Best WWII Air-Force

[Kurfürst]

I have a good series of books called the Diaries of the OKW each about a 1000 pages long from each year of the war. They list materials and equipment in each front and so forth and it pretty much goes day by day as well as telling what was happening during those time periods.

The Book is in German but there might be an english version of it out there as well if you wish to have the ISBN or info on the books.

There are no pictures or anything it is just documents and so forth.

Please, details, details! I hate pictures anyway.

 

[Glider]

I doubt the 'swallow up part' would be true. I base that on the info I have of Bf 109 (which of course, is my main interest) losses and production during the BoB period.

I.e. the Bf 109 losses were between July - August (via Hooton, who quotes the LW Quartermeister).

Permanent (total, 60-99%, 100%) losses : 663
502 to enemy action on operations
98 to non-enemy action on operations
63 not on operations

Damaged aircraft : 259
71 to enemy action on operations
111 to non-enemy action on operations
77 not on operations


During the same period, German factories delivered 643 Bf 109s (incl. 9 Bf 109Fs) between 30.06.1940 and 31.10.1940. (this is newly produced aircraft, excluding the ones returning from repair centres).

Something isn't right here. Your posting says that the German losses in July and August (2 months) were 663. It also says that the Germans built 643 109's in July to October (4 months). So roughly the Germans were losing aircraft at twice the rate they could be replaced.
Presumably those coming back from repair wouldn't have been written off in the first place, so including those simply confuses the situation.

Also my comment was based on the figures I have for the start of the BOB and the start of the Invasion of Russia. They were almost the same if there incorrect please let me know
I should point out that your own posting seems to support this statement
29 June 1940
1107 fighters, 1126 pilots.
29 March 1941
1104 fighters, 1204 pilots

Also you seem to have a problem with the point that the RAF were outnumbered in the BOB. I have asked you what your figures are for operational fighters for Luft 2, 3, and 5 to ensure that we are comparing like for like. Can you supply this figure?

 

[Kurfürst]

Something isn't right here. Your posting says that the German losses in July and August (2 months) were 663. It also says that the Germans built 643 109's in July to October (4 months).

Yes you are right - both figures are fror July - October, 4 months. I just labelled them mistakenly. They are for the same period and are comparable, my mistake!

i think I have such a breakdown for the Luftflotten, earlz August IIRC, more on that later - but now, bedtime! 8)

 

[Udet]

Doctor, hello...

Since i am travelling all i am carrying with me is a luggage set, 2 surfboards, iPod, laptop (borrowed) and 2 books (Xenophon´s Anabasis and Numerical Solution of Partial Differential Equations). Also there was a cellphone that my bosses give me, but that i do not know where i put it, possibly i flushed it down some toilet. Feel lighter without that damn gadget.

This means my WW2 materials and stuff are elsewhere, so hopefully within a few weeks -or months- i will be able to come back with the numbers ("my" numbers)

Also i have to say i am to a great extent familiar with the information you are sharing with regard to P-51 fighter groups available to escort the bombers in the ETO/MTO.

I digress, the notion P-51 pilots found themselves outnumbered during the escort runs and still managed to defeat the attacking 109s and 190s troubles me. As i said, this isn´t the first time i come across the notion.

100% agree with you when you say there were many times Luftwaffe air traffic controllers proved their skill vectoring the 109s and 190s to attain local superiority several times, with the German interceptors inflicting high losses to enemy formations.

Where i can not agree, based upon the data i have reviewed, is that numerical inferiority for the escorts was the rule and not the exepction.

The information you posted indicating fighter groups and victories does not seem to support the case: if such high losses of German fighters were the deed of a small number of pilots for a given period of time, then i am forcefully inclined to believe the number of personal air-to-air victories of P-51 aces should be higher.

I now paste the data you cited -since i am away from my papers, i have to rely on something to keep on discussing right?-:

P-51 Groups - 51 air to air only (USAF 85)
4th FG Mar-May 273
352 FG Apr-May 134
354 FG Jan-May 255
355 FG Mar-May 126
357 FG Feb-May 223
339 FG May1 41
359 FG May12 40
--------------------
total LReich ~ 1,092

1,092 German planes claimed for all P-51 units only between January and May 1944.

Ok, let´s see what we can see...yes, let´s take the numbers of the 4th and 355th FG´s, whose periods of activity on that table seem almost indentical, that is March-May 1944.

So these two units claimed a total (air-to-air) of 399 enemy planes between March and May 1944. Assuming these 2 units were outnumbered when in combat with German fighters, it would be interesting to have a possible break down of victories showing the names of all pilots who flew for both groups during such months indicating the number of victories awarded to each one of them.

So if as a rule, all this groups entered combat outnumbered, then how many German fighters were they facing? 1,092 victories in the first 5 months of 1944 for Lucifer´s sake...

The less people we have at the party to cut the cake, the bigger the slice of cake each guest will have when platting (hmmm...well a party at your place with only a few people coming over could mean you do not have too many friends?)

Ok so how do we proceed with allotment of air-to-air kills to P-51 pilots of the groups involved?

So in your view to what extent the alleged numerical superiority attained by the fighters of some Geschwader from Luftflotte Reich when engaging an escort flight from the 357 FG throughout April of 1944 could have been? 2:1? 3:1? Or perhaps higher?

I will not use the words of Luftwaffe veterans i have met in the past to strengthen my case, which flew during the final 6 or 7 months of the war, which told me of the nightmare they went through when having to manouver as wild as possible to escape from just too many P-51s which would seem to fight between themselves to score the kill, returning to the base completely soaked in their own sweating. One mentioned the fact their arms were hard as steel due to the brutal effort they put when trying to evade the enemy.

Good you mentioned those Bf 110s and Me 410s operating under Reichsverteidigung...what an unwise administration of material and human resources; as i have sustained in the past, had the Germans disbanded all the day-light Zerstörergeschwadern by the closing days of 1943, to use all Bf 110 and Me 410 pilots as single engined fighters, and to convert at least part or majority of those rear-gunners/radio operators for single-engined pilots, the story could have been different. One once told me this is wrong...that training rear-gunners/radio operators and/or convert bomber pilots to single-engined fighter pilots will not yield good results...really? how come? So does that mean that to apply to become a fighter pilot a mandatory requirement states you should have previous fighter pilot experience?

Finally Doctor, this is an interesting debate. From your word i acknowledge the fact you´ve been around in business for far longer than i have...i did not commence the "serious" reading of this stuff until 6 or 7 years ago, when in my mid-teens.


i am surprised that the Chairman of the Board of AIF (Allied Integrist Front), Syscom3 has not yet jumped in to this specific branch of the discussion.

SoDstitch...ok, got it. Tucson is a great city in my view. Of course breakfast is not the time to think about linking up with girls..hehehe...that is why i say the dinner time is better. Also, not that when i went to the restaurant i was trying to hook up with the waitresses, that´d be such a rude unmannered method in such a sophisticated place eh? Sullivan´s is not like a bikers pub -hahaha-. Usually, it is the girls that do all the manouvering. 8)

 

[Erich]

side notation to your posting Udet. twin engine destroyers were used into spring of 44 in different arms combos along with 1 -2 Br 21cm rocket launchers under the wings. II./ZG 1 was side by side with II./JG 27 flying their Bf 110G-2's out of Austria taking on the US 15th AF in the summer of 44. they took a toll of B-17/B-24's but also took it right back in the shorts heavily. Just to add it was not over in late 43 only just starting

 

[Hop]

In short there are about 1200 combat types not accounted by Murray and you. And it would be rather odd not considering NF Bf 110s, Ju 88s, which quite often operated in the daylight as well. It woud be also odd not to consider the by then rather numerous FW 190 ground attack units as combat types either... Yet he list still not details Zestorer units. And so on.

Fair enough. I used the figures from Murray. Of course, if you include dive bombers and ground attack aircraft in the later figures, you have to include them in the earlier ones too.

Let's take January 1944 on your as an example. It says :

Jan 1944
1561 'fighters'
1604 'bombers'
6741 in total

I have figures for 31 December 1943, so it should be close enough. It goes as:

1561 SE fighters
1604 bombers
6584 in total*

Similiar isn't it? Well, half the story only. Groehler also gives some other type breakdowns for the date as :

611 night fighters
601 dive bombers and attack/CAS (Schlact) aircraft.

Right. But as I said, if you add in those types for 1940 as well, you get the following figures:

May 1940:
1369 single engined fighters
367 twin engined fighters
1758 bombers
417 dive bombers
5398 total

Jan 1944:
1561 single engined fighters
611 night fighters
1604 bombers
601 dive bombers and close support
6584 in total

I still fail to see much expansion. In 1940 the figure for the 4 combat categories listed is 3,911. Nearly 4 years later, the for the same categories is 4,377, an increase of less than 12%.

I must note that it's an interesting custom that you always include Zestörer units whenever you're trying to sell balloney claims about the RAF fighters units being badly outnumbered, you always include Zestörer unit losses whenever you're counting Luftwaffe losses, yet somehow those same Zestörer units suddenly disappear from your totals when it comes to the Luftwaffe's frontline strenght, which you attempt to prove to have not increased at all during the war...

No, if I was trying to be dishonest I'd have included the twin engined fighter figures for 1940, and not for later periods.

I don't have anything by Groehler, so of course I can't quote his more complete figures. Murray gives a graph towards the end of Strategy for Defeat showing fighters, bombers and total aircraft, which is what I took the figures from. As the same figures are used throughout, they are consistent and so give a fair reflection of the change in Luftwaffe strength.

I wonder how this adds up. Ie. actual German losses in BoB (July-October), from the LW Quartermaster's returns.
On operations.
This includes both shot down (100%) and write-offs (60-99%).

Type / Destroyed by

SE fighters : 502 / 98 = 600 (+63 not on operations)
Zestörer : 224 / 11 = 235 (+17)

A-ha. So 'fighters' means both SE and TE unit when Hop counts losses.

Yes, because the figures come from Murray's details on the BoF and Wood and Dempster, which both give a detailed breakdown. The total strength figures come from Murray and do not give a breakdown, just a simple "fighters" and "bombers" figure, which I quoted.

Unlike some people, when I don't have further information I do not simply make up facts

In comparison, during the (almost) two month period of the BoF, the LW lost as total loss :

250 SE fighters
124 TE fighters

But again, that's during the two months of the BoF, compared against the four months of BoB. It's quite clear the BoF was not any less costly per month ,yet from what the British had to endure a few months later, it's hard to see they were in any way paralyzing..

Well, according to you the BoB didn't even start until mid August, so losses in July shouldn't be counted.

In reality, the fighting was concentrated in August, by late September the Luftwaffe was greatly scaling back their attacks.

Where are your loss figures for the BoF from? Murray lists 235 109s destroyed on operations, 22 not on operations, and 106 110s on operations, 4 not on operations.

If you compare that with August 1940, the Luftwaffe lost 211 109s on operations, 20 not on operations, and 120 110s on ops, 5 not on ops. The totals are very similar when you compare August 1940 to the entire BoF.

And of course the all important pilot losses were much greater in the BoB.

It's a blanket statement. The Luftwaffe lost 1272 dead, 1156 WIA, and 580 MIA during the French campaign with frontline units in just 50 days - that's not including the ones lost with the Flak, in Germany, in schools etc.

Well, according to Christer Bergstrom, the Luftwaffe lost 83 109 pilots killed in the BoF. Compare that to the BoB, where they lost 443 killed or PoW.

The difference, apart from the much greater numbers of fighters lost, was that the fighting was usually over water or enemy territory, so a far higher proportion of pilots was lost. The pilot of a 109 hit over France had a good chance of bailing out safely, and even if he was captured he was released at the end of the fighting. A German pilot bailing out over the Channel had far lower chances of getting back to his unit, and one bailing out over Britain had almost no chance at all.

Incidentally, when you look at the fact the Luftwaffe had about 1,200 SE fighter pilots in May, lost 83 killed in the next two months, and then another 443 by the end of October, you can see the devastation in the German fighter force. If you allow a few pilots invalided out because of wounds sustained, then half the SE fighter pilots were lost in 6 months. According to Bungay, (iirc, I can't find the exact reference now) very few new 109 pilots were captured over Britain, nearly all the PoWs had joined their squadrons before the BoF. No wonder Caldwell talks about the irreplaceable pilots lost.

Now look at the figures for May 1941. Overall they had more aircraft than May 1940, but they had less fighters and less bombers than they'd had a year earlier.
I look at them but I can't see anything like that.

Perhaps that's because you are looking at German figures from Junes, after their losses in the BoF?

I.e. German single engined fighter strenghts (not including Zestorer units) :
On-hand strenght, meaning not all being servicable/ready for duty.

29 June 1940
1107 fighters, 1126 pilots.

And in May, before they began the BoF?

In fact just by looking at it, they had just the same number of SE fighters and SE fighter pilots on 29 March 1941 then on 29 June 1940, just before the Battle of Britain. And, naturally your double standards are showing off again, you count Zestörers and fighters sometimes, then not, and forgetting of other fighters - by mid-1941, there were about 250 nightfighters around, for example.

It doesn't seem to hold any water that they had any trouble replacing the planes and pilots in short notice after BoB.

Well, lets look shall we?

29 June 1940
1107 fighters, 1126 pilots.

28 December 1940
829 fighters, 915 pilots

And let's compare that to Fighter Command:
29 June 1940: 814 aircraft available in squadrons (includes all types, not just SE fighters
2nd November 1940: 1064 aircraft available in squadrons (again, includes all types)

Whilst the Luftwaffe were contracting, FC were expanding. Indeed, look at the figures again. At the end of June the Luftwaffe had 293 more SE fighters than the RAF had fighters of all types. By the end of the year, even assuming FC didn't expand any more, the RAF had 235 more fighters total than the Luftwaffe had SE fighters. And it wasn't done by drawing down reserves, either. At the end of June FC had 410 Spits and Hurris in storage, at the beginning of Nov it was 396.

 

[syscom3]

i am surprised that the Chairman of the Board of AIF (Allied Integrist Front), Syscom3 has not yet jumped in to this specific branch of the discussion.

What is a "integrist"? Someone who is for integration?

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Please, details, details! I hate pictures anyway.

Here ist he ISBN for Book 1 and covers until 31.12.1941. I am sure you can get the other books by finding this one.

ISBN: 3-8289-0525-0

 

[drgondog]

Doctor, hello...

Since i am travelling all i am carrying with me is a luggage set, 2 surfboards, iPod, laptop (borrowed) and 2 books (Xenophon´s Anabasis and Numerical Solution of Partial Differential Equations).

I wonder... if your numerical solutions of DE any different from my numerical methods of 40 years ago.. I wonder if I will ever use Calculus of Variations or Vector Analysis in the real world - certainly not at Lockheed or Bell.

This means my WW2 materials and stuff are elsewhere, so hopefully within a few weeks -or months- i will be able to come back with the numbers ("my" numbers)

That's ok - this discussion will never be entirely solved with numbers, statistics or verbs and nouns

Also i have to say i am to a great extent familiar with the information you are sharing with regard to P-51 fighter groups available to escort the bombers in the ETO/MTO.

That is interesting because to my knowledge, at least in internet forums, I am the only idiot that spends any time focusing on these discussions

I digress, the notion P-51 pilots found themselves outnumbered during the escort runs and still managed to defeat the attacking 109s and 190s troubles me. As i said, this isn´t the first time i come across the notion.

100% agree with you when you say there were many times Luftwaffe air traffic controllers proved their skill vectoring the 109s and 190s to attain local superiority several times, with the German interceptors inflicting high losses to enemy formations.

Where i can not agree, based upon the data i have reviewed, is that numerical inferiority for the escorts was the rule and not the exepction.

Udet, nothing is as simple as it seems, nor is this a cleart cut thesis. I just wrote an article with Erich's help on the German side (plus Frank Olynyk Mike Williams, and my own research on Encounter Reports) to isolate a battle around Munich on April 24, 1944. It will be on Mike Williams' site shortly... but some of it summarized below

The information you posted indicating fighter groups and victories does not seem to support the case: if such high losses of German fighters were the deed of a small number of pilots for a given period of time, then i am forcefully inclined to believe the number of personal air-to-air victories of P-51 aces should be higher.

Here is a thought for you. The number of pilots, rotating flights on different missions, assigned to each Fighter Group Flight, in that period, number probably 6-8.. plus HQ officers Grp CO, Deputy, Gp Ops and Asst Gp Ops - all fighter pilots. Unlike the LW, the USAAF had more pilots than a/c - and NOBODY except freaks like Blakeslee flew most every mission.

So, approximately 80-90 Mustang pilots to each Mustang Group to fly (take off) 48 (4 Flights of four per sqdrn, three sqdrns per Group )plus a couple of spares, on every mission. In my fathers group the top scoring ace Henry Brown was flying number 4 as a F/O and 2nd Lieutenant for at least half of his scores. It took him two months flying a Mustang to get his first five. As a Captain, in September '44 he scored six in two weeks as a Flight Leader where he had a lot more control in attack

The point is that victories often went to wingmen, and different wingmen because the pilots flew perhaps half of the missions, leaders more but not more than 75%. In that period weather was bad (as you well know) and often the LW was not up. So, relatively few encounters per month for the number of sorties flown

I now paste the data you cited -since i am away from my papers, i have to rely on something to keep on discussing right?-:

P-51 Groups - 51 air to air only (USAF 85)
4th FG Mar-May 273
352 FG Apr-May 134
354 FG Jan-May 255
355 FG Mar-May 126
357 FG Feb-May 223
339 FG May1 41
359 FG May12 40
--------------------
total LReich ~ 1,092

1,092 German planes claimed for all P-51 units only between January and May 1944.

Ok, let´s see what we can see...yes, let´s take the numbers of the 4th and 355th FG´s, whose periods of activity on that table seem almost indentical, that is March-May 1944.

So these two units claimed a total (air-to-air) of 399 enemy planes between March and May 1944. Assuming these 2 units were outnumbered when in combat with German fighters, it would be interesting to have a possible break down of victories showing the names of all pilots who flew for both groups during such months indicating the number of victories awarded to each one of them.

I have the exact breakdown by pilot, by location and time, for every award (not claim) air and ground for the 355th. It might be useful to note that the 4th had far more aces by the time they got Mustangs - the 355th had exactly one. That and the attitude of the 355th towards sticking to bomber escort duties and sending flights and sections to a bounce instead of complete squadrons tended to reduce scoring for 355th vs 4th

But perhaps the crucial facts are not apparent in the statistics above. Namely, German skilled fighter pilots were lost in 'singles' and 'double's in most of the encounters with P-47's - a steady but small percentage - Translate the number of a/c shot down into KIA and WIA in those five months against the number that either started in Luft Reich on January 1 or were transferred in from Ost Front as replacements to the huge attrition

This is why the Mustang was so important - not because it is "best" (I don't say that) but because of the huge relative losses they caused in those five months to LW skills. I'm not really talking about Experten as much as the skilled pilot who could bore into a formation of B-17s head on - and close.. and there was a lot of flight and Staffeln leaders killed in this period also - making the future LW forces even more vulnerable when the WAS massive superiority of USAAF over Germany

So if as a rule, all this groups entered combat outnumbered, then how many German fighters were they facing? 1,092 victories in the first 5 months of 1944 for Lucifer´s sake...

As always, it varied.. As a rule the German fighters avoided escorts because their orders were to attack bombers - which usually meant either a diving pass and continue in the presence of escorts or sustained head on attacks when the escorts were not present. Most of the battles were result of miscalculations (or sheer tenacity) in continued attacks enabling bombers to call for help and MUstangs arrive. Many would start at bomber altitudes with flights and sections of both GAF and US fighters, some in turning fights, more in diving chases to low or medium altitude where the 51s would be close enough to close with superior speed.

So in your view to what extent the alleged numerical superiority attained by the fighters of some Geschwader from Luftflotte Reich when engaging an escort flight from the 357 FG throughout April of 1944 could have been? 2:1? 3:1? Or perhaps higher?

Never more than 2.5:1 in all the research I have been able to do. In the example noted above the 355th and 357th arrived at R/V point Ne Augsburg as the 1st TF of B-17s were undergoing "persistent and aggressive" attacks mostly from Me 109s - some Fw 190s and some Me 110's. Each of the attacks by different units were 30-50 fighters each.

In all, 200-250 German fighters made contact in that area. The order of engagement seems to be Sturmstaffel I. with Stab and 1./JG3 flying top cover around 1315-1320, followed by III./JG3 around 1325, then Stab.III./JG3 and III IV./JG3, Stab./JG301, I./JG301 and III./JG26 in the 1330-1335 timeframe. IV./JG 27 and I./JG5 appeared in the 1336-1340 timeframe followed by III./ZG26.

The 355th claimed 24, awarded 20; the 357th claimed 27, awarded 23 plus probables and damaged for both.

The 355th lost 3 air to air, ditto 357 but two of their losses were mid air collisons with debris from destroyed Me 110's

LW lost Expertens Franz, Schwaiger plus II./JG3 GruppeKommandeur Kapp-Herr in this fight, and I./JG301 GruppeKommandeur Bredensbach crashlanded his badly damaged 109.

On the other side Expertens Bartels, Dahl, Muller and Stigler scored against the Mustangs.

And the LW shot down 12 and caused to land in Switzerland another 9 B-17s - all too badly damaged to return to England

As I noted in the article this is a battle in which sections and flights of each Mustang Group were dispatched to break up attacks of larger numbers of German fighters - some of which evaded and some fought - with German gaggles breaking up into sections of 10 and 6 and pairs during the battle.

 

[drgondog]

Also i have to say i am to a great extent familiar with the information you are sharing with regard to P-51 fighter groups available to escort the bombers in the ETO/MTO.

I digress, the notion P-51 pilots found themselves outnumbered during the escort runs and still managed to defeat the attacking 109s and 190s troubles me. As i said, this isn´t the first time i come across the notion.

I have studied the air battles over Germany for 50+ years starting at age 6 when I first read "First of the Many" by Tex McCrary - a VERY good book about 8th AF struggles in 1943 and early 1944. I have had several conversations with Galland and other German fighter pilots, all of whom I was impressed with - most of all Rall and Galland. The only reason I bring this up is that I asked detailed questions regarding tactics and of course comparisons of fighters.

In my opinion, the reason the relative scores between Mustangs and Fw190s and Me 109s were to the favor of Mustangs wasn't about performance as much as doctrine. When the Luftwaffe was in a position of numerical superiority they often did not capitalize on it - because they were under orders to 'avoid'. The US pilots were aggressive and this behavior (not fear) of the German pilot caused many battles that could have ended badly for the P-51 force ended up in defeat for the 109 or fw190 because some of the pilots were trying to follow orders rather than seek out and engage the Mustang units.. There are of course many exceptions to this generality.

100% agree with you when you say there were many times Luftwaffe air traffic controllers proved their skill vectoring the 109s and 190s to attain local superiority several times, with the German interceptors inflicting high losses to enemy formations.

Where i can not agree, based upon the data i have reviewed, is that numerical inferiority for the escorts was the rule and not the exepction.

Don't agree but as you go forward on your own studies be aware of the force structure I posed for you and carefully examine the LW Order of Battle over Germany. This discussion has nothing to do with valor or relative strength of Luftwaffe Fighter Arm versus USAAF.

It is all, ond only, about what forces were available to escort 8th AF (and then later 15th) past Dummer Lake or Mannheim to important targets in Germany and Czechoslovakia and Poland - and what forces were sent to resist attacks on those targets.

So these two units claimed a total (air-to-air) of 399 enemy planes between March and May 1944. Assuming these 2 units were outnumbered when in combat with German fighters, it would be interesting to have a possible break down of victories showing the names of all pilots who flew for both groups during such months indicating the number of victories awarded to each one of them.

Get a copy of USAF Study 85 from Maxwell Field and Kent Miller's two volumes for quicker access to specific Group and pilot data.

So if as a rule, all this groups entered combat outnumbered, then how many German fighters were they facing? 1,092 victories in the first 5 months of 1944 for Lucifer´s sake...

I can think of 8 missions of the 355th in which they encountered a LW Force exceeding 50 single engine fighters and were able to engage a high percentage with one and sometimes two squadrons. Only one time in 355th History did all three squadrons engage - November 26, 1944 - against JG301 in Hannover/Gardlingen area - shooting down 26 for loss of none - most sluggish Fw190A8's, some 109G-10's from JG6 flying high cover.

There were more circumstances in which large gaggles were spotted but to attack would have left the bombers unescorted - and there were many in which 15-30 were engaged by one squadron.

I would say that in the large battles that at least 2/3 were of a nature that most tried to dive away while the escort 109s stuck to fight. I do not have one incident of a Fw190 shooting down a P-51 of the 355th at bomber altitudes and only four losses (one to a Fw190D) at low altitude. All the rest of the 355FG losses were to a.) 109's or b.) collisions with debris from a destroyed German fighter (t/e mostly but some single engine.

Not one 355th ace was shot down in air combat, three were lost to flak or attempted rescue.

The less people we have at the party to cut the cake, the bigger the slice of cake each guest will have when platting (hmmm...well a party at your place with only a few people coming over could mean you do not have too many friends?)

Simple facts were Luftwaffe hard to engage with fighters as their orders were to kill bombers and avoid fighters

Ok so how do we proceed with allotment of air-to-air kills to P-51 pilots of the groups involved?

Suggest away and I'll help any way I can


I will not use the words of Luftwaffe veterans i have met in the past to strengthen my case, which flew during the final 6 or 7 months of the war, which told me of the nightmare they went through when having to manouver as wild as possible to escape from just too many P-51s which would seem to fight between themselves to score the kill, returning to the base completely soaked in their own sweating. One mentioned the fact their arms were hard as steel due to the brutal effort they put when trying to evade the enemy.

Mostly true - after D-Day the circumstances in which LW had local superiority at a point in time were far fewer - and the number of Mustangs and Thunderbolts available (now that they had range) to quickly come to rescue made every day a tiresome one for German Fighter pilot.. also the K-14 gunsight and G-suits made the US fighters even more efficient

Good you mentioned those Bf 110s and Me 410s operating under Reichsverteidigung...what an unwise administration of material and human resources; as i have sustained in the past, had the Germans disbanded all the day-light Zerstörergeschwadern by the closing days of 1943, to use all Bf 110 and Me 410 pilots as single engined fighters, and to convert at least part or majority of those rear-gunners/radio operators for single-engined pilots, the story could have been different. One once told me this is wrong...that training rear-gunners/radio operators and/or convert bomber pilots to single-engined fighter pilots will not yield good results...really? how come? So does that mean that to apply to become a fighter pilot a mandatory requirement states you should have previous fighter pilot experience?

I can give you an American example which may apply. The Scout Force (s) were conceived to improve target and weather intelligence in real time, enough advance notice so that the bomber streams behind could avoid really bad weather and still get to primary or note that primary was covered and divert to secondary. Fighter pilots were deemed clueless in the matters, besides being terrible navigators - so volunteer bomber pilots were convertedto fly Mustangs and form these units.

Some of the bomber pilots became able fighter pilots, others died in training accidents. The unit was a sucess. If you are interested I wrote an article on them also - on Mike William's web site.

QUOTE]

let me summarize what I am NOT saying or think.

That the American Fighter pilot was better. Simply a stupid statement or belief for that period. Valid in General when LW training standards were reduced.

That the American Mustang was far superior to the Me 109G-5 and G-6s that they fought in that period. It is to a degree true for performance in the 25,000 range and not true at 10,000 feet.

What I am saying is that
The Mustang pilots were often outnumbered at both high and low altitude over Germany in that period, and that when they engaged they shot down far more than were shot down in turn.

That the number of experienced pilots that the Mustangs killed or wounded over Germany far exceeded the casualties inflicted by P-47s, P-38s or Spitfires or Tempests in that period.

That the experienced pilots lost in that period were simply irreplacable afterwards because of further attrition and lower training standards

I attribute much to the fact that German pilots were instructed to go after bombers and stay away from fighters, thereby reducing their natural aggressive tendencies and making them more vulnerable. It also took LW pilots a long time to become aware they could not out dive the Mustang or Thunderbolt - making them more vulnerable in trying to get away.

Good conversation Udet. Best wishes on your studies - Engineering? Where?

Bill (aka dragondog)

 

[Erich]

the only ting I wish to add to your lat posting Bill is at the bottom. Come 1945 it was the desire of more and more LW Geschwader to have experienced fighter pilots stand up with the US P-51 escorts and ignore the bombers altogether. In fact even JG 7 was given an order in the jets to take out as many Mustangs as possible which in reality never happened and the order was almost enitirely ignored

 

[drgondog]

the only ting I wish to add to your lat posting Bill is at the bottom. Come 1945 it was the desire of more and more LW Geschwader to have experienced fighter pilots stand up with the US P-51 escorts and ignore the bombers altogether. In fact even JG 7 was given an order in the jets to take out as many Mustangs as possible which in reality never happened and the order was almost enitirely ignored

I'm pretty sure the last two air to air losses of 355th were from 262s on 7 April mission when Plowman and Mills went "Missing".

 

[Erich]

also a small reminder that after the end of January 45 the 8th AF was running up against very few of the LW Geschwader as the task had now turned to the Ost front to protect the eastern border along with the capital Berlin. obviously as the 8th and the 15th plus the 9th were able to find bases in occupied Germany their fingers could go forever longward to the east where defense Geschwaders JG 300 and 301 were trying to stem the tide and of course got creamed in the process along with portions of JG 27 and JG 53 in the south in Bavaria. Even the NF's flew day time ground attack missions to open escape portals for surrounded Wehrmacht truppen, and of course too they were easy pickings

 

[Soren]

All this comparison of fighter numbers...

I hope we're all aware that bombers win the war, not fighters. The important aircraft for the Luftwaffe was the bomber - for a proper look at the Battle of Britain you should be looking at how many bombers the RAF shot down for a loss of RAF fighters. Shooting down the German escorts was a bonus.

And if you want to be really technical, try and find out how many German bombers were shot down before they dropped their bombs on target to see how well the RAF really did when intercepting.

I do have to admit the debate is good reading.

And the USAAF was the best air force of World War II, it was strategic and tactical in every theatre of U.S operation. The only one that came close was the RAF but it only performed strategically in Europe.

Exactly Plan_D - Hence the LW's focus on bringing down those bombers before they could reach their cities.

The escorting Mustangs had themselves rather easy pickings as the LW interceptors engaged the bombers, the LW interceptors emmidiately being on the defensive after their initial attack. The few dedicated LW fighters had their hands full facing 8 to 12 times as many Mustangs which obviously meant they had no chance of keeping them away from the bomber interceptors.

Another crucial factor to remember is that the altitudes where the fighting mostly took place over Germany by 1944 ranged from 26,000 to 33,000 ft, an ideal altitude for the Mustang but not for the FW-190A series or the early 109's. Had the enaging altitudes been lower things might well have looked very different, the Mustang not proving a very effective fighter over the channel facing the FW-190A Bf-109G's at lower altitudes - but then again the main focus would've still been on the bombers.

 

[pbfoot]

There seem's to be a light change in the method of escorting the 8th AF when the RAF and RCAF were escorting initially before the US got there own escorts they were ordered not to stray after LW but to "stick like glue " to the heavies and not chase after the LW that they could often see lurking in the distance. These instructions were included in the D form or operational orders . This was a slight bone of contention for the fighter pilots because if they kept close to the heavies they got shot at and they couldn't chase after the LW

 

[drgondog]

There seem's to be a light change in the method of escorting the 8th AF when the RAF and RCAF were escorting initially before the US got there own escorts they were ordered not to stray after LW but to "stick like glue " to the heavies and not chase after the LW that they could often see lurking in the distance. These instructions were included in the D form or operational orders . This was a slight bone of contention for the fighter pilots because if they kept close to the heavies they got shot at and they couldn't chase after the LW

PB - eaxactly the same for 8th and 9th AF until Doolittle changed the game on or about January 11, 1944 - and was accused of committing 'murder' by some of his bomber leaders..

 

[Hollywood]

This is just my opinion of course but if Hitler hadn't been a "nut" and had let his Commanders have more input and listened to their ideas we might ALL be speaking German.......... Just as an example, if the Me262 had been introduced in the fighter configuration ASAP the sky would have been OWNED by the Luftwaffe................Roger that?

 

[drgondog]

The escorting Mustangs had themselves rather easy pickings as the LW interceptors engaged the bombers, the LW interceptors emmidiately being on the defensive after their initial attack. The few dedicated LW fighters had their hands full facing 8 to 12 times as many Mustangs which obviously meant they had no chance of keeping them away from the bomber interceptors.

IIf you followed the link I posted for you you would have seen that the units I cited for you in the battle over Munich were all Me 109G-6's with about 30+ 109G-6/U4's in III./JG26 plus about 15 109G-5's out of approximately 200 Me 109s encountered in different flight/gaggle sizes. There was also Sturmsaffel I. Fw 190's plus about 20 Me 110's and a few Me 410's - all attacking the 1st Task Force that the 355th and 357th were defending.

Look up The TO&E for the following units - which BTW all made claims for either B-17s or P-51s or both, with exception of JG106, II./ZG76, and III./ZG26..

The order of engagement seems to be Sturmstaffel I. with 1/JG3 flying top cover around 1315-1320, followed by III./JG3 around 1325, then Stab.III./JG3 and III IV./JG3, Stab./JG301, I./JG301 and III./JG26 in the 1330-1335 timeframe. IV./JG 27 and I./JG5 appeared in the 1336-1340 timeframe followed by III./ZG26 and II./ZF76 and JG106. Then JG3 and JG26 engaged again in 1400-1425 time.

MORE units could have been engaged, but the claims list is where I derived the above timings and units

The source for the losses there of 39 KIA, 12 WIA, 60 a/c lost is from Prien's IV./JG3 book as I noted before. The sources for the 355 and 357 Losses were Macrs and their respective USAAF Unit Histories as well as 8th AF 24 April Mission Summary.

What are your sources for the constant "8;1 or 12:1" ratios?

Soren, If you want to make a case that the 109's were clumsy, pitiful bomber interceptors go for it. But prove it, cite referencable facts - otherwise your words have neither merit nor substance, do they? Please report back to this forum what you find.


Had the enaging altitudes been lower things might well have looked very different, the Mustang not proving a very effective fighter over the channel facing the FW-190A Bf-109G's at lower altitudes - but then again the main focus would've still been on the bombers.

????? which 'Channel' battles are you referring to?

There are as many engagements at medium and low altitudes you can look to in which the P-51 did quite well against 109s and 190s at low and medium altitudes but I attribute that to skill - not fighting with inferior or superior fighters. All three had advantages over each other on the deck.

Remember while the LW was trying to evade engagement, they dove to escape and were caught at lower to low altitudes. They weren't climbing.

At least half of the LW fighters destroyed by 355th Mustangs were in medium or lower altitudes for this reason (PURE Speculation on my part on 'half' - it could be 45% or 56% - but a substantial portion, from reading hundreds of Encounter Reports). Someday I may go back and re-read all the 355 ER's and note high/medium/low battles to get a precise number.

Because I don't have the German Encounter Reports for 24 April, I can't tell you whether Hillman, Norman or Sturm were shot down at high, low or medium altitude - but they would be the first 355FG pilots POSSIBLY shot down at high altitude until 20 May when two were Definitely shot down by JG26 in diving pass. Hillman and Norman were separated from other elements so were definitely alone when shot down.

Having noted this observation, most 355 Mustang losses air combat losses occurred at Medium and Low altitudes, most to 109s and most while trying to turn at medium to slow airspeeds and unable to shake the 109s. Not very many in total were lost in air combat

11 of the 355th's air losses were in P-47s and half of those were shot down by Fw190s at medium to low altitude primarily by JG2 and JG26.

As near as I can determine only four 355th Mustangs fell to Fw190s including one to a 190D at 1000 feet in a head on pass - out of perhaps 28 (if all 'unknown' were air losses instead of weather, Mechanical or something like oxygen failure.)

The experiences of the other Groups is similar Soren.. Hell look for yourself - Mike Williams has at least 100 copies on his website... that would be a good sample size anyway

According to most Mustang pilots the 109G was the more formidable fighter until the 190D arrived - but this discussion has been made ad nausem in this thread


These are nearly always verifiable in the MACR's so the source documents exist

 

[drgondog]

This is just my opinion of course but if Hitler hadn't been a "nut" and had let his Commanders have more input and listened to their ideas we might ALL be speaking German.......... Just as an example, if the Me262 had been introduced in the fighter configuration ASAP the sky would have been OWNED by the Luftwaffe................Roger that?

Actually probably not OWN it but it would have been far bloodier for 8th AF daylight bombing, but no real probable effect on RAFnight ops - and perhaps forced US to night ops. It would have forced the introduction of the YP-80 much sooner as well as Meteor to combat them... more accidents.

While the 262s would have been devastating, daylight roaming by Mustangs would have probably have destroyed a lot of them on the ground or landing or taking off.

Nevertheless a lot more US bomber and fighter crews would have been killed -

A more probable outcome is either a delay in D-Day, or failure, and everyone in Europe speaking Russian. The 262 would not have stopped the Soviets from rolling through Germany

Often wrong but rarely uncertain

Bill

 

[renrich]

Bill, wish you would clarify something for me. Earlier in this thread you were comparing Mustang sorties, losses and kills with Jugs and P38s. Said something like their kills were mostly German. Are you saying that some of those awarded kills were not German, perhaps japanese? The reason I ask is that the sortie numbers and loss numbers jibe exactly with mine but I am under the impression those sortie numbers were all in the ETO.