Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
It sounds like a plausible plan until you look at the losses Ju52s suffered just from ground fire and "operations" in Norway Netherlands and Crete. The other thing is that there isn't really a "night time" in Dover in June. Civil twilight, that is where it is light enough to do most things lasts from 4AM to midnight, it is only dark enough to give cover of darkness for about 2 hours. Floating transport planes towards the centre of UKs air and coastal defences is a great idea for someone else to try.In "With wings like Eagles" Michael Korda wrote that Milch had proposed the day after Dunkerque fell with the British Army in disarray, to immediately use every Ju-52 to fly as many troops over as possible nightly, secure an airfield and a port and follow up with more sea borne troops. Germany may not have been able to conquer Britain, but peace negotiations may have gone differently with several thousand German troops in Kent.
In "With wings like Eagles" Michael Korda wrote that Milch had proposed the day after Dunkerque fell with the British Army in disarray, to immediately use every Ju-52 to fly as many troops over as possible nightly, secure an airfield and a port and follow up with more sea borne troops. Germany may not have been able to conquer Britain, but peace negotiations may have gone differently with several thousand German troops in Kent.
The whole fanciful idea rests strongly on the LW taking and keeping open an airfield or just a field in Kent or Sussex and the RAF not doing anything about it, same with the army, navy and home guard. It is as if Kent is some obscure region on the north African coast, Churchill's house, Chartwell is between London and Brighton in Kent.Unless the Germans change their parachute doctrine/tactics in 1940 instead of AFTER Crete the suggested operations are going to be a disaster.
German paratroopers dropped with a 9mm pistol and two 8 round magazines and a few concussion grenades. Rifles, submachine guns, MG-34 machine guns, light mortars(?) and such normal company weapons were in containers that the Paratroopers had to find, open, sort through. This was the first priority on landing, ahead of linking up with unit members from the same plane let alone different planes. Initial ammo supplies were also light for the these weapons.
The glider landing troops do have light weapons but number of gliders available in June of 1940? 3-4 weeks after the attack on Holland?
Same for the Ju-52s. Numbers operational in the 2nd week of June after the losses in April and May are going to be much lower than what was available in Sept. after 3-4 months of intensive work by repair organizations.
Using them up doing combat landings as done in Norway and Holland (and later in Crete) is going to leave the reinforce/supply efforts well behind what is need to even engage the Home Guard.
From Wiki on the battle for Holland
" German Ju 52 total losses in the entire battle amounted to 224, compared to 430 Ju 52s deployed by the airborne troops"
I don't know if that is final losses or if the losses include planes later repaired. However trying to stage an airborne assault on England with only about 200 JU-52s to start with sure seems like a recipe for disaster.
Unless the Germans change their parachute doctrine/tactics in 1940 instead of AFTER Crete the suggested operations are going to be a disaster.
German paratroopers dropped with a 9mm pistol and two 8 round magazines and a few concussion grenades. Rifles, submachine guns, MG-34 machine guns, light mortars(?) and such normal company weapons were in containers that the Paratroopers had to find, open, sort through. This was the first priority on landing, ahead of linking up with unit members from the same plane let alone different planes. Initial ammo supplies were also light for the these weapons.
The glider landing troops do have light weapons but number of gliders available in June of 1940? 3-4 weeks after the attack on Holland?
Same for the Ju-52s. Numbers operational in the 2nd week of June after the losses in April and May are going to be much lower than what was available in Sept. after 3-4 months of intensive work by repair organizations.
Using them up doing combat landings as done in Norway and Holland (and later in Crete) is going to leave the reinforce/supply efforts well behind what is need to even engage the Home Guard.
From Wiki on the battle for Holland
" German Ju 52 total losses in the entire battle amounted to 224, compared to 430 Ju 52s deployed by the airborne troops"
I don't know if that is final losses or if the losses include planes later repaired. However trying to stage an airborne assault on England with only about 200 JU-52s to start with sure seems like a recipe for disaster.
How could the Luftwaffe get air superiority?, even with planes they never made and drop tanks for the ones they did the RAF could stay out of reach and attack on it's terms.
The Germans did change an evolve their Paratrooper tactics. The outstanding FG42 automatic rifle easily replaced both the MG34 squad machine gun and the K98 bolt action rifle and could be carried by the solider during the drop, of course they needed something in 1940, perhaps a semi-automatic carbine. German airborne forces were very innovative for their time. They could drop a 3.7cm or 5.0cm PAK by multiple parachute, they could land gliders, they could drop ammunition and fuel containers. The fuel container weighed around 250kg and featured 4 55 Litre flat drums that could easily be picked up by handles. they have 75mm and 105mm recoilless canon including hollow charge rounds, light weight aluminium 20mm FLAK and the kettenrad motor cycle half track could be transported by Ju 52 and be used as a tractor to tow artillery.
Of course dropping paratroopers on top of a fully armed soldiers that are prepared (as happened in Crete due to enigma decrypts) is also a disaster as it was when British troops were dropped on top of an SS division in Arnhem. The issue in Holland seems to have been that the Ju 52 were shot up by Dutch FLAK on the ground in many cases. The loss of pilots was devastating to the war effort as these Ju 52 pilots were also flight training instructors and may just have saved Britain it is said by Mosier. I'm not sure why do many Ju 52 were lost in Holland, it seems they just landed at defended Dutch airfields.
The Ju 52 was the best transport available in the world at the time excluding the DC3 but the Ju 52 would serve Germany poorly because of its slow speed and limited range, ineffcient because they were too short of resources to build the Ar 232 or Ju 252.
Used properly over short distances the Ju 52 was effective. I'm assuming each Ju 52 could carry about 2.5 tons or 20 troops per flight to Britain. Allowing for an optimistic 6 flights per day that's 120 troops or 15 tons of cargo per aircraft per day over short distances (100miles/160km). Some 500 Ju 52 were available for the invasion of the Low countries of which 125 were lost. One could thus potentially transport 500 x 15 = 7500 tons of cargo per day or 120 x 500 = 60,000 troops. That's with airfields established, safe from the RAF and everything tightly organised. No refuelling in UK and no loading up apart from wounded.
The Germans did change an evolve their Paratrooper tactics. The outstanding FG42 automatic rifle easily replaced both the MG34 squad machine gun and the K98 bolt action rifle and could be carried by the solider during the drop, of course they needed something in 1940, perhaps a semi-automatic carbine. German airborne forces were very innovative for their time. They could drop a 3.7cm or 5.0cm PAK by multiple parachute, they could land gliders, they could drop ammunition and fuel containers. The fuel container weighed around 250kg and featured 4 55 Litre flat drums that could easily be picked up by handles. they have 75mm and 105mm recoilless canon including hollow charge rounds, light weight aluminium 20mm FLAK and the kettenrad motor cycle half track could be transported by Ju 52 and be used as a tractor to tow artillery.
Of course dropping paratroopers on top of a fully armed soldiers that are prepared (as happened in Crete due to enigma decrypts) is also a disaster as it was when British troops were dropped on top of an SS division in Arnhem. The issue in Holland seems to have been that the Ju 52 were shot up by Dutch FLAK on the ground in many cases. The loss of pilots was devastating to the war effort as these Ju 52 pilots were also flight training instructors and may just have saved Britain it is said by Mosier. I'm not sure why do many Ju 52 were lost in Holland, it seems they just landed at defended Dutch airfields.
The Ju 52 was the best transport available in the world at the time excluding the DC3 but the Ju 52 would serve Germany poorly because of its slow speed and limited range, ineffcient because they were too short of resources to build the Ar 232 or Ju 252.
Used properly over short distances the Ju 52 was effective. I'm assuming each Ju 52 could carry about 2.5 tons or 20 troops per flight to Britain. Allowing for an optimistic 6 flights per day that's 120 troops or 15 tons of cargo per aircraft per day over short distances (100miles/160km). Some 500 Ju 52 were available for the invasion of the Low countries of which 125 were lost. One could thus potentially transport 500 x 15 = 7500 tons of cargo per day or 120 x 500 = 60,000 troops. That's with airfields established, safe from the RAF and everything tightly organised. No refuelling in UK and no loading up apart from wounded.
Unless the Germans change their parachute doctrine/tactics in 1940 instead of AFTER Crete the suggested operations are going to be a disaster.
German paratroopers dropped with a 9mm pistol and two 8 round magazines and a few concussion grenades. Rifles, submachine guns, MG-34 machine guns, light mortars(?) and such normal company weapons were in containers that the Paratroopers had to find, open, sort through. This was the first priority on landing, ahead of linking up with unit members from the same plane let alone different planes. Initial ammo supplies were also light for the these weapons.
The glider landing troops do have light weapons but number of gliders available in June of 1940? 3-4 weeks after the attack on Holland?
Same for the Ju-52s. Numbers operational in the 2nd week of June after the losses in April and May are going to be much lower than what was available in Sept. after 3-4 months of intensive work by repair organizations.
Using them up doing combat landings as done in Norway and Holland (and later in Crete) is going to leave the reinforce/supply efforts well behind what is need to even engage the Home Guard.
From Wiki on the battle for Holland
" German Ju 52 total losses in the entire battle amounted to 224, compared to 430 Ju 52s deployed by the airborne troops"
I don't know if that is final losses or if the losses include planes later repaired. However trying to stage an airborne assault on England with only about 200 JU-52s to start with sure seems like a recipe for disaster.
The reality is that they simply did not have the right equipment. That is all.
The procurement decisions made by the Luftwaffe in 1937, 1938 determined the battle of Britain. In order to gain air superiority the Luftwaffe would need
1 Drop tanks on all Me 109 and Me 110. Could have easily been done.
2 A long range escort. The Fw 187 could have done this in time simply by sacrificing some Me 110 production to obtain the required engines. The aircraft was flying in May 1937. Maybe only 10% of the fighter force.
50 x Ju89 would probably not equal more than 20 in front line service at any one time, 30 at a push. All you would do is give the Blenhiem IVF a job it could actually do, long range fighter missions against large, slow, unescorted, poorly defended bombers.That probably wouldn't be enough. A relatively long range reconnaissance bomber needs to be available to put pressure on all of Britain's coast to force her to to spread her defences and help the u-boat campaign. Something better than a few Fw 200 commandeered from the Japanese. Probably 50 Ju 89 or Do 19 powered by the 1000hp BMW radial that powered the Do 17Z. The He 177 isnt needed.
As long as you only have about 12 destroyers in your entire navy Sea Lion was doomed to failure. In 1941 the British defences were considerably stronger than in 1940 which brings us to the next pointThe assault on Britain seems hard to imagine not because the use of River Ships, large Rhine barges and tugs is not workable but because it couldn't be done in 1940. Operation Sea Lion would only happen from mid 1941 I suspect. I would also require keeping the US out of the war except in the form of massive military aid which is unlikely.
The Luftwaffe was probably not going to repeat the mistake of the aerial assault in Holland. That is relying paratroops to capture Dutch airfields and then land Ju 52 on them. It was an excessively risky strategy with too many moving parts.
They would just land a DFS230 with its retro rocket and ribbon parachute in a field of Barley in Kent.
This is just wrong, repeatedly posting it does not make it a fact. The LW did attack shipping, coastal targets, airfields and aircraft production but that is not London. The attack on London was just that, an attack London and its docks. Planning to do something you cant do because you don't have the equipment is folly. If you postpone Sealion to 1941 you can forget any use of barges, by 1941 the RAF fighters have cannon.Dozens of haughty pompous pop historians have earned a living claiming that the Germans were incompetent in their implementation of planning and strategy around the battle of Britain. One of these shibboleths that has been demolished is that Changing the from bombing of airfields to harbours, docks and industrial targets (like aircraft plants) generally referred to as "London" lost the Battle of Britain for the Germans. In fact it was a strategy that was supposed to compliment the U-boat commerce war. Yes in "the fog of war" they made mistakes and had flaws in their system of assessment. Bit it seems it is simply jingoistic grand standing.
.
Lets take it one step at a time
1 - Drop tanks on all Me109 and Me110 - Result The Me109 and Me110 would be hugely vulnerable when intercepted in that all important first moment of combat. The RAF had the advantage of Radar interception and German fighters had less freedom of movement. Yes they would have a good increase in range but and its a big but, they still only had 60rpg for the 20mm and the RAF fighters were well armoured against 2 x LMG so their room for combat would still be restricted.
2 - Fw 187 - Feasible certainly but with the same limitation of 60rpg for the 20mm.
50 x Ju89 would probably not equal more than 20 in front line service at any one time, 30 at a push. All you would do is give the Blenhiem IVF a job it could actually do, long range fighter missions against large, slow, unescorted, poorly defended bombers.
As long as you only have about 12 destroyers in your entire navy Sea Lion was doomed to failure. In 1941 the British defences were considerably stronger than in 1940 which brings us to the next point
I find your comment slightly bemusing. The idea that flying large number of gliders into a combat zone where you do not have control of the skies, where the defences in 1941 are far stronger in every way, where the AA guns are placed so they can fire at ground targets and are set up in such a way that they support each other, is less risky than dropping paratroopers first and then following up with the Ju52 hard to imagine. They are both as mad as each other
This is just wrong, repeatedly posting it does not make it a fact. The LW did attack shipping, coastal targets, airfields and aircraft production but that is not London. The attack on London was just that, an attack London and its docks. Planning to do something you cant do because you don't have the equipment is folly. If you postpone Sealion to 1941 you can forget any use of barges, by 1941 the RAF fighters have cannon.
The superb German coastal guns didn't manage to hit anything till June 44. They were mostly shooting at convoys consisting of small coal carrying coasters of about 2000 tons capable of 10 knots. If you're not hitting those targets how are you going to hit naval vessels.
Well, I sure don't earn a living at this, I don't even make enough for a fish and chip dinner once a year
Some of the questions for me are could the Germans, with what they had available at the time, come up with a better plan or plans.
No aircraft, radars, small arms, or artillery from 1941 or later.
Cherry picking features from certain aircraft without acknowledging some of the shortcomings doesn't do more than get into long arguments.
I have a love/hate relationship with the FW 187. I like the looks, I think it was an interesting aircraft that quite possible could have contributed more if produced in numbers.
I hate it because in many of these discussions it is made of rubber and keeps changing shape/form to suit the the argument of the moment.
The Germans have several problems with this hypothetical aircraft in 1940.
They are stuck with the drum feeds on the MG/FF cannon. The 110 got around this by having the man in the back (the radio operator) change the drums, much like the first 400 Beaufighters (except that guy had to keep up with four cannon, which didn't happen much in real life.)
The Guy in the back if the 110 had the same radio as the He 111 so the 110 could communicate with it's base and with the bomber formations. At least it was possible, how much it was done I don't know. The 109 (of 1940) had a short ranged radio with limited channel options. Flying over the North sea with the same radio as the 1940 109 may not have been a very good idea? Later 109s may have gotten better or different radios, Perhaps I am wrong. But lets try to stick to 1940 guns and radios when talking about long range escort fighters.
Performance of a two seat Fw 187 with conventional DB 601 engines is certainly subject to question. It is obviously going to be slower than the prototype using experimental engines and cooling systems, It should be faster than the 109Es using the same engine as they were pretty poor aerodynamically.
Where on the spectrum does it fall? Some people want the speed and manoeuvrability of single seat version but don't seem to want to accept the limited ammo and communications problems.
The 110 actually could play a number of rolls in the BoB even if not very good as an escort fighter. It could carry the standard Luftwaffe recon camera/s and was going to be faster than recon versions of any of the twin engine bombers. It could play the role of light bomber at low level fairly well. A few units did do this. A few score more bomb rack sets?
The 900lb Gorilla in the room is what do the Germans do about the Royal Navy in the invasion scenarios. The German Navy in 1940 cannot challenge it as they have to sink 4-6 British ships for everyone they loose. It doesn't matter if the British loose 15-20 destroyers and smaller craft and cruiser in proportion if they stop the invasion.
Common answer is the Luftwaffe will stop the entire British Navy. But there is no evidence to back up that claim, cause losses yes, eliminate the majority of British ships in the British Isles in the summer/fall of 1940?????
The Luftwaffe also has many jobs.
1. Keeping the RAF at bay.
2. Better recon.
3. Acting as flying artillery for the invasion forces.
4. Keeping the RN at bay.
4a, in some scenarios by dropping large numbers of aerial mines.
They have to do this all at the same time.
haven't even gotten to the barges and/or logistics.
When you were young, did they have a show called Jackanory where you lived?
We now have
1) Drop tank that don't impact the aircrafts performance think climb and agility (drop tanks the Germans didn't have in 1940)
2) MGFF with 90 rounds that didn't exist in 1940 as if they had I am sure the Me110 would have had them
3) Totally redesigned Do19. Remembering that the 109E had bracing struts until the 109F which had a redesigned wing
4) a 1940 bomber that can fight off three fighters
5) Gliders that carry about 8-10 people with little space for any kind of equipment (that would be sitting ducks to AA fire) I also strongly suspect that 18/1 glide ratio with any load is wildly optimistic, I frankly don't believe it. Also you will be travelling in a straight line, unable to evade, going probably around 100 mph at low altitude, the very definition of a sitting duck.
6) All the stuff of cancelling Barbarosa and not declaring war on the USA. Can someone tell me how that impacts the war in late 1940 or 1941. Also it ignores the much stronger UK defences that would exist in 1940 both on land sea and air
7) 15in guns that were incapable of hitting merchant ships going about 5 kts (10 knots for a coaster is very fast) in a straight line, are now able to hit Naval vessels going much faster and can evade.
8) Germany had little faith in their radar for gun ranging for the good reason that they had limited performance and their optics were better. Torpedo boats generally didn't get radar until 1943,
9) The idea that the Germany Navy could control the North Sea at night is a pipedream. They didn't have the ships, men training or Technology