Thankyou for the answer, and very comprehensive and informative. However, whilst i agree that the number of times the German surface Navy was engaged in combat are very limited I think that limited dataset is being even more restricted by the approach you are adopting. For example, at Barents Sea there was more to the action than the Hippers shooting. Hipper represents the successful element of the german plan, what about those ships less successful, like the Lutzow and the destroyers?
"To compound Kummetz's dilemma, Admiral Burnett's cruisers Sheffield and Jamaica appeared seemingly out of nowhere. The Sheffield opened fire first, straddling Hipper with several salvos before getting her range and then scoring a damaging hit. Kummetz attempted to swing around and make smoke but before he could do so Hipper took two more hits. Again immobilized by Hitler's restrictive orders, he decided he was already in deep trouble for taking what the Führer would consider an unacceptable risk, so he ordered a cease fire and a speedy withdrawal of all units. But Burnett suffered no such reluctance to engage. At 1133, the German destroyers Friedrich Eckholdt and Richard Beitzen mistook the Sheffield and the Jamaica for the Hipper and Lützow and attempted to link up with them. Before the German commanders could realize their error, every gun on the two British cruisers opened up.
Being closer in, the Friedrich Eckholdt was hit directly amidships and sunk within less than two minutes. The Richard Beitzen escaped unharmed. This distraction had taken the British cruisers to the north of the convoy and caused them to lose contact with the Hipper which was now hustling westward to join the Lützow .
Meanwhile, Captain Stänge aboard the Lützow identified several possible targets in the convoy through the mist and smoke. The nearest was three miles away and the farthest seven. Though the range of his guns was 15 miles he fired 87 11-inch and 75 6-inch rounds without scoring a direct hit. Stänge had missed the sort of opportunity seldom presented to a naval commander"
At North Cape I am certain the the DoY was achieving multiple straddles of the Scharnhorst the same as Scharnhorsts return fire. Despite Scharnhorsts being outnumbered in termsof tubes she could fire, her ROF was superior to the DoYs, so it would be interesting to see who was straddling who more often.
As an ex-naval officer, having been involved in many training shoots, ive never heard of the saying you are quoting. I was wondering who exactly would make that statement. admittedly my experience is postwar, we considered it successful shooting to actually hit the target rather than attempt to straddle, and whilst my knowledge of radar is overshadowed by your own, I can assure you that we relied on radar heavily to achieve those hits as early as possible, and the radars we were using were direct developments of the wartime types (I served initially on a Daring Class destroyer, later I was on an Adams class DDG). And we trained according to the principals laid down in the 1954 US gunnery training manual, as updated, but which itself had been prepared on the basis of lessons learned during the war. Even though there was a world of difference between the environment I trained in and WWII, the links and experiences are still tangible I believe. Achieving a straddle was seen as a positive step, but we could and did make rapid corrections to our azimuth and bearing to achieve a hit as quickly as possible. Radar direction was crucial to achieving that firing solution, so I am at a loss in understanding where this idea that radar could only get you "near enough" or "somewhere near" the target. That is not how we were trained, and we were using essentially wartime technology to learn the traded. We were taught to adjust fire as quickly as possible, and to use the most appropriate target location devices that were available, which invariably meant we spent a lot of time peering at the radar scope to determine the firing solution as quickly as possible. Radar has its limitations, and ought not be relied on as the sole means to verify target position and speed, but it was our prime means of fire control.
Straddles usually preceded hits, because it meant that the enemy's range/speed/course had been found, and there was a better chance of being able to predict its position for the next salvo. Radar (and computers), allowed that firing solution to be found very quickly, so i am at a bit of a loss as to why you would imply that radar does not help, or is of limited help, in achieving hits. That is just contrary to everything I ever saw learned or observed whilst in service