Battle of the Bulge.....

[Njaco]

Remember the Germans had almost no avaliable airpower at this stage.

Don't know what you mean by this. The German aircraft industry just came off its highest production months in years (Sept and Oct) and the same for oil reserves being brought back up. A lack of quality pilots or at least pilots of 1939-40 vintage but I don't think a lack of aircraft and the means to wage war with them.

 

[syscom3]

The LW was dwarfed by combined might of the RAF and AAF.

They might as well as didnt exist as they lacked quality pilots and the ability to shape the battlefield.

And that doesnt even take into account the overwhelming might of the Soviets.

 

[Njaco]

You'r correct and I'm not forgetting that but to say they had almost no available air power is misleading IMHO.

 

[syscom3]

The allies could fly 4000 sorties in a single mission over Luxembourg (with the 9th and their counterparts in the RAF able to fly multiple sorties), and the LW could put up a couple hundred at one time.

I'd say its as close to being non-existant as you can.

 

[Watanbe]

You'r correct and I'm not forgetting that but to say they had almost no available air power is misleading IMHO.

What I mean is that, there air power they did have was occupied in small time raids and in defence of Germany. They had almost no air power to launch or support an offensive. I think Syscom understands my point, it is also relative to the power of the Allies.

 

[Njaco]

I will concede the point. To conduct an ongoing offensive , the LW was entirely incapable, I agree.

 

[RabidAlien]

The allies could fly 4000 sorties in a single mission over Luxembourg (with the 9th and their counterparts in the RAF able to fly multiple sorties), and the LW could put up a couple hundred at one time.

I'd say its as close to being non-existant as you can.

Heh. Tell that to the crew of the B-17 who were classified as "negligible losses" on that mission.

Kinda hard to compare the effectiveness of the air forces of a nation who's industrial might is being pounded mercilessly every day, as opposed to the combined might of TWO nations, one of which is seperated from the conflict by a 1500 mile stretch of open ocean agressively patrolled by friendly navies. At the time of the BoB, I'd say that the Luftwaffe was no longer much of a concern, but they were still able to put up a determined, if ineffective in the long run, resistance. Remove all outside distractions, put their best pilot in their best plane (prop-driven) up against the Allies' best pilot in our best plane (prop-driven), and I'd say it would be a battle to behold!

But I'm just rambling this morning. At what point does one call in to work and tell them you're incapacitated by a raging migrane? I figger if I'm coherent enough to call in, I can go in.....owey....

 

[Thorlifter]

From one migrane sufferer to another, I feel for you R.A. I don't get them too often anymore (knocking on every piece of wood I can find).

 

[Lucky13]

(knocking on every piece of wood I can find).

Will you PLLEEAASSEE stop knocking on my head TO.....not funny!

 

[syscom3]

Rabid, losses are inevitable and the Allies could absorb far more material and aircrew losses than the LW.

There is also no disputing the fact that (in Dec 1944) the LW could neither defend Germany itself, or go on meaningfull offensive operations. It doesnt matter the reasons for it, its just that "it was".

 

[parsifal]

Hitlers expectations regarding Wacht Am Rhein WERE the total defeat of the allies. Moreover it was his plan basically from start to finish. Although the detailed planning was of course the product of his staff, the drive to have it implemented was all his own.

Rundstedt, the man tasked to execute the plan, had absolutely no faith in it. He described it as "the most ridiculous plan I have ever seen....if we should make it to to the Meuse, let alone Antwerp, we should get down on our knees and give thanks to God" he is reported as saying.

OKW kept recommending the "short hook" throughout the planning stages, that was much less ambitious, and might have yielded a Corps or at most two, for the Germans. This of course would not deliver outright victory, but it might have given the hard pressed Germans some negotiating and manouvering room in which to reach some sort of peace with the allies (although I very much doubt it). Hitler rejected this option as totally inadequate to his war aims. He wanted total victory, but this was totally unachievable.

 

[Erich]

with all due respect guys but the LW was still a very capable force in December 1944 due to the attrition they gave to the US heavies of the 8th and B-26's of the 9th AF. some of the cruelest aerial battles were during this month for both sides fighting for the skies.
Bodenplatte was a failure of high command not the lower fledglings that suffered during air combat, had the LW been in itself in control and offered to exploit all its JG gruppen for Bodenplatte on at least 1 Heavy bomber strike in December the overall effects would of been far more felt that the air/ground debalcle on 1-1-45

 

[RabidAlien]

I agree, Syscom. It sounds cold and callus, but losing ten B-17's on a mission would be considered a light day, later in the war (and an easy day early in the war, when they were losing 1 in 3), and there were so many replacement crews and brand-new planes rolling off the lines that it was hardly a hickup in the system for the Allies. Those same ten planes/crews for the LW, though, would've been a much MUCH more telling blow. Yes, they were still building planes, but their output was (I believe....and I'm no expert on production numbers) quite a bit less than the combined might of England and the US. Kinda like saying both me and Bill Gates earn a paycheck.....his, however, can support buying a BMW every week. Mine can't.

 

[Erich]

side notation :

LW A/C production was at it's highest in late 1944..................go figure

 

[drgondog]

side notation :

LW A/C production was at it's highest in late 1944..................go figure

Of course you are right about LW still having formidable force - as Bodenplatte demonstrated.

Speer continued to raise fighter production priority from Feb 1944 through Dec - which meant fewer resources toward Tigers, etc.. and his decentralization efforts started paying divedends. But he knew the LW had to TRY to stop the attacks on Oil.

 

[syscom3]

Of course the LW produced lots of aircraft in the later part of 1944.

But how many quality aircrews did they have? If you only have a few hundred high quality pilots, then the size of your AF is only really only a few hundred. Anything else is just a soon to be target.

After the spring of 1944, there was nothing the LW could do that could materially effect a battle or campaign. It was a spent force. Was it capable of drawing blood on occasion? Yes. Could it do it often enough to make a difference? No.

 

[drgondog]

Of course the LW produced lots of aircraft in the later part of 1944.

But how many quality aircrews did they have? If you only have a few hundred high quality pilots, then the size of your AF is only really only a few hundred. Anything else is just a soon to be target.

After the spring of 1944, there was nothing the LW could do that could materially effect a battle or campaign. It was a spent force. Was it capable of drawing blood on occasion? Yes. Could it do it often enough to make a difference? No.

Pretty much true - hence the huge ground scores in April, 1945 - lots of a/c -no fuel/few skilled pilots..

The comment that I made was that Bodenplatte demonstrated they weren't kaput during the Bulge - however ineffective Bodenplatte was.

 

[parsifal]

But the allied juggernaut, especially in the air, WAS unstoppable by December 1944