if you would read what others write I wrote "German infantry was capable to march while following motorized troops 50km per day" so while FOLLWING the panzer and Inf. division (mot.), so along the roads which were first used by panzer divisions and their artillery and supply columns. And source is the Finnish translation of von Tippelskirch's history of the WWII. V. Tippelskirch happened to has been the CG of 4th A during the destruction of AG Centre in summer 44. And of course such forced marches were hard to infantry.
Why are you mentionng situations that would not apply and are of no benefit to the issue we are looking at???? A division following another is not in an engaged situation, and the original supposition that led to this little debate was what an unmotorized division could do if it began in an engaged condition with the enemy. So the question arises....are you (still) saying that in enagaged situations an Infantry division could retreat 40km. If not, what distances are you suggesting as an appropriate yardstick to estimate their capabilities.
I have not read your Von Tippelskirch, but it may well be a case of someone trying to cover their own behind, arguing it was all Hitlers fault and the army could have managed the situation if they had been given the opportunity. In other words, someone trying to cover themselves.
Whilst I havent Tippelskirch, I have read a series of articles put together into a single volume called "Fighting In Hell" The articles were by Erhard Raus, General Der Infantrie Dr Waldeimar Erfuth (considered by many to be the foremost Infantry specialist in the wehrmacht) and Franz Halder (who needs no introduction). I also have read Von Manteuffels book (the name of which I forget). All of these guys do not support the notion that 50km sustained marching by unmotorised infantry even in an unengaged situation is at all possible. And for the record, they make the point that units following a Panzer formation on a Rusian road had a hard time moving at all, because the roads system was so badly torn up,, so many bridges collapsed after the passage of the Panzer unit and the like. It generally took weeks of repair to restore a Russian Road network that had been torn up by German motorised forces, simply through usage
With regard to your last sentence, that strikes me as the classic understatement..."force marches were hard on the Infantry"....you think!!!!!. Out of roughly 800000 defenders, 680000 of them were killed or captured in the DAGC . Most of the survivors were generally rear area line of communications troops and the like. The average strength of those divisions that did survive was just 1000 men, no transport, no artillery, virtually no equipment. I guess you could say it was a little hard on the formation, given it was a deferat that led directly to the capitulation of both Rumania and Finland, and is recorded as the greatest defeat of the German army up to that time in the WWII.
And pre-war western allies manuals are only that, not necessary apply to divisions fighting in the Eastern Front as seen for ex. the western rule of thumb that a div after 30% casualties was no more capable to normal combat operations, when in the East much more depleted divs had to fought and fought even successfully.
Just to clarify, the US manual was updated in 1971, and again in 1993. With regard to calculating march speeds, it has not really changed. Evidently there were plenty of people who considered it to have value. Its still used at places like Duntroon, Sandhurst and West Point AFAIK, but in your little world these places arent worth the ground they are built on I guess.
I agree that German Infantry continued to fight past the point of 30% casualties. The usual strength for German Infantry on the Eastern Front was an average of 40% authorized strength, but given the greatest losses were in their transport and logistics areas this only makes their mobility problem even harder. by 1944 German Infantry Divs could no longer move in unison. They were so short of both MT and Draft animals, that divisions could only be moved by pooling transport and moving units in stages, or alternatively dropping their gear and running. this was particularly true in so called "static sectors" like AGC and AGN, wher the divisions were stripped out to provide transport to other more dynbamic sectors.
The British manual was updated during and after the war. I havent seen the post war manual, but I have seen the wartime revision. It makes no change with regard to mobility and march calculations.
So, either these Operations manuals are worth looking at, and are reliable, or Allied commanders were incredibly stupid to teach their armed forces procedur4es that were below the capabilities of the troops. And, if the operating procedures are accurate, why would they not be applicable, or at least comparable to German forces, unless you really do believe that the Germans were somehow the race of super soldiers, capable of things the allies could only dream of...
For example it seems that German 4th A would have made it if the Soviet flanking units would not have had 2 days – 3 days head start because of interference from higher up. And 4th A was retreating in very bad conditions, almost uncontested enemy air superiority (3 weeks after D-Day in Normandy which had attracted was majority of LW fighters in the West), using rather bad road network through swampy and forested areas with lot of partisans harassing them while especially north of them a Soviet pincer was advancing along the Smolensk – Minsk highway, and regular enemy forces attacking constantly their rear and flanks, but some of its divs could march 30-50 km per day, even 85km per day parts of 110. Inf Div on 3 Jul 44, source Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 8
Really, this is the stuff fairy tales are made of Juha. AGC was incapable of rapid movement because of the crisis in their transport arm. And whilst orders were issued, or formations were just attempting movements of 40-80 km per day, how much was surviving. How much of the formations were actually falling out of formation and getting themselves captured???. At the end of the operation they had lost all of their artillery and transport, and rifle strengths were down to 1000 or less per division. If you call that surviving, well, you have a different concept of sustainable operations to me.
Perhaps I should qualify. Units in rout can save remnants of the formation if resistance is abandoned, and the personnel take to sheer flight. These elements are no longer a coherent defence, no longer in contact, and no longer a military organization. Under those conditions, the more determined individuals have a chane of survival, but the force as a coherent body is finished. I thought we were talking about the conditions needed to save a formations artillery, not the fact that a few ragged individuals made it out of a cauldron alive. The Soviets managed similar feats in 1941, but on a larger scale in the various cauldrons that developed around their armies during Barbarossa. Many of the personnel managed to escape such encirclements, but noit as formed military units.
It would have mattered very little if the germans had started moving 2 days earlier than they did. By the time of the offensive, AGC was a house of cards that simply was incapable of rapid movement at the same time. To save more of its personnel it would simply have had to abanadon most of its heavy equipment, and start running earlier than it did. Thats still not a retreat, its still a rout, and a big one.
And blaming Hitler or higher up...really, I thought you had a better grasp of the situation than that. Sure Hitler was stubborn, and at times his orders unrealistic, but in this instance, he didnt have a choice. Retreat as is generally (ie as formed military formations) was not possible for AGC in 1944, indeed retreat as an option was not possible on any front for the germans by that time, except for their mobile formations.