Bizarre Question Regarding Vietnam

[Zipper730]

This is probalby going to sound awful, but I'm honestly curious how much the death tolls would have varied if we just simply did Vietnam SAC's way (short of nukes) and simply hit all 94 targets on the JCS list and burned down every city in NVN (or until they surrendered) instead of waging a very long, drawn out war that saw (seemingly?) little damage to cities, but saw who knows how many villages burned out of existence?

Dimlee, fubar57, Graeme, GrauGeist, T tyrodtom, X XBe02Drvr

 

[ThomasP]

It is difficult to estimate due to the circumstances.

WWII saw the destruction of pretty much every major city in Germany, and what effect did that have? The main difference between Germany and North Vietnam was that Germany was an industrialized notion and for the most part manufactured their own war machine, while North Vietnam relied on the Soviet Union and to a lesser degree China for their equipment.

In North Korea we bombed every city, village, and dam, we could see from 20-35,000 ft - most of them in a relatively short time period - resulting in the deaths (directly or indirectly) of somewhere around 2,000,000 NK people MINIMUM, which is around 15%-20% of the population at the time - 95% of whom had nothing to do with the war other than that the NK army and Chinese army came through and took young men and supplies to help fight the war. For a significant % of the NK people the bombs exploding on their village was the first they knew that there was a war. Having said that, if the Chinese had not sent their army into NK the Allies would have won the war when they reached the Yalu.

 

[Zipper730]

WWII saw the destruction of pretty much every major city in Germany, and what effect did that have? The main difference between Germany and North Vietnam was that Germany was an industrialized notion and for the most part manufactured their own war machine, while North Vietnam relied on the Soviet Union and to a lesser degree China for their equipment.

Would this be similar to North Korea's circumstances in the 1950 period?

In North Korea we bombed every city, village, and dam, we could see from 20-35,000 ft - most of them in a relatively short time period - resulting in the deaths (directly or indirectly) of somewhere around 2,000,000 NK people MINIMUM

2-3 million seem to be common figures; as for the percentage: LeMay in a 1988 interview said the following: "Over a period of three years or so we killed off, what, 20 percent of the population of Korea, as direct casualties of war or from starvation and exposure?"

Having said that, if the Chinese had not sent their army into NK the Allies would have won the war when they reached the Yalu.

Almost certainly: I remember somebody made a silly comment about the war being akin to a game of football, with both sides fumbling in the end zone.

Do you think China would have sent large numbers of people across the border to cause mayhem in North Vietnam, or "reactivate" the Korean Penninsula if the JCS 94-target list was executed?

 

[Shinpachi]

People only have to evacuate into mountains widely to continue resistance for decades

 

[ThomasP]

re

Do you think China would have sent large numbers of people across the border to cause mayhem in North Vietnam, or "reactivate" the Korean Penninsula if the JCS 94-target list was executed?

Again, it is hard to say. What Shinpachi posted above is the most likely response (I think). In the early 1970s China had no real ability to fight the US in a direct head-on manner - they were too far behind in terms of technology.

China had said at the time of the Korean War that they would not tolerate a 'Western Culture' (this is I think the correct translation for the terms the Chinese Ambassador used) nation directly on their border, and this is a major (the major?) reason for them sending in their army when the Allies reached the Yalu - they had actually warned the US and UN about their probable response. This attitude had not changed at the time of the Vietnam War. They had seen what occurred on the various fronts of the various modern wars over the past century and did not want to put themselves in such a potentially disadvantageous position. The Eastern European satellite/Warsaw Pact nations area were the Russian version of the same attitude. In effect, the USSR and China wanted a buffer zone between themselves and the most likely potential invaders.

Incidentally, this concept is still part of the Chinese rational involved in the Taiwan situation today.

Also maybe see my post in the Arc Light One discussion thread:

"Arc Light One"

 

[Zipper730]

People only have to evacuate into mountains widely to continue resistance for decades

So they would have responded to our actions by evacuating into the mountains then carrying out a long-term guerrila war campaign?

 

[Frog]

re


Again, it is hard to say. What Shinpachi posted above is the most likely response (I think). In the early 1970s China had no real ability to fight the US in a direct head-on manner - they were too far behind in terms of technology.

China had said at the time of the Korean War that they would not tolerate a 'Western Culture' (this is I think the correct translation for the terms the Chinese Ambassador used) nation directly on their border, and this is a major (the major?) reason for them sending in their army when the Allies reached the Yalu - they had actually warned the US and UN about their probable response. This attitude had not changed at the time of the Vietnam War. They had seen what occurred on the various fronts of the various modern wars over the past century and did not want to put themselves in such a potentially disadvantageous position. The Eastern European satellite/Warsaw Pact nations area were the Russian version of the same attitude. In effect, the USSR and China wanted a buffer zone between themselves and the most likely potential invaders.

Incidentally, this concept is still part of the Chinese rational involved in the Taiwan situation today.

Also maybe see my post in the Arc Light One discussion thread:

"Arc Light One"

And at the end of the 70s (1979), China was not even in a condition to effectively fight against a Vietnamese Army that was not that far advanced technologically speaking...

 

[SaparotRob]

And at the end of the 70s (1979), China was not even in a condition to effectively fight against a Vietnamese Army that was not that far advanced technologically speaking...

I wasn't paying too much attention at the time but weren't the PLA up against the second tier Vietnamese Army units? I think the Vietnamese Army was in Cambodia fighting the Khmer Rouge?

 

[Frog]

China did not appreciate

I wasn't paying too much attention at the time but weren't the PLA up against the second tier Vietnamese Army units? I think the Vietnamese Army was in Cambodia fighting the Khmer Rouge?

Context : China relations with the USA were good, those of Vietnam with USSR were strong.
China did not appreciate the Vietnamese incursion in Cambodia against the China backed Khmers Rouges and took pretext of so called persecution of the Chinese minorities and of its Spratleys Islands sovereignty pretentions to attack Vietnam. As the main VN regular troops were occupied in Cambodiia, China believed in an easy victory against provincial troops. To keep it short, things did not go well for China, demonstrating many blunders from the PLA.

 

[SaparotRob]

Essentially the Vietnamese national guard using American weapons?

 

[Dimlee]

Thanks to Zipper730 for bringing this up.
My knowledge of JCS's 94(99) target list was vague, so I searched and found this interesting article. I'll keep it in my Vietnam War archive:

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA524103.pdf

Note that hitting targets from that list didn't mean burning cities to the ground.

Just my humble opinion with all the might of 20/20 hindsight... what could be done differently, with or without the JCS-94.
1. No micromanagement in the Johnson-McNamara style.
2. No bans on attacks on airbases and SAM sites.
3. Marine blockade and Linebacker II - five years earlier.
4. Reduction of the no-fly zone near the Chinese border to the absolute minimum.
5. Shutdown of Ho Chi Minh trail. Probably the most difficult task. Could the historical Operation Steel Tiger be more effective? I don't know. However, if ##1-4 are done consistently, the traffic through the trail would drop considerably.

 

[SaparotRob]

..No restrictions on Ukraine's use of weapons to hit military targets...

Sorry, I'm a little pissed off right now. Continue with your regularly scheduled thread.

 

[special ed]

I saw a TV interview not too long back with Henry Kissinger discussing the Viet Nam war. One thing that stood out for me was we told the NVA what we were going to bomb the next day as well as the route we would take. Although the mission planners didn't know the NVA AA would be waiting, forewarned, the missions were flown. Some mission commanders were gigged if they diverted routes due to weather of other problems. This was Johnson & McNamara's way to convince the Vietnamese at the Paris talks we serious about ending the war. Don't forget the micromanagement from Washington. Any ground officer, Captain and above, who came upon a valuable ambush possibility had to get approval. Radio transmission to D.C. and back was at the fastest 20 minutes, and usually the opportunity had changed and was lost. Remember, Johnson said, "They can't bomb a shithouse without I say so."

 

[Zipper730]

Thanks to Zipper730 for bringing this up.

No problem

My knowledge of JCS's 94(99) target list was vague, so I searched and found this interesting article. I'll keep it in my Vietnam War archive:

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA524103.pdf

It did involve a lot less city-busting than I would have thought. I remember General LeMay once being asked if the plan was to burn down every city in Vietnam, to which he said "yes" (I'll give LeMay some credit, he generally didn't give a crap about political sensibilities so, much like Bomber Harris, he would tend to be more likely to either tell the truth or get closer to it than others). I'm guessing the idea was to either intentionally bomb in a sloppy fashion, or switch to incendiary area attacks in the event that the more precise targeting failed to deliver (this seems to fit better).

Just my humble opinion with all the might of 20/20 hindsight... what could be done differently, with or without the JCS-94.
1. No micromanagement in the Johnson-McNamara style.
2. No bans on attacks on airbases and SAM sites.
3. Marine blockade and Linebacker II - five years earlier.
4. Reduction of the no-fly zone near the Chinese border to the absolute minimum.
5. Shutdown of Ho Chi Minh trail. Probably the most difficult task. Could the historical Operation Steel Tiger be more effective? I don't know. However, if ##1-4 are done consistently, the traffic through the trail would drop considerably.

That makes sense.

I saw a TV interview not too long back with Henry Kissinger discussing the Viet Nam war. One thing that stood out for me was we told the NVA what we were going to bomb the next day as well as the route we would take.

That really is one of the more disgraceful aspects of the conflict. I still have trouble grasping what possible good would have come out of that.

 

[Zipper730]

Dimlee,

Regarding the matter of the Chinese border: One scenario I could imagine would be that there'd be likely to be aerial combat with China which would send their planes across the border. I'm curious with the JCS-94 plan what odds you'd see that this would lead to either the desire to, or the actual destruction of airfields in China?

I'm not sure what length of leash the JCS-94 plan would have allowed, but I'd suspect if the leash was any longer than it needed to be, you'd see the USAF and USN itching for any excuse it could to justify bombing airfields in China.

Note to self: I'm planning on creating a new thread which covers this in more detail since I didn't know about the JCS-94 target plan in detail (Dimlee posted it earlier).

 

[Dimlee]

I'm curious with the JCS-94 plan what odds you'd see that this would lead to either the desire to, or the actual destruction of airfields in China?

Good question, but I'm not qualified to discuss it. It is for professional historian with a deep knowledge of the US political system at that time.