Best WWII Air-Force

Best WWII Air-Force

  • Royal Air Force

    Votes: 72 22.0%
  • Luftwaffe

    Votes: 104 31.8%
  • United States Air Force

    Votes: 132 40.4%
  • Royal Australian Air Force

    Votes: 9 2.8%
  • Regia Aeronautica

    Votes: 5 1.5%
  • Royal New Zealand Air Force

    Votes: 8 2.4%
  • Royal Canadian Airforce

    Votes: 15 4.6%
  • Chinese Air Force

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Russian Air Force

    Votes: 13 4.0%
  • Japanese Air Force

    Votes: 4 1.2%

  • Total voters
    327

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Doctor Gon Dog (it´s easier to spell in this form):

I do not deny the Mustang was a superb fighter with advanced combat capabilities for the scenario it would be operating over...but so were those ships fielded by the Germans: G-5,-6,-14/AS, G-10, K-4, the Antons, the Doras and of course the rare Ta 152 H-1.

Also agree with your comments that it was ONLY skill of the pilot in the cockpit which would come to make the difference.

Where i will have to disagree with you is when you say "...enabling relatively small numbers to turn the control of the air over Germany to the US".

When you say "small numbers" you should of course be referring to the long range escorts...that their numbers were low enough to find themselves outnumbered.

This is not the first time i come across this notion; that the P-51´s over Germany were significantly outnumbered, yet managed to defeat whatever enemy fighter stream they confronted in the air...

If so, such high losses of German fighters inflicted by a relatively small number of P-51 pilots should reflect on the lists of top scorers of the 8th USAAF to say the least...i mean, i am doing this by memory but if i recall correctly the list has Gabby as the top scorer with some 28 kills (but Gabby flew the venerable Jug as i also seem to recall); following behind should come the Noble Robert Johnson -which also flew a Jug and not a Mustang)...so apart from these 2 gentlemen, i think there are only 5 or 6 more USAAF aces with more than 20 kills -and i ought to check this for they are not all P-51 pilots as well-, most of them from the 56, 352 and 359 FGs.

And i am aware of the combat program for fighter pilots in the USAAF...fly during a specific time, if you survive then clear your stuff and go back home.

So -overclaiming acknowledged- less than 30 kills as the standard (only 6 or 7 pilots with 20-28 kills), and also not too many Mustang pilots with 10-19 kills, seems quite low if i position myself under the assertion a relatively small number of pilots which were most frequently -or always?- outnumbered by enemy fighters are responsible for turning the control of air space over Germany to the U.S., something the implies the defeat of the enemy tagjagdwaffe.

This is only one approach to counter this theory.

About the G-6/R6´s, well there i too agree with you; there is no way we can know an accurate number of the 109s which were fitted to operate with the extra-cannon equipment under the wings...someone i met in Europe told me it was his estimate at least 50% of 109s used during late 1943-mid 1944 were fitted with the underwing gondlas, but it was just that, an estimate.

What we do however know is the fact that particular version saw widespread use in combat in several units, like JG 1 and JG 11 since late 1943, when they were covering Holland and northern Germany -i know late 1943 does not have Mustangs in the long range mode-, but also through most of 1944 in those 2 units and many others as well that were committed to Reichsverteidigung. Also my Luftwaffe videos and films show an important number of these bomber-destroyer configuration of the 109 in Luftwaffe airfields.

So you are suggesting that those G-6/R6´s who managed to return to their base -which were the significant majority of them- after being engaged by the escorts could only attain it for the main reason there were not enough P-51´s to go after them?

No credit to the capabilities of the 109 although somewhat disrupted by such fitting of equipment? No credit to 109 G-6/R6 pilots who proved capable to evade any pursuing P-51s?

If so many G-6/R6´s managed to return to base after engaging Jugs and Mustangs, what could one think of a Bf 109 bearing only its classical weapons? Surely more capable.

Houston, we have a problem...and the problem i see is the allies have managed to depict the Germans finished the war almost if not identical to the Japanese style...more hogwash to remove from my list. You know virtually "all German fighter missions wiped out to the very last...with only a fistful of wounded pilots returning to base on foot because they too were shot down".

Crap. As i said, i have a close idea of the magnitude of German losses during summer 1944 until the end in 1945. High. Simple. But not like the allies have said, not with regard to German losses, not with regard to the losses of their own.

The only equal thing was total and unconditional surrender; the rest deserves very special analysis.



Now the guncamera thing...i agree with you -and was also aware of it- that in so many times it was either a German guy or USA guy who got outflown and paid accordingly...i possibly used the wrong words, not that you can learn "tech specifications" of craft from watching guncamera footage, right...but my point is that you do not get to see that much footage shown P-51´s blowing in huge fire balls.

Speaking for myself is that i tell you that before acquiring my collection i had seen possibly ONE -repeat, one- film of a P-51 getting hit and it was not even conclusive for the film shot ended before showing if the pounding continued finishing with a possible kill.

What the videos did show me is that many many times P-51 pilots attempted evading procedures to no avail: the narrowest turning possible with the camera of the 109 or 190 remaining inside scoring hits, dives, climbing...huge fire balls from silly pilots with the drop tanks still under the wings...if a well trained pilot from the USAAF could not escape from the pursuing German then it also tells me the German was a very competitive pilot and that his plane allows for displaying the necessary skills to destroy your enemy.

I have ~85 shots of sauteed P-51s, plus dozens more showing similar fates of Jugs, Spitfires, Typhoons/Tempests and even some P-38s. What of the many other USAAF fighters that got shot down by the Luftwaffe? Were all those the cause of badly trained pilots manning inadequate planes??

Who is Ken Miller? Is his work published?


SoDStitch:

I simply like the truth. Books such as the one i did describe focused on Bodenplatte used to pissed me off big time a very few of years ago, when i was still a teenager. Now i find them amusing.

The allies have lied big time about so many issues of the war; every aspect of the war has been targeted in a lesser or higher degree with their lies: weapons, battlefield records, politics.

In fact, i take most of what comes from the allied side with a grain of salt.

Perhaps you have seen Erich around here; well he himself shared his experiences with some historians or researchers from some USAAF bomber group when he was denied access to information or files. Why would that be? Because they want to hide the successes of such group?

Well...so you live in Tucson? I have not been at Sullivan´s for breakfast. Only for dinner, but hey, dinner is something like more special don´t you think? I rarely go out for breakfast wherever is it that i might be living in.

Dinner is really something; the day is over, and you want to forget about the things of the day whatever they are: bad day at work, your wife or girlfriends conspiracies, the IRS...

If you have not yet had dinner there you are missing something. I am of the opinion that the sophisticated ambience of a place gets enhanced during the night. Something that works marvelously in that restaurant. Also the bar has something special; i barely drink, but being at Sullivan´s bar before entering the dining room makes me want to have a cold beer or some good scotch...and the waitresses, yeah!

The last time i went there, i stayed there for about a week and a half; i stayed with a friend who lives in La Paloma. During such time we went there 4 times for dinner -two of those were in a row-; i have fun when i remember the face of the manager upon seeing me entering his dining room.

There was this appetizer which is unforgettable: Seared Ahi Tuna...small cuts of Albacore, seared in the outside, and that real creamy buttery flavor in the inside...you should really try it. The oysters...well, the USA has really got one of the greatest logistic systems on earth...a city in the middle of the Sonora Desert, not far from the border with Mexico and you can have some of the freshest and best oysters you can think of...as if you were in some fishermen village by the sea side...on a different setting -and surrounded by fine women in black-.

I loved the black outfit all the waitresses; whenever is it that i come back, i might give you a call.8)
 
 
I will concur with Bill about the 355th fg, he has it all wrapped up........... certainly there are gaps in any history LW or Allied, and if anything interviewing pilots from both sides concerning a dogfight many would tell you if given the chance again they would do things differently if they could.

here is another kicker : comparing the overall strengths in 1944 summer onward of the LW day fighter Geschwader to a typical 8th AF day fighter group. Even with the included extra staffel in a 3 gruppen Geschwader the LW was still under the gun...........

as it turns out this is more of a Udet to drgondog discussion so i will leave it be........
 

The Luftwaffe wasn't very large. It only grew by around 15% in the entire war from beginning to end. They did produce large quantaties of aircraft and this was a significant achievement but to all intents and purposes, they only replaced the planes destroyed.
As a comparison the RAF grew from 136(ish) squadrons in 1939 to 405 squadrons on Jan 1945.

Germany had plenty of aircraft. Hell just look at the Bf 109 which was the most produced aircraft in history if I recall.
See above comment


The problem was the number built. For practical purposes the Germans didn't have more than a minimal and patchy maritime recce ability
 
Udet - back to Mustang aces vs Jug aces.

Complex discussion - simple answer - many more 51 aces than 38 or 47 aces. Simple reason - the bulk of the German Fighters shot down by USAAF fighters were by Mustangs.

Independent of overclaiming by both sides, the AWARDS by USAF were approximately 4,950 a/c in the air (4131 ground) - most by far German- in 213,873 sorties, and lost 2,520 total - all causes.

With 423,435 sorties the P-47 shot down 3,082 in the air (3,202 ground)- mostly German and lost 3,077.

With 129,849 sorties, the P-38 shot down 1,771 in the air (749 ground) - Most Japanese and lost 1,771.

Just looking at January - May 1944 a breakdown on air scores for the 47 and 51 and 38 groups in the 8th AF. The 9th AF 354FG scored large

P-51 Groups - 51 air to air only (USAF 85)
4th FG Mar-May 273
352 FG Apr-May 134
354 FG Jan-May 255
355 FG Mar-May 126
357 FG Feb-May 223
339 FG May1 41
359 FG May12 40
--------------------
total LReich ~ 1,092

Keeping this in perspective

P-38 Groups
20 FG Jan-May 50
55 FG Jan-May 25
364 FG Mar-May 30
----------------------
Total LReich ~ 105

P-47 Groups --------> mostly LufFlotte 3

4 FG Jan-Feb 58
78 FG Jan-May 88
352FG Jan-Apr9 44
353FG Jan-May 67
355FG Jan-Mar 8 22
356FG Jan-May 80
359FG Jan-May12 40
361FG Jan-May15 21
--------------------
Total Luft3 ~ 420

Draw your own conclusions regarding the combat effectiveness of the Mustang flying far few sorties than the P-47s in the 8th AF (~16 Group 'months' versus 33 for rough count). Simply stated 1/2 the activity and 2.5 more destruction (air alone) plus enormous damage strafing airfields.

While not all of the GAF downed by Mustangs were LuftReich - most were. Conversely the P-47s dueled JG11 and JG1 often but most were JG26 and JG2 in LufFlotte 3 region because of range restrictions.

Another reason for the higher scorers is reasonably simple - the key high scorers in P-47s started nearly a year before the Mustang aces (Gabreski, Johnson, Schilling, Zemke, Duncan, Mahurin, Christenson, Beckham to name most with scores above 18 were P-47 aces) and of course many have scores in both. For the 355th, they performed indifferently with P-47s and had only one ace that scored more than 3 in P-47s (Norm Olson with six air). Twenty scored from 5.0 to 14.2 - all Mustang aces starting their scoring after mid March 1944

As to low scoring relative to Luftwaffe you may imagine daylight operations against the USAAF offered a target rich environment for the LW while the reverse was quite true for US. My father was able to engage and shoot only five times to get 6 Me 109s and a Stuka from D-Day to September 11. In the latter part of his first tour and all of his second he was depty CO of the 355th and never able to find the LW in the area when he was leading.

Many Mustang aces had the same experience/

Regards,

Bill
 

Unfortunately (or fortunately), I do not live in Tuscon, my brother did; we were visiting him and had a chance to have breakfast there (nice restaurant!). Also spent some time in Flagstaff (beautiful town!).

And, yes, I do remember the waitresses; in fact, I vaguely remember trying to hit on one. Unfortunately, 9:00 AM in the morning is not the best time to try pick up women, even if you do look like Don Johnson . . .
 

In that case yes you are correct. I will agree....


Glider said:
See above comment



The problem was the number built. For practical purposes the Germans didn't have more than a minimal and patchy maritime recce ability


For the most part overall numbers built was not bad. There were more than eneogh aircraft to do the mission, especially when you include the 500+ built Ar 196 and 130+ He 115 for closer range and coastal recce.

I will agree however that the maritime ability was dodgy but not based off of numbers of aircraft.

Your numbers for the Do 24 are incorrect however but that is also irrelevent.

Do 24: 279 were built right up until 1945.
 
I have to congratulate the participants in the Best WW2 Air Force discussion.
Great job guys. Very informative and well thought out.

Thank you!


I wish Soren would come back!

...


I still think the Luftwaffe is the best in WW2 but it is probably a product of semantics.

Define Best? Define WW2 (1939 or American entry and learning curve).

... Certainly the US was the best from mid 43 - 45 and has not relinquished the top position for a moment since.

From 1939 - Early 1943 the Luftwaffe kicked ass (BoB will be addressed.. calm down)

From 1943-45, the Luftwaffe was slowly beaten into submission but they get huge points for innovation and mechanical expertise.
If you take away points for the lack of strategic bombing and screwy leadership then it's pretty damn close to a tie with the US Army Air Corps.

The UK was freaking awesome in terms of design, strategy and tenacity. I hate to say it but I've read more instances of Germans recounting their feared opponents and the Brits seem to be more often mentioned then the Yanks. Big applause for the UK but they just didn't have the resources.
The BoB was a tremendous feat but the limitations of the Luftwaffe in Time over Target are a huge factor.

Now if the question was which is the "Best Air Power of WW2" my answer is the US. HANDS DOWN. If you throw in Naval and Marine aviation, it's not even close.



.

.
 
You're forgetting about the AAF having 4 types of heavy bombers, 3 types of long range fighters, a sophisticated air transport system and an immense industrial base in which to arm and rearm.

There can be no other conclusion.... after Jan 1 1944, the AAF was the best in the world.
 

I am afraid you are quite wrong in this, and I am curious on what you base your fscts on. The 12 Sept 1939 strenght of the LW was 4093 aircraft, and it continued to increase steadilz.

The daz before Barbarossa it rose to 5245 (so much about claims made on the devastating effects of the BoB, in fact it was not any more bloody than the much shorter French campaign).

A week before Kursk, 30 June 1943, it's numbers increased to 7089 aircraft, and ironically it was on peak strenght at around Bodenplatte - on the 1 Jan 1945 it possessed 8764 airraft. (see Groehler)

In short, during the war, the LW's frontline strenght more than doubled. The problem for them was that they were spread thin from mid-war onwards.
 
Im trying to see if I can find the figures in my copies of the Kriegstagebuch of the Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (War Diaries of the High Command of the Wehrmacht) because that is also what I allways thought as well.
 

Thanks for the info. Obviously my info is different so can I ask for the ISBN no of the book your quoting from, as it seems worth getting.

I have a total strength (all types) of
May 11 1940, 4,782
June 21 1941 4,882

So the losses incurred in the BOB swallowed up all the German production for the next 12 months before the attack on Russia. So yes, I would say that the LW suferred very heavy losses in the battle.
 

The number of aircraft in the Luftwaffe certainly grew, but it's important to look at the types. Growth occured mainly in the non combat types like trainers and coastal, the front line fighters and bombers hardly increased at all.

Figure from Strategy for Defeat by Williamson Murray:

Mon Year Fight Bomb Total aircraft
Jan 1940 1016 1381 4258
May 1940 1369 1758 5398
Jan 1941 817 1339 4347
May 1941 1277 1481 5524
Jan 1942 1324 1351 5133
Jul 1942 1353 1534 5967
Jan 1943 1380 1193 5374
Jul 1943 1849 1663 7203
Jan 1944 1561 1604 6741
Mar 1944 1747 1441 7023

The daz before Barbarossa it rose to 5245 (so much about claims made on the devastating effects of the BoB, in fact it was not any more bloody than the much shorter French campaign

Well, again it's according to type.

The Germans lost 1345 aircraft on operations during the Battle of France. However, they only lost 341 fighters, 604 bombers.

In the BoB they lost 835 fighters and 833 bombers on operations during the BoB. More importantly, they lost large numbers of pilots during the BoB, whereas they lost far less during the BoF, and regained the pilots who had been captured.

Now look at the figures for May 1941. Overall they had more aircraft than May 1940, but they had less fighters and less bombers than they'd had a year earlier.

A week before Kursk, 30 June 1943, it's numbers increased to 7089 aircraft

Look at the figures for July 1943 (which seems to be the beginning of the month, before Kursk). Total aircraft has gone up greatly over May 1940, but fighters are only up by 480, bombers down by 95.
 
Udet - back to Mustang aces vs Jug aces.

Complex discussion - simple answer - many more 51 aces than 38 or 47 aces. Simple reason - the bulk of the German Fighters shot down by USAAF fighters were by Mustangs.

Independent of overclaiming by both sides, the AWARDS by USAF were approximately 4,950 a/c in the air (4131 ground) - most by far German- in 213,873 sorties, and lost 2,520 total - all causes. Air to air losses were roughly 25% of the total, flak the highest and mechanical/coolant about the same as air losses, weather and accidents the rest

With 423,435 sorties the P-47 shot down 3,082 in the air (3,202 ground)- mostly German and lost 3,077.

With 129,849 sorties, the P-38 shot down 1,771 in the air (749 ground) - Most Japanese and lost 1,758.

Just looking at January - May 1944 a breakdown on air scores for the 47 and 51 and 38 groups in the 8th AF. The 9th AF 354FG scored large while on loan to 8th AF

P-51 Groups - 51 air to air only (USAF 85)
4th FG Mar-May 273
352 FG Apr-May 134
354 FG Jan-May 255
355 FG Mar-May 126
357 FG Feb-May 223
339 FG May1 41
359 FG May12 40
--------------------
total LReich ~ 1,092

Keeping this in perspective

P-38 Groups
20 FG Jan-May 50
55 FG Jan-May 25
364 FG Mar-May 30
----------------------
Total LReich ~ 105

P-47 Groups --------> mostly LufFlotte 3

4 FG Jan-Feb 58
78 FG Jan-May 88
352FG Jan-Apr9 44
353FG Jan-May 67
355FG Jan-Mar 8 22
356FG Jan-May 80
359FG Jan-May12 40
361FG Jan-May15 21
--------------------
Total Luft3 ~ 420

Draw your own conclusions regarding the combat effectiveness of the Mustang flying far few sorties than the P-47s in the 8th AF (~16 Group 'months' versus 33 for rough count). Simply stated 1/2 the activity and 2.5 more destruction (air alone) plus enormous damage strafing airfields.

While not all of the GAF downed by Mustangs were LuftReich - most were. Conversely the P-47s dueled JG11 and JG1 often but most were JG26 and JG2 in LufFlotte 3 region because of range restrictions.

Another reason for the higher scorers is reasonably simple - the key high scorers in P-47s started nearly a year before the Mustang aces (Gabreski, Johnson, Schilling, Zemke, Duncan, Mahurin, Christenson, Beckham to name most with scores above 18 were P-47 aces) and of course many have scores in both. For the 355th, they performed indifferently with P-47s and had only one ace that scored more than 3 in P-47s (Norm Olson with six air). Twenty scored from 5.0 to 14.2 - all Mustang aces starting their scoring after mid March 1944

As to low scoring relative to Luftwaffe you may imagine daylight operations against the USAAF offered a target rich environment for the LW while the reverse was quite true for US. My father was able to engage and shoot only five times to get 6 Me 109s and a Stuka from D-Day to September 11. In the latter part of his first tour and all of his second he was depty CO of the 355th and never able to find the LW in the area when he was leading.

Many Mustang aces had the same experience/

Regards,

Bill
 

Jump in Erich -

It's absolutely clear that the Geschwaders were operating at approximately half strength - at least from spring 1945 onward based on Walter Grabmann's research. The primary reason is probably a combination of two things - one, a decreasing availability of skilled replacement pilots rendering fewer pilots than available fighters and second, perhaps reflecting damaged a/c under repair due to strafing/bombing attacks.

The German production figures, according to published German records increased steadily despite USAAF attacks because more priority was allocated to production of fighters.

What I haven't figured out is 'where did they go'?

If you look at the LW "balance sheets' of fighters on a month to month basis, look at the losses they recorded (including write offs) there seems to be a significant gap in 'deliveries minus losses'.

The Strategic Bombing Survey points out the question and to my knowledge it hasn't been answered.

Independent of those questions it is clear from Grabmann's work that LuftReich was operating in the 50% range between 'authorized' and 'actual' after May.

Hey Erich - I just got an email from a friend of Dad - Warren Peglar an RCAF pilot that was transferred from a RAF Spit IXunit to 355th to fly Mustangs for two months. He returned to RAF and flew Tempest V's for rest of war -Interesting comments not only about Spits and Mustangs but also Mustangs and Gustavs and Antons.. I'll send it to you.

He flew both 51Bs and 51Ds and shot down 190s and 109s with both. He flew just two months with 355th. In three years in Spit V, IX, Tempest V he encountered one enemy a/c - a 262 - for a draw.
 

I have a good series of books called the Diaries of the OKW each about a 1000 pages long from each year of the war. They list materials and equipment in each front and so forth and it pretty much goes day by day as well as telling what was happening during those time periods.

The Book is in German but there might be an english version of it out there as well if you wish to have the ISBN or info on the books.

There are no pictures or anything it is just documents and so forth.
 

Balloney.

Indeed it's important to look at the types.

Your list only shows single engined fighters, and tradiational level bombers while basically it ommits a large amount of combat types - Stukas, Ground attacks aircraft, nightfighters, night attack aircraft etc - and you baselessly assume all these latter are liason planes and the kind.

Let's take January 1944 on your as an example. It says :

Jan 1944
1561 'fighters'
1604 'bombers'
6741 in total

I have figures for 31 December 1943, so it should be close enough. It goes as:

1561 SE fighters
1604 bombers
6584 in total*

Similiar isn't it? Well, half the story only. Groehler also gives some other type breakdowns for the date as :

611 night fighters
601 dive bombers and attack/CAS (Schlact) aircraft.

In short there are about 1200 combat types not accounted by Murray and you. And it would be rather odd not considering NF Bf 110s, Ju 88s, which quite often operated in the daylight as well. It woud be also odd not to consider the by then rather numerous FW 190 ground attack units as combat types either... Yet he list still not details Zestorer units. And so on.

Furthermore, Groehler notes that the 6584 in total* Iststärke (oh no, sein und sollen rose it's ugly head again! ) does not include non-combat units : OTU-equivalents, liason, night harrasment/attack units, transport, glider and maritime aux. units.

I must note that it's an interesting custom that you always include Zestörer units whenever you're trying to sell balloney claims about the RAF fighters units being badly outnumbered, you always include Zestörer unit losses whenever you're counting Luftwaffe losses, yet somehow those same Zestörer units suddenly disappear from your totals when it comes to the Luftwaffe's frontline strenght, which you attempt to prove to have not increased at all during the war...

It's similiarly baseless as your claims that the RAF fighters were outnumbered in BoB, and that Luftwaffe was sustaining twice the loss as the RAF.

Take note I am not arguing here this or that airforce was 'better'. IMHO it's a silly attempt to rank them, considering how different their challenges and task were during the war...! However I do feel the need to correct when I see the wrong, especially when it comes from some not-so-naive people who know better...

It's just the same kind of manipulated BS, if you don't mind me calling it what it is.

Well, again it's according to type.

The Germans lost 1345 aircraft on operations during the Battle of France. However, they only lost 341 fighters, 604 bombers.
In the BoB they lost 835 fighters and 833 bombers on operations during the BoB. [/QUOTE]

I wonder how this adds up. Ie. actual German losses in BoB (July-October), from the LW Quartermaster's returns.
On operations.
This includes both shot down (100%) and write-offs (60-99%).

Type / Destroyed by

SE fighters : 502 / 98 = 600 (+63 not on operations)
Zestörer : 224 / 11 = 235 (+17)

A-ha. So 'fighters' means both SE and TE unit when Hop counts losses.
'Fighters' however do not include TE units when Hop counts frontline strenght (when he seeks to prove the LW frontline strenght did not increase through the war. When he wants to prove the RAF was badly outnumbered, TE units are counted again).

In comparison, during the (almost) two month period of the BoF, the LW lost as total loss :

250 SE fighters
124 TE fighters

But again, that's during the two months of the BoF, compared against the four months of BoB. It's quite clear the BoF was not any less costly per month ,yet from what the British had to endure a few months later, it's hard to see they were in any way paralyzing..

Bombers cause more of a headache, losses during BoB, as above :

Kampfgeschwadern : 488 / 205 = 693 (+99)
Stuka : 59 / 10 = 69 (+25)

In comparison, during two months of the BoF :

Kampfgeschwadern : 477
Stuka : 123

It's actually shows the bomber losses were far worse during BoF than during the BoB. For example, the worst month for German bombers over Britain was August 1940, when they lost 259 of their bombers (Kampf, no Stukas, see later). Only 183 of that, however, was attributed to the RAF and British AAA.

In comparison, between 10 and 31 May, in a short 20 day period, the German bomber total losses amounted no less than 350, far worse than the RAF in BoB ever managed in any month during BoB.

Stukas lost 75 aircraft in the same 20 day period, and 123 Ju 87 during the whole French campaign (May-june).

In comparison, their total losses on operation amounted only 69 in the entire four months of the BoB, 94 if you add losses occuring outside operations. 59 of that, however, was attributed to the RAF and AAA.

More importantly, they lost large numbers of pilots during the BoB, whereas they lost far less during the BoF, and regained the pilots who had been captured.

It's a blanket statement. The Luftwaffe lost 1272 dead, 1156 WIA, and 580 MIA during the French campaign with frontline units in just 50 days - that's not including the ones lost with the Flak, in Germany, in schools etc.

The difference is, of course the timeframe.

The German losses in the 'Battle of France' refer to a mere two months period, between May 10 and 30 June.

The German losses in the 'Battle of Britain' refer to twice the time period, ie. four months, between July 1 and 31 October.

During this time, the Germans lost a total of 2073 aircraft, of which 1401 aircraft was a total loss. That's in a bit less than 2 months.

In comparison, during the four months of BoB, they lost 3022 aircraft, of that, 2009 was a total loss. Of the 2009 total loss, 1789 was occured on operations, and of that 1789, 1385 was knocked down by the Britsh Air Force or AAA.

During the same four months, the British ost 307 bombers, and 1140 Fighters as Category C. That of course just Bomber Command and Fighter Command, but figures are not available for Coastal Command, FAA etc., whereas the German figures include a considerable number of Transport,Coastal, misc. aircraft.

The math is simple to do.

Now look at the figures for May 1941. Overall they had more aircraft than May 1940, but they had less fighters and less bombers than they'd had a year earlier.

I look at them but I can't see anything like that.

I.e. German single engined fighter strenghts (not including Zestorer units) :
On-hand strenght, meaning not all being servicable/ready for duty.

29 June 1940
1107 fighters, 1126 pilots.

28 September 1940
920 fighters, 917 pilots.

28 December 1940
829 fighters, 915 pilots

29 March 1941
1104 fighters, 1204 pilots

28 June 1941 (take note that Unternehmen Barbarossa is raging for almost a week by now)
1213 fighters, 1309 pilots

27 September 1941
1137 fighters, 1452 pilots

27 December 1941
1233 fighters, 1381 pilots

In fact just by looking at it, they had just the same number of SE fighters and SE fighter pilots on 29 March 1941 then on 29 June 1940, just before the Battle of Britain. And, naturally your double standards are showing off again, you count Zestörers and fighters sometimes, then not, and forgetting of other fighters - by mid-1941, there were about 250 nightfighters around, for example.

It doesn't seem to hold any water that they had any trouble replacing the planes and pilots in short notice after BoB.

Here it should be mentioned that fighter production suffered during the period since Messerschmitt factories and it's sub-contractors had to re-set the production lines as the 109F entered into production and service during the fall of 1940, and lots of 109Es were simply withdrawn from the frontline units and were replaced by 109Fs, instead of just adding them to strenght.
 
Look at the figures for July 1943 (which seems to be the beginning of the month, before Kursk). Total aircraft has gone up greatly over May 1940, but fighters are only up by 480, bombers down by 95.

Well the figures you posted say
Jul 1943
1849 (SE) fighters
1663 bombers
7203 in total

Groehler has the exact same numbers for bombers and fighters, though 7089 on total for 30 June 1943. However he also notes this Iststärke of 7000+ does not include non-combat units : OTU-equivalents, liason, night harrasment/attack units, transport, glider and maritime aux. units.

He also notes the presence of 554 night fighters.

As a final touch, let's take a detailed look at the details of the Luftwaffe's strenght on 31 January 1945.

On 31 January 1945 the combat units of the Luftwaffe and their associated Erganzungs Einheiten, had the following strength in types.

These are on hand totals, they include both 'frontline' and 'other' units (the latter, shown in the second number, being an equivalent of OTUs, non-combat operational training units.
Included are all aircraft operational and non-operational at the time. Combat types in bold.

Bf 109 SE fighters (1435/527)
Other Jagd types totaled (1058/359)
Schlacht types totaled (680/375)
Nachtschlacht types totaled (422/95)
Zerstorer types totaled (42/0)
Nachtjagd types totaled (1241, no breakdown between the two)
Kampf types totaled (543/158)


Nahaufklarer totaled (407/27)
Fernaufklarer totaled (195/81)
See types totaled (78/17)
Transport types totaled (496/9)

Grand total (6597/1631)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Of that, 1176/134 are non combat types : short/long range recces, coastal/maritime aircraft, transport aircraft.

Of course, recce aircraft were either armed fighter-recons, or bomber types of the standard fighters and bombers : Bf 109s and Ju 88s usually.
Unlike the Allies, the Germans did not employ unarmed recces (with some exceptions, like the Ar 234), each of them was capable to (and often did) carry armament and/or bombs.

There are 5421 combat aircraft with first line units, 1497 combat aircraft with second line units. These break down into :

4662 fighters (SE, TE, NF)
2273 bomber and attack airract, both first and second line.

6935 combat aircraft in total.

Any possible substraction etc. erros after the ----- line are mine.
 
Thanks for the info. Obviously my info is different so can I ask for the ISBN no of the book your quoting from, as it seems worth getting.

ISBN 963 326 271 2

So the losses incurred in the BOB swallowed up all the German production for the next 12 months before the attack on Russia. So yes, I would say that the LW suferred very heavy losses in the battle.

I doubt the 'swallow up part' would be true. I base that on the info I have of Bf 109 (which of course, is my main interest) losses and production during the BoB period.

I.e. the Bf 109 losses were between July - August (via Hooton, who quotes the LW Quartermeister).

Permanent (total, 60-99%, 100%) losses : 663

502 to enemy action on operations
98 to non-enemy action on operations
63 not on operations

Damaged aircraft : 259
71 to enemy action on operations
111 to non-enemy action on operations
77 not on operations


During the same period, German factories delivered 643 Bf 109s
(incl. 9 Bf 109Fs) between 30.06.1940 and 31.10.1940. (this is newly produced aircraft, excluding the ones returning from repair centres).
 

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