 174
So On strength vs GB > 920 - 216 = 704
So Ready vs GB > 712 - 174 = 538
As the above numbers were obtained from German documentation, I would take these numbers (704/538 ) over the number (276) in the graphic in Post #28.
II./JG51 Bf 109E 39 35 28 39 34 25
I./JG52 Bf 109E 39 28 21 39 24 17 -
II./JG52 Bf 109E 39 25 24 39 29 17 -
III./JG52 Bf 109E 39 28 28 39 38 38 -
I./JG54 Bf 109E 39 24 15 39 32 23 -
Stab/JG77 Bf 109E 4 4 4 4 4 4 -
II./JG77 Bf 109E 39 42 33 39 35 35 -
III./JG77 Bf 109E 39 26 17 39 38 34 -
Stab/JG1 Bf 109E 4 4 4 4 4 3 -
On Strength - 216
Ready - 174
So On strength vs GB > 920 - 216 = 704
So Ready vs GB > 712 - 174 = 538
As the above numbers were obtained from German documentation, I would take these numbers (704/538 ) over the number (276) in the graphic in Post #28.
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
you would think this would have been a wake up call or the writing on the wall for them to take notice. but this problem plagued them from the onset and it doesnt appear they did anything to remedy it. i can understand late in the war when fuel conservation was critical....but at this juncture they should have had the training schools going full bore and had pilots standing around looking for something to fly. they can always fulfill a less critical second duty with minimal training...but when you need experienced replacement pilots you would have them.
GregP
Major
Hi Milosh,
Maybe you could explain what your numbers are. The Battle of Britain was basically fought from some day in July through September 1940, and you give a lot of numbers in your post. Are they numbers by month? If so, of what? Strength? Were they ready, on strength? Or what? What do the I., II., III. Stab, etc. stand for? I believe the BOB was fought by Luftflotte 2, 3, and 5 commanded by Kesselring, Sperrie, and Stumpff respectively. Are you saying these were comprised of the JG's in your post above?
From the post, "on Strength" and "Ready" are not apparent, especiallty since you appear to be subtracting the on strength number from some 920 number than comes from somewhere. The data listed even in Wiki comes from German sources, too. Specifically from documents taken from Otto Bechtle attached to KG 2 in 1944.
In fact, all the sources I looked at say their numbers for the Germans come from German data and there are citations to that effect. Nowhere I looked claimed to get the German data from British sources ... unless it was data about British assets.
So, maybe you could explain your post above. If not or if you just don't care to, I understand and am not really arguing, just trying to understand what you posted so I can go from there. I know your post seems apparent to you, but I ask for a slightly better explanation if you will. I'm sure it makes sense when explained.
Maybe you could explain what your numbers are. The Battle of Britain was basically fought from some day in July through September 1940, and you give a lot of numbers in your post. Are they numbers by month? If so, of what? Strength? Were they ready, on strength? Or what? What do the I., II., III. Stab, etc. stand for? I believe the BOB was fought by Luftflotte 2, 3, and 5 commanded by Kesselring, Sperrie, and Stumpff respectively. Are you saying these were comprised of the JG's in your post above?
From the post, "on Strength" and "Ready" are not apparent, especiallty since you appear to be subtracting the on strength number from some 920 number than comes from somewhere. The data listed even in Wiki comes from German sources, too. Specifically from documents taken from Otto Bechtle attached to KG 2 in 1944.
In fact, all the sources I looked at say their numbers for the Germans come from German data and there are citations to that effect. Nowhere I looked claimed to get the German data from British sources ... unless it was data about British assets.
So, maybe you could explain your post above. If not or if you just don't care to, I understand and am not really arguing, just trying to understand what you posted so I can go from there. I know your post seems apparent to you, but I ask for a slightly better explanation if you will. I'm sure it makes sense when explained.
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Tante Ju posted a link, which can be found in my Post #46.
You don't understand the Luftwaffe unit designations Greg?
The Gruppen number was indicated by the Roman figure, whilst that of the Staffel was the Arabic figure: thus III./JG27 was the third Gruppe, and 3./JG27 was the third Staffel of JG27. The complete organisation of JG27 in early 1943 was:
Stab/JG27
I./JG27 (Gruppenstab, 1. - 3. staffeln)
II./JG27 (Gruppenstab, 4. - 6. staffeln)
III./JG27 (Gruppenstab, 7. - 9. staffeln)
You don't understand the Luftwaffe unit designations Greg?
The Gruppen number was indicated by the Roman figure, whilst that of the Staffel was the Arabic figure: thus III./JG27 was the third Gruppe, and 3./JG27 was the third Staffel of JG27. The complete organisation of JG27 in early 1943 was:
Stab/JG27
I./JG27 (Gruppenstab, 1. - 3. staffeln)
II./JG27 (Gruppenstab, 4. - 6. staffeln)
III./JG27 (Gruppenstab, 7. - 9. staffeln)
GregP
Major
Thanks Milosh. I am interested, but I basically love the aircraft themselves, and have not looked long and hard into Luftwaffe groups and units. I am assuming you posted what was in place in the summer of 1940 above.
So, I know a bit about their aircraft (and have worked on some of them including the Bf 109 and the He 111), but not necessarily the Nazi military organization. So, you have 6 numbers with some in bold and some not bold. From the post I can't tell what the numbers represent and assume it means aircraft on hand at some point in time ... probably the start or end of a month. But I don't know if they were "on strength", "ready" or what. You also don't say where you got the numbers except they are from German sources.
To me, the Germann units would have some authorized number of planes, some actual number of planes, and some aithorized and actual number of crews including pilots, mechanics, etc. A unit might be authorized for, say, 40 planes, but might have only 35, with maybe 27 serviceable and ready for a mission. They might have 20 - 40 crews for those 27 serviceable planes.
The references I looked at all say the Luftwaffe got the worst of it except for some posts that, if you believe them, would seem to indicate the Germans won. They didn't and Operation Sealion never happened.
I am given to believe that the Luftwaffe aircraft losses were not easily or quickly replaced and pilots losses were also not easily replaced, particularly since any new pilots were "green" by definition. If they got a light stream of green pilots who could be assigned as wingmen to veterans, then they migyht have done well. But losses of enough veterans that would have to be replaced by green pilots were higher than expected, so general pilot quality declined.
So, my understanding is that while the losses were not that lopsided either way, the Luftwaffe lost aircraft on hand strength, veteran pilots, and was generally much worse off after the BOB than was the RAF Fightter Command who had lower veteran pilots losses and produced enough aircraft to just about replace their losses along the way, if not slightlty increase their strength. It helped that the BOB was actually mostly over Great Britain so any bail outs or forced landings were necessarily over much friendlier soil, contributing to the lower loss rate of veteran pilots.
It appears that you are arguing that the generally accepted numbers of aircraft on hand are wrong, and that the Luftwaffe had more aircraft and pilots on hand than is gemerally thought by most people. If that were true, why wouldn't the Luftwaffe continue the Battle of Britain since they thought Fighter Command was ready to be beaten?
Just trying to understand where you are going with your contention. Not saying you are right or wrong. Looks like you are saying the order of battle at the end of the BOB generally accepted by most people is wrong and that the Lufftwaffe was stronger than usually thought ay the end of September 1940. If true, then somewhere along the line they made awfully poor use of their resources.
So, I know a bit about their aircraft (and have worked on some of them including the Bf 109 and the He 111), but not necessarily the Nazi military organization. So, you have 6 numbers with some in bold and some not bold. From the post I can't tell what the numbers represent and assume it means aircraft on hand at some point in time ... probably the start or end of a month. But I don't know if they were "on strength", "ready" or what. You also don't say where you got the numbers except they are from German sources.
To me, the Germann units would have some authorized number of planes, some actual number of planes, and some aithorized and actual number of crews including pilots, mechanics, etc. A unit might be authorized for, say, 40 planes, but might have only 35, with maybe 27 serviceable and ready for a mission. They might have 20 - 40 crews for those 27 serviceable planes.
The references I looked at all say the Luftwaffe got the worst of it except for some posts that, if you believe them, would seem to indicate the Germans won. They didn't and Operation Sealion never happened.
I am given to believe that the Luftwaffe aircraft losses were not easily or quickly replaced and pilots losses were also not easily replaced, particularly since any new pilots were "green" by definition. If they got a light stream of green pilots who could be assigned as wingmen to veterans, then they migyht have done well. But losses of enough veterans that would have to be replaced by green pilots were higher than expected, so general pilot quality declined.
So, my understanding is that while the losses were not that lopsided either way, the Luftwaffe lost aircraft on hand strength, veteran pilots, and was generally much worse off after the BOB than was the RAF Fightter Command who had lower veteran pilots losses and produced enough aircraft to just about replace their losses along the way, if not slightlty increase their strength. It helped that the BOB was actually mostly over Great Britain so any bail outs or forced landings were necessarily over much friendlier soil, contributing to the lower loss rate of veteran pilots.
It appears that you are arguing that the generally accepted numbers of aircraft on hand are wrong, and that the Luftwaffe had more aircraft and pilots on hand than is gemerally thought by most people. If that were true, why wouldn't the Luftwaffe continue the Battle of Britain since they thought Fighter Command was ready to be beaten?
Just trying to understand where you are going with your contention. Not saying you are right or wrong. Looks like you are saying the order of battle at the end of the BOB generally accepted by most people is wrong and that the Lufftwaffe was stronger than usually thought ay the end of September 1940. If true, then somewhere along the line they made awfully poor use of their resources.
parsifal
Colonel
On the discrepancy in pilot numbers, as Steve says, any number of reasons could explain this. I would think that some would relate to pilots still completing training, pilots that are wounded, I would even think it would include pilots missing, but not yet confirmed dead or captured. It might also include pilots on furlough....these were, after all, just men, who needed to be rested like any other person.
The IJN went to war with about 1300 aircraft availbale, and over 5000 trained pilots. It still suffered chronic shortages of pilots almost from the very beginning. The US air services at the beginning of the war had 4500 front line aircraft, hardly any fit for front line service. At the beginning the US scrounged for aircraft.
This should demonstrate just how easy it is to mislead people with dodgy interpretations of the basic data...lies, damn lies and statistics.
The IJN went to war with about 1300 aircraft availbale, and over 5000 trained pilots. It still suffered chronic shortages of pilots almost from the very beginning. The US air services at the beginning of the war had 4500 front line aircraft, hardly any fit for front line service. At the beginning the US scrounged for aircraft.
This should demonstrate just how easy it is to mislead people with dodgy interpretations of the basic data...lies, damn lies and statistics.
GregP
Major
OK, I went back and looked at the link.
What makes Single engine fighters - 28.09.40 a believable reference? We don't know where the data came from, only that comments be addressed to Michael Holm. Is he more believable than other authors? He says the numbers come from, "HRA 137.306-14 has been extracted from a series of 35 files of documents entitled "Einsatzbereitschaft der Fliegenden Verbände" which were originated by sections of the 6. Abteilung of the Luftwaffe General quartiermeister's Staff." Unless we look that up and confirm it, it's just another internet set of numbers.
So I looked up the Luftwaffe makeup and know what the designations are now. But some things are elusive. For instance, I/JG2 and II/JG2 were both part of Luftlotte 3 while III/JG2 came under the command of Luftlotte 2. Might make sense in the future, but is somehwat confusing right now. Of course, I don't have to know the reasoning behind the organization to be aware of the command path.
I do find it quite interesting that so many references give numbers at odds with one another, yet all claim to be from good sources. Sorting it out WOULD be a good thing for this thread to accomplish and I applaud the thougt Mustang Nut. Let's continue.
What makes Single engine fighters - 28.09.40 a believable reference? We don't know where the data came from, only that comments be addressed to Michael Holm. Is he more believable than other authors? He says the numbers come from, "HRA 137.306-14 has been extracted from a series of 35 files of documents entitled "Einsatzbereitschaft der Fliegenden Verbände" which were originated by sections of the 6. Abteilung of the Luftwaffe General quartiermeister's Staff." Unless we look that up and confirm it, it's just another internet set of numbers.
So I looked up the Luftwaffe makeup and know what the designations are now. But some things are elusive. For instance, I/JG2 and II/JG2 were both part of Luftlotte 3 while III/JG2 came under the command of Luftlotte 2. Might make sense in the future, but is somehwat confusing right now. Of course, I don't have to know the reasoning behind the organization to be aware of the command path.
I do find it quite interesting that so many references give numbers at odds with one another, yet all claim to be from good sources. Sorting it out WOULD be a good thing for this thread to accomplish and I applaud the thougt Mustang Nut. Let's continue.
No, what I have posted is in reply to your Post #30 and that the numbers, at least for the fighters, is wrong in the book whose numbers are quite at odds with other sources for Sept 28 1940. Who are these 'most people'?
The Luftwaffe did continue the BoB till the spring of 1941 but they switched to mainly night attacks where s/e fighters were not required.
Holm got his info at the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg. Can't get a much better source than that.
GregP
Major
If you don't know who "mostb people" are then you're in the same boat I was in with internal Luftwaffe unit makeup. The other sources also claim to be using German data, as I said earlier.
However, the 276 for LW fighters avaiable seems low to me, too, given the losses by month up until that time. I'd dig into it like you did if I were so inclined. I wonder how many of the 917 or so pilots available in Holm's numbers were new, green pilots? He doesn't say and I'd bet that a fair number were new guys, with that number getting worse steadily after that point time. However, I don't have the information to go prove that assertion numerically, so I'll just let it ride.
We know the Luftwaffe didn't train enough pilots to cover attrition as the war went along, to the point where average pilot quality dropped for the LW as the war wore on while it climbed for the Allies to the point where they had the better pilot corps late in the war, coupled with vast numbers of good fighters available. Still, the BOB seems to have been as close to a draw as possible without a decisive victory for either side at the time. The real victory came as the LW were unable to replace the BOB losses in a timely enough manner to stay well matched as losses mounted after the BOB while simultaneously attacking the Soviet Union and North Africa / the Med.
Still, if the Nazis had not invaded the Soviet Union, they might have done a great job in Europe, even with the high attrition of aircraft and pilots. Good thing Hitler was fixated on the Soviet Union, huh? If not for that, things might have been ... interesting.
However, the 276 for LW fighters avaiable seems low to me, too, given the losses by month up until that time. I'd dig into it like you did if I were so inclined. I wonder how many of the 917 or so pilots available in Holm's numbers were new, green pilots? He doesn't say and I'd bet that a fair number were new guys, with that number getting worse steadily after that point time. However, I don't have the information to go prove that assertion numerically, so I'll just let it ride.
We know the Luftwaffe didn't train enough pilots to cover attrition as the war went along, to the point where average pilot quality dropped for the LW as the war wore on while it climbed for the Allies to the point where they had the better pilot corps late in the war, coupled with vast numbers of good fighters available. Still, the BOB seems to have been as close to a draw as possible without a decisive victory for either side at the time. The real victory came as the LW were unable to replace the BOB losses in a timely enough manner to stay well matched as losses mounted after the BOB while simultaneously attacking the Soviet Union and North Africa / the Med.
Still, if the Nazis had not invaded the Soviet Union, they might have done a great job in Europe, even with the high attrition of aircraft and pilots. Good thing Hitler was fixated on the Soviet Union, huh? If not for that, things might have been ... interesting.
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This again no...
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GregP
Major
Yah, but that's my opinion. I know you think differently. That's OK.
No real argument since it didn't happen and we both might be right or wrong in the "what if" scenario.
No real argument since it didn't happen and we both might be right or wrong in the "what if" scenario.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Greg, I have some of the same questions but I know what some of what Milosh posted means. I would like to know what date those numbers come from.
Quick LW Unit Designations:
A whole geschwader (or group) was called something like JG 26 and had 4 squadrons within the group that were designated by roman numerals - so II./JG 26 was the second squadron in the 26 Group. To confuse even more, each squadron had 4 units called Staffeln that were numbered by conventional Arabic numbers. So 3./JG 26 would mean the third staffel of JG 26.
As for Milosh's numbers, I think they can be read from left to right as: total a/c, a/c on operations, a/c servicable but there are far too many numbers. I would like to know when and where.
oh and the BoB ran from July 10 to October 31 for most historians.
Quick LW Unit Designations:
A whole geschwader (or group) was called something like JG 26 and had 4 squadrons within the group that were designated by roman numerals - so II./JG 26 was the second squadron in the 26 Group. To confuse even more, each squadron had 4 units called Staffeln that were numbered by conventional Arabic numbers. So 3./JG 26 would mean the third staffel of JG 26.
As for Milosh's numbers, I think they can be read from left to right as: total a/c, a/c on operations, a/c servicable but there are far too many numbers. I would like to know when and where.
oh and the BoB ran from July 10 to October 31 for most historians.
